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Co-Chair Introduction 
This comprehensive report outlines Task Force recommendations and Task Force Member 
opinions.  It also includes extensive third-party research and analysis of solar incentives across 
the United States, alternative solar policy options for Massachusetts, a cost and benefit analysis 
of alternative policy options, and a full appendix that includes additional supporting 
documents. The Net Metering and Solar Task Force has met its statutory obligation with the 
completion of this report which reflects six months of meetings, research and analysis, 
discussion, public comment and negotiation.    
The Baker-Polito Administration is committed to using the recommendations and analysis from 
the Net Metering and Solar Task Force as a foundation for working with the Massachusetts 
Legislature, energy community and other stakeholders to achieve continued solar growth and 
establish a framework for a sustainable solar program with reasonable ratepayer costs.   
To that end, the Co-Chairs reaffirm earlier public remarks made by Energy and Environmental 
Affairs Secretary Matthew A. Beaton.  In meeting the objectives of creating a program that not 
only reaches the 1,600 megawatt target – but also establishes a sustainable program beyond 
2020 at reasonable cost – the program must reconcile two competing interests.  Any future 
credit and incentive must be at the appropriate levels to continue driving the solar industry 
forward.  At the same time, ratepayers who fund the programs through electric rates should 
not be paying more than is necessary to reach the installation goals. 
With these priorities in mind, and the Baker-Polito Administration’s emphasis on transparency, 
we note that the Task Force process included an analysis of the costs of the programs that 
support solar development.  As discussed during this process, any cost projections are complex 
and involve numerous assumptions, and as a result, it is appropriate to consider benefits and 
costs.  Nonetheless, based on analysis provided by the distribution company Task Force 
Members and by the Task Force consultant team, cost projections for non-participating 
ratepayers are in the range of $2.5 to $4 billion for the period 2014-2020.   
In light of these projections, the Administration does not support raising the net metering caps 
in the short term absent a long term sustainable solution.  Rather, we believe it is extremely 
important that any adjustments to the caps be accompanied by meaningful changes to the mix 
of incentives and proper consideration of the role of the ratepayers.  As Secretary Beaton has 
articulated, the Commonwealth has a vital opportunity to develop a sustainable long term 
framework that effectively balances promoting clean energy and lowering costs to ratepayers.  
The Baker-Polito Administration looks forward to leading a dialogue to develop a program that 
strikes the right balance.   
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Executive Summary 
Summary of Task Force Process 
On August 6, 2014, An Act Relative to Credit for Thermal Energy Generated with Renewable Fuels, 
Chapter 251 of the Acts of 2014 (“Act”) established a net metering task force (“Task Force”).  The Act 
directs the Task Force to “review the long-term viability of net metering and develop recommendations 
on incentives and programs to support the deployment of 1,600 megawatts (“MW”) of solar generation 
facilities in the Commonwealth.” 
The Task Force consists of 17 members as directed by the Act and was co-chaired by the Department of 
Energy Resources (“DOER”) and the Department of Public Utilities (“DPU”).    The Task Force convened 
for the first time on November 13, 2014.  Since that date, the Task Force has held twelve meetings.  At 
its initial meeting, the Task Force reviewed and approved a set of Task Force Ground Rules and a Task 
Force Framing Document.  As directed by the Act, two of the Task Force meetings were devoted 
primarily to public comment; the first was held on January 6, 2015 in Boston, and the second was held 
on February 25, 2015 in Holyoke.  The majority of the other Task Force meetings also provided the 
opportunity for public comment.  Members of the public were invited to submit comments at any time 
to the Task Force via a Task Force e-mail address.  A Net Metering and Solar Task Force website1 was 
also established as a resource for Task Force Members and members of the public and contains copies 
of all Task Force-related documents, including the final Net Metering and Solar Task Force Report.2   
Recognizing the need for an in-depth review and analysis of various solar incentives and net metering 
policy options, DOER hired a team of consultants to work with the Task Force.3  The work of this 
consultant team was intended to inform Task Force deliberations but not replace the statutory duties of 
the Task Force.  The Task Force Members reviewed and approved a Consultant Scope of Work involving 
six separate tasks to be completed by the consultants: 
 Task 0: Interviews of Task Force Members and Other Stakeholders 
 Task 1: Summary of Solar Incentive Programs Offered in Other States 
 Task 2: Summary of Solar Development in Other States without Solar Incentive Policies 
 Task 3: Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Massachusetts (“MA”) Net Metering and Solar 
Incentive Policies 
 Task 4: Provide a Range of Options to Reach the 1,600 MW Goal 
 Task 5: Minimum Bill Survey and Analysis 
                                                          
1
  See http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-utilities-clean-tech/nms-taskforce/.   
2
  Available documents include upcoming Task Force meeting schedules and agendas, a list of Task Force 
Members, Consultant Task Reports, consultant presentations, public comments, the Task Force Framing 
Memorandum, Task Force Ground Rules, and Task Force Scope of Work, past meeting agendas, meeting 
minutes, and other miscellaneous Task Force-related documents.   
3
  The consulting team consisted of Peregrine Energy Group, Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC, Meister 
Consultants Group, and La Capra Associates. 
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Each of the consultant tasks has involved ongoing input from the Task Force Members.  During Task 
Force meetings, the consultants presented their findings for all tasks.  The presentations were 
interactive in nature and involved Task Force Member input, questions, and discussion.  Task Force 
Members were encouraged to submit comments and edits to the consultant presentations and 
summaries, but ultimately, the consultants had final say over whether or not to include these 
suggestions.  The Consultant Task Reports sought to inform Task Force discussion, including the 
development of the “Task Force Recommendations,” however, the short timeframe of both the Task 
Force and consultant’s work limited the ability of Members to fully analyze, query or incorporate certain 
data into the recommendations. Inclusion of the Consultant Task Reports in the Net Metering and Solar 
Task Force Report does not constitute the endorsement of the consultant’s recommendations and 
analysis by the Task Force Members.  
As the last step in the process of compiling the report to the Legislature, Task Force Members drafted 
final recommendations in small sub-groups to present to the larger Task Force, which were discussed 
and refined over the course of the final six meetings.  The final recommendations represent a consensus 
of the Task Force where possible.  Where disagreement remained, the final recommendations include a 
discussion of the various points of view on the topic.  Task Force Members were also encouraged to 
provide individual statements as a supplement to the group’s final recommendations, which are 
provided herein.  The “Task Force Recommendations” contained herein represent the only views 
endorsed by the Task Force and are offered as such following unanimous approval by Task Force 
Members.4  This report contains consultant task reports for use as background information, rather than 
a representation of the recommendations or beliefs of the Task Force.   
Key Findings and Recommendations 
Following several months of discussion among Task Force Members, a substantive discussion around 
recommendations was begun at the March 26, 2015 meeting, with the introduction of an initial 
recommendations framework document drafted by the DOER and the DPU staff. This document was 
designed to stimulate discussion, identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and help Task Force 
Members develop consensus on the issues faced. Using the document and discussions from the 
March 26, 2015, and April 6, 2015 meetings as a template, Task Force Members broke into subgroups to 
discuss specific issues and draft recommendation statements. These recommendation statements were 
then used to compile the recommendations section of this report, which immediately follows this 
section. The recommendations are divided up into the following sections: 
1. General Principles 
2. Solar Cost/Benefit Study 
3. Solar Incentive Program Design 
4. Net Metering and Net Metering Caps 
5. Geographic Distribution 
6. Fair Compensation for Use of the Distribution Grid 
7. Treatment of Municipal Light Plants 
                                                          
4
 Christina Fisher, designee of Senator Benjamin Downing, abstained from voting.  Neither Representative Brian 
Dempsey, nor his designee, were present for voting. 
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8. Further Recommendations 
Each section identifies consensus recommendations made by the Task Force Members on specific 
issues. Where consensus could not be reached, differing positions are summarized by the Members 
supporting each position. 
Task Force Member Individual Statements are included to supplement the group’s final 
recommendations. In the Individual Statements, Task Force Members provide their individual opinions 
and positions on the final Net Metering and Solar Task Force Report delivered to the Legislature. 
Summary of Consultant Task Reports 
In their proposal, the consultants agreed to perform six separate tasks, which generally aligned with the 
Scope of Work approved by the Task Force Members and Request for Quote solicited by DOER. In 
performing each of these tasks, the consultants prepared individual reports, each of which are provided 
in the body of the report.  The Task Reports included in this report represent the work of the Consultant 
and while they were intended to inform Task Force discussions, they were not necessarily endorsed or 
incorporated by Task Force Members in the “Task Force Recommendations.”  In particular, the final Task 
3 Report came very late in the process, leaving the Task Force Members with little ability to clarify the 
results or question the modeling analysis. 
Task 0: Interviews of Task Force Members and Other Stakeholders 
In order to better understand the perspectives of Task Force Members and other stakeholders, the 
consulting team organized five 1.5 hours phone-based focus group sessions. Focus groups sessions 
included Task Force Members representing similar constituencies. These sessions were conducted for 
the following Task Force groupings:  
 Utilities; 
 Utility customers and customer advocates; 
 Solar industry representatives;  
 Legislators; and 
 Non-Task Force stakeholders.  
Themes explored during these focus groups included:  perspectives on the current solar market model, 
perspectives on the current net metering approach, long-term goals for the Massachusetts solar market, 
perspectives on other solar incentive models, and perspectives on the future use of net metering and 
minimum bill provisions. Participants were provided with the opportunity to provide written comments 
along with their focus group session comments. Transcripts of these discussions are provided as an 
addendum to this report in Appendix A.  
Task 1: Summary of Solar Incentive Programs Offered in Other States 
In order to better understand the range of options available to the Task Force in making its 
recommendations, the consulting team conducted literature reviews to develop policy summaries that 
discuss the critical elements of a range of incentive mechanisms, from declining block programs to 
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long-term contract solicitations and utility ownership programs. Policies reviewed under this task 
include:  
 The California Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (“Re-MAT”), Renewable Auction Mechanism 
(“RAM”) and declining block programs;  
 The New York declining block programs;  
 The Rhode Island Renewable Energy Growth program;  
 The Delaware Solar Renewable Energy Credit (“SREC”) Solicitation program;  
 The Connecticut Zero Emissions Renewable Energy Credit (“ZREC”) program;  
 Utility financing, ownership, and long-term contracting programs in New Jersey;  
 The Vermont Sustainably Priced Energy for Economic Development (“SPEED”) long-term 
contracting program; and 
 Value of Solar Tariffs.  
The policy choices made to develop each of these unique programs represent efforts by policymakers to 
balance sometimes-conflicting goals of solar market development scale and speed with ratepayer cost 
impacts. The summaries developed by the consulting team examine critical policy elements, such as 
program structure, incentive-setting mechanisms, market size, long-term market goals, complimentary 
incentives and programs, resulting market characteristics, and other key elements. 
Task 2: Summary of Solar Development in Other States without Solar Incentive Policies 
In the Task Force’s initial meeting, the Members expressed an interest in understanding the relationship 
between state solar programs and actual deployment of solar, and whether it might be reasonable to 
expect solar development even in the absence of significant state programs. The purpose of Task 2 was 
to provide a representative analysis of the level of solar development in states that do not have a 
state-level incentive program. 
The consulting team’s analysis was divided into three components: 1) a review of solar market 
development in states that do not have net metering; 2) a review of solar market development in states 
that have similar characteristics to Massachusetts in terms of the economic value of solar production; 
and 3) a review of recently announced large-scale solar installations in states and utility territories that 
do not have substantial solar incentives. 
The analysis shows that solar market development has been largely dependent on state-level policies in 
the United States. States that do not offer net metering have had highly limited solar market 
development compared to Massachusetts. Additionally, state-level targets and incentives have been a 
major driver of solar market development to date. The analysis also shows that states without robust 
solar incentives and targets, but adequate solar potential, have seen very limited market growth 
compared to similar states with solar incentives and binding targets. This suggests that, for the time 
being, state-level solar policies are critical to future solar market growth in the U.S.  
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Task 3: Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of MA Net Metering and Solar Incentive Policies 
The consultant work on Task 3 set out to calculate the cost and benefits of the current policy and 
potential future net metering and solar incentive policy options identified in Task 4. However, with the 
variety of perspectives required for examination by the statute and from the Task Force stakeholders, 
the analysis represents one approach to a solar cost-benefit analysis, and is not a “Value of Solar” study.   
Task Force Members gave input on the policy paths to model (leaning on Task 4 information) and on the 
assumptions for the modeling.  However, the final modeling inputs, analysis, and results represent the 
independent work of the consultants.  Additionally, Task Force Members had little time to digest, 
understand and analyze the Task 3 report and therefore were largely unable to incorporate these results 
in the recommendations and individual statements contained herein. 
In order to determine the costs and benefits associated with alternatives to Massachusetts’ current 
solar policies, the Task 3 report examines both 1) the impacts of existing systems; and 2) the forecasted 
impacts of future systems under three policy futures:  
- “SREC Policy” – Policy in this scenario would remain the same as under current law and 
policy, save for the sub-scenarios in which the baseline is extended to include a third Solar 
Carve-Out program (SREC-III). Incentives would remain market-based, tradable SRECs, with 
existing (and, for SREC-III, forecasted) Solar Alternative Compliance Payment (“SACP”) and 
Solar Credit Clearinghouse Auction (“SCCA”) trajectories serving as a price ceiling and soft 
floor. 
- Policy Path A – Under Policy Path A, the SREC programs are replaced by a set of declining-
block and performance-based incentives that decline over time for small projects 
(≤ 25 kilowatts, “kW”), and through competitive bidding for the large projects (> 25 kW ). 
Additionally, net metering credits, where available, are limited strictly to the generation 
component of customer rates.  
- Policy Path B – Under Policy Path B, the SREC market structure is replaced by 1) an incentive 
that reflects an upfront payment based on the expected lifetime performance of the solar 
photovoltaic (“PV”) system (similar to programs in New York and California) for small 
projects; and 2) a similar declining-block incentive to that proposed in Policy Path A for large 
projects. Net metering credits in this scenario reflect the full generation, transmission and 
distribution values customers currently receive. 
The study also breaks out these policy futures into sub-scenarios for further analysis based on: 
- Whether the MW target is expanded to 2,500 MW (or remains at 1,600 MW);  
- Whether the aggregate net metering caps under current law remain in place or are removed. 
Finally, per the legislation creating the Task Force, each component of the costs and benefits associated 
with solar PV was considered for each of four key perspectives: 
- Non-owner participants that directly benefit from (but do not own) solar PV systems; 
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- Solar customer-generators that own and/or operate solar PV systems; 
- Non-participating ratepayers that do not directly participate in solar PV programs; and 
- The citizens of Massachusetts at large, the aggregate impacts accruing to in-state entities. 
Key Takeaways and Observations 
 Under all scenarios, Massachusetts reaches its current goal of 1,600 MW of solar by 2019.   
 All future scenarios examined would be less expensive than the current SREC-I and SREC-II 
program. 
 The choice of policy path affects the costs and benefits, the type of systems that will be built, 
and the category of participant impacted.  
Task 4: Provide a Range of Options to Reach the 1,600 MW Goal 
In order to conduct the modeling in Task 3, the Task Force Members first had to select the potential 
futures, or “policy paths”, to be modeled. Utilizing the research conducted in Tasks 1 and 2, stakeholder 
objectives as expressed in the focus groups conducted in Task 0, and public comment, the consulting 
team developed an initial set of seven potential policy paths.  These paths were discussed at the Task 
Force meeting on February 12, 2015. After the meeting, additional Task Force feedback on the paths 
was solicited through a survey, and a narrowed set of three options was presented to the Task Force on 
March 5, 2015.  At that meeting, the Task Force modified the options and selected the set to be 
modeled.  
In selecting these policy paths, the Task Force Members made an explicit distinction between selecting 
paths for modeling and selecting paths for potential implementation.  For the modeling exercise, the 
Task Force’s objective was to choose paths for which the modeling would generate useful information. 
The selection of a path for modeling is not an indication that a majority, or indeed any, of the Task Force 
members would like to see that path implemented. 
Task 5: Minimum Bill Survey and Analysis 
Minimum bill mechanisms have been designed to ensure a minimum customer contribution toward the 
costs of the distribution system from all ratepayers and to reduce the potential impacts of customer 
cross-subsidization. Minimum bills differ from other bill mechanisms such as customer charges and 
demand charges in that they are designed to only impact a limited segment of utility customers, leaving 
rates and charges for customers who regularly exceed the minimum bill unaltered. The Task 5 report 
reviews the theory behind the minimum bill mechanism, evaluates the impact of minimum bills in other 
states, and models the potential impact of a minimum bill on a representative PV system in 
Massachusetts. Key findings include:  
 Residential minimum bills that have been implemented in other states have, to date, 
been relatively modest, ranging from $1.77 per month in one California jurisdiction to 
$25 per month for large customers of one Hawaii utility.  
 Minimum bills have been implemented in some of the most robust solar markets in 
the country, suggesting that these mechanisms, at the rates implemented, are not 
incompatible with PV market growth.  
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 Cash flow modeling of a Massachusetts residential PV system shows that the impact 
of a minimum bill policy will vary significantly based on the size of the PV system 
relative to the annual electric load of a home and the minimum bill level.  
 Modeling also indicates that minimum bills could have a greater impact on lower 
consumption utility customers compared to customers with average consumption 
assuming both are subject to the same minimum bill. 
Summary of Appendices 
Additional documents and information produced over the course of six months of meetings, research 
and analysis, discussion, public comment and negotiation by the Net Metering and Solar Task Force are 
included in the Appendices. The Appendices are divided into the following sections:  
Appendix A: Task Report 0 Summary of Interviews and Written Responses: The complete set of 
interview summaries and written responses received as part of Task 0. 
Appendix B: Task Report 3 Appendices: Detailed information on the key assumptions, results, and 
modeling parameters used by the consultant for the purposes of analyzing the costs and 
benefits of Massachusetts net metering and solar incentive policies.  
Appendix C: Consultant PowerPoint Presentations: Task 4 power point presentation. 
Appendix D: Utility Data Request and Responses: The complete set of responses received in 
response to the information request made to the utilities on the projection of the total cost for 
solar generation support programs. 
Appendix E: Other Documents: Link to additional documents related to the efforts of the Task Force, 
including: Public Comments; Task Force Ground Rules; Task Force Framing Document; Task 
Force Scope; Meeting Agendas; and, Meeting Minutes 
 
  
9 
 
Task Force Recommendations 
The Task Force Members submit the following recommendations for the Legislature’s consideration5: 
General Principles 
The Task Force Members support a policy to maintain the growth of the solar market to 1,600 
megawatts (MW) and beyond. 
The long-term goal of any policy should be for the renewable energy industry, including solar 
developers, to be competitive with other sources of energy, taking into account the characteristics of 
each resource.  Policy design should promote the orderly transition to a diverse and self-sustaining solar 
industry.  This will induce investment in Massachusetts, generate new local jobs and sustain existing 
ones, and contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  The Task Force Members also 
recognize as valuable the maintenance of solar market diversity in Massachusetts in terms of the scale 
of solar projects, the locations of solar projects, and the range of firm sizes, both local and national, and 
ensuring ease of market entry, as well as enabling equitable access to solar, where reasonable.   
The Task Force Members recognize that there are costs, as well as benefits, for ratepayers associated 
with net metering and incentive policies. In particular, attention should be paid to the balance of costs 
and benefits for those who do not own or receive direct economic benefit from solar or other qualifying 
distributed generation.  The issue of cost impacts on participants and non-participants is not a new issue 
in electricity policy. Accordingly, here as elsewhere, consideration of any policy should include a careful 
examination of costs and benefits to ensure that the policy is as cost-effective as possible and that 
ratepayer costs are minimized. 
The Task Force Members recognize that the development of solar generation and the industry require 
an increased understanding of the costs and value of developing and integrating solar on the 
distribution system, and recommend that work continue to assess this.   
Everyone who is connected to the distribution system should contribute their fair share towards their 
use of it and towards the system benefits included on the distribution company bill for public policy 
reasons (e.g., low income support and energy efficiency). 
The Task Force Members support solar policies that ensure incentives are tied to market signals, are 
transparent, reduce any subsidies, and achieve solar deployment goals and policy objectives while 
minimizing ratepayer contributions. 
The Task Force Members support implementing a new policy framework as soon as possible, but also 
recognize the timelines associated with legislative and regulatory processes. The Task Force Members 
also recognize the potential upcoming changes to federal incentives such as the Investment Tax Credit 
(“ITC”), and urge legislative action in a timeframe to allow regulatory implementation to occur prior to 
January 1, 2017, which is the scheduled expiration date of the ITC. 
                                                          
5
 DOER and DPU abstained from any recommendations pertaining to Executive Branch action. 
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With this understanding, the Task Force Members recommend that any new policy be fully implemented 
with due notice to the solar industry. To enable smooth, low-cost transition to a new policy structure, 
visibility about the details of the new structure should be provided several (6-8) months in advance of 
the policy implementation date.  
The establishment of any future solar goal should either be determined by the Legislature or established 
via a stakeholder/regulatory process led by the Department of Energy Resources (“DOER”) and the 
Department of Public Utilities (“DPU”). 
While there is disagreement on whether existing net metering facilities should be grandfathered under a 
new policy framework, Task Force Members agree that existing projects and projects with 
Statements/Assurances of Qualification that were obtained prior to any new policy framework being 
adopted shall continue to receive Solar Renewable Energy Certificates (“SRECs”) under the current SREC 
policy frameworks.  
Value of Solar/Comprehensive Benefit Cost Study  
(Note: DOER and DPU abstained from these recommendations). 
Task Force Members support conducting a comprehensive and transparent solar benefit/cost study to 
determine the value and impact of solar in Massachusetts.  
Value of Solar studies evaluate total benefits in two broad categories: a) system benefits, including 
avoided system costs and b) societal benefits. These studies do not evaluate utility-specific system 
needs.   
An understanding of costs to build and generate solar as well as an understanding of benefits from solar 
should be very clearly separated in the study.   
A Value of Solar study can inform compensation and incentives for solar, but is not determinative.  
If undertaken, this study should be spearheaded by DOER and DPU, with a scope to be informed by 
input from interested stakeholders. The study should be undertaken on a schedule such that it would 
not delay implementation of a new policy framework. 
Solar Incentive Program Design 
The Task Force Members support a solar incentive policy framework that supports diversity in the type 
and geographic locations of solar installations.  Forms of support such as grants, rebates, tax credits, and 
incentives should be considered for specific locations or system types, and would increase the 
transparency of the costs and benefits of these particular system types.  Incentive levels and sources 
should be differentiated in order to support diverse installation types that provide unique benefits. 
In particular, incentive levels should be differentiated in a way that recognizes the differences between 
small, medium, and large scale solar projects. The Task Force recommends that the size thresholds that 
determine these categories should either be set by the Legislature or established via a 
stakeholder/regulatory process led by DOER/DPU. 
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Additional compensation that is necessary to achieve policy goals, such as landfill, brownfield, low 
income, community shared solar, and parking canopy development, can be provided by targeted 
incremental incentive value, separate from the net metering credit. 
Consideration should be given to leveraging outside funding sources to provide upfront incentives to 
solar projects when benefits achieved are outside of the electrical system (i.e., economic development, 
landfill development, etc.). An example of such outside funding sources would be a refundable tax credit 
for state residents. 
Any new incentive framework for solar should have the following attributes: 
a. Promote the orderly transition to a stable, equitable and self-sustaining solar market, in 
which solar incentive levels are equivalent to those offered in broader renewable programs 
available in the Commonwealth. 
b. Track underlying system costs and revenue streams (i.e., module costs, balance of system 
costs, installation costs, soft costs, and revenues available from other sources).  
c. Rely on market-based mechanisms and/or price signals as much as possible to set incentive 
levels. 
d. Minimize direct and indirect (i.e., administrative and transaction-related) program costs and 
barriers. 
e. Feature a known or easily estimated budget to achieve program goals. 
f. Differentiate incentive levels to support diverse installation types that provide unique 
benefits. 
g. Promote investor confidence through long-term incentive revenue certainty and market 
stability. 
h. Be readily adaptable to changing market conditions. 
Recommendations Specific to Small Scale Solar Projects 
Any incentive policy for small scale solar should be performance-based and should particularly provide 
open access for small scale distributed solar projects and such projects should not have to participate in 
competitive solicitations.  
The Task Force Members support a continuation of the SREC II incentive program for small solar projects 
until a new solar policy can become effective. At that time, a replacement such as a carefully designed 
Declining Block Incentive tariff with adjustments to increase/decrease value based on market growth 
would be an acceptable form of incentives for small solar. 
Recommendations Specific to Large Scale Solar Projects 
Large scale distributed solar can bring scale economies to reaching the Commonwealth’s overall solar 
goals at lower cost and therefore should be part of a diverse state-based solar market.  
Incentives delivered to owners and developers of large scale distributed solar systems should be limited 
to an amount necessary to support the economic viability of efficiently developed and financed systems.  
12 
 
In addition to the attributes applicable to any new incentive framework, generally, which are listed 
above, incentives for large scale distributed solar should have the following attributes: 
a. Impose competitive discipline on market participants and create a robust competitive 
marketplace.  
b. Have performance-based incentives (i.e., paid out over time based on demonstrated actual 
production). 
c. Be designed to avoid conflicts with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission jurisdiction over 
markets for energy and capacity. 
d. Support both orderly deal flow and the orderly recovery of the system costs from its 
beneficiaries (i.e., a regularly available incentive structure to prevent start/stop markets, 
and regular contributions to the expenses associated with the electric distribution grid). 
Incentive Delivery Mechanism for Large Scale Distributed Solar 
Position # 1 (Supported by Eric Krathwohl, David Colton, William Stillinger, Fred Zalcman, Janet Besser, 
Larry Aller (alternate for Geoff Chapin), Lisa Podgurski) 
Task Force Members recommend a Declining Block Incentive that can adjust to respond to market 
conditions. In the view of these parties, it is critical for the Task Force’s objectives that the incentive be 
designed as an “open access” program where incentives are continuously available to market 
participants. In the view of these Task Force Members, a Declining Block Incentive has the following key 
advantages: 
a. The incentive level is transparent and predictable.  While a competitive procurement model 
also offers the key advantage of providing clarity on future revenues, the declining block 
model has the advantage of providing transparency on incentive level and availability during 
early-stage project development.  
b. The program is “always on.”  Incentive funding is available to projects on their development 
schedule, not on the solicitation schedule.  
c. The program budget is fixed.  A declining block model locks in the total ratepayer 
expenditure for the incentive program.  It is simply the sum of all capacity blocks multiplied 
by the associated incentive level. 
d. It imposes market discipline and leads to a self-sustaining industry.  The program 
encourages cost-cutting and competition.  Low-cost providers gain the greatest market 
share.  And the end-state of the program is a mature market that can sustain itself without 
incentives.  
Position # 2 (Supported by Paul Brennan, Liam Holland, Robert Rio, Charles Harak, Camilo Serna, Amy 
Rabinowitz) 
Task Force Members recommend a Competitive Procurement Model. In the view of these Task Force 
Members, Competitive Solicitations are one of the most widely used methods for procurement of 
energy and related products within the utility and power industry. In the view of these Task Force 
Members, they are repeatedly chosen as the preferred method of procurement due to a number of 
clear advantages:  
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a. Open and competitive solicitations result in highly transparent pricing based entirely on the 
response from the active market.    
b. Competition provides assurance that customers pay only what is necessary to support 
cost-efficient suppliers.  
c. The total cost, volume of purchases, and market activity can be readily managed within a 
solicitation framework.  
d. Typical solicitation terms encourage market discipline by requiring suppliers to submit 
binding proposals and including non-performance penalties. 
Net Metering and Net Metering Caps 
The Task Force Members note that the discussion around net metering and net metering caps is focused 
on how solar fits into the net metering construct. The Task Force Members recognize that other 
renewable energy and clean energy sources are eligible for net metering, but are not making any 
specific recommendations to the Legislature to change how these sources should be treated with 
respect to net metering. 
Net Metering Compensation 
Position # 1 (Supported by Eric Krathwohl, Paul Brennan, Liam Holland, David Colton, Charles Harak, 
William Stillinger, Fred Zalcman, Janet Besser, Larry Aller (alternate for Geoff Chapin), Lisa Podgurski) 
Some Task Force Members propose the following: 
Solar generators should receive fair compensation for the value that solar provides to the grid and to the 
Commonwealth overall through a combination of bill credit value and additional compensation from 
incentives or other sources. 
Fair value should be determined through a comprehensive solar benefit/cost study. This study should 
quantify the various value streams associated with solar generation. The study should analyze the value 
of different “categories” of projects: 
a. Behind the meter projects  
i. Projects designed to serve no more than 100% of annual load allowing for some 
reasonable amount of growth such as heat pumps and electric vehicle  charging, as 
well as projects designed to predominately serve behind-the-meter load but may 
incidentally export. 
b. Proximate to load projects 
i. The solar facility is located on and serves a distinct campus of buildings under 
common ownership. This would include, but not be limited to, municipal facilities, 
colleges and universities, hospitals, industrial plants, office parks, and retail 
developments. 
ii. The solar facility is located within and serves a group of market rate and/or low 
income residential units joined by an association. This would include, but not be 
limited to, residential condominium associations, apartment buildings/complexes 
under common management, and homeowners associations. 
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iii. The solar facility is located within and serves a distinct and contiguous municipal 
zoning district. This would include, but not be limited to, central business districts, 
residential subdivisions, urban neighborhoods, community shared solar, and 
agricultural zones. 
c. Projects within the same load zone but not “proximate to load” 
i. This will cover many types of projects that qualify as virtual net metering today. 
If a comprehensive solar benefit/cost study reveals significant cross-subsidization, either from or to solar 
generators, the DPU should be authorized to open a proceeding to investigate the need and how to 
address it. 
Assuming a credit value that returns to the solar generator only the fair value of benefits provided, and 
correspondingly, utilities receive fair compensation for the services provided to solar generators, caps 
on net metering should be removed. 
Projects in operation or those with Net Metering Cap Allocations that were obtained prior to any new 
policy framework being adopted shall receive compensation/credit under the current policy framework. 
Position # 2 (Supported by Robert Rio, Camilo Serna, Amy Rabinowitz) 
Task Force Members believe that the cost of net metering to ratepayers needs to be addressed as soon 
as possible.  These Task Force Members recommend a model by which solar generation output is valued 
at retail generation or Qualifying Facility wholesale rates, because solar production displaces another 
electricity source.  Payments to solar hosts should be based on production that is separately measured 
by the distribution company.  Payments to solar hosts should not include distribution and transmission.   
Instead, to the extent that energy and other generation attributes of solar facilities provide benefits to 
the distribution grid that are known, measureable, and verifiable and that actually reduce utility cost of 
service to customers, they will be compensated.  Compensation for societal or environmental benefits, 
such as those included in the Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”), should be provided as discussed in 
the Small and Large Solar Incentive sections.   
Task Force Members also recommend that the ability to transfer excess net metering credits be replaced 
by payments for energy and other generation attributes, as described above, that would be made to the 
solar host who, in turn, would be free to enjoy or distribute such compensation as it saw fit.  
In order for solar to be compensated for any service to the electric distribution grid, the amount paid 
should be less costly than alternatives, including, for example, distribution investment, energy 
efficiency, and demand response. 
In order to get fair compensation for the distribution system, all net metering customers should be 
moved to the new compensation as soon as is practical. The specifics on timing of such move can be 
determined through a DPU proceeding. 
Net Metering Caps 
Near-term adjustments to existing net metering caps 
15 
 
At the time of this writing, the existing net metering caps have been reached in National Grid’s service 
territory. Some smaller systems are exempt from net metering caps. Updated information on net 
metering caps can be found at www.massaca.org.  
 
Position # 1 (Supported by Paul Brennan, Eric Krathwohl, David Colton, Charles Harak, William Stillinger, 
Fred Zalcman, Janet Besser, Larry Aller (alternate for Geoff Chapin), Lisa Podgurski) 
 
The Legislature should raise the net metering caps a limited amount so as to avoid adverse 
consequences that would otherwise occur to solar development during the pendency of the legislative 
review and administrative implementation of long-term sustainable solar policies.  
Position # 2 (Supported by Robert Rio, Camilo Serna, Amy Rabinowitz) 
Task Force Members believe that raising the net metering caps will cause adverse consequences to non-
participating ratepayers and is not necessary to continue the growth of solar and therefore should not 
be adjusted until the overall policy structure is updated and implemented.   
Net Metering Caps Over the Long-Term 
Position # 1 (Supported by Paul Brennan, Eric Krathwohl, Liam Holland, David Colton, Charles Harak, 
William Stillinger, Fred Zalcman, Janet Besser, Larry Aller (alternate for Geoff Chapin), Lisa Podgurski) 
Caps on net metering can be eliminated over the long-term if certain other actions and measures are 
taken. Specifically, the Task Force Members believe that caps on net metering are no longer necessary 
where: 1) All customers, including solar generators, are paying their fair share for grid services; and 2) All 
customers are receiving the fair value for the services and products they supply to the grid and 
Commonwealth at large. 
To make this determination, a comprehensive and transparent study to identify the benefits and costs of 
solar to ratepayers, the distribution system, and the Commonwealth as a whole should be completed. 
Should either a significant net cost or benefit to ratepayers be found, appropriate rate design or 
financial mechanisms should be implemented. 
Position # 2 (Supported by Paul Brennan, Eric Krathwohl, Liam Holland, Robert Rio, Camilo Serna, Amy 
Rabinowitz) 
The ability to increase or remove net metering caps is dependent upon the level of progress towards fair 
and full compensation by users of the grid for that use and social benefit costs, and non-participant 
ratepayers costs that are reasonable and justified. 
Geographic Distribution 
The Task Force Members agree that there should be an equal opportunity for solar development across 
the state. 
 
16 
 
Total solar compensation (inclusive of any incentives and net metering credits) that is the same amount 
across the state will encourage a more even geographic distribution of solar generation across the state.   
Encouraging solar generation where it can provide benefits to the distribution system should be 
explored and evaluated in relation to other public policy objectives. Studies could be performed to 
investigate and capture empirical data about the value of solar to a company’s electric system and 
customers to provide information about the value of solar generation to electric system operations, 
investment deferral and other potential values. This information should be made available to solar 
developers subject to appropriate safeguards.  
Fair Compensation for Use of the Distribution Grid6 
The Task Force Members agree that everyone who is connected to the distribution system should 
contribute towards their use of it and towards the system benefits charges included on the distribution 
company bill for public policy reasons (e.g. low income support and energy efficiency).  
A fair compensation mechanism should apply to all customers, should be cost based, and should be set 
in accordance with the customer’s use of the distribution system. 
The level of any charges associated with a fair compensation mechanism for a group of customers or 
rate class should take into account customer size and/or other service characteristics in order to develop 
appropriately sized contributions. 
A fair compensation mechanism should be designed appropriately for low income customers consistent 
with the DPU’s established rate design principles. 
Specifics of rate design and rate levels should be determined by the DPU in a utility-specific evidentiary 
proceeding consistent with the DPU’s established rate design principles of efficiency, simplicity, 
continuity, fairness, and earnings stability.  These factors, along with transparency and 
understandability, are important when considering a fair compensation mechanism and in determining 
rates for all components of service for all customers. 
At the discretion of the distribution company and approval by the DPU, a fair compensation mechanism 
should be considered through a distribution company’s base rate case, a revenue neutral rate design 
proceeding, or the grid modernization filing. 
Following any initial setting and implementation, the DPU should and will review the fair compensation 
mechanism during distribution company rate cases. 
Treatment of Municipal Light Plants (“MLPs”)  
(Eric Krathwohl, David Colton, and Charles Harak abstained from making recommendations on this issue) 
The value of SRECs come from the requirement under M.G.L. c. 25A § 11F that retail electricity suppliers 
purchase SRECs and pass the costs to their customers.  This section exempts MLPs and their customers 
from this requirement while not prohibiting solar facilities owned by MLPs or their customers from 
                                                          
6
 This addresses the Task Force’s charge from the Legislature to address a monthly minimum bill. 
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generating and selling SRECs. This exemption results in Investor Owned Utility (“IOU”) customers paying 
for the SRECs generated by projects located in MLPs. 
Given the historical exclusion for MLPs from requirements and regulations imposed upon IOUs, the Task 
Force Members do not recommend any mandates on MLPs at this time. However, the members do 
suggest that the Legislature explore the following issues with respect to MLPs: 
a. RPS cross-subsidization (i.e., who pays for future SRECs) 
b. MLP customer access to solar (e.g., explore opt-in by MLPs to solar policy structure) 
c. Clarify that MLPs may allow third-party owned on-site distributed generation transactions 
without undermining their retail franchise.   
Further Recommendations 
Although not central to the scope of this Task Force, the Task Force recognizes that there could be 
opportunities to reduce soft costs associated with project permitting, interconnection timing and 
process, taxes, and financial risk of project incentive revenue streams that could be addressed.  
Permitting 
In particular, a process to support a uniform and expedited permitting process for small solar 
installations across the Commonwealth should be explored. While a single state-wide process may not 
be possible, state legislation can provide significant value by enabling a standardized and expedited 
process based on best practices to be shared and put in place by Massachusetts 
municipalities. Examples of states that have successfully implemented such approaches are Vermont, 
California, and New York, in which efforts have been particularly focused on small systems, generally 
25 kilowatts  or below. 
 
Interconnection  
Task Force Members recommend that the Technical Standards Review Group , DPU, and DOER continue 
to ensure that the most efficient interconnection practices possible are being utilized, noting that 
interconnection processes are complex, yet important as they address safety and reliability issues 
regarding the electric distribution grid.  
 
Taxes 
The Task Force Members note that there has been considerable confusion and/or variable treatment at 
the municipal level of the appropriate approach to taxing of solar facilities, and accordingly recommend 
that the Legislature should direct the Department of Revenue to provide clear guidance regarding 
municipal taxation that will have the salutary effect of assisting municipalities and providing greater 
consistency and certainty for solar developers and owners.   
Additionally, the Task Force Members suggest the possibility of authorizing municipalities to grant local 
tax credits for solar facilities if that is desired by the municipality. 
The Task Force Members observe that solar development could be supported via refinements of off-bill 
revenue. 
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Task Force Member Individual Statements 
Note: The following section contains statements from individual Task Force Members. These statements 
reflect their individual viewpoints and were not reviewed or approved by the Task Force. 
Associated Industries of Massachusetts, Robert Rio 
Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM) is the state's largest nonprofit, nonpartisan association of 
Massachusetts employers. AIM's mission is to promote the well-being of its thousands of members and 
their employees and the prosperity of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by improving the economic 
climate, proactively advocating fair and equitable public policy, and providing relevant, reliable 
information and excellent services.  
As a member of the Net Metering Task Force, we are pleased to offer the following comments for 
inclusion into the Task Force Report to the Legislature.  
The High Cost of Electricity is Hurting Business in the Commonwealth  
According to the Energy Information Administration ((EIA) – part of the federal Department of Energy), 
Massachusetts has the highest or near the highest cost of electricity in the United States, double that of 
states which compete with us for business.  
The impact of this high cost on business competitiveness and the difficulty Massachusetts has attracting 
and retaining important business is not anecdotal. EMC, a company with deep roots in Massachusetts, 
recently constructed a data center in North Carolina explaining that the action was precipitated 
“Because of the high energy costs in Massachusetts”.  
And it is not just large companies concerned about energy costs. In a recent outreach to AIM members, 
we heard from several businesses concerning the negative impacts these high costs have on their 
operations. Among the more poignant comments are two from small businesses: “We have seen a 55% 
increase in our power costs over the last 2 years. It is hurting our company significantly” and “Utilities 
and insurance are without a doubt our largest financial drains”.  
Reducing the Cost of Solar Programs and Electricity Should be the Highest Priority  
In recent years, AIM heard several justifications for solar and other “green” programs: they will create 
jobs or keep money in Massachusetts; lower carbon emissions or allow diversity of our energy mix, 
andeven lower ratepayer costs. Under scrutiny, however, virtually none of these goals were realized – in 
fact, they may be at odds with each other. With virtually no coal or oil being used regularly in 
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Massachusetts, our electric generation supply is much cleaner than ever and much cleaner than virtually 
all other parts of the United States.  
There should be only one goal for any energy program - to reduce the cost of energy in Massachusetts.  
With this backdrop the goal for supporting solar and other renewables should also be clear. Renewable 
energy, including solar procured through the programs that are the subject of this task force, should 
have demonstrable benefits and be procured at the lowest cost, using a competitive market without 
preference as to technology. This is not the case now. In data submitted to the Task Force, Eversource 
(formerly Northeast Utilities) showed that because of our generous subsidies through the SREC and net 
metering programs, procuring solar power in Massachusetts is more than double the cost of procuring 
the same power in neighboring states! Lower costs, even with renewable power, is achievable.  
Current solar program costs (which include SRECs and net metering) are unsustainable. While lack of 
natural gas pipeline capacity is a major driver of recent energy increases, solar costs are growing. 
Unchecked, National Grid and Eversource estimate that the ratepayer impact of the current solar 
program through 2020 will be over 4 billion dollars; adding 10-15% to the distribution portion of the 
electric bill. Worse, as steps are taken to reduce the price of natural gas by increasing capacity (See 
D.P.U. 15-37) and the price of electricity stabilizes, the unchecked growth of solar and other non-
bypassable programs will increase and become a much more significant part of a bill, particularly since 
these programs essentially become a permanent part of rates.  
Cross-Subsidization of Solar Programs Penalize Non-participants and Contributes to an Unreliable 
Electric Grid  
AIM shares the goals of the Administration regarding clean energy. However, virtually all the savings 
(except for wholesale fuel costs) attributable to solar installations are basically a transfer from non-
participating ratepayers to those who have solar, increasing costs for those who may not be able to take 
advantage of solar programs. While the easy answer is to encourage more solar, in fact, the viability of 
the program depends on this inequity. If everyone took advantage of solar programs, there would be no 
ratepayers left to pay the cross-subsidy.  
This inequity is leading to an unreliable electric grid. As solar programs increase, there are less 
customers to pay the cost associated with maintaining the distribution and transmission system, which 
is still required to be ready willing and able to serve the customer when the sun is not shining. 
Additionally, some customers are not paying their fair share of other social costs which have been 
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embedded in distribution rates over the last several decades, causing a massive shift in who pays for 
programs which serve low-income customers and support other societal programs. This additional cost 
then leads other customers to find ways to reduce their use, including self-generating through combined 
heat and power, a downward spiral that is getting even more pronounced as these technologies become 
cheaper.  
Therefore, as part of the update of the solar program, there must be an acknowledgement that those 
who are still “connected” to the grid must pay their fair share of maintaining the grid that they in fact 
rely upon.  
A Transparent Solar Program Based on Sound Economic Principles will Bring More Opportunity to the 
Commonwealth  
This report should serve as a guidepost for changes to the solar program as it identified several areas 
that need attention to make the program more equitable. We urge you to look beyond easy answers. In 
fact, we urge you to look beyond the concept of net-metering as currently structured to encourage solar 
development. There may be other cost-effective ways to encourage solar development that do not rely 
on unfair and costly cross-subsidies.  
We also urge you to resist the urge to make any short-term changes to the current program, including 
raising net-metering caps, until a comprehensive review of the current program can be accomplished 
and a plan for future growth can be implemented. Within this report there is clear data which shows 
that the current system is working best for solar developers and investors, at the expense of business 
trying to build and expand their businesses without the benefit of overly generous cross-subsidies. 
Changes may result in fewer solar jobs in the shop term. However, the benefits of a well-run sustainable 
program based on sound economic principles will in the long run be better for our economy and the 
ratepayers of Massachusetts. And lower electricity costs overall will result in more sustainable job 
prospects throughout the state. 
Paul Brennan, III, Designee of the Attorney General 
Market forces coupled with innovative green policies have spurred solar megawatt deployment 
across the Commonwealth, creating thousands of new jobs.  The clean energy sector remains vitally 
important to our low carbon future.  Going forward, we must ensure that our solar and clean energy 
industries continue to mature and ultimately thrive, independent of the policies and programs that have 
helped launch their success. 
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 To that end, we must work towards better coordination among the variety of innovative green 
policies and programs, and the incentive payments, which all aim to benefit electric customers, solar 
development, and the Commonwealth.  We must look to electric ratemaking tools and solar policies and 
programs that capture those cost effective solar opportunities available for all customers.  We must 
advance these policies and programs wisely and in a transparent manner, ensure that benefits inure to 
customers, and strive to minimize any impacts and cross-subsidies especially for our most vulnerable 
low-income customers and businesses.   In doing so, we will move the Commonwealth towards a 
sustainable and balanced solar market.  
Any allocation of distribution costs throughout the system must be consistent with established 
rate design principals as envisioned by the Task Force.  Further, we must pay careful attention to any 
potential adverse impacts on certain low usage customers and energy efficiency market incentives.  As 
we move forward, we should also consider the establishment of alternative rate mechanisms, such as a 
rate class that would appropriately value the contributions of distributed generation and consider 
distributed generation’s load profile and system use.  Such a rate mechanism could take many forms, 
including a two-part tariff separately measuring consumption and generation, or more complex pricing 
structures that appropriately take into account imports, exports and demand.     
 Establishing the next generation of net metering and solar policies and programs must be a 
stepping stone on the way to creating a more level and consumer-focused playing field for all demand-
side resources utilizing the grid.   Anticipated modernization of the electric grid in Massachusetts along 
with a move towards an electricity rate structure that better reflects the cost to serve and value of 
energy generated by distributed generation will help the Commonwealth move away from an outdated 
utility-centric service model that only rewards more and more infrastructure investment rather than 
innovation and efficiency.  The work must continue to be done in an open and transparent process, with 
regular reviews of the various programs and incentives to ensure their continued efficiency.  We must 
continue to seek savings for ratepayers, bring all stakeholders to the table, and strive for balanced 
solutions.   
Eversource Energy, Camilo Serna 
Eversource believes clean energy is needed in Massachusetts and has and will continue to be committed 
to help the State meet its goals in a cost-effective manner.   Eversource believes that solar energy 
policies should balance the following three objectives: 
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 Minimize customer bill impacts and protect the interests of non-participating customers 
 Ensure there is a fair contribution for the use of the distribution system 
 Provide incentives that are fair, market-based, transparent and fairly distributed  
Eversource has been pleased to contribute to the work of the Net Metering and Solar Task Force and 
continues to stand ready to support cost-effective solar programs.  Eversource wishes to provide 
comments around five specific areas:  
1. Total Solar Costs Impact 
Eversource highlighted throughout the entire process its concerns about the current and forecast cost to 
ratepayers associated with reaching Massachusetts’ solar targets and the impact that these costs will 
have on its customers, especially those that do not participate in the solar programs.   
Eversource’s analysis indicates that Massachusetts is currently paying for solar at well above market 
prices.  Currently, Massachusetts customers are paying more than 60 cents/kWh for solar electricity.  At 
the same time, wind generation has been purchased for around 8 cents/kWh under long-term contracts 
and, nearby, Connecticut is supporting new solar projects for less than 25 cents/kWh.  
Given the current trajectory, Eversource and National Grid customers will be spending close to $3.8 
billion in solar between 2015 and 2020, at a rate of more than $600 million per year, which is clearly 
unsustainable.   Of this, about two thirds of the costs are related to supporting the solar renewable 
energy credits (SREC) and one third related net metering.  Consultant statements support this by 
indicating that “current combination of SREC policy and net metering framework is providing large 
margins for a diverse array of project types and participants”. 
Eversource contends that this level of investment is not warranted and believes there are better 
mechanisms to achieve similar clean energy goals, at a much lower cost.  For example investments in 
other clean energy resources can reap greater environmental benefits, given those resources greater 
capacity factors, at a fraction of the cost.   In addition, there are significant unintended consequences 
when investing in solar due to the need for additional generation to back solar power when is not 
producing, as well as the increased integration challenges and costs faced by distribution companies in 
order to manage the intermittency associated with solar generation. 
2. Current Solar Incentive and Compensation Framework Flaws 
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Massachusetts’ incentive structure for solar relies on two mechanisms: net metering credits and SRECs.  
Both mechanisms need to be completely revamped in order to meet the State’s solar goal in a more 
cost-effective manner.   More specifically, Eversource believes the existing net metering approach is not 
well designed to support increased deployment of distributed generation and solar in an efficient, cost 
effective and sustainable manner.   
Through net metering, solar customers are avoiding paying for some or all of the distribution services 
(i.e., resiliency, maintenance of grid), yet receiving even more value from the grid (i.e., reliability, start-
up services, ability to transact and monetize solar energy).  Further, solar customers are avoiding other 
non-T&D costs used for other public policy programs such as the renewable and energy efficiency funds, 
low income programs and many others.   
These costs that solar customers are being credited for, even though they are being incurred to operate 
and maintain the grid for their use, must still be collected by the electric utility company and are 
increasing the costs to non-solar customer bills.  Furthermore, virtual net metering (VNM) has created a 
significant cross subsidy mechanism and administrative burden. VNM’s issues include the transfer of 
payments from generator to customer accounts that has no relation to actual load reductions.   
The issues associated with net metering and VNM are an irrefutable fact highlighted by the consultant 
when it concluded that “T&D charges avoided by onsite generation and virtual net metering charges are 
significant in all scenarios and it is understandable that utilities are concerned about the impacts of the 
current incentive framework”. 
3. Net Metering Revamp 
The Department of Public Utilities’ (DPU) long-standing rate design goals are efficiency, simplicity, 
continuity and fairness.  Net metering as it currently stands violates these principles.   Proper cost 
allocation is essential to fair ratemaking and the avoidance of hidden cross-subsidies.  In order to ensure 
that net metering or other mechanisms do not result in cost displacement among customers or impose 
undue costs on all non-distributed generation ratepayers, regulators must ensure that rates reflect 
equitably the benefits and costs of distributed generation. Deviations from this policy lead to distorted 
incentives and diseconomies that are not sustainable over time. 
A rate design based on service provided at the customer’s delivery point would be more transparent and 
equitable than that provided under a net metering scheme.  Adaptation of separate metering at the 
delivery point and at the point of production will allow provide greater transparency and explicit 
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evaluation of the costs of providing service and value of generation at these service locations, and help 
inform the extent to which service characteristics of customers with solar are distinct from other 
customers.  Furthermore, this information will help inform the basis for a separate rate class for 
customers with solar, or whether cost of service characteristics for certain components of service (e.g., 
distribution and/or transmission) warrants a separate or identical rate design. 
4. Competitive Procurement for Large Scale Solar 
SRECs have been very good at supporting the development of solar resources, but Eversource is 
concerned that this is mostly due to the availability of customer-funded SREC revenues that ultimately 
far exceeded what was or is necessary to support solar development in the state.   
Eversource has been pleased with the results of long-term competitive programs it is running in 
Connecticut where solar RECs have been procured at 40% less than those in Massachusetts in 2015.  A 
similar, thoughtfully designed program in Massachusetts will provide for transparent pricing, will bring 
down the cost of incentives and will provide for an orderly market development and evolution. 
5. Net metering caps 
Eversource believes the topic of net metering caps does not need to be addressed until the overall 
policy structure is updated, and further believes there should always be a system of checks and balances 
to ensure costs to ratepayers are reasonable and justified.   
Massachusetts can still meet its goal of 1,600 MW for solar within the current cap structure as 
evidenced by the consultant analysis.  There are still more than 250 MW available under caps 
throughout the state, and many systems are not subject to caps.   
Maintaining the current cap will not impede solar development.  On the contrary, the number of 
applications and proposed MWs for interconnection are materially higher than they were last year at 
this time, when the cap had not been reached.  This indicates that there is ample compensation through 
the SREC program and robust activity under the current regime without expanding net metering caps.  
IBEW 103, Lisa Podgurski 
Value of Solar /Comprehensive Benefit Cost Study 
 We would recommend that the legislature consider reconvening the Net Metering Task Force to 
determine the scope of the Value of Solar Study and choose a consultant selected and approved by the 
task force.  This study will also be integral to determining net metering compensation. 
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Incentive Delivery Mechanism for Large Scale Distributed Solar 
 We strongly urge the legislature to implement a Declining Block Incentive that can adjust to and 
respond to market conditions.  
A Declining Block Incentive is transparent and predictable allowing optimal investment 
conditions within the solar industry. This incentive model will create a self-sustaining market and 
industry. California has had much success with a similar program and continues to thrive. Massachusetts 
was number four in the United Sates this past year for solar growth. We want to see that growth in the 
solar sector continues. 
Unlike the Declining Block Incentive, a Competitive Procurement Model (CPM) will only create 
an unreliable landscape within the market.  Investors and developers need to have a level of certainty 
and transparency when investing in projects early on.  Here are some reasons it will not be 
advantageous to the industry: 
 The CPM replaces the value of solar with a price set by competition rather than through 
a process that more closely reconciles it with the value of solar, which brings it to the market 
and market based investment returns.  
 The CPM reduces the ability to target policy-driven segments of the market, such as low income 
housing, community solar, carports, rooftops and others while favoring larger scale projects that 
can simply sell at wholesale and achieve minimum hurdle returns.  
 CPM will essentially end the ability for both private and public entities to rationally and in an 
organized fashion engage in the long term procurement of solar given that developers will not 
be able to reliably offer pricing to customers until after capacity has been awarded under such a 
program.  
 CPM makes Community Solar almost impossible to reliably deploy considering the long planning 
and lead times related to the development and marketing of these projects, as well as the 
higher costs related to the development of these types of projects. 
Net Metering Caps 
 The Net Metering Caps must be lifted immediately. National Grid, one of the largest territories, 
has hit both of their caps. The solar industry is going to come to a grinding halt. Without the assurance 
of net metering, investors and developers will not continue to invest money in this state and the solar 
industry. If that happens, jobs will be lost. The solar market has created over 12,000 jobs. We do not 
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want to see jobs lost because the legislature chose not to raise the caps to advance the solar industry at 
a time when we are still climbing out of a recession and dealing with a jobs report that did not give us 
the numbers we anticipated.  
Here are some additional points on the potential detriment to the solar industry if the caps are not 
lifted immediately: 
 Critical market segments such as community shared solar, low income housing, landfill and 
brownfield development and much of the municipal solar market are all dependent on net 
metering as a means of allocating credits to off-site load. Without such a bill crediting 
mechanism, these market segments will not be viable. 
 The lack of net metering will significantly change the composition of the Massachusetts solar 
market and limit market diversity.  
 Achievement of the commonwealth's solar goals will be significantly delayed. The consultant 
analysis presumes that exempt (under 25 kw) market and small rooftop behind the meter solar 
installations can increase fourfold to make up for larger net metering projects that rely on net 
metering while the Federal ITC for residential is scheduled to go to zero, which stretches 
credulity.  
 The commonwealth's solar goals will be achieved at higher cost as market development shifts 
away from lower cost installations to smaller rooftop systems.  
 The window of opportunity for Massachusetts to leverage the 30% Federal ITC is closing quickly, 
and if prompt action were not taken to lift the cap, this financial support for solar in 
Massachusetts would be lost. 
Knowing that it could take the legislature some time to sift through this report and form their 
conclusions and create a policy, it is imperative that immediate action is taken to raise the caps for 
relief. While speaking with various developers over the past few weeks there has been a common theme 
and that is panic. They are already seeing projects halted, investors walking away and many are still 
submitting applications to National Grid hoping and praying other projects in the queue fall apart so 
theirs can move up in the queue to obtain the net metering benefits. Should they not then they will pull 
their applications unless the caps are lifted. This is no way to create stability in the market and sustain 
growth.  
“Grandfathering” of Current Incentive Programs and Net Metering 
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 We strongly believe that existing participants in the SREC programs and those that take part in 
net metering should be “grandfathered” and be able to retain those benefits. The residential community 
as well as the large-scale solar community invested in their systems based on our existing statute and 
regulations. Although no promises were made on the value of those net metering credits and we 
understand that can fluctuate, the basic incentive structure should not be changed on them. They may 
not have made that investment if they knew ahead of time that they structure may change or 
completely go away.  
Eric Krathwohl – Appointee of Senator Bruce Tarr 
Overview 
This Task Force member is pleased to see the extent of consensus that has been reached on 
many issues that are both complex and have important implications for various stakeholders.  I hope 
that the Task Force efforts, informed and supported by extensive work by the consultants, will prove 
useful to the Legislature and help achieve legislation that establishes a framework to foster the solar 
industry in the Commonwealth to the goal of 1600 MW of solar facilities installed with continued growth 
beyond on a basis that is as economic as possible.  This statement seeks to provide a general perspective 
on the process, as well as expanding on positions taken on certain issues. First, there are significant 
benefits from solar that are well-acknowledged and which justify serious consideration to ensure that 
solar development is properly compensated and is fostered through supportive policies.  These benefits 
to electric customers include:  1. Increased diversity of the resource mix; 2. Significant  transmission and 
distribution cost savings – even netted out after the costs of interconnection of solar; 3. Reduction in the 
cost of capacity.  Also, there are significant other macro-economic benefits to citizens of the 
Commonwealth, including jobs, tax revenues and emissions reductions from generation resources.  
Several studies, including the consultants’ detailed cost-benefit analyses provide detailed calculations of 
these significant economic benefits (showing net present values (“NPV”) exceeding $14B, or about 20 
cents/kwh NPV) that result from installation of solar.  Accordingly, compensation or economic support 
to solar can and should be reflected in rates, Solar Renewable Energy Credits and tax credits.   
It is acknowledged (and the consultants’ report shows) that electric customers not participating 
directly in solar programs will be supporting solar development through their electric rates on a net  
basis – even after considering the direct benefits to such customers.  That some utility service customers 
(or taxpayers generally) will be supporting some program that is deemed a public good without 
receiving direct benefits is by no means unique to solar.  While of course, significant efforts should be 
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made to keep the costs of the Commonwealth’s solar programs as low as possible while still achieving 
the desired goals, reduction of cost impacts on non-participants should not compromise sound program 
design or otherwise undermine the achievement of the goals or fostering of the solar industry.  Rather, 
significant efforts should be made to democratize solar to the greatest extent possible, i.e. make solar 
available to as many electric customers as possible.  This can be done through programs that foster 
projects including community shared solar and solar in low income housing.  As the consultants 
explained, once the caps on net metering are reached, these sorts of projects (and certain efficient large 
scale installations) become unfeasible.  This is an important point when considering net metering caps 
immediately, but also over the long term. In the same context, diversity of projects and breadth of 
participation are important goals and those are affected by decisions on the framework.  Achievement 
of these goals may well require considerations beyond a simple cost benefit analysis. 
Specific Issues Upon Which Consensus Was Not Reached 
1. Net Metering Caps.  There is some consensus that if the pricing relevant to solar were right, 
caps would be unnecessary.  Not all Task Force Members support immediate lifting of caps. However, 
there is a serious short term problem where the public and private caps in the National Grid service 
territories are already filled.  It is not a sufficient answer that solar development can proceed in the 
other half of the state or that rooftop solar will pick up the slack.  Simply, solar development should 
occur where it makes most sense considering efficiency, cost effectiveness and other factors.  Such a 
severe curtailment of the possibilities for development cannot help but have a significant adverse effect 
on the important solar industry, including jobs in the Commonwealth and other economic benefits.  
Therefore, I have supported immediate cap relief, to the extent deemed proper.   
Nonetheless, as a lawyer very familiar with the DPU ratemaking process through handling of 
over 50 rate cases, I certainly agree with the fundamental principle of every electric customer paying  
the fair cost for the services received and that such principle is relevant to whether or how much caps 
are raised.   (As discussed below, that concept is also relevant to net metering compensation as well).  In 
the long run, if solar pays its fair share (after full consideration of the benefits solar provides), caps are 
unnecessary.  Those calling for refraining from cap relief now make a mistake to assume that solar costs 
exceed benefits.  That assumption is not only unproven, it is contrary to the consultants’ report.  
Without an open review of a comprehensive study of the benefits and costs of solar, solar development 
in any area should not be halted for the significant period it will take to perform and review a 
comprehensive benefit cost study.  A thorough review by all interested parties in the context of a 
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hearing before the DPU is entirely appropriate, but should not be a precondition for some limited, 
interim cap relief.   
2. Competitive Solicitations.  This Task Force Member recognizes the benefits of competitive 
solicitations – particularly in terms of reducing costs of projects bid into such solicitations.  However, I 
believe that a better approach for most projects is a declining block incentive (“DBI”) mechanism which 
would also incorporate the salutary benefits of competition.  A DBI mechanism will provide several 
other benefits including a market responsive incentive level, certainty and predictability of price 
available to solar generators and overall costs of the program.  Moreover, without the starts and stops 
and costs of the competitive solicitation process, the DBI will foster more level rates of development 
and constant employment.  Therefore, I support the policy recommendation of using the DBI.  
Nevertheless, for the largest projects, competitive solicitation may be appropriate.   
3. Net Metering Compensation.  As noted above, appropriate compensation must consider 
benefits, as well as costs, of solar. To ignore the benefits noted on page 1 above, and to limit 
compensation to solar generators to the “generation” rate as suggested by the utilities and AIM is 
contrary to the basic ratemaking recognition of cost causation and is inconsistent with the goal of 
fostering the solar market with its widely recognized benefits.  Also, the compensation structure should 
give appropriate consideration to the various “categories” of solar projects as referenced on pages 5-6 
of the Task Force Recommendations.  The majority of solar projects will not be utility procurements, so 
compensation should not be limited to the cost of energy efficiency or other resources procured by the 
utilities. Not only do the utilities seek to “compare apples and oranges” in urging such a standard, but 
they seek to impose a framework that simply is not applicable, intrudes on the market and would stifle 
extensive benefits.  Further, it would be a mistake to change the availability of net metering for existing 
projects. Investment decisions were made in reliance upon state assurances of availability of net-
metering (with recognition that the rates could change), so serious damage to credibility of the 
Massachusetts solar program and market would result if the playing field were moved before a 
reasonable opportunity to recover investments occurred. Current harm to existing generators and 
future harm to the potential for investment in solar in Massachusetts would result from changing the 
rules now.  In contrast, future investments made after adoption of a new statutory/regulatory 
framework could be made subject to a different compensation scheme without such risks. 
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National Consumer Law Center, Charles Harak 
 The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) is a non-profit organization with the mission of 
advocating on behalf of low-income people on a range of consumer and economic issues.  In particular, 
we seek to ensure that low-income families can afford the basic energy supplies (including electricity) 
they need to survive.  While we actively support energy efficiency programs and renewable technologies 
that can provide benefits to low-income households, we are always mindful of the potential cost 
burdens that these households can face if program designs do not carefully balance benefits and costs. 
 Massachusetts has enjoyed some of the fastest growth in installation of solar photovoltaic (PV) 
power in the country, as a result of policies consciously adopted to promote PV.  On a size-adjusted 
basis, we’ve installed more than 10 times the amount of solar PV as Texas, despite that southern state 
enjoying far more sunshine, and it’s now clear that we’ll easily meet not only the 1,600 MW goal 
contained in Section 7 of Ch. 251 of the Acts of 2014, but also that we will have installed 2,500 MW by 
somewhere around 2023 under any of the solar incentive scenarios considered by the Task Force.  The 
benefits are far-ranging: solar PV is an important tool in helping us meet our greenhouse gas reduction 
goals; investments in PV keep dollars in the state that would otherwise flow elsewhere to purchase 
natural gas used in electric generating plants; those who install PV enjoy substantial protection against 
cost increases in the price of utility-delivered electricity; and PV investments have helped build a vibrant 
and growing local solar industry that supports good jobs here in the Commonwealth. 
 But as the industry has matured, it is important to reconsider policies that were developed at a 
time when it needed substantial assistance to get off the ground.  When installed PV capacity was small, 
providing substantial assistance to PV made sense – and had almost no discernible impact on ratepayers 
who did not install PV.  The current panoply of policies that provide assistance to PV – primarily, the 
“SREC” (solar renewable energy credit) requirements and allowance of “net metering” – are quite 
expensive and more generous than almost any other state in the country, including states that are also 
enjoying rapid growth in solar.  In response to a request from DPU Chair Angie O’Connor, Eversource 
and National Grid provided data showing that the current net metering and SREC I & II policies will result 
in a shift of over $600 million in costs in 2015 alone, onto that vast majority of ratepayers who have not 
installed PV7.  The Task Force consultants have proposed various designs for a new “SREC III” under 
which the state will reach 2,500 MW of installed capacity by early in the next decade, and at lower cost 
                                                          
7
 Of course, ratepayers also receive benefits from having solar PV added to the system, but those 
benefits were not quantified in the data responses by Eversource or National Grid. 
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than the current SREC II regime.  NCLC encourages the legislature to ensure that our solar support 
policies are not more expensive than they need to be, and do not require cross-subsidies from 
ratepayers who do not install PV to those who do. 
 Two important and closely related issues with which the Task Force has wrestled are the rules 
governing net metering, and the idea of establishing minimum bills, each of which we are required to 
address under Ch. 251, § 7.  Current net metering rules compensate a customer who generates 
electricity at the same rate per kilowatt-hour (kWh) that the customer pays the utility when buying 
electricity.  This arrangement was developed to help accelerate the growth of solar PV and avoid the 
metering  and other problems that would arise if, for example, the customer had to buy all electricity at 
the company’s published tariff rate, but be paid for electricity generated at some different rate.  But net 
metering is not based on any study showing that the price at which a utility sells electricity to a 
customer should be identical to the price at which the customer sells electricity to the utility – in fact, it 
would be quite surprising if those prices should be the same.  When a customer buys electricity from a 
utility, the price includes not only the cost of the actual electricity delivered, but a bundle of other costs: 
the costs of electric meters, stations, distribution poles and lines, and central monitoring/control 
equipment, and the labor/administrative costs for repair and maintenance of the system, billing, and 
customer support.  When a customer sells electricity to the utility, the only thing directly delivered is the 
electricity itself. 
 NCLC readily acknowledges that solar PV can provide a range of other values: PV may somewhat 
reduce the need for expensive investments in generation, transmission and distribution systems, and 
unquestionably provides significant environmental benefits.  But this does not mean – contrary to the 
assumption behind net metering – that the price to be paid a solar PV generator is necessarily identical 
to the price the utility charges a customer purchasing electricity.  NCLC recommends that a study of the 
value of solar PV-generated electricity be conducted.  This study may show that PV generators are being 
overpaid – or underpaid – under the current net metering regime.  The price paid to those who generate 
electricity via PV should be set in accordance with the results of such a study.  NCLC believes that the 
DPU should consider adopting a separate tariff for those who self-generate electricity as this would 
make it far easier to track the costs and benefits attributable to these customers and get the pricing 
right. 
 Because there is the perception among many that the current net metering regime may not 
fairly compensate utilities for the costs of their infrastructure and distribution systems, Ch. 251, § 7 
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directs the Task Force to consider minimum bills “as a mechanism to support a reliable  distribution 
system.”  The reason minimum bills should even be considered is precisely because of this perception 
that net metering does not fairly compensate utilities for the costs of the distribution system that all 
customers need, including customers who install PV.  The better fix, therefore, is to make sure that the 
price solar PV customers are paid is right, rather than layering minimum bills on top of a net metering 
regime that still needs fixing.  NCLC strongly opposes minimum bills for two reasons.  First, to the extent 
that minimum bills provide revenues to the utility, the kWh charges will have to be lowered because the 
company’s total revenues are fixed by the DPU.  As more revenues come from minimum bills, less can 
come from the kWh charge.  This sends a bad signal in terms of the state’s energy policies: that 
investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy are worth less.  Second, as demonstrated below, 
per customer consumption of electricity in Massachusetts is, on average, lower among elderly, low-
income and minority consumers.  Imposition of minimum bills – depending on the precise design – are 
thus most likely to adversely impact the very customers the state should most want to protect.  
Minimum bills are this bad public policy from either an environmental or low-income perspective. 
 
 In order that the work of the Task Force should affirmatively help low-income households, NCLC 
urges the legislature to make sure that Community Shared Solar (CSS) will remain economically feasible 
in light of any changes made to current policies, whether through more favorable net metering rules 
that apply only to CSS or through other policies.   Low-income households are extremely unlikely to 
participate in solar PV except through mechanisms like CSS because they are disproportionately renters 
(not owners) who have no ability to install PV on their own homes.  Even those low-income households 
who do own their homes generally cannot afford the up-front capital payments or monthly lease 
payments that would be required.  
Total Site Electricity  
usage, in kilowatt- 
hours, 2009 
Total Site  
Electricity usage,  
in kilowatt-hours,  
2009 
Total Site  
Electricity usage,  
in kilowatt-hours,  
2009 
No 6,056 Less than 65 6,027 White 5,883 
Yes 
4,222 65 or More 4,522 Black or  
African/American 4,323 
Total 5,686 Total 5,686 Asian 5,177 
Total 5,686 
Householder's Race 
National Consumer Law Center, April 2015  
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration - 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey 
Massachusetts Household KWH by Poverty 150%, Age of Householder and Race of Householder 
Household income at or  
below 150% of poverty  
line 
Age of  
Householder 
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 NCLC is pleased that we have been able to participate in the Task Force.  Many people have 
devoted a tremendous amount of time and thought to this effort, which should help guide the 
legislature as it considers changes to current policies. 
National Grid, Amy Rabinowitz 
 National Grid is a strong supporter of solar energy, and sees great opportunities to make solar 
successful in Massachusetts while lowering costs for customers.  Today, with the current net metering 
caps and solar carve-out program, we project that the cost of providing net metering and solar 
incentives for 1600 megawatts (MW) from 2014 to 2020 is almost $2 billion for National Grid customers, 
and more than $6 billion for customers of investor-owned utilities across the state over the life of the 
programs.  Massachusetts pays more for solar output than any other state, with the current 
compensation ranging from $450-$600 per megawatt-hour, which is considerably more than it needs to 
be to meet our solar goals.  Current solar policies will add about 1.5 cents to every kilowatt-hour used 
for nearly the next decade.  The net metering approach currently in use requires our customers without 
solar to shoulder an inordinate share of these costs, while enabling customers with solar to by-pass 
paying towards our electric distribution system which they use 24/7, whether their solar unit is 
generating or not.  Massachusetts should transition as soon as possible to a long-term, sustainable 
approach that is competitive, efficient, and fair.    
Net Metering Caps and Costs: 
 There is no need to adjust the current net metering caps.  Only National Grid has reached its net 
metering caps; elsewhere, there is still approximately 250 MW of net metering capacity available.  
National Grid reached its net metering caps in March of 2015, and continues to receive significant 
numbers of applications, a greater volume of both applications and proposed MW than last year at this 
time.  In addition, applications for residential and small solar systems, which are not capped, nearly 
tripled, with 3,075 applications (representing 18 MW) received already in 2015 compared to the same 
time period last year.   
 There are several problems with net metering as in place today in Massachusetts.  First, it 
overpays customer-generators because they receive credit for their energy at the retail rate, plus credits 
for distribution and transmission.  These latter two are services that net metering customers do not 
provide; instead, they rely on National Grid and the electric system 24/7, for example, exporting 
electricity while the sun shines, importing electricity when it does not, and relying on us to administer 
the distribution of benefits to others, such as by allocating “virtual net metering credits,” where they use 
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the distribution system and the utility’s administrative services for free.  Second, net metering shifts the 
costs of these net metering credits, less any revenue received for their excess energy, onto customers 
who do not net meter.  National Grid’s customers bore $34 million of costs associated with net metering 
in 2014, but this cross-subsidy will reach $64 million in 2015 and continue to grow each year.  Between 
2014 and 2020, we estimate that National Grid’s paying customers will see net metering impact their 
rates by more than $600 million even without raising the net metering caps.  
Alternative Policies: 
 A new framework needs to replace net metering and SRECs.  Net metering, alleged by some to 
be “rough justice” compensation for the benefits of solar, is based on an unproven hypothesis that solar 
is providing services to the electric system, and any services that it provides are of equal value to retail 
rates.  In addition, SRECs are a separate incentive payment that is meant to compensate generators for 
the environmental and other renewable energy attribute benefits of solar energy.  Today, the SREC 
payments are too high because they are driven by administratively-determined formulas and price 
supports.  As a result, they do not enable us to seek lower costs from the solar industry.  
 Net metering, and particularly “virtual net metering,” needs to be addressed as soon as possible.  
Payments to solar hosts should be based on the energy that they produce and any other system benefits 
to the distribution grid that are known, measured, and verified to actually reduce system costs for all 
customers. These credits should not include distribution and transmission rates, nor societal benefits, 
nor unproven services to the system.   The best framework would provide solar developers with long-
term payments that would encourage low-cost financing of their projects, and compensate them for any 
services they provide that are less costly than alternatives. This should be done without creating 
artificial “energy savings” from virtual net metering that are paid for on the backs of other customers. 
Incentives for Solar Through Competitive Bidding: 
 National Grid is routinely required by state regulators to use open and competitive bidding in 
order to get the best prices for customers.  The Commonwealth uses open and competitive bidding for 
its purchases.  Other generators in New England bid into a regional market to sell their electricity.  Open 
and competitive bidding, with a maximum or “ceiling price,” is the best method for the Commonwealth 
to have procurement for solar energy, renewable attributes and related products because they: 1) 
create transparent prices from an active market; 2) ensure that customers pay only what is necessary; 3) 
allow for the management of total expenses, and volume of purchases; and 4) ensure “serious bids” 
through binding proposals, and non-performance penalties. 
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 Instead of contracts, tariff payments can provide secure and simple funding for solar hosts, and 
competitive bidding should lower costs paid by all customers.  In Rhode Island, this construct has 
resulted in dramatically lower prices.  While the cost of developing solar has rapidly declined across the 
country and worldwide, Massachusetts’ policies have kept the prices artificially high.  The 
Commonwealth should advance policies that push the solar industry from a protected market into a 
competitive one, to reduce their costs to customers.   
Comments on the Consultants’ Report: 
 While we appreciate the hard work of the consultants, we have a number of issues with the final 
version of the consultants’ report.  In early drafts, National Grid recommended changes to remove 
errors and bias, which were not adopted (e.g., competitive bidding was characterized as disruptive to 
the development of a stable industry with steady job growth, and can also result in “speculative 
bidding”).  Competitive bidding is relied upon by businesses and governments because it is proven to 
reduce costs, which is clearly a benefit for purchasers, or in this case, paying customers. 
 Review of the modeling and scenarios presented the most serious challenge, and Task Force 
members were given very limited time to assess the final version.  While National Grid cannot endorse 
the consultant’s recommendations and analysis, we plan to continue to verify and assess the models 
presented.  Our initial review suggests mischaracterization of system costs as benefits, the omission of 
the cost of capital as a cost, and no consideration of the costs of economic and job losses from overly 
expensive solar programs.  Also, we disagree with the assumptions about the benefits of avoided 
distribution and transmission costs, which should be analyzed, not assumed, using system-specific 
information.  However, the modeling showed that, in all scenarios, non-participating ratepayers pick up 
the tab, with a benefit cost ratio of less than one. 
 Finally, despite our requests, the report does not offer an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the 
total payments made for solar output by other states operating solar incentive programs.  It gathers and 
presents useful information, but it is a mix of numbers and characterizations that are not comparable.  It 
is another lost opportunity.  A simple price analysis could have shown, in a transparent manner, how 
much Massachusetts pays for solar programs compared to other states. 
Conclusion:   
 Along with the Net Metering Task Force report, the Legislature and the Administration have 
more information to review in reforming the laws and regulations for the Commonwealth’s solar 
programs.  Policy makers must examine the benefits and costs for all Massachusetts residents, especially 
those who cannot directly benefit from solar ownership.  National Grid acknowledges the environmental 
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benefits and energy supply diversity associated with solar development.  However, as evidenced by the 
experiences in other states, there are opportunities to achieve those results at far lower costs that 
ensure greater benefits for everyone in the Commonwealth. 
New England Clean Energy Council (NECEC), Janet Besser 
INTRODUCTION 
NECEC commends the Net Metering and Solar Task Force Chairs and members for their diligence 
and collaboration in this effort.  The topic of net metering and solar incentive policy is complex and 
stakeholders hold strong views.  The quality and tone of the discussion has been positive and took place 
in an open and transparent process.  The work of the Task Force has laid a foundation for the next steps 
needed to ensure a robust solar industry in Massachusetts that will continue to create jobs and attract 
investment, secure and diversify our energy supply and reduce the environmental impacts of energy use 
and production.  
The Task Force deliberations took place in a broader context of concern about high electricity 
costs in Massachusetts and across the region.  The Baker Administration and policymakers generally are 
looking for ways to reduce energy costs for customers, businesses and industries.  NECEC shares the goal 
of making energy more affordable for customers now and over the long term.  Costs, however, cannot 
be viewed in isolation or only in the short term.  The costs of solar and other renewable energy 
resources constitute a very small portion of customers’ electricity rates.8  Dollars spent on solar are also 
an investment in the Commonwealth’s energy and economic infrastructure that stays in Massachusetts.  
This investment is earning a positive return in jobs (12,000), 9 investment ($2.37 billion),10 and energy, 
peak load and greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions.  Solar energy is clearly a critical and valuable 
component of an energy platter that will satisfy our appetite for electricity.  
 That said, the Task Force was charged with reviewing “the long-term viability of net metering 
and develop[ing] recommendations on incentives and programs to support the deployment of 1,600 
megawatts (“MW”) of solar generation facilities in the Commonwealth.”  Implicit in this charge was 
consideration of actions that could reduce the costs of solar programs in Massachusetts and ensure that 
those costs are allocated fairly, while achieving the 1600+ MW of solar.  This would further enhance the 
value of solar for the Commonwealth at large.   
                                                          
8 Renewables/other charge is not even visible in graphs from “Analysis of Costs and Benefits – Update and Preliminary Results Draft (041515),” 
slide 27, presented at April 16, 2015 Task Force Meeting. 
9 Massachusetts Clean Energy Industry Report, 2014. 
10 Investment 2010-2014, SEIA. 
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PRESERVE AND ADVANCE SOLAR IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Immediate Term Action Needed 
NECEC’s immediate action priority is to raise net metering caps now and through the end of 
2016 in order to prevent further disruption of successful solar industry projects in Massachusetts, an 
industry that is delivering economic, energy and environmental benefits to the Commonwealth’s 
citizens, businesses and industry.  The caps have been reached in National Grid’s service territory and 
will be reached in other service territories before a new solar policy framework can be implemented.  
The Task Force recommendations support  “a policy to maintain the growth of the solar market to 1600 
MW and beyond” and state that a “[p]olicy design should promote the orderly transition to a diverse 
and self-sustaining solar industry.”  One of the first steps needed in this transition is an increase in the 
current net metering caps now.  A majority of the voting Task Force members recommend that “[t]he 
Legislature should raise the net metering caps … to avoid adverse consequences that would otherwise 
occur to solar development during the pendency of the legislative review and administrative 
implementation of long-term sustainable solar policies.”  Acting now can avoid the loss of jobs, 
investment, tax revenue and federal incentives, and substantial energy and environmental benefits.  
Acting now will also enable solar development to contribute to achievement of the Commonwealth’s 
GHG reduction requirements.  While a long-term policy framework to support the orderly development 
of solar is essential, the Legislature should take this vital interim step and address the net metering caps 
immediately so that solar development and the jobs and investment it brings to the Commonwealth are 
not disrupted.  
Action Needed for the Long-Term Solution 
NECEC’s priority for the long term is establishment of a “sustainable” policy framework – one 
built on sound economics and designed to achieve energy and environmental policy objectives 
efficiently and cost-effectively.  A long-term sustainable framework rests on fair compensation to solar 
customer/generators for the value they provide to ratepayers, the distribution grid and the 
Commonwealth as a whole and fair compensation to distribution companies for the service they 
provide.  With fair compensation both ways, caps on net metering can be eliminated.  The Task Force 
recommendations make this point:  “Specifically, [a majority of] the Task Force Members believe that 
caps on net metering are no longer necessary where: 1) All customers, including solar generators, are 
paying their fair share for grid services; and 2) All customers are receiving the fair value for the services 
and products they supply to the grid and Commonwealth at large.”    
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 To establish fair compensation for solar a comprehensive and transparent benefit/cost analysis 
or “value of solar” study should be undertaken, which identifies the broad range of benefits and 
beneficiaries, as well as the costs associated with solar development over the long term.  The Task Force 
supports conducting such a study in a timely manner, recommends that it be led by DOER and the DPU, 
and that it be used to inform appropriate compensation for solar. 
To determine fair compensation for use of the distribution grid, a fully adjudicated rate case, 
revenue neutral rate design case, or equivalent data and information in the distribution companies’ grid 
modernization plans should be filed.  Proposed rates should be consistent with long established 
ratemaking principles and take into account public policy objectives, including but not limited to pursuit 
of all cost-effective energy efficiency, renewable energy, demand response/reduction, greenhouse gas 
(GHG) reduction, system efficiency, and reductions in electricity price levels and volatility.  NECEC notes 
that grid modernization and time varying rates are additional tools to advance these objectives and 
enable DER integration in a cost-effective and efficient manner to capture its benefits for all customers.  
ENSURING A SMOOTH TRANSITION 
Continued growth of the solar market in the Commonwealth requires policy and regulatory 
certainty.  Developers and investors will not bring their business to Massachusetts if they are not 
confident that the deals they strike and commitments they make will be honored.  While it is 
appropriate for the solar policy framework to evolve as the solar industry matures, program and 
compensation mechanism changes must apply prospectively. The majority of the Task Force recognizes 
that It would be very disruptive to require existing net metering facilities to transition to a new 
framework and recommends that “[p]rojects in operation or those with Net Metering Cap Allocations 
that were obtained prior to any new policy framework being adopted shall receive compensation/credit 
under the current policy framework.”  Existing net metering customers should be allowed to transition 
to a new framework and could be encouraged to do so.  A smooth transition to a new solar policy 
framework also requires sufficient notice to the market, which the Task Force recognized, stating, “To 
enable smooth, low-cost transition to a new policy structure, visibility about the details of the new 
structure should be provided several (6-8) months in advance of the policy implementation date.” 
NEXT STEPS IN 2015 
NECEC looks forward to working with the DPU, DOER and the Legislature on next steps to ensure a self-
sustaining solar industry that will continue to provide benefits to the Commonwealth cost-effectively.  
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NECEC believes that the best path forward is legislation this year that does three things: 
 Provides net metering cap relief for the period of time required to review and make any 
necessary and appropriate adjustments to how solar is compensated through net metering; 
 Directs the DOER and DPU to conduct a transparent and comprehensive solar benefit-cost study 
to provide the foundation for fair compensation to solar and any adjustments above; and 
  Instructs the DOER to transition the solar incentive program to a more efficient incentive 
delivery mechanism. 
Next Step Living (Geoff Chapin/Larry Aller) Individual Statement 
There is strong consensus on the Task Force that solar is important for Massachusetts, and that solar 
growth to 1600MW and beyond should be actively supported.  In developing the policy and further 
goals for solar in the Commonwealth, it is important to consider several factors:  
1) Over 8,300 MW of generation will be decommissioned in the region over the next five years   
2) The region’s share of generation from natural gas has more than doubled to close to 40% 
3) Shortage of natural gas supply has caused massive incremental costs to MA ratepayers. For 
example, winter rates caused over $3 Billion in extra costs in just three months this winter. 
4) Additional gas supply would cost residents additional billions in infrastructure costs 
We face the decision about how to evolve the region’s energy mix during this next five years and 
beyond: Should we increase demand for natural gas by installing more gas generation when supply 
shortages are already causing billions in extra costs in just a few months, and spending additional 
billions funded by Massachusetts residents is being considered just to meet current gas demand? Or 
should solar and other sources be used and grown further to diversify our electric supply to provide 
lower and more predictable overall costs?  If solar is to be utilized, Massachusetts will need to go well 
beyond 1,600MW just to maintain natural gas’s current share of the generation mix. 
In order to achieve state energy and solar goals, two issues are absolutely critical: Addressing the net 
metering caps immediately, and grandfathering current net metering policy for existing solar projects. 
Immediate action to address the net metering caps is needed to preserve jobs and enable the 
Commonwealth’s solar goals to be achieved cost-effectively.  This action cannot wait for the overall 
process by the Legislature to review and establish long-term solar policy.  The net metering caps are 
preventing solar projects from being planned and developed in the over 170 communities in National 
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Grid territory right now, and more caps will be hit between today and the implementation of the full 
long term policy.  A majority of the Task Force members support action here. 
The actions of the Legislature have created over 12,000 jobs as part of a strong and vibrant solar 
industry that is helping achieve a low cost and clean energy future for the Commonwealth.  Without 
immediate action on the caps, many of these jobs will be lost over the next year and a half.  If nothing is 
done, the long-term policy will be implemented, the Commonwealth will ask for companies and workers 
to achieve those goals, and few will remain to answer the call. These jobs will then have to be replaced 
at much greater cost, if at all, and Massachusetts will also be losing the opportunity for hundreds of 
millions in federal funding between now and when the federal ITC is set to expire at the end of 2016.      
In addition to these considerations, solar investment should be continued and accelerated in the short 
term because solar delivers clear, significant, and well-documented net benefits to the 
Commonwealth overall.  Multiple in-depth studies in ME, NY, CT, VT, MN, MS, and recently by the 
Acadia Center in MA show that solar provides significant net benefits to the electric system, and to the 
community overall – any claims that solar in Massachusetts is using grid services while being subsidized 
by other ratepayers are unsubstantiated.  
Grandfathering current net metering policy for existing projects is absolutely necessary for both new 
and existing solar in Massachusetts.  If this does not happen, practically no residents or investors will be 
willing to invest in solar in the Commonwealth, and many existing solar projects will face default or risk 
of default.  Over 20,000 residents and investors have invested over $2B in solar in Massachusetts based 
on the existing policy structure for net metering.  If they fear that such investments can be 
fundamentally destabilized by state policy changes at some unknown point in the future, they simply 
will not invest.  Massachusetts will lose the jobs and societal benefits it has worked so hard to create 
through a strong and vibrant solar ecosystem, and will be at risk for billions in extra costs from natural 
gas and other generation to make up the overall and summer peak generation that solar would 
otherwise provide.  The majority of the Task Force supports this grandfathering, and it should be an 
immediate action of the Legislature to provide confidence to financial investors that supply the capital 
necessary for solar projects to happen.    
Approach for effective and complete solar benefit/cost analysis : Any long-term policy should be based 
on a full and complete understanding of all the long term benefits and costs of integrating solar into our 
energy system – at a grid level and at a societal level. Components to consider include:  Avoided costs 
for energy, transmission, distribution, generation and reserve capacity, NG pipeline capacity, and CO2 
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and other pollutant costs; fuel price and marginal market price reduction; economic development and 
other environmental and social value; and solar integration costs and grid services costs.  There should 
be a broad and inclusive stakeholder process with opportunity to review, discuss and refine the 
components and technical details of such analysis.  The team led by Karl Rabago and Richard Perez has 
deep experience doing this in Austin, Minnesota, Maine, and elsewhere, and can provide a legislative 
briefing on approach and considerations in evaluating the complete set of benefits and costs. 
Community shared solar and Low income access as policy priorities : One of the primary principles of 
the Task Force consensus is that equitable access to solar, where feasible, is an important goal.  
Community shared solar and access to solar by low-income communities are foundational pieces of 
enabling this equitable access, and should be supported with policy structure and incentives as 
necessary to enable these emerging segments to offer the ability to participate in solar to the eight in 
ten residents who do not have a good roof for established solar offerings.   
Another consideration to highlight is that given the limited amount of time, the Task Force was unable 
to have an in-depth consideration of issues related to low income access to solar, and how solar can be 
leveraged to proactively address energy affordability concerns in low income communities 
Alignment of utility compensation with Massachusetts solar goals: While time limits prevented in- 
depth discussion of this topic on the Task Force, this is highly important for achieving Massachusetts’ 
solar goals cost effectively.  Options that would clearly align utility financial interests with the state’s 
solar goals should be explored further.  Options could include enabling the utilities to earn a return on 
investments in solar integration and grid storage, and performance incentives for achieving solar goals.  
Risks of Competitive solicitation: While the goals of competitive solicitation are good ones, the real-
world functioning of this approach often does not match the theoretical positives of delivering solar 
capacity cost-effectively that we are all trying to achieve. For example, the actual result of these systems 
is often higher costs and lower installed capacity, as few companies can afford to participate, 
undeliverable bids are made, and program delivery deadlines are missed due to uncontrollable issues 
such as delayed interconnection from the utility, often resulting in forfeit of the project deposit. Given 
these risks, a competitive solicitation should not be used, as the same positives and goals can be 
achieved by the market-adjusting incentive for large-scale solar described by several members of the 
Task Force in the Recommendations.     
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Minimum monthly contribution: We share the concerns of several other Task Force members regarding 
the risks of a minimum monthly contribution, including regressive impacts, negative impacts on energy 
efficiency policy and goals, and other political risks, while better than fixed fees or customer charges.  
Other options achieve the goal of fair payment for use of the grid with less risk and should be 
considered.   
In closing, our sincere thanks for the opportunity to participate in this Task Force and help the 
Commonwealth achieve its energy goals.  
Solar Energy Business Association of New England (SEBANE), William Stillinger 
I am the representative for SEBANE, the Solar Energy Business Association of New England. This 
statement reflects the positions of the membership of SEBANE, a trade association whose members 
comprise both small and large-scale solar installers, project developers, equipment suppliers, 
consultants, and other related professionals in the solar industry. SEBANE’s mission is straightforward: 
to promote the use of solar energy and the development of the solar energy industry in the region. Our 
primary policy focus has been in Massachusetts.  
Our positions throughout the MA Net Metering and Solar Task Force (NMSTF) process have been guided 
by three principles:  
 to ensure a stable and self-sustaining market for solar energy in the Commonwealth,  
 to promote equal access to the benefits of solar energy for individuals, organizations, and 
communities, and  
 to support development of utility rate structures whereby all customers pay equitably for their 
use of the electric distribution system.  
The Net Metering and Solar Task Force  
While some general issues have found consensus agreement in arriving at the Task Force’s 
recommendations, in many instances the parties could do no better than to “agree to disagree” over 
several key issues.  
1. Chief among the unresolved issues is actively dealing with the reality of having hit the caps (the 
artificially-imposed limits on solar capacity installations) in a large portion of the state; bringing to a halt 
medium and large project solar development in over 170 Massachusetts towns. It will be difficult to 
restore the economic momentum lost (including job losses) if the caps are not lifted quickly by the 
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legislature. The opportunity for Massachusetts to leverage the current 30 percent federal income tax 
credit (scheduled to expire at the end of 2016) will also be lost. And the achievement of the 
Commonwealth’s goals for solar development and greenhouse gas reductions will be put further out of 
reach. Important classes of solar project hosts such as low-income housing organizations, municipal and 
community shared solar plans, use of landfill and brownfield space for clean energy are put on hold. The 
caps must be raised by legislation enacted this year in order allow the solar industry to transition to a 
long-term net metering and solar incentive policy that captures the interests of all stakeholders.  
2. Legislation enacted this year should authorize an effort to be led by the DOER and the DPU to 
undertake an open and comprehensive solar benefit/cost study, so that policy makers are informed as 
they balance the often competing interests of the many stakeholders (including ratepayers who do not 
participate in solar programs, those who do, the utilities, society in general). With the holistic results of 
such a study in hand, one can see and evaluate the directions and degrees of cross-subsidies that may 
exist under the framework of net metering. This study procedure is described more fully below.  
3. Net energy metering is of vital practical importance to the successful operation of solar and other 
distributed generating resources. The comprehensive benefit/cost study will thus be the basis for 
determining fair compensation for the various stakeholders, putting to rest unsubstantiated claims that 
solar development is doing economic harm, and properly dealing with any economic imbalances that 
may be found and substantiated.  
4. The other solar incentive mechanism of importance that the Task Force could not agree to was the 
appropriate incentive mechanism to replace the current SREC system. The apparent choices were a 
periodic competitive procurement program, or an adjustable declining block mechanism. SEBANE 
strongly supports adopting the adjustable declining block mechanism, for reasons that are listed in the 
Task Force Recommendations Report.  
5. At the outset SEBANE believed the Task Force’s activities were to be focused on improving future 
solar policy, and that all the effort and investment that built the hundreds of MWs of existing solar 
facilities in the state would generally not be materially affected by changes to the policy. Surprisingly 
and sadly, the Task Force could not reach agreement on this important treatment of existing solar 
project investments. Tampering with the terms of existing project arrangements signals developers that 
they face increased future financial uncertainty, needlessly raising project costs.  
The Analysis Performed So Far  
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The consultants’ work has been extensive, complex, and far-reaching. In our opinion, after all of it no 
clear policy path with regard to solar incentives emerges from their analysis. This is not meant to 
denigrate the effort; only to say that the consultants’ data can now best be used to provide a basis for 
further study of the differing perspectives that need to be balanced in setting long-term solar policy. 
Even the data that the utilities provided on their costs in administering solar programs might be useful in 
a future holistic analysis. But the data-gathering and work that was undertaken faced such time 
pressures that the consultants could not allow for a full variety of stakeholders to participate in the 
gathering of study assumptions and discussion of results. Task Force members themselves did not have 
enough to absorb the consultants’ work.  
Further Work to be Done  
Presumably the legislature now has many of the major issues to be resolved laid out in (if not resolved 
by) the Task Force’s report, so that they can prescribe and authorize the path forward. SEBANE believes 
parallel regulatory activities need to be initiated while the legislature sets the parameters of the next 
solar policy. In order to be widely accepted, solar electricity policy must proceed from a thorough and 
open benefit/cost analysis of solar energy as a distributed generation resource, interconnected and 
integrated with the grid. This evaluation (led by the DOER and the DPU) must be conducted in a 
transparent, open environment (all stakeholders engaged), so that it is consistently performed from 
multiple perspectives. Further, the analysis needs to be more than studying a snapshot in time. For 
proper comparison purposes the attributes should be evaluated over a consistent long-term (e.g. 20 
years) net present value horizon, capturing most of the useful life of solar and other distributed 
generation facilities) to get all the disparate costs and benefits on a comparable footing. Regulators and 
legislators will then have the information they need to begin making informed and thoughtful policy 
decisions. Only by taking this whole systems view can policy makers balance the interests of society 
overall, ratepayers, the electric distribution companies, solar project owners, etc. in shaping our future 
direction.  
A Final Word  
It has been an honor to participate in the work of the Task Force. Its establishment last summer by the 
legislature was a major step toward opening up the public dialogue around solar policy in the state. In 
addition to our own constituents, SEBANE and other Task Force members have been mindful to work 
with and include an even broader solar community in the deliberations of the Task Force. If nothing 
more, this openness can be counted as a positive accomplishment. Now we look forward to working 
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with the legislature and the DPU and DOER to enable solar energy to continue to efficiently bring its 
economic, social, and environment benefits to the Commonwealth.  
Solar Energy Industries Association, Fred Zalcman 
While the report of the Net Metering Task Force (NMTF) reveals many areas where stakeholders 
continue to express a diversity of perspectives, one conclusion stands out for the robust consensus it 
has drawn: Massachusetts wants solar. From the legislature to its constituents, from utilities to 
communities to businesses, we find only unanimity in the belief that Massachusetts can and should 
continue to ensure that solar is a growing part of our energy mix. Indeed, this broad position is the one 
that the NMTF chose as the very first principle in its report. The question is not if, but how.  
There are two distinct policies under consideration: net metering, or the way that solar 
electricity is compensated for the benefits it provides to the grid; and SRECs, or the mechanism for 
delivering the additional incentives needed to make solar projects viable. Together, these policies are 
delivering benefits to the Commonwealth that far exceed the total costs to consumers, as shown by the 
NMTF consultants’ report.11 Based on numerous studies conducted by utility commissions across the 
country, SEIA’s position is that net metering is fair compensation for the benefits it provides to the grid, 
and should not be altered. However, SEIA recognizes that reviewing net metering and incentive 
programs is a prudent and necessary action with the maturation of the solar industry in the 
Commonwealth. Implementation of the consensus of the NMTF – that solar should continue in 
Massachusetts, and that we should capitalize on the foundation and momentum we have built – 
depends on the thoughtful and careful management of any transition.  
In order for the NMTF to be true to its most fundamental position, near-term action to address 
the net metering cap constraint is urgently needed. That said, SEIA fervently supports a transition to a 
sustainable net metering and solar incentive program and believes that a formulation that is in the long-
term interests of all stakeholders is within sight.  
SEIA believes that the best path forward is legislation this year that does three things:  
1) Provides net metering cap relief for the period of time required to review and make any 
necessary and appropriate adjustments to ensure proper compensation to solar electricity;  
                                                          
11
 Consultant’s 4/27/15 presentation of Task 3 results, Slide 20, available for download at < 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/analysis-of-costs-and-benefits-final-results-4-27-15.pdf>  
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2) Directs the DOER and DPU to conduct a transparent and comprehensive solar benefit-cost study 
to definitively determine the benefits or costs to ratepayers occurring under current rate 
designs and with respect to the major categories of solar development; and  
3) Instructs the DOER to transition the solar incentive program from the SREC model to a more 
efficient incentive delivery mechanism.  
With regard to Point #1, the consequences of a failure to provide near-term relief from the net 
metering caps are profound:  
 Critical market segments that depend on the bill crediting mechanism enabled by net metering, 
such as community shared solar, low-income housing, landfill and brownfield development, 
local government projects, and customers who cannot install solar on their own property are no 
longer able to participate in the market;  
 The window of opportunity for Massachusetts to leverage the 30% federal Investment Tax 
Credit (ITC) will close, resulting in the loss of a major outside revenue source in support of the 
Commonwealth’s solar goals;  
 The net metering cap constraint will shrink the Massachusetts solar economy as each of the 
utility and sector caps is hit in succession;  
 The composition of projects will change significantly resulting in a loss of Massachusetts’ rich 
diversity of project activity across market segments, customer classes, and system sizes; and  
 Achievement of the Commonwealth’s solar goals – both in terms of MWs and self-sustainability 
– will be delayed, and the total cost to achieve those goals will rise.  
Already, members of the legislature are hearing from local officials, businesses, and residents who 
want to participate in solar projects in National Grid service territory, but that these projects cannot 
advance without net metering cap relief. Some members of the NMTF argue that “Maintaining the 
current caps will not impede solar development.” Residents and local governments in the 171 cities and 
towns in the National Grid service territory would challenge that claim. The current net metering caps 
are impeding solar development, today. There are already hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands 
of construction jobs at risk. Supporting solar means addressing that constraint quickly.  
Point #2 is a critical first step to determine if any potential adjustment to the way that solar is 
compensated through net metering is necessary. At its core, the claim some stakeholders make that net 
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metering is unfair or unsustainable is rooted in a belief about the relative costs and benefits of 
distributed solar generation. It seems prudent that any change to the existing net metering framework – 
the framework, again, that has delivered significant, positive, and popular results – would only be made 
on the basis of a formal benefit-cost analysis that includes robust participation from multiple 
stakeholder perspectives, with a process for developing a record on how to properly value distributed 
solar generation, in a forum that recognizes and protects the interests of all parties.  
The NMTF consultant report affirms that the Massachusetts’ solar program has yielded benefits far 
exceeding the costs, and will continue to do so by a wide margin under most plausible future 
frameworks. However, it is important to highlight that the NMTF consultant report does not determine 
the relative costs and benefits of the current NEM policies in isolation but rather gives a general sense of 
the magnitude of costs and benefits of NEM and incentive policies combined. The NMTF consultant 
process is also not a sufficient substitute for the rigor required as the basis for making fundamental rate 
design reforms. As the NMTF report acknowledges, the process provided only limited opportunity to 
understand and provide feedback on the methodology and assumptions underlying the cost and benefit 
categories; in short, there was wholly insufficient opportunity for engagement by technical experts on 
key modeling and methodology assumptions that is the hallmark of the ratemaking process. Some 
stakeholders contend that net metering should be changed because it involves a cross-subsidy. Any such 
claim must be subject to a full and fair benefit-cost calculation to test that premise, such as that used in 
several other jurisdictions as a step towards making compensatory policy. SEIA recognizes the need to 
avoid the repetitive cycle of serial net metering cap increases and point #2 above proposes a path in 
that direction.  
On point #3, SEIA recognizes consensus among NMTF members that the SREC program, while highly 
successful in stimulating the first phase of the Massachusetts solar market, can be – and ought to be – 
improved. Significant ratepayer savings can be captured by transitioning to an incentive delivery model 
that is more efficient – and therefore lower-cost – than the SREC program. SEIA believes that the 
legislature can instruct DOER to initiate this transition immediately and complete it on a faster timeline 
than any transition in the net metering program. Here, as with the net metering policy, we highlight that 
any program change should occur only after due notice to the industry and its customers.  
Finally, it is critical that any change to the net metering or incentive framework apply prospectively, 
and not to projects in service, under construction, or into which significant development resources have 
been invested. As long as electricity is a regulated industry, investors will assess political and regulatory 
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risk when making decisions about how much capital to invest, and at what price. To maintain the 
Commonwealth’s ability to attract capital, existing investments must be held harmless in any transition.  
In closing, I want to thank you, on behalf of my company, the Association, and personally, for the 
opportunity to serve on the NMTF. I’ll return to the point with which I opened: Massachusetts wants 
solar, and there is no disagreement about that. We respectfully suggest that the task before the 
legislature now is to make both near-term and longer-term policy that shepherds the hard-won 
momentum in the local solar industry, along with the jobs, economic growth, and pride that it has 
stimulated. We look forward to continuing to work with the DPU, the DOER, legislators, members of the 
NMTF and other stakeholders on that process.  
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Consultant Task Reports 
Note: The following sections are the work of the consulting team hired to perform analysis intended to 
inform the Task Force. While Task Force Members had input into the work performed, the resulting 
reports do not reflect the views of the Task Force Members and were not necessarily endorsed or 
incorporated by the Task Force into its recommendations.  
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Task 0. Task Force and Stakeholder Focus Groups 
 
In order to better understand the perspectives of Task Force members and other stakeholders, the 
consulting team organized five 1.5 hours phone-based focus group sessions. Focus groups sessions 
included Task Force members representing similar constituencies. These sessions were conducted for 
the following Task Force groupings:  
 Utilities; 
 Utility customers and customer advocates; 
 Solar industry representatives; and, 
 Legislators. 
A fifth focus group was conducted for non-Task Force stakeholders.  
Themes explored during these focus groups included:  perspectives on the current solar market model, 
perspectives on the current net metering approach, long-term goals for the Massachusetts solar 
market, perspectives on other solar incentive models, and perspectives on the future use of net 
metering and minimum bill provisions. Participants were provided with the opportunity to provide 
written comments along with their focus group session comments.  
Transcripts of these discussions are provided in Appendix A of this report. During the sessions, 
individual Task Force members and other focus group participants highlighted a number of goals and 
key themes. Some of these are provided in the table below. Critically, these goals and themes were not 
unanimously expressed by all focus group participants and represent a cross section of Task Force 
opinions and priorities.   
Focus Group Goals and Themes 
Ensure policy transparency and minimize complexity Ensure fairness to those who have made past 
commitments 
Minimize market disruption Support steady industry growth 
 Minimize ratepayer impact Support market-based approaches 
Support PV siting where most needed Transition to sustainable market that does not require 
incentives 
Encourage supplier diversity Encourage low-cost financing 
Encourage participant diversity Prioritize competitive market structures 
Ensure cost effectiveness Protect low-income ratepayers 
Maximize solar PV installation growth Minimize cost-shifting between participants and non-
participants 
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1 Executive Summary 
The Massachusetts Net Metering Task Force is addressing many of the critical issues related to solar market 
development, including incentive programs and net metering structures, which are currently being discussed in a 
number of other. A wide range of incentive types have been developed to promote solar market growth, with no U.S. 
states having identical solar policies. The Task Force has an opportunity to learn key lessons from the development and 
implementation of solar incentive programs in other states. Literature reviews were conducted to develop policy 
summaries that discuss the critical elements of a range of incentive mechanisms, from declining block programs to long-
term contract solicitations and utility ownership programs. Policies reviewed under this task include:  
 The California Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (Re-MAT), Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM) and 
declining block programs;  
 The New York  declining block programs;  
 The Rhode Island Renewable Energy Growth program;  
 The Delaware Solar Renewable Energy Credit (SREC) Solicitation program;  
 The Connecticut Zero Emissions Renewable Energy Credit (ZREC) program;  
 Utility financing, ownership, and long-term contracting programs in New Jersey;  
 The Vermont Sustainably Priced Energy for Economic Development (SPEED) long-term contracting program; and 
 Value of Solar Tariffs.  
The policy choices made to develop each of these unique programs represent efforts by policymakers to balance 
sometimes-conflicting goals of solar market development scale and speed with ratepayer cost impacts. Summaries have 
been developed that  examine critical policy elements, such as program structure, incentive-setting mechanisms, market 
size, long-term market goals, complimentary incentives and programs, resulting market characteristics, and other key 
elements. 
1.1 Policy Types and Key Findings 
Policies examined in this report section fall into five broad incentive mechanism types: declining block incentives (DBIs), 
adjusting block incentives (ABIs), competitive solicitations, value of solar tariffs, and other incentive price setting 
mechanisms. Descriptions of each of these policies are provided below along with key considerations related to each 
incentive mechanism.  
1.1.1 Declining Block Incentives 
Declining block incentive programs have been implemented in both California and New York. This incentive mechanism 
type establishes a fixed, volume-based incentive schedule whereby incentives are provided at higher levels during the 
early phases of the program and lower levels in later phases. Once a block of incentives has been fully reserved, the 
program transitions to a lower incentive tier. This process continues until the total program volume has been reserved 
and the incentive level has been reduced to zero. Figure 1 illustrates this mechanism and shows the incentive block 
structure for one New York region.  
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Figure 1. Proposed Large MW Block Program Incentives for the ConEdison Territory (NYSERDA, 2014) 
 
These programs have a predefined fixed budget and also result in a known quantity of solar being developed in advance 
of the start of the program. A fundamental component of DBIs is that they do not have a defined program timeline, 
meaning that the rate of solar PV installations under a DBI program will be unknown to policy makers. Declining block 
incentives are an open-access incentive type, meaning that incentives are distributed on a first-come, first-served basis. 
They can also be designed to either provide upfront rebates or performance based incentives (PBIs), which pay 
generators based on the power they produce over time.  
The limited number of jurisdictions that have implemented DBIs have achieved market transitions that created self-
sustaining solar markets which no longer rely on state-based incentives. These programs also have the advantage of 
providing market participants with incentive price transparency and can be designed to provide real-time information to 
market participants about incentive levels and application volumes. Despite these advantages, these programs have, to 
date, relied on predefined incentive reduction schedules, meaning they may not have the potential to adequately adjust 
to outside market impacts that could impact solar market growth such as unexpected increases in installed costs or 
changes to federal incentives. DBIs also have the potential to lead to uneven solar market activity if incentive levels 
decline more quickly than solar installation costs, making new installations unattractive to potential project owners.  
1.1.2 Market Volume Adjustment Mechanisms (CA Re-MAT) 
California has implemented a unique solar policy mechanism under its Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (Re-MAT) 
program. This program provides solar incentives for a fixed volume of solar capacity through regular bi-monthly 
incentive offerings. Incentive levels adjust, up or down, in subsequent offerings based on the volume of incentive 
reserved during the previous incentive period. If the previous period’s offering was significantly over-subscribed, 
incentives in the next offering are lowered. If the previous offering was significantly under-subscribed, the incentive 
level is raised. Figure 2 below shows this mechanism as implemented in one of the California utility territories.  
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Figure 2. Re-MAT Adjustment Mechanism 
 
This program type provides an open-access, first-come, first served incentive offering. Because the programs have a 
fixed volume of capacity that is offered on a fixed schedule, policy makers can define the rate of solar market 
development as part of the program’s design. This incentive type has the advantage of being responsive to outside 
market influences such as changes to federal tax incentives, making it potentially better able to support solar market 
stability. Like the DBI programs discussed above, this market mechanism provides near-term incentive price 
transparency for market participants, but unlike the declining block programs, market volume adjustment mechanisms 
are not designed to explicitly transition the solar market away from state-based solar incentives. Experience with this 
incentive model has been limited to date as it has only been implemented by three California utilities.  
1.1.3 Competitive Solicitations (RI, VT, CT, CA, DE, NJ) 
Competitive solicitations have been used by a number of jurisdictions to award solar PV incentives. Competitive 
solicitation programs in Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, California, Delaware and New Jersey are profiled in this 
report. Under this program mode, a competitive process such as a solicitation or auction is used to award incentives, 
typically using a price-based selection criteria. Regular solicitations are conducted on a pre-determined schedule to 
create market activity over time. By relying on a competitive process, these incentive mechanisms award incentives to 
the lowest-cost projects within a market, potentially leading to lower overall policy costs relative to other incentive 
program mechanisms. These programs are not open access, requiring project developers to win an incentive allocation 
through a competitive process in advance of developing a project. Market activity for this program type will be defined 
by the volume and frequency of solicitations, providing policymakers with flexibility to define market activity. 
Competitive solicitations have typically been used to provide solar incentives for larger-scale PV systems, as the time and 
expense of developing pricing proposals for smaller PV systems has been perceived by policy makers as a potential 
deterrent to residential market activity. These incentive program types may also result in high contract failure rates if 
programs are not carefully designed to prevent project proponents from submitting low-cost speculative bids. 
Additionally, infrequent or a limited volume solicitations may result in a small number of project developers receiving 
incentive awards, potentially reducing market competition over time.    
1.1.4 Other Forms of Standard Offer Performance-Based Incentives 
In addition to the incentive price-setting mechanisms discussed above, states have also used both administratively-set 
and competitively-derived mechanisms to determine PV incentive rates. Administratively-set pricing involves conducting 
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cost-based modeling along with a public stakeholder process to determine an incentive level. This mechanism is 
currently being used as part of the Rhode Island Renewable Energy Growth program and was formerly used in the 
Vermont SPEED program. This price setting strategy allows policy makers target particular policy goals such as quickly 
growing the market or rewarding only the lowest cost solar projects. Calibrating pricing to meet these goals may be 
challenging and pricing incentives incorrectly can lead to unintended market dynamics.  
Competitively-derived pricing has been used in Connecticut to establish incentive levels for smaller systems. Under this 
program, small system incentive levels are set as a function of incentive prices awarded to larger projects in the state’s 
competitive solicitation program. This methodology has the advantage of ensuring that incentive prices are indexed to 
current market prices. Establishing the appropriate price adder requires careful consideration, as setting the pricing 
either too high or too low may result in market growth that is either too rapid or too slow.    
1.1.5 Value-of-Solar Tariffs (VOSTs) 
Value-of-Solar Tariffs are a relatively new incentive type that is intended to eliminate cross-subsidies between 
participating and non-participating net metering customers. In a VOST, solar generators are provided a per kWh 
incentive based on the market value of their production. This value is developed through an administrative process and 
can include elements such as:  
 The wholesale value of the generated power, 
 The value of avoided transmission and distribution investments,  
 Avoided environmental compliance costs, and 
 Other societal benefits. 
In theory, VOSTs, if properly set should be cost-neutral from the perspective of all utility customers. These rates, 
however may not be sufficient to support solar market development.  To date, Minnesota and Austin, Texas are the first 
jurisdictions to establish VOST rates.  
1.2 Solar Incentive Levels in Other States 
Each of the above-listed program types uses different mechanism to incentivize solar market development. Given the 
unique nature of each state’s solar market, including the cost of developing and installing a project, the risks associated 
with different incentive types, and the availability and value of ancillary incentives, directly comparing incentive levels 
between states can be challenging. Despite this, reviewing incentive pricing levels in other states may provide Task Force 
members with critical context that can be used to support the development of recommendations regarding future solar 
market incentives in Massachusetts. The following table lists current incentive levels for the programs examined in this 
report chapter. Where applicable, ranges have been provided to indicate incentive levels for programs that provide 
multiple incentive pricing tiers. Further information regarding the specifics of each incentive program is provided in the 
following section.  
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Table 1. Current Solar Incentive Levels in Profiled States 
State Incentive Incentive Type Incentive Range 
California 
California Solar Initiative 
Declining Block Incentive, Upfront Rebate 
or Performance Based Incentive 
$0.20 per Watt rebate or  
$0.03/kWh PBI  (non-residential) 
Renewable Market Adjusting 
Tariff (Re-MAT) 
Market Volume Adjustment 
Mechanism, Performance Based 
Incentive 
$57.23 – 77.23 per MWh 
PBI (10-20 years)  
Renewable Auction Mechanism 
Competitive Solicitation, Performance 
Based Incentive 
N/A 
New York Megawatt Block Program 
Declining Block Incentive, Upfront 
Rebate or Performance Based 
Incentive 
$0.80-0.30  
per watt rebate 
Rhode Island 
Renewable Energy Growth 
Program 
Competitive Solicitation/Administratively 
Set Price, Performance Based Incentive 
$0.1640-.04135 per kWh PBI (15-
20 years) 
Delaware 
Delmarva Power SREC 
Solicitation Program 
Competitive Solicitation 
$34.36 - $300  
per MWh PBI (7-years + 13 
years at $35 per MWh) 
Connecticut ZREC Program 
Competitive Solicitation/Competitively 
Derived Pricing 
$60.48 – $81.59  
per MWh PBI (15 years) 
Vermont SPEED Program Competitive Solicitation 
$0.1187 to $0.1420/3kWh 
PBI (25 years) 
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2 Solar Incentive Policies in Other States 
The following sections provide profiles of solar incentive polices in other states. For each program reviewed, a brief 
description of the incentive structure is provided along with information about key interactions with other state polices 
and critical observations about state-level solar market dynamics.    
2.1 California: California Solar Initiative Declining Block Program, Re-MAT Tariff and 
Renewable Auction Mechanism Program 
2.1.1 Introduction 
California’s solar market is the largest in the United States and is supported by three major incentive policies for 
different system sizes. Larger solar projects between 3-20 MW can participate in the Renewable Auction Mechanism 
(RAM), which requires investor owned utilities to procure 1,229MW of renewables via biennial reverse auctions. Smaller 
solar projects have historically benefited from a capacity-based, upfront payment incentive or a performance-based 
incentive (PBI) through the California Solar Initiative (CSI). The value of these cash incentives is based on a declining 
block structure tied to the overall installed capacity in each of the state’s utility territories. Finally, systems 3MW and 
smaller are eligible for the California Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (Re-MAT), which provides a 10-20 year standard 
offer contract based on $/MWh rate set by an innovative solicitation volume adjustment mechanism. These three 
programs are the focus of this policy profile.  
California has a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) which requires 33 percent of each investor owned utility’s retail 
sales to come from renewable or alternative sources by 2020. There is currently no solar carve out to the RPS, however 
the programs discussed in this section serve to support utility RPS obligations. California has a regulated electricity 
market, which is managed primarily by the California Independent System Operator (ISO). The California ISO contracts 
with Load Serving Entities (LSEs), and operates a day-ahead and real-time market.  
California has had incentive support for solar since 1998 and California’s incentive policies have continued to evolve 
since their inception. In 2006, Senate Bill 1 established Go Solar California, which funded and established California’s 
existing incentive programs and shifted the market towards performance-based incentives. Administered by the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), Go Solar California has a total of $2.8 billion to disperse from 2007 to 2016 
and has a target of 3,000MW of installed capacity by 2016. 
Similarly, California’s net metering policy has also changed as the solar market has continued to grow. In 2008, California 
allowed limited virtual net metering--or the distribution of net metering credits to multiple off-site locations. In 2013, 
the CPUC decided to extend the existing net metering program until July 1, 2017 or until individual utility program caps 
are reached after which distributed generators will receive a new tariff. There is an ongoing discussion on new policies 
and rate design at the CPUC related to this and other solar market issues.  
2.1.2 Policy Description 
2.1.2.1 Declining Block Program 
California developed two declining block incentive programs as part of the California Solar Initiative (CSI) to support 
smaller scale systems. The Expected Performance Based Buydown Program (EPBB) is an upfront incentive payment for 
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PV systems 30 kW and smaller. Projects 30 kW and larger are eligible for the Performance Based Incentive (PBI) program 
which provides $/kWh payments based on system output over five years. Smaller systems can choose to opt-in to the 
PBI program. The incentive amount a system receives is based on a declining 10-step schedule, which is determined by 
the installed MWs in the program for each utility territory. Non-profits, which are not able to take advantage of federal 
tax benefits, receive a separate, more generous incentive.   
Figure 3 below shows the incentive rates and MW block sizes for the program (Go Solar California, 2015).  
Figure 3. CSI Block and Price Diagram 
 
As of January 2015, funds for the program have been nearly fully allocated, with both Southern California Edison (SCE) 
and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) having completed their allocations and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) having only 5 
MW of program capacity remaining. Since the expiration of the SCE and PG&E incentives, the PV market has continued 
to grow in those territories without access to the declining block programs. Even without state-funded incentives, 
California PV system owners still benefit from net metering and federal tax incentives. In particular, California electricity 
rates typically include inclining volumetric pricing, which can result in high net metering power values that can be highly 
beneficial for PV system economics.  
2.1.2.2 Re-MAT Program 
The Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (Re-MAT) is a standard offer program that provides a PBI for distributed 
generators under 3MW. California’s three largest IOUs (SCE, SDG&E and PG&E) conduct a solicitation every two months 
for long-term renewable energy contracts of 10, 15 or 20 years. Contracts are for both power and renewable energy 
attributes. Participating PV system owners are able to select contract lengths at the time of their application. The 
program solicits contracts from three renewable energy project types: as-available peaking, as-available non-peaking 
and baseload. These project categories correspond to renewable energy technologies such as solar, wind and biomass 
respectively. The program offers a fixed capacity in each solicitation and adjusts offer pricing for future solicitations 
based on whether the prior solicitation was over or under subscribed. The contract rate for each technology type adjusts 
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upward or downward in increments of $4, $8, or $12 based on previous auction volumes. For instance, if a solicitation is 
significantly undersubscribed, the next solicitation price will increase by $4. If the next solicitation is again significantly 
undersubscribed, prices in the next round will increase by $8. After three rounds of significant undersubscription, the 
price will rise by $12. Figure 4 below illustrates the program’s price setting methodology while Table 2 illustrates how 
price increases and decreases are determined based on solicitation volumes (Pacific Gas and Electric, 2013). 
Figure 4- Re-MAT Adjustment Mechanism 
 
 
Table 2. Re-MAT Price Adjustment Mechanism 
Subscription for Program Period MWs 
Bi-monthly Period 
Price Adjustment 
< 20% (0.0-0.9 MW) Price Increase 
20-99% (1.0-4.9 MW) No adjustment 
>=100% (5.0+ MW) Price Decrease 
The initial tariff level was based on the highest executed contract received by each investor owned utility in the 
renewable auction process (see discussion of RAM below). Table 3 below shows the historical pricing for the Re-MAT 
solicitation program for as-available peaking (i.e., solar PV) projects in each of the participating utility territories. Pricing 
does not include multipliers that are available for delivery of power during peak demand periods. PV systems with Re-
MAT contracts can receive an additional 15 percent of their contracted power price for delivering power during critical 
periods (PG&E, 2015). The first solicitation round opened in October 2013 while the most recent round opened in 
January of 2015. 
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Table 3- Re-MAT Prices Rounds 1-8  
Utility Round 1  Round2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8  
PG&E $89.23 $85.23 $77.23 $65.23 $53.23 $57.23 $57.23 $57.23 
Southern 
California 
Edison 
$89.23 $85.23 $77.23 $77.23 $77.23 $81.23 $81.23 $77.23 
San Diego Gas & 
Electric 
$89.23 $89.23 $89.23 $89.23 
N/A – 
segment 
fully  
subscribed 
N/A – 
segment 
fully  
subscribed 
N/A – 
segment 
fully  
subscribed 
N/A – 
segment 
fully  
subscribed 
As the table indicates, incentive prices have moved sharply down in the PG&E territory since the beginning of the 
program and have increased slightly during the last several solicitation rounds. In the SCE territory, the contract price 
initially declined, but has fluctuated near $80 per MWh during much of the program. SDG&E, which had a smaller overall 
solicitation volume, was fully subscribed after the fourth program round.  
2.1.2.3 Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM) 
The CPUC required California’s three largest IOUs to procure 1,229 MW of distributed generation to comply with RPS 
targets. Under the Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM) program, five auctions occurred biennially between November 
2011 and June 2014. A sixth auction was recently approved by California regulators and will include unused capacity 
from contracts awarded under previous solicitations as well as 75 MW of new capacity. Any generator qualified under 
California’s RPS between 3 and 20 MW is eligible to bid into the auction. Eligible technologies include:  
 Photovoltaics 
 Solar thermal electric  
 Wind 
  Certain biomass resources  
 Municipal solid waste conversion (Incineration 
ineligible) 
 
 Geothermal electric 
  Certain hydroelectric facilities 
 Ocean wave, thermal and tidal energy 
 Fuel cells using renewable fuels 
 Landfill gas
 
 
Bids are selected by the IOUs based on project viability and bid price. Information on bid price is considered confidential 
and no data has been published on winning bid prices. Solar PV systems have been the majority of projects entering the 
RAM solicitations and more than 80 percent of the capacity awarded through the program has gone to solar PV systems 
(Hunt, 2014), (Public Utilities Commission of California, 2014), (San Diego Gas and Electric, 2014). 
2.1.3 Key Interactions 
As described above, California’s solar programs are closely interconnected. The RAM, Re-MAT, and the California Solar 
Initiative are intended to support meeting state-wide RPS targets. The initial rate for the Re-MAT program was 
determined based on the results of the latest reverse auction held through the RAM process. Solar systems cannot 
benefit from both cash-based CSI rebates and the Re-MAT program. Additionally, many customer-sited systems 
participating in the CSI program benefit from net metering, which can be a substantial benefit given California’s inclining 
block electricity rate structure. High net metering values have likely contributed significantly to the continued growth of 
the state’s residential solar market since the end of the CSI program.  
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2.1.4 Impact and Observations: 
California ranks first in the nation for installed PV capacity, and over half of the state’s current installed capacity came 
online in 2013 (2,756MW of solar installations). Even though the declining block incentives have either been fully 
exhausted or have reached their enrollment caps, distributed solar continues to grow in California. Average installation 
costs have also continued to decline, falling 6 percent over the last year. (Solar Electric Industries Association, 2015). 
Existing installations and expected solar market growth in California has required the grid operator to consider future 
operating paradigms that are substantially different from historical demand patterns. Known in the industry as the 
“Duck Curve,” the California ISO has developed a forecast under likely expected solar PV market penetrations in which 
the net power requirements on the grid drop considerably during hours of peak sunshine as utility customers generate 
more of their own power. Stakeholders in the state are actively engaged in exploring how flexible grid resources can be 
deployed to manage the energy supply and demand paradigms (California ISO, 2015).  
Figure 5. The Cal-ISO Duck Curve Load Projections 
 
As a large state with a substantial renewable energy RPS commitment, California has implemented a range of PV 
incentive programs that have created a diverse market. Creating incentive programs within distinct utility territories 
with different incentive pricing levels has allowed California’s solar market to accommodate geographic differences in 
solar resources and local solar market conditions. As was seen in both the Re-MAT and CSI initiatives, the pricing and 
market development rates have been different in each utility territory allowing these state sub-markets to develop 
without a single region of the state receiving a disproportionate amount of solar incentives. This approach may be a 
viable option in Massachusetts where differences in real estate costs, PV installation costs and retail electricity prices 
could potentially create geographic imbalances in solar market development under a single incentive structure.  
Both the Re-MAT and CSI declining block programs are innovative incentive setting mechanisms that overcome some of 
the challenges associated with typical standard offer and rebate-based programs. By establishing clear program criteria 
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and adjusting incentive levels based on market conditions, these programs have limited ratepayer risk of over-
subsidization. Additionally, the declining block incentive framework was structured to move the state’s distributed solar 
market away from subsidies in a market-responsive fashion. Additionally, the fixed program budget and defined MW 
program target provides significant transparency into program costs. This mechanism has been adopted by New York as 
part of that state’s latest incentive program iteration. One notable feature of the Re-MAT program its ability to increase 
incentive prices in response to changing market conditions. This policy feature is likely to make Re-MAT-like mechanisms 
more responsive to changes outside the control of state and utility program administrators such as changes to federal 
incentive policies or increases in global PV system component costs.  Finally, the RAM program has shown that, at least 
in the California market, large scale solar PV systems can effectively compete against other renewable energy 
generators.  
As with all programs that require centralized program managers to award incentives, some proportion of projects that 
are awarded incentives will not be constructed. This can result in programs not meeting overall market capacity goals 
and can frustrate developers with viable projects that were not awarded contracts. Both the Re-MAT and RAM programs 
have bid deposit mechanisms that are intended to prevent speculative bidding (PG&E, 2015). While these mechanisms 
are in place to limit potential contract failures, several of the California utilities routinely discount the expected 
production of renewable energy systems they have under contract but which have not yet been completed as part of 
their RPS obligation forecasts because of expected project failure rates.  
The suite of incentive programs implemented in California over the past several years has resulted in steady market 
growth and the development of a sustainable PV industry in the state. The unique incentive rate setting mechanisms 
pioneered in California may be worth considering in the Massachusetts context as they provide market-responsive 
incentive pricing with standard offer, open-access incentives. 
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2.2 New York Megawatt Block Incentive Program  
2.2.1 Introduction 
In comparison to other East Coast states such as New Jersey and Massachusetts, New York has historically had a 
relatively small solar market. In 2012 Governor Cuomo launched the NY-SUN initiative, a $1 billion program to drive the 
development of 3 GW of solar PV by 2023. A continuation and expansion of previous state programs, the NY-SUN 
initiative fits within the framework of New York’s RPS policy, which has a current goal of supplying 30 percent of the 
state’s power from renewable sources by 2015. The state RPS is implemented through a two-tiered system with a Main 
Tier for utility-scale systems and a Customer-sited Tier (CST) for distributed installations. NYSERDA centrally procures the 
RPS Main Tier through regular solicitations for long-term contracts. NYSERDA implements several programs as part of 
the CST including programs for fuel cells, anaerobic digesters, small wind installations and solar PV.  NYSERDA’s solar PV 
programs, which have been in place since 2003, are now operated under the umbrella of the state-wide NY-SUN 
initiative. The state’s current solar program offerings include a declining block incentive program called the Megawatt 
Block program. In early 2015, this program will expand to include larger-scale solar projects over 200 kW, which were 
previously supported by a competitive solicitation process. Funds for the program are paid for via RPS charges on 
ratepayers. 
In 2010, the New York RPS target was expanded from 25 percent by 2013 to 30 percent by 2020. The Customer-sited 
Tier was also expanded from 2 percent to 8.44 percent. The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) recently raised 
the state net metering cap from 3 percent to 6 percent of 2005 peak demand after concerns that the existing cap would 
not enable the market to reach current goals. The PSC also commissioned a study on net metering impacts and a future 
value-based tariff.  
New York has had retail electric competition since the 1990s, and the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 
serves as the transmission system operator for the state. The NYISO also operates capacity and ancillary service markets. 
The state has six investor owned electric distribution companies (EDCs) in addition to the Long Island Power Authority 
(LIPA), a public-power provider serving Long Island that has been recently rebranded as PSE&G Long Island. The 
territories of the investor owned EDCs have traditionally been under the jurisdiction of NYSERDA programs while the 
former LIPA territory has historically developed and implemented its own renewable energy policies. This has recently 
changed with NYSERDA now supporting renewable energy programs in the former LIPA territory.   
2.2.2 Policy Description 
New York’s small-scale Megawatt Block program is an incentive program that provides upfront payments in the form of 
rebates calculated as a dollar per watt incentive. The program’s incentive rate declines as MWs of capacity are enrolled 
in the program on a predetermined schedule. The current program provides incentives for PV systems up to 200kW. In 
recognition of the differing economics of PV systems across the state, NYSERDA has defined separate incentive levels 
and declining block schedules for the upstate region, ConEdison’s territory and Long Island. Within each regional 
territory, a separate incentive with a distinct declining block schedule has been defined for residential and non-
residential systems.  The incentive is made available to installers approved by NY-SUN who then pass the savings on to 
consumers. PV systems in the program must serve less than 110 percent of on-site load. Non-residential systems receive 
a larger incentive for the first 50 kW of capacity and receive a smaller incentive for the remainder up to 200 kW. The 
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step schedules for each utility territory are provided in Table 4 and Table 5 below along with the total MW expected 
from the program for each territory.12  In each table, the current incentive block as of January 2015 is highlighted. 
Table 4- Residential Program Tiers for Long Island, Con Edison and Upstate NY (NYSERDA, 2015) 
 
Long Island ConEdison Upstate 
BLOCK MW $/WATT MW $/WATT MW $/WATT 
1 37 $0.50 14 $1.00 40 $1.00 
2 15 $0.40 6 $0.90 15 $0.90 
3 20 $0.30 9 $0.80 19 $0.80 
4 50 $0.20 12 $0.70 22 $0.70 
5 
  
15 $0.60 24 $0.60 
6 
  
18 $0.50 31 $0.50 
7 
  
38 $0.40 70 $0.40 
8 
  
70 $0.30 75 $0.30 
9 
  
120 $0.20 148 $0.20 
Total 122 $40.5 MM 302 $113.2 MM 444 $194.1 MM 
 
Table 5 - Non-residential Program Tiers for Long Island, Con Edison and Upstate NY (NYSERDA, 2015) 
  Long Island ConEdison Upstate 
BLOCK MW 
0-50kW 
$/WATT 
50-200kW 
$/WATT 
MW 
0-50kW 
$/WATT 
50-200kW 
$/WATT 
MW 
0-50kW 
$/WATT 
50-200kW 
$/WATT 
1 7 $0.50 $0.50 6 $1.00 $0.60 35 $1.00 $0.60 
2 6 $0.45 $0.43 4 $0.90 $0.55 8 $0.90 $0.55 
3 7 $0.40 $0.36 6 $0.80 $0.50 10 $0.80 $0.50 
4 9 $0.35 $0.30 8 $0.70 $0.45 12 $0.70 $0.45 
5 15 $0.25 $0.23 10 $0.60 $0.40 18 $0.60 $0.40 
6 14 $0.15 $0.15 15 $0.50 $0.35 23 $0.50 $0.35 
7 
   
35 $0.40 $0.30 28 $0.40 $0.30 
8 
   
45 $0.30 $0.25 77 $0.30 $0.25 
9 
   
73 $0.20 $0.20 95 $0.20 $0.20 
10 
   
101 $0.15 $0.15 145 $0.15 $0.15 
Total 58 
  
303 
  
451 
  
 
NYSERDA maintains a website that provides real-time data on incentive step levels and provides data on the current 
volume of capacity that has been reserved. This allows solar stakeholders to have an up-to-date view of when incentive 
levels could decrease. Figure 6 below shows the online dashboard developed by NYSERDA for the program.  
                                                          
12
 Long Island has traditionally had a more robust solar market with lower installed costs. Additionally, electricity rates in Long Island 
are generally higher than those in many other parts of the state. The program incentive levels reflect these factors.  
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Figure 6. NYSERDA MW Block Program Dashboard (NYSERDA, 2015) 
 
In addition to the small scale Megawatt Block Incentive Program, NYSERDA is in the process of developing a similar 
program for larger systems (customer-sited systems greater than 200kW). Like the program for smaller systems, this 
program will have a defined schedule of incentives that decline over time based on total volume installed. Unlike the 
program for smaller systems, the new program will provide incentives as a hybrid of a performance based incentive (PBI) 
and an upfront payment. The total maximum incentive will be based on the current block dollar per watt incentive level. 
This capacity-based incentive level will be used to calculate a maximum potential system incentive and associated 
$/kWh performance based incentive. System developers will be provided with 25 percent of the maximum incentive 
upon commercial operations of the system and then will be provided three annual payments that will be based on the 
systems actual production multiplied by 75% of the maximum system performance based incentive. Table 6 below 
illustrates a hypothetical 500kW system receiving a $0.63/kW block incentive. This table shows an ideal circumstance 
under which the PV system produces its estimated annual production. In the event that the system produces less than 
the expected production, the system owner’s annual production-based compensation would be lower than the 
maximum available incentive.   
Table 6. Illustrative Example of Incentive Calculation Under the Proposed NYSERDA Large System MW Block Program (NYSERDA, 2015) 
Parameter Value Calculation 
System Size 500kW 
 
Annual Production 586,920 (500 kW) X (13.4% Capacity Factor) X (8760 hours per year) 
Maximum Incentive Amount $315,000 (Total System Size) X ($0.63/kW Incentive) 
Three year per kWh Incentive Amount $0.179 (Maximum Incentive)/(Annual Production X 3 Years) 
Upfront Payment at Commercial Operations $78,750 25% X Maximum Incentive Amount = (.25) X ($315,000) 
Year One Performance Payment $78,750 
75% X Three Year kWh Incentive X Annual Production = (0.75) X (0.179) X 
(58,6920) 
Year Two Performance Payment $78,750 
(75%) X (Three Year kWh Incentive) X (Annual Production) = (0.75) X (0.179) 
X (58,6920) 
Year Three Performance Payment $78,750 
(75%) X (Three Year kWh Incentive) X (Annual Production) = (0.75) X (0.179) 
X (58,6920) 
Total Incentive $315,000 
Upfront Payment + Year One Payment + Year Two Payment + Year Three 
Payment 
The current proposed large-scale Megawatt Block Incentive Program also provides 20 percent incentive value adders for 
locating PV systems in strategically critical locations as defined by the local electric distribution utility. This added 
incentive is intended to improve the economics of systems in geographic areas where solar PV has the greatest value to 
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the grid. Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the current proposed incentive rates, block volumes and associated $/kWh 
incentives for the ConEdison territories and the remainder of the state. The remainder of the state incentive program 
has been geographically divided into a western region, with higher early incentives, and a non-western region.  
Figure 7. Proposed Large MW Block Program Incentives for the ConEdison Territory (NYSERDA, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 8. Prosed Large MW Block Incentive Levels for non-ConEdison New York Regions (NYSERDA, 2014) 
 
As currently proposed, the large system Megawatt Block Incentive Program would support 340 MW in the ConEdison 
territory at a total cost of $125 million. The estimated budget for the remainder of the state is $300 million and is 
expected to support 1,235 MW (NYSERDA, 2014). 
2.2.3 Key Interactions 
Megawatt Block Incentive Program participants assist with the achievement of the Customer-sited Tier of the New York 
RPS. Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SRECs) are not available in New York, therefore system owners receive these 
rebates in lieu of an SREC-based incentive. New York State also offers a 25 percent residential solar tax credit of up to 
$5,000, a sales tax exemption, and has loans available for solar systems through NYSERDA. Jurisdictions in New York also 
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have the option to offer a property tax exemption for solar in an effort to reduce soft costs.  Systems taking advantage 
of the Megawatt Block Incentive Program can also benefit from net metering in New York State. In New York, excess 
generation is credited at the full retail rate with annual excess generation credited at avoided cost rates. New York does 
allow remote net metering under which individual customers can allocate net metering credits to other accounts they 
are responsible for (NY PSC, 2011). 
2.2.4 Impact and Observations 
In designing the Megawatt Block Incentive Programs, NYSERDA sought to “provide certainty and transparency to the 
industry regarding incentive levels” and to provide incentives that account for differences in regional solar installed 
costs. The program was also designed with the intent of driving the state towards a self-sustaining market that was not 
reliant on state incentives (NYSERDA, 2014).  The MW Block program is a relatively new incentive program with the 
small scale program launched in August 2014 and the large-scale program expected to be launched in early 2015. The 
early stages of the small-scale program have seen robust uptake in several regions. For instance the Long Island 
residential program tranche has already allocated 64 MW of the program’s expected 122 MW, reducing the incentive 
level from $0.50 per watt to $0.30 per watt. Despite this early success, it is too early to evaluate how the market has 
responded to this program compared to previous NYSERDA offerings. 
As a standard offer program with open access for approved installers, the NYSERDA Megawatt Block Incentive Program 
provides the benefits of an open-market program that does not require regularly scheduled solicitations. In theory, this 
market feature should reduce individual installation cost as project developers will not need to enter competitive 
solicitations that may require installers to develop multiple projects in order to win a single contract. This program 
feature will provide certainty and transparency to developers and should promote long-term industry growth. Counter 
to that benefit, the Megawatt Block Incentive Program has set a fixed incentive schedule, meaning that, in the event of 
changes from external market factors, such as major increases in global solar component costs or the expiration of 
federal tax benefits, the rigid structure of the Megawatt Block Incentive Program could create market contractions. In 
the event of such an occurrence, policymakers may feel significant pressure to revise incentive levels in order to prevent 
industry job losses. The pending reduction in the federal Investment Tax Credit could present a major challenge to 
declining block programs.  
In designing the large-scale Megawatt Block Incentive Program, NYSERDA has established geographically distinct 
incentives for different state regions as well as bonus incentives for installations located in utility-identified regions 
where installations have the greatest value to the grid. This model may be of interest to Massachusetts policy makers as 
several stakeholders in the Massachusetts Net Metering Task Force process have suggested that location-based 
incentives that promote grid benefits be considered. As further details about the final design of the large-scale 
Megawatt Block Incentive Program become available, the effectiveness of this approach could be further evaluated. One 
additional potential consideration with this approach are potential equity concerns related to differentiated program 
incentives. Solar incentives are paid for by all electricity ratepayers yet only a sub-segment of ratepayers will have 
properties that allow them to take advantage of solar incentives. These incentive distributional effects may be further 
concentrated if added incentives are preferentially distributed to ratepayers in geographically defined areas.  
The New York Megawatt Block Incentive Program has a fixed budget and predefined step-down schedule. This means 
that program administrators know the full cost of the incentive program at inception. This provides greater transparency 
compared to SREC market-based mechanisms in which annual compliance costs can be estimated, but not fully known in 
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advance. While the overall cost of the program can be known in advance, with a fixed budget and schedule, but no fixed 
timeline, estimating annual program costs will depend on market response to incentive levels.  
As a program with limited available data, project success and failure rates are unavailable at this time. That said, 
NYSERDA has proposed an enrollment mechanism for the large-scale program that is intended to prevent developers 
from reserving incentives and not moving forward with projects. This includes a reservation security deposit of up to 15 
percent of the total estimated incentive or $25/kW, whichever is greater. Additionally, installers will have 18 months to 
install projects once incentives have been reserved (with the ability to apply for a 6 month extension if certain criteria 
are met).  
The New York Megawatt Block Incentive Programs build off the model pioneered in California under the California Solar 
Initiative. In that state, the steadily declining incentives lead to a stable, unsubsidized residential solar market that has 
continued to grow over time. The New York declining block programs may repeat this success, however it remains to 
been seen whether this model will prove resilient in the likely event that major reductions occur to federal solar 
investment tax incentives. Regardless, the New York Megawatt Block Incentive Program has established a transparent 
incentive framework with standard offer incentives and a fixed program budget that could serve as a potential model for 
consideration by the Massachusetts Net Metering Task Force.  
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2.3 Rhode Island Renewable Energy Growth Program 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Rhode Island’s Renewable Energy Growth (REG) Program offers 20-year utility tariffs13 to qualifying solar, wind, anaerobic 
digestion and hydroelectric projects through a competitive process.  The program is administered by the Office of Energy 
Resources (OER) and the Distributed Generation Board and is effectively an extension of the Distributed Generation 
Standard Contracts (DG SC) Pilot Program, which operated from 2011 to 2014.  Maximum contract rates (referred to as 
“ceiling prices”) are approved annually by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC).  National Grid, the state’s sole investor-
owned utility, manages the competitive solicitations and enters long-term tariff agreements with successful bidders.  The 
REG Program’s objective is to successfully develop an incremental 160 MW of distributed generation in Rhode Island by 
2019 (RI REF, 2015). 
Rhode Island operates a competitive retail electric market, which was established through the Rhode Island Utility 
Restructuring Act of 1996.  National Grid provides distribution service to the vast majority of the state’s customer load.  
Retail customer access to competitive markets began in 1997, with National Grid assigned as the provider of Standard 
Offer service for customers electing not to switch their generation service.   
Rhode Island offers a supportive policy environment for renewable energy, particularly for small on-site and distributed 
generation projects. The state has established a Renewable Energy Standard (RES), a long-term contracting standard for 
90 MW of RES-eligible renewables as well as offshore wind supply, net metering, a Renewable Energy Fund which 
administers grants and loans, a DG Standard Contracts Program and the current REG Program.  The RES was enabled in 
2004 and originally required load-serving entities to supply 16 percent of retail sales with qualified New (14 percent) and 
Existing (2 percent) renewable energy resources14.  Rhode Island’s net metering program enables generators up to 5 MW 
to offset retail electric bills.  Generators must be “reasonably designed” to provide up to 100 percent of a customer’s 
annual electricity consumption (up to 125 percent for any individual billing cycle), so deliberately oversized projects are 
excluded.  Net excess generation is credited at the utility’s avoided cost.  Multiple meters on a single, or adjacent, 
property may be aggregated, but virtual net metering is not offered – except to facilities owned by, or owned and 
operated on behalf of, municipalities or other public entities.  There is an aggregate net metering capacity limit of 3 
percent of peak load for Block Island Power Company and Pascoag Utility District, but this limit was removed for National 
Grid, which serves as distribution utility for the majority of load in the state.  The Rhode Island Renewable Energy Fund15 
(REF) is a public benefits fund created by the 1996 restructuring legislation which offers grants and loans to a wide range 
of renewable projects.  The REF currently supports four program areas: small solar, commercial development, feasibility 
studies, and early-stage commercialization.  Small solar is supported primarily through a block grant program (currently 
offering grants of $1.15 per watt to a maximum of $10,000) (RE Growth Program Public Review Meeting, 2015). 
The REG Program, which is just beginning in 2015, was developed in accordance with RIGL § 39-26.6-4 (a) (1) and the 
applicable provisions of RIGL § 39-26.2-4 and 39-26.2-5.  It succeeds and replaces the Distributed Generation Standard 
Contracts Pilot Program, which had been in place since 2011 and offered up to 40 MW of 15-year power purchase 
agreements with National Grid through a similar competitive process.  Both programs were developed in response to 
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  A host-owned solar projects < 10 kW has the option to elect a 15-year tariff. 
14
 In a 2014 determination of resource inadequacy, the PUC delayed the 2015 new RES target increase by one year and called for the 
overall new target to truncate at 12.5 percent rather than 14 percent.   
15
 The REF was created under the Office of Energy Resources and is administered by the RI Commerce Corporation. 
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increasing pressure to attract the potential for renewable energy job and economic development to Rhode Island.  The 
RES – while successful at meeting its goals to date – has largely resulted in procurement from out of state generators.  
Recognizing Rhode Island’s limited land area and resource potential to support large-scale projects, policymakers turned 
their focus to distributed generation.  The DG SC Program has successfully encouraged grid-connected projects between 
50 kW and 3 MW.  The REG program will expand the reach of this policy to include residential customers, streamline the 
contracting process by replacing Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with tariffs, and grow Rhode Island’s distributed 
generation mandate to a total of 200 MW by 2019 – a substantial sum for a small state (RE Growth Program Public 
Review Meeting, 2015).  It is designed to do so in a manner that is not additive to the net metering incentive, as discussed 
further below.  As of January 2015, the DG SC program has concluded with 39.07 MW currently under contract, most of 
which is solar PV.  Sixteen projects are operating and the remainder is under development.  The REG Program 
commences in 2015, with a first-year contracting target of 25 MW (RI REF, 2015). 
2.3.2 Policy Description 
The REG Program offers a long-term, fixed price tariff between National Grid and qualifying renewable energy projects 
which is implemented as a performance-based incentive.  The tariff approach replaces the use of contracts under the DG 
Standard Contract program.  Host-owned solar projects less than 10kW may elect either a 15- or 20-year tariff.  All other 
projects receive a 20-year tariff.  Pricing is fixed and flat for the duration of the agreement.  For solar projects up to 250 
kW, fixed tariff pricing is approved by the PUC on an annual basis – there is no price bidding for these projects, and 
program MW are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis (H.7727 The Distributed Generation Growth Program, 2015).   
All other projects must bid in response to one of up to three competitive solicitations offered annually.  Awards are made 
based on price, assuming all other eligibility criteria are met.  For successful projects, tariff pricing is “as-bid” and is paid 
by National Grid for all production.  Once a contract is awarded, projects have 24 months (solar and wind) to achieve 
commercial operations.16   A performance guarantee deposit is required to maintain each project’s position in the 
program during this time.  For projects less than 1 MW, a security of $15/REC (for total estimated REC production) must 
be received within 5 days after a project is awarded a place in the program through a Certificate of Eligibility.  For projects 
of 1 MW or greater, a security of $25/REC is required.  The exceptions to this rule are solar projects up to 250kW, for 
which no security deposit is required.  National Grid is authorized to grant one 6-month extension at no cost for non-
residential projects for unforeseen delays.  A second 6-month extension (for a total of 12 months) may be granted if the 
project provides an additional security deposit of 50 percent of the original performance guarantee.     
The DG SC Program was implemented using PPAs.  The process of securing PUC approvals and administration also placed 
a burden on National Grid personnel. A cornerstone of the new REG Program is its implementation through utility 
tariffs. From the National Grid perspective, use of a tariff insulates the commitments from impacting the company’s 
financial statements (an issue with PPAs) and places the transaction under PUC jurisdiction (power contracts falling 
under FERC jurisdiction). Policymakers, utilities and project developers hope that this will streamline the process while 
still satisfying financial institutions. Policymaker objectives with respect to project type have also evolved. The DG SC 
Program accepted only projects greater than or equal to 50 kW and interconnected on the utility’s side of the meter. By 
comparison, the REG program allows residential participation, including a legislated target of 3 MW in the first program 
year. All projects under the REG program are required to have a generation (net) meter, which is interconnected on the 
utility’s side of the host customer service meter. 
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 36 months for anaerobic digesters or 48 months for hydroelectric. 
   
74 
 
The programmatic goal of 160 MW is divided into annual targets, and then further divided into segments by technology 
and project size.  For example, the 2015 REG program will offer tariff to up to 25 MW of projects, allocated as follows: 
Table 7. Allocation of 2015 Renewable Energy Growth Program MW 
Technology & Eligible Class kW Allocations 
Small Solar I – Host Owned 
3,000 kW* DC Small Solar I – Third Party Owned/Financed 
Small Solar II 
Medium Solar 4,000 kW DC 
Commercial Solar 5,500 kW DC 
Large Solar 6,000 kW DC 
Wind I 
5,000 kW DC 
Wind II 
Anaerobic Digestion I 
1,500 kW DC 
Anaerobic Digestion II 
Small Scale Hydropower I 
Small Scale Hydropower II 
Total 25,000 kW 
*The REG statute requires a minimum of 3 MW be allocated to the small solar class during the 
2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 program years. 
Annual program targets for the remaining program years are as follows: 50 MW in each of 2016 through 2018, and the 
greater of 15 or all of the remaining MW in 2019.  In addition, any remaining (un-contracted or unsuccessful) MWs from 
the DG Standard Contracts Pilot Program will be added to the 2019 REG target (Tariff Advice Filing for Renewable Energy 
Growth Program and Solicitation and Enrollment Process Rules, 2014). 
Competitively bid tariff rates are subject to a cap, which is referred to as a ceiling price.  Ceiling prices are set 
administratively (by the PUC), based on recommendations developed by the OER and DG Board through a public 
research- and stakeholder comment-driven process.  Independent research and stakeholder data submittals are 
combined in a consultant analysis which analyzes the levelized contract price required to enable projects to cover their 
costs and achieve a market-based, risk-adjusted rate of return. Ceiling prices are approved for each technology and size 
category.  For example, the recommended 2015 REG ceiling prices are as follows: 
Table 8. Recommended 2015 REG Ceiling Prices 
Technology Ceiling Prices (¢/kWh) 
Small Solar I – Host Owned (15 Year Tariff) 41.35 
Small Solar I – Host Owned (20 Year Tariff) 37.75 
Small Solar I – Third Party Owned/Financed 32.95 
Small Solar II 29.80 
Medium Solar 24.40 
Commercial Solar 20.95 
Large Solar 16.70 
Wind I 22.75 
Wind II 22.35 
Anaerobic Digestion I 20.60 
Anaerobic Digestion II 20.60 
Small Scale Hydropower I 21.35 
Small Scale Hydropower II 21.10 
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Table 9 provides a summary of historic ceiling prices, established during the DG Standard Contracts Program. 
Table 9. Historic Ceiling Prices*, DG Standard Contracts Program 2012-2014 
Technology Class 2014 2013 2012 
 Size ¢/kWh Size ¢/kWh Size ¢/kWh 
Small Solar   50-100 kW 29.95 10-150 kW 33.35 
Medium Solar 50-200 kW 27.10 101-250 kW 28.80   
Commercial 201-500 kW 27.30 251-499 kW 28.40 151-500 kW 31.60 
Large Solar 501-3000 kW 23.50 > 500 kW 24.95 501-1000 kW 28.95 
Wind 1.0-1.5 MW 17.50 1.0-1.5 MW 14.80 N/A 13.35 
Hydro 50 kW-1.0 MW 17.90 400-500kW 17.90   
Anaerobic 
Digestion 
50 kW-1.0 MW 18.55 0.5-1.0 MW 18.55   
* Including ITC (Solar, Wind) or PTC (Hydro, AD); without Bonus Depreciation 
The combination of ceiling prices and competitive solicitations has yielded declining contract prices over time.  Figure 9 
demonstrates the decline in DG Standard Contract Ceiling Prices between 2012 and 2014, and includes the 
recommended REG Ceiling Prices for 2015. 
Figure 9. Ceiling Price Decline, 2012 - 2015 
 
Figure 10 demonstrates the range, and overall decline, in the bid prices of large solar projects selected for DG Standard 
Contracts between 2011 and 2014.  As can be seen, prices have at times been well below the ceiling prices, although in 
2014 this trend leveled off (anecdotally, prices in 2013 were reportedly at unsustainable/unprofitable levels). 
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Figure 10: Bid Prices of Large Solar Projects Selected for Standard Contracts, 2011 - 2015 
 
As demonstrated by the data in Table 8 and Table 9, and the trends in Figure 9 and Figure 10, the ceiling price construct 
provides policymakers with a mechanism to benchmark price caps to market conditions and make course corrections 
over time.  Through this process, Rhode Island hopes to support its dual objectives of supporting renewable energy 
development at a just and reasonable cost to ratepayers.  
2.3.3 Key Interactions 
All projects participating in the REG Program (and the DG Standard Contracts Program before it) must be qualified as 
Rhode Island RES New resources.  For all non-residential customers, both DG Standard Contracts and REG Tariffs convey 
all energy, capacity and renewable energy certificates (RECs) to National Grid.  By statute, residential customers retain 
all energy and capacity for self supply, selling only RECs.17  In all cases, National Grid owns all RECs, which it may apply 
towards its RES compliance obligation or liquidate into the regional market.   
During the initial DG SC Pilot Program, project owners were compensated by National Grid through a PPA for all output.  
DG SC generators were not eligible to be net metering generators.  For the REG Program, projects operating under the 
non-residential tariff may elect to be compensated either directly (e.g. by check) or through bill credits which resemble a 
form of net metering.  Bill credits are provided for the lesser of the project’s output or the customer’s use during the 
billing period.  Bill credits are calculated at the full value of the per kWh delivery and commodity charges applicable to 
their current service rate.  This amount is then deducted from the full REG tariff (PBI18) rate, with the remaining balance 
(if any) paid by check.  If the bill credit in a given month exceeds the PBI, the customer will receive the full amount of the 
bill credit (which will not exceed the total of the per kWh delivery service and standard offer charges).  In other words, 
the customer benefits from the greater of the PBI and net metered value, but the PBI and net metering credit are not 
additive.  Projects electing the bill credit approach must comply with all other requirements of the net metering 
program – including the limitation of project installed capacity to no more than 100% of the customer’s three-year 
historic average load.  All residential projects are compensated under the bill credit mechanism described above and 
must therefore comply with all net metering requirements.   For both residential and non-residential projects, those 
eligible may revert to the net metering program at the conclusion of their REG tariff.   Small solar projects must elect 
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 Energy and capacity are deemed to be consumed on-site, and are not available for sale to the utility. 
18
 Performance-based incentive. 
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either the REG Program or the REF Grant Program.  These are important attributes of the REG Program and unique 
interactions between a PBI and Net Metering Credit (RE Growth Program Public Review Meeting, 2015).   
Finally, the DG SC and REG Programs also take into account the interaction between ceiling prices and federal renewable 
energy policy.  During each year’s ceiling price evaluation process, the OER and DG Board consider the federal incentives 
likely to be available during the following program year (for which ceiling prices are being set).  When federal incentives 
are uncertain, the OER and DG Board may submit more than one set of ceiling prices to the PUC – reflecting, for 
example, pricing options with and without the Investment Tax Credit (ITC).   
2.3.4 Impacts and Observations 
The DG Standard Contracts Pilot Program achieved some success in attracting at least an initial burst of attention to the 
potential for solar development activity in Rhode Island.  During the 2012 and 2013 program years, new access to utility 
long-term contracts, federal incentives, and robust ceiling prices spurred activity among solar developers.  During this 
period, both smaller in-state developers and much larger regional and national developers began to establish project 
pipelines and submit bids to National Grid.  For the larger solar categories, 2012 and 2013 solicitations were over-
subscribed, and contract prices declined rapidly.  Wind and anaerobic digesters have not followed this trend, receiving 
serious attention from only one developer each throughout the program.   
The diversity of solar market participants was temporary. During 2014, market participation decreased significantly. 
This was likely due to a combination of factors, including: reduced margins driven by price competition (and based on the 
authors’ anecdotal conversations with various market participants over the course of the last several years, potentially 
speculative bidding), the limited amount of program MWs, siting and permitting challenges, high  or uncertain 
property taxes, and a greater volume of opportunities in other state markets in the region. Developers may be able to 
justify an unsustainable margin in order to complete an initial project and establish a market foothold, but – by 
definition – a viable business cannot be built in this manner. To this end, the bidding activity and price declines of 2012 
and 2013 may have been (at least in part) symptoms of exuberance among less experienced developers. The degree of 
project attrition over time will help to determine the extent to which this may have been the case. The 2014 
solicitations had less participation than in 2013 and were generally undersubscribed. National Grid observed that the 
allocations in 2013 along with the allowed ceiling prices drove high interest in limited class sizes in 2013.  In 2014, there 
was a decline in several solar class ceiling prices while the amount allocated in some classes and flexibility was 
increased.  The 2014 solicitations were ultimately less competitive than in prior years (a higher percentage of projects 
that applied were awarded contracts) while the price in some classes and overall still declined.  By the end of 2014, the 
larger regional players appeared19 to exit the market. Because the annual target MWs were allocated by technology 
and by size, the program as a whole fell short of its targets on numerous occasions when one or more categories was 
undersubscribed. This is a side-effect, and possibly a short-coming, of integrating specific inflexible diversity targets 
During the first two program years (201120 and 2012), 16 projects totaling 15.12 MW executed Standard Contracts with 
National Grid.  Since then, twelve (12) of these projects have become operational and four (4) projects totaling 2.15 MW 
(25 percent of projects and 14.21 percent of MWs) have terminated their contracts.  As of the December 2014 program 
end date, the DG Standard Contracts Program includes 46 active contracts totaling 39.07 MW, which consist of 41 solar, 
                                                          
19
 Some market participants have speculated – although we cannot confirm this – that developers may have decided to wait for the 
REG program with its larger size, lower transaction costs, and hoped-for greater margins. 
20
 The program initiated in 2011, which was a partial year – with one enrollment period offered in the fall. 
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1 anaerobic digester, and 4 wind projects.  No contracts were awarded to small scale hydropower.  Due to the 
challenges presented by renewable energy permitting, financing and construction, it is reasonable to expect additional 
attrition.  It is too early to assess an attrition rate for the remainder of active projects. Again, any MW not constructed 
under the Standard Contracts program will be rolled into the final 2019 solicitation under the REG Program (Renewable 
Energy Growth Program, 2014).  
Procurement structure also has an influence on the program.  While common in many markets, periodic procurements 
tend to foster episodic bursts in market activity rather than foster a fluid market.  It is challenging to realize permanent 
job growth in a market that limits the development of stable project pipelines. This may lead to frustration for project 
hosts and developers alike since the project development process requires ample lead time and sufficient certainty in 
increasing demand over time to justify continued investment.  Rhode Island’s small size, and the pilot nature of the DG 
Standard Contract program, preclude over-interpretation of the programs’ impact on in-state jobs (the prospect for job 
growth in Rhode Island may be closely linked with the level of activity in its larger neighbors).  Compared to the 
Connecticut ZREC program with its once per year procurements, the more frequent procurements in Rhode Island’s 
programs provide for a steadier stream of activity in support of job creation.  
Overall, the Rhode Island DG SC and REG programs hold the potential to offer considerable benefits to developers 
through long-term, fixed price contracts for energy, capacity and RECs with a creditworthy utility.  This should provide 
the market and revenue certainty necessary to encourage continued market investment and attract financing at 
reasonable costs reflective of minimized revenue risk.  In addition, the REG Program’s future relationship to net 
metering is clearly spelled out in National Grid tariffs, and distributed generation will be supported in a manner that is 
well-matched to distributed loads.  This approach is designed to avoid over-subsidization through separate net metering 
and solar incentive programs.   
As described, however, the program faces some challenges.  Like other competitive procurement programs, 
competition can be eroded at times by some degree of aggressive or speculative bidding, and the ensuing project 
attrition  (Wiser, O'Connell, Bolinger, Grace, & Pletka, January, 2006).  While Rhode Island’s small market size is 
undeniably a factor, these dynamics create tension in a program designed to achieve a diversity of participants, 
technologies and project sizes.  Due to its much larger size and the current robustness and diversity of participants, 
Massachusetts may be able to adopt aspects of the Rhode Island program that generate certainty and developer 
investment without impairing the state’s ability to achieve its goals for a range of market segments.  
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2.4 Delaware SREC Solicitation Program  
2.4.1 Introduction 
Delaware first implemented a state-wide renewable portfolio standard in 2005. This legislation has been revised on 
several occasions.  Under the current policy, 25 percent of the state’s electricity must be sourced from renewable 
energy sources in the PJM region by 2026.  Unlike most other RPS states which place their RPS obligation on load-serving 
entities, in Delaware this obligation is placed on the state’s distribution providers (Delmarva, DEC, and DEMEC).21  As 
part of the state’s RPS program, distribution utilities are required to source a specific portion of their renewable 
obligation from in-state solar installations. Utilities can fulfill this obligation either through owning their own generation 
or by purchasing and retiring Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SRECs). Both DMWEC and DEC have pursued a strategy of 
fulfilling their solar RPS requirements through self-generation. Delmarva has taken a portfolio approach to meeting its 
annual SREC obligations. This includes procuring SRECs through various brokerages, purchases from individually 
negotiated long-term contracts as well as the implementation of the SREC Solicitation Program (Delmarva Power, 
2014).22 The SREC Solicitation Program is implemented in cooperation with the Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility 
(SEU), a state-sponsored entity charged with developing and implementing energy efficiency and renewable energy 
programs and policies in Delaware.  
Delaware has a restructured electricity market and is part of the 13-state PJM regional transmission organization (RTO). 
Delmarva power is the state’s only investor owned utility (IOU), serving roughly 60 percent of Delaware’s load. The 
Delaware Electric Co-operative (DEC) provides distribution services in the state’s two southern-most counties and 
accounts for about 20 percent of Delaware’s total load. Additionally, the state has a nine municipal utilities which are 
served by the Delaware Municipal Electric Co-operative (DEMEC). The SREC Solicitation Program was originally approved 
by the Public Services Commission in 2011 and has held annual solicitations in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Originally launched 
as a pilot, the solicitation program has evolved over time, with each annual solicitation having different program 
parameters. The overall goals of the solicitation program are to provide long-term SREC contracts to system owners, 
ensuring incentive price certainty while also creating a competitive landscape to limit ratepayer costs and ensure only 
the most cost-effective solar PV systems receive incentives.  
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 Municipal electricity providers and rural co-operatives are given an option to opt-out of the RPS if they develop and implement 
comparable renewable energy programs.  
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2.4.2 Policy Description 
The SREC Solicitation Program has undergone a series of changes with each annual iteration of the program. The 
program offers long-term contracts to PV system owners for SRECs. Contacts awarded under the solicitation program 
have typically had a step-down feature, with SREC prices for the first period of the contract (i.e. seven years in the most 
recent solicitation) awarded to system owners at the as-bid contract price and the second phase of the contract (i.e. 
years 8-20 in the latest program solicitation) at a pre-determined fixed rate. For the 2014 solicitation, this fixed rate was 
set at $35 per SREC. In the 2012 and 2013 solicitations, this price was $50 per SREC. Delmarva has not indicated a 
specific annual target for the percentage of its total SREC obligation it intends to procure through this program, although 
roughly 30 percent of its 2014 obligation was satisfied through SRECs procured through the program (Delmarva Power, 
2014).23 
Delmarva and its contracted program administrator24 hold annual solicitations in which system owners bid an initial 
contract price for SRECs.25 Contracts are awarded to lowest bidders first until the full volume of available credits is 
procured. In an effort to promote the growth of a diverse solar market that is accessible to a range of market 
participants, the program is divided into different solicitation tranches based on system size. The number of tranches 
and the relative volume of SRECs procured in each tranche has changed over the course of the annual solicitations. 
Additionally, the program includes tranches for both existing systems that do not currently have long-term SREC 
contacts, as well as new systems.26 Table 10 shows the total number of annual SRECs procured in the 2014 solicitation 
(SRECDelaware, 2014).  
Table 10. 2014 Delmarv Power SREC Solicitation Program Tranches 
New Systems (systems with final interconnection approval after April 12th, 2013) 
Tier Nameplate Rating - (DC at STC) Annual SRECs in Tier 
N-1 Less than or equal to 30 kW 3,800 Pool* 
N-2 Greater than 30 kW but less than or equal to 200 kW 1,600 
N-3 Greater than 200 kW but less than or equal to 2 MW 1,600 
 
Existing Systems (systems with final interconnection approval before April 12, 2013) 
Tier Nameplate Rating - (DC at STC) SRECs in Tier 
E-1 Less than or equal to 30 kW 3,800 Pool* 
E-2 Greater than 30 kW but less than or equal to 2 MW 3,800 Pool* 
* Systems in the N-1, E-1 and E-2 tiers compete for the same pool of SRECs 
For the 2014 solicitation, the two tiers for existing systems (E-1 and E-2) and the tier for smaller systems (N-1) each 
competed for the same pool of 3,800 annual SRECs.27 In order to limit speculative bidding, bidders are required to 
provide a bid deposit of $100 per kW in order to enter the solicitation. Bid deposits are returned to solicitation entrants 
that are not awarded contracts or when winning bidders finish construction of their PV system. Additionally, the 
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 For the first two solicitations, the Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility (SEU) and SRECTrade jointly administrated the program. 
Since 2014, InClime has administered the program along with the SEU.  
25
 Under the Delaware solar incentive model, system owners qualify for net metering as well as SREC-related incentives.   
26
 New systems can include systems that have already reached commercial operations since the last auction or systems that are 
planned to begin operations within twelve months.  
27
 In August 2014, the Delaware SEU launched an upfront payment program for smaller PV systems which was intended as an 
alternative to the SREC solicitation program.  
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program applies penalties to winning bidders if the delivered volume of SRECs is substantially below the SREC volume 
bid by the system owner in any given year.   
Table 11 below shows the range of prices bid for winning bidders as part of the 2014 solicitation. As mentioned 
previously, winning bidders are granted a 20-year SREC contract for the first seven years at the price bid into the 
auction. The remaining years of the contract are at $35 per MWh. Of note, the rules of the Delaware SREC program 
provide multipliers for systems that use Delaware-manufactured materials and/or use Delaware sourced labor, meaning 
that the actual value per MWh of generation for winning bidders may up to 20 percent higher than the values shown 
below.28 
Table 11. Winning Bid Pricing for the 2014 Delmarva SREC Solicitation 
Tier Low Bid High Bid 
Weighted Average Bid 
Price 
N1, E1, E2 Pool $0.00 $300.00 $53.44 
N2 (New systems >30kW to <=200kW) $34.46 $141.23 $88.84 
N3 (New systems >200kW to <=2 MW) $98.73 $98.73 $98.73 
 
Prices in the three annual solicitations have generally declined over time. Table 12 and Table 13 below show weighted 
average winning bid prices for the 2013 and 2012 solicitations respectively. Tier sizes, contract lengths and other 
parameters have all changed over the course of the solicitations making direct year-over-year comparisons difficult. In 
the first solicitation year, smaller system sizes were awarded contracts at an administratively-set contract price with 
winning bidders selected through lottery.  Administratively set prices are show in Table 13 for reference.  
 
Table 12. 2013 Delmarva SREC Solicitation Prices 
Tier 
Weighted Avg. 
Bid Price 
N1 (New systems <= 30kW) $46.48 
N2 (New systems >30kW to <=200kW) $86.60 
N3 (New systems >200kW to <=2 MW) $51.13 
E1 (Existing systems <= 30kW) $34.59 
E2 (Existing systems (>30kW to <= 2MW) $39.29 
 
 
Table 13. 2012 Delmarva SREC Solicitation Prices 
Tier 
Weighted Avg. 
Bid Price 
Tier 1 (Administratively set, up to 50kW) $260 
Tier 2A (Administratively set, 50 to 250kW) $240 
                                                          
28
 Systems using Delaware-sourced parts receive 1.1 SRECs per MWh of generation. Similarly, systems using Delaware labor receive 
1.1 SRECs per MWh of generation. Systems qualifying as using both Delaware-sourced parts and Delaware labor generate 1.2 SRECs 
per MWh.  
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Tier 2B (Competitive, 250 to 500kW) $131.13 
Tier 3, (Competitive, 500 to 2,000kW) $154.35 
As the three tables show, bid prices generally declined between the 2012 and 2013 solicitations, however no obvious 
trend in pricing is evident between the 2013 and 2014 solicitations. This may be, in part due to the lowered later year 
SREC values provided to winning bidders in the 2014 solicitation.  
2.4.3 Key Interactions: 
Contracts awarded under the SREC Solicitation Program are one of several incentives available to Delaware PV system 
owners. As an alternative to the SREC Solicitation Program, the Delaware SEU recently launched an upfront payment 
program for smaller systems under which system owners agree to sign over all SRECs generated by their systems for a 
20-year period. System owners taking part in this program cannot be awarded long-term SREC contracts under the SREC 
Solicitation Program.  
In addition to benefitting from revenues from SREC sales, Delaware PV systems also take advantage of net metering. In 
the Delmarva territory, net metered systems have a 2 MW limit and qualify for full-retail rate compensation for power 
exported to the grid. Delaware net metering rules also allow for meter aggregation and community solar models 
(Delaware PSC, 2011). Table 14 below lists the average residential, commercial and industrial retail electricity rates for 
Delaware as of October 2014 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015).  
Table 14.Delmarva Power Retail Electricity Prices 
Rate Type Average Rates 
Residential 14.72 cents/kWh 
Commercial 10.32 cents/kWh 
Industrial 7.68 cents/kWh 
2.4.4 Impact and Observations 
Compared to states with more aggressive solar RPS carve-outs, such as New Jersey, the Delaware renewable portfolio 
standard has established relatively modest near term solar energy targets. The RPS schedule requires incremental 
annual capacity addition in the 20 to 30 MW range each year between 2010 and 2025. These limited increasing 
incremental annual SREC targets, as well as Delmarva Power’s existing bi-lateral SREC contracts29 and a state-wide SREC 
oversupply, have limited total volumes procured under the SREC solicitation program over its first three years. In fact, 
the first year of the program saw the highest volume of SRECs procured, with 20-year contracts for 11,472 (estimated 
8.6 MW) total SRECs/year awarded under the solicitation. The 2013 solicitation awarded long-contracts for 7,000 
SRECs/year (approximately 5.2 MW) while the 2014 solicitation awarded contracts for 6,600 SRECs/year (approximately 
5.0 MW). Given Delmarva’s efforts to procure limited volumes of new SREC contracts every year in order to satisfy its 
expected obligations, and the state’s relatively steady annual SREC RPS requirement, the Delaware solar market is 
unlikely to see major year-over-year growth in the coming years.  
The SREC Solicitation program has been designed to promote market diversity. With multiple solicitation tiers for 
different system sizes, the program has ensured that a range of system types can participate in the program. This market 
diversity has increased the total number of systems installed in the state compared to a program that would support 
only larger systems, likely increasing total employment related to the program. Given the limited volume of SRECs 
                                                          
29
 Delmarva has existing bi-lateral SREC contacts with generators in the state that were signed before the creation of the SREC 
Solicitation Program. 
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procured in each annual solicitation and the even smaller number procured in each tier, market interest in some tiers for 
some solicitations has been limited to only a few proposed projects. The SREC Solicitation Program has driven market 
competition with SREC contract prices declining between the first and second solicitations. One potential concern for 
small solicitations is that limited participation can result in winning bidders receiving higher contact prices than would be 
available in a more competitive program.  
A full ratepayer impact analysis is beyond the scope of this policy summary, and, given the portfolio approach taken by 
Delmarva, comparing the ratepayer costs related to the SREC Solicitation Program to other SRECs acquired in their 
compliance efforts is challenging. In its 2014 RPS compliance filing, Delmarva reported acquiring 37,214 SRECs in order 
to meet its RPS obligation. The reported weighted average price for these SRECs was $141.55. SRECs retired in 2014 
procured during the 2012 pilot solicitation had an average reported price of $213.26 while SRECs procured during the 
2013 solicitation had an average price of $45.17.  SRECs procured through brokerage transactions by Delmarva for the 
2014 compliance year had an average price of $62.46 suggesting that SRECs procured through the 2013 solicitation were 
below spot market prices during the compliance year while those from the 2012 solicitation were above spot market 
prices (Delmarva Power, 2014).  
Total Delmarva costs related to all SRECs retired in 2014 were $5.6 million. Distributed across Delmarva’s 2014 load, 
SREC compliance costs are less than 0.08 cents per kWh. Included in this compliance cost are $296,779 in administrative 
fees associated with the implementation of the SREC solicitation program. These cost are roughly 5 percent of 
Delmarva’s total SREC compliance cost (Delmarva Power, 2014). 
The Delmarva SREC Solicitation Program has promoted some market stability by procuring SRECs based on the 
company’s expected future SREC compliance needs. This is in contrast to other RPS-based state solar incentive models 
where market supply and demand may become imbalanced leading to periods of over- and under-supply. Delaware’s 
approach of placing the RPS obligation on the distribution utilities instead of its electricity suppliers also decreases the 
potential for boom-bust cycles as the distribution utility is able implement a compliance strategy that takes into account 
future obligations. While the program’s annual solicitations have been relatively small, these were each tailored to the 
company’s expected compliance needs based on the legislatively established RPS schedule. 
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2.5 Connecticut ZREC Program  
2.5.1 Introduction 
Like Massachusetts, Connecticut has a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) that is assessed as a percent of total load 
served on all electricity providers (including competitive retail suppliers) for each of three classes.  Connecticut’s Class I 
is comparable to the Massachusetts’ Class I, with some material eligibility differences.  Compliance is demonstrated by 
the purchase and retirement of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).  Connecticut’s RPS ramps up to 20 percent by 2020 for 
Class I RECs, which includes production from biomass (with some emissions restrictions), small hydroelectric, wind, tidal, 
and solar photovoltaic plants, generally without a vintage threshold.  There is an Alternative Compliance Payment (ACP) 
of $55/MWh which serves as a price cap. 
The Class I obligation has typically been served by out-of-state generation, and mostly by legacy biomass and landfill gas 
generators due to the lack of a vintage requirement.  The Connecticut Zero-Emissions Renewable Energy Credit, or ZREC, 
program is a long-term contracting program for Class I RECs designed to incentivize the development of distributed 
generation resources in the state (CT PURA, 2011).  It is worth clarifying that while all RECs generated under the ZREC 
program are used to offset Class I REC obligations, the ZREC program is not a specific carve-out of the Class-I market, as 
with the Mass. SREC market.  The ZREC program was introduced as a part of suite of programs through Public Act 11-80, 
passed in July 2011 (State of Connecticut, 2011).  Given the lack of in-state wind potential, the main focus of the 
programs was solar and fuel cell projects.  These programs complement recent long-term contracting efforts that have 
selected new, regional wind resources to contribute to the state’s Class I REC supply. 
In Connecticut, there are only two Electric Distribution Companies (EDCs) – Connecticut Light and Power (CL&P) and 
United Illuminating Company (UI).  These companies carry about one-third of the RPS obligation, with the rest being 
borne by competitive retail suppliers.  The Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (CT PURA), formerly known 
as the DPUC, administers the LREC/ZREC program and only has the authority to direct EDCs to participate in long-term 
contracting programs.  Thus, UI and CL&P carry the full burden of the state’s goals for distributed generation.  
2.5.2 Policy Details 
The ZREC program was established in conjunction with the Low-Emissions Renewable Energy Credit, or LREC, Program in 
2011 pursuant to Sections 107, 108 and 110 of Public Act No. 11-80 (State of Connecticut, 2011). Implementation has 
occurred under the auspices of the CT PURA.  The intention of this program is to incentivize the development of 
distributed generation in the state of Connecticut.  The ZREC program is open to wind, solar and small hydroelectric 
projects up to 1 MW, while the LREC program is open to all of the above, along with natural gas fuel cells, landfill gas, 
and biomass gasification units up to 2 MW.  Both programs offer 15-year fixed price contracts with the state’s electric 
distribution companies (EDCs) for RECs, all of which are Class-I eligible (CT PURA, 2011).   
The ZREC program is operated on a fixed-budget basis, with the two EDCS offering $8 million of new contracts once per 
year for six years, beginning in 2012.  The LREC program has an additional $4 million of annual contract budget.  It is 
important to note that this budget reflects the single-year contracted amount.  Thus, at its peak, the ZREC program 
would cost $48 million per year (See Figure 11 for illustration of expense schedule).  The total program budget is divided 
between the EDCs based on their respective share of total load served – 80 percent for CL&P and 20 percent for UI.  The 
ZREC program (and its budget) is also divided by size categories. 
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Figure 11. LREC/ZREC Program Expenses Illustration 
(The Connecticut Light and Power Company and the United Illuminating Company, 2011) 
 
Table 15. Project Size Definitions and Annual Contract Budget 
ZREC Project 
Category 
Capacity Range 
Total Solicitation Budget (UI & CL&P) 
UI CL&P 
Small 0-100 kW AC $0.533 M $2.133 M 
Medium 100-250 kW AC $0.533 M $2.133 M 
Large 250-1000 kW AC $0.533 M $2.133 M 
Each year, the EDCs offer a single, simultaneous solicitation for projects in their territory.  The solicitation is limited to 
the Medium and Large ZREC categories, which are selected on a least-cost basis.  Bids are evaluated for each EDC 
separately, and projects are awarded contracts as-bid until the full budget is exhausted or there are no more 
applications.  The only exception to the least-cost provision is for projects including technologies researched, developed 
or manufactured in-state.  These projects are assessed at a cost 10 percent below their actual bid price.  The Small ZREC 
program is administered as a fixed price tariff program with a competitively-derived price set at 110 percent of the 
weighted average bid price of selected Medium ZREC projects.  These projects are selected on a rolling admissions basis, 
with tie-breaking procedures in place for rounds in which the program is oversubscribed on the first day.   
The price cap for all sectors of the ZREC program is $350/REC in Round 1 and decreasing by round over time.  Each year, 
CT PURA may lower the program cost cap by 3-7 percent according to multiple factors including actual bid prices from 
the previous year and expected changes in installed costs (The Connecticut Light and Power Company and the United 
Illuminating Company, 2011).  Across all sectors, projects will be notified if and when their bid has been selected, at 
which point the applicant must execute a contract with the applicable company and submit the required performance 
assurance.  This deposit is equal to a percentage of the maximum annual quantity of ZRECs multiplied by the contract 
price.  This percentage is 20 percent for Large ZREC projects, 10 percent for Medium, and 5 percent for the Small ZREC 
category (The Connecticut Light and Power Company and the United Illuminating Company, 2011).  Projects may also 
opt to terminate their application at this time, in which case a contract will be offered to the next projects (or projects) 
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in the queue for which budget is available.  In any year where the full budget is not utilized, the EDC may be directed to 
hold an additional solicitation, and/or shift budget between size categories to ensure that the program’s funds are fully 
utilized.  Excess budget may also be rolled into future years’ solicitations.   
Once a project’s contract is executed, it has until its contracted Delivery Term Start Date plus a 12-month grace period to 
reach commercial operation.  This provides a roughly two-year development window.  Regardless of the project’s actual 
online date, its 15-year contract term will begin on the Delivery Term Start Date.  The relatively long development 
window has both benefits and drawbacks, as it gives projects an appropriate amount of time to reach commercial 
operation, but does not regularly clear out undeveloped projects. This results in long delays in budget reconciliation and 
capacity recycling into future rounds. 
Rounds 1 and 2 both attracted sufficient bids such that the full budget could be allocated for each market segment in a 
single solicitation.  In each round, minor adjustments were made to shift budget between sectors such that surpluses 
could be pooled to accommodate an additional project or projects.  All of these adjustments require PURA approval.  
Any remaining budget surpluses are rolled into the following year’s solicitation.  Round 3 was the first round in which a 
program sector was undersubscribed due to front-end attrition of projects.  In this case, an additional solicitation was 
held to fully contract the budgeted amount. 
Table 16. Total and Accepted Number of Bids by EDC and Round 
Program Category EDC 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Total Accepted Total Accepted Total Accepted 
Large ZREC 
CL&P 140 21 52 19 78 32 
UI 22 6 12 4 8 8 
Total 162 27 64 23 86 40 
Medium ZREC 
CL&P 113 47 157 70 113 95 
UI 37 13 35 24 50* 27* 
Total 150 60 192 94 163 122 
Small ZREC** 
CL&P 484 214 460 277 N/A N/A 
UI 107 31 108 51 N/A N/A 
Total 591 245 568 328 N/A N/A 
*After receiving insufficient interest in the first solicitation, UI was directed by CT PURA to re-
open the Medium ZREC solicitation to additional bids.  This total reflects the additional 
applications received during that process. 
** CL&P’s “accepted” numbers represent projects with executed contracts.  UIs are noted as 
“Selected”.  May not be consistent. 
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Table 17. Total and Accepted Capacity (MW) of Bids by EDC and Round 
Program Category EDC 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Total Accepted Total Accepted Total Accepted 
Large ZREC 
CL&P 94.3 12.2 34.2 12.2 65.3 27.6 
UI 12.1 2.6 7.2 2.4 5.9 5.9 
Total 106.4 14.8 39.4 14.6 75.0 32.7 
Medium ZREC 
CL&P 21.5 8.8 30.2 14.2 24.5 18.1 
UI 7.1 2.5 6.4 4.4 9.7* 5.1* 
Total 28.6 11.3 36.6 18.6 30.4 24.0 
Small ZREC 
CL&P 22.0 9.2 23.3 13.4 N/A N/A 
UI 6.7 2.3 6.2 2.9 N/A N/A 
Total 28.7 11.5 29.5 16.1 N/A N/A 
*After receiving insufficient interest in the first solicitation, UI was directed by CT PURA to re-
open the Medium ZREC solicitation to additional bids.  This total reflects the additional 
capacity contracted during that process. 
The program has been successful in attracting bids at prices below those for SRECs on the spot market in neighboring 
Massachusetts.  The results of each solicitation to date are summarized in the table below.  This data presents only the 
average bid price for selected projects.  Though individual bid prices are protected, it is clear that the range of bid prices 
has narrowed considerably over time.  In Round 1, the average price of selected bids came in $30-40/MWh less than the 
average price of all bids.  By Round 3, this gap dropped to $0-10.  This could signal developers generally providing more 
competitive bid prices or the more expensive developers falling out of the market. 
Table 18. Weighted Average Prices of Selected Bids for ZREC Program  
(Calculated Tariff Price for Small ZREC Category) 
Program 
Category 
EDC Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Large ZREC 
CL&P Weighted Average $101.36 $76.63 $59.35 
UI Weighted Average $117.27 $90.43 $65.76 
Total Weighted Average $104.13 $78.87 $60.48 
Medium 
ZREC 
CL&P Weighted Average $149.29 $93.65 $73.61 
UI Weighted Average $135.36 $102.31 $76.40 
Total Weighted Average $146.23 $95.70 $74.22 
Small ZREC 
CL&P Calculated Price $164.22 $103.01 $80.97 
UI Calculated Price $148.89 $112.54 $84.04 
Average Calculated Price $161.15 $104.92 $81.59 
2.5.3 Key Interactions 
The ZREC program differs from some renewables contracting programs in that the EDCs are only contracting the RECs 
associated with production, and that energy and capacity are not included in the transaction. As a result, ZREC 
premiums are directly dependent on the current and projected value of electricity and capacity in Connecticut, as well as 
the availability of virtual net metering for larger projects. Projects are able to get financing based on host-owned 
expected returns (based on expected savings versus retail rates) and third-party-owned projects, based on PPA sales 
to the host.  The degree to which there is risk associated the future retail rate changes is comparable to the situation 
in the Massachusetts SREC market; and like that market, developers may hedge that risk through fixed price PPAs  
with project hosts.   The ZREC market also interacts (to a limited extent) with the LREC market and the broader Class I 
Renewable Energy Credit market.  Although solar is eligible to participate in both of these markets, the price of RECs in 
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both is well below that of ZRECs and is likely to stay that way for the duration of the program.  In theory, if the program 
was extended to the point at which solar reached parity with LREC or other Class I resources, LREC and ZREC prices 
would converge at a level below Class I prices, reflecting the financing benefits of a long-term contract, and solar 
projects up to 2 MW would have access to this mechanisms through LRECs. 
Net metering is available to RPS Class I Renewable Energy Sources with a generating capacity of 2 MW or smaller in 
Connecticut. Any net excess generation is credited at the Electric Distribution Company’s avoided wholesale power 
cost at the end of twelve months. RECs associated with the net metered facilities are retained by the customer. 
Unlike Massachusetts, Connecticut does not have an aggregated net metering cap. Currently, virtual net metering is 
only available to municipal, state and agricultural customer hosts. A virtual net metering facility must be a RPS Class I 
facility with a generating capacity of 3 MW or smaller or a RPS Class III facility (primarily combined-heat and power 
systems). Excess generation is credited at the sum of (i) the generation service component and (ii) the transmission 
and distribution components at a declining schedule30. The virtual net metering program has an annual statewide 
cap of $10 million virtual net metering credits (apportioned to each of the state’s Electric Distribution Companies 
based on consumer loads). Each customer class (i.e. agricultural, municipal and state) must not receive more than 
40% of the total virtual net metering budget available for each company. Connecticut currently does not authorize 
community-shared solar installations, although a community-shared clean energy facility pilot was proposed in the 
2015 legislative session.  
2.5.4 Impacts and Observations 
To date, there have been three rounds of solicitations under the ZREC program.  The program has attracted a large 
number of bids across all sectors.  To date, almost all of the ZREC bids (both offered and selected) have been solar 
photovoltaic projects.31  Selected bids are diverse in terms of project size, with projects falling across the range of 
eligibility for each category. 
Reviewing the list of participating project developers, the Connecticut ZREC market appears very similar to the 
Massachusetts market with a mix of local and national developers.  The detailed bid data for Round 3 has not been 
released yet, so it is premature to speculate on trends over time, but it appears that a healthy level of diversity is 
present in the market.  Similarly, anecdotal evidence suggests that both municipalities and private houses are engaging 
in offtake agreements.  This data is not published, making it difficult to speculate on how this has changed over time.  
In total, between 400 and 450 MW of solar is expected to be contracted and built through the ZREC program, with all 
projects online by 2019.  This results in a peak installation rate of roughly 100 MW/year from 2015-2017.  Broken down 
by sector, the ZREC program should support roughly 125 MW of small solar (<100 kW), 150 MW of medium projects 
(100-250 kW) and 160 MW of large projects (>250 kW).  Contracted capacity in the 2015 and 2016 solicitations is 
expected to continue to increase as bid prices fall, with a contraction in 2017 after the expiration of the ITC.  This 
volatility is one of the side effects of a fixed-budget program, and could be disruptive to developers attempting to ride 
out an already difficult time in the market. 
                                                          
30
 80% of transmission and distribution charges in the first year of commercial operation; 60% in the second year; and 40% in the 
third year.  
31
 Four small hydro projects were selected in Round 2 and two were selected in Round 3.  In Round 1, three small hydro projects and 
two wind projects bid into the solicitation and were not selected.  The industry as a whole expects these technologies to play little if 
any role in future solicitations.   
   
89 
 
What is not reflected in any of the tables above is the rate of success for executing contracts with selected projects, and 
the additional fallout of projects for which contracts have been executed.  There have been substantial front-end 
withdrawals across all sectors, detailed in Table 19 below.  It is interesting to note that while front-end attrition for Large 
ZREC projects dropped significantly following the first round, they have stayed relatively constant for Medium projects 
and jumped substantially from Round 1 to Round 2 for small projects.  Broadly speaking, however, roughly 35 percent of 
the ultimately contracted capacity dropped out pre-commitment over the course of the first three rounds for CL&P, with 
this figure dropping in successive rounds from 68 percent to 26 percent to 19 percent.  The first round appears to be an 
outlier – anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of developers jumped in without fully understanding net metering 
rules or other constraints and pulled out as they learned their projects would not be financially viable; the next two 
rounds may be more indicative.  This dynamic suggests that some speculative bidding has taken place, or perhaps more 
accurately, that the single procurement per year cycle forces submission of some bids that are insufficiently vetted.  
However, it also suggests that the performance assurance requirements are somewhat effective in shaking out 
untenable projects from the program early, clearing space for projects willing to provide performance assurance. 
Table 19. Front-End Attrition Rates for CL&P ZREC Solicitations32 
Event Category 
# Bid/ 
Applied 
MW 
Withdrawn 
After 
Selected 
MW 
# Fully 
Executed 
MW 
Year 1 RFP 
Large ZREC 140 94.3 22 16.7 21 12.2 
Medium ZREC 113 21.5 13 2.4 47 8.8 
Small ZREC 484 22.0 33 1.5 214 9.2 
Year 2 RFP 
Large ZREC 52 34.2 4 3.2 19 12.3 
Medium ZREC 157 30.2 13 2.5 70 14.2 
Small ZREC 460 23.3 85 4.6 277 13.4 
Year 3 RFP 
Large ZREC 78 65.3 7 5.8 32 27.6 
Medium ZREC 113 21.5 14 2.7 95 18.1 
To further examine the issue of speculative bidding, it is important to look at a number of other factors.  First, the early 
rounds of the program have been plagued by long delays and high attrition rates among projects with executed 
contracts.  The table below summarizes terminations and in-service delays for Connecticut Light and Power, which 
carries 80 percent of the program obligation.  Round 1 saw roughly 25 percent of Medium and Large projects ultimately 
terminate their contracts, with four projects still not yet online.  So far, attrition rates are much lower for Round 2, but 
with the majority of projects still not operational, the number of terminations here is likely to increase, perhaps 
substantially. 
Table 20. LREC/ZREC Solicitation Performance – CL&P Contracts from Rounds 1 and 233 
Event Category 
Applied 
Fully 
Executed 
Active Terminated In-Service Pending 
# MW # MW # MW # MW # MW # MW 
Round 
1 
Large ZREC  140 94.3 21 12.2 13 8.2 8 4.0 12 6.3 1 1.9 
Medium ZREC  113 21.5 47 8.8 31 5.4 16 3.4 30 5.0 1 0.4 
Small ZREC  484 22.0 214 9.2 180 7.6 34 1.6 115 3.5 65 4.1 
                                                          
32
 Data summary provided by Northeast Utilities January 27, 2015. 
33
 Data summary provided by Northeast Utilities January 27, 2015.  
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Round 2 Large ZREC  52 34.2 19 12.3 18 11.4 1 0.9 3 1.4 15 10 
Medium ZREC  157 30.2 70 14.2 68 13.8 2 0.4 25 4.7 43 9.1 
Small ZREC  460 23.3 277 13.4 275 13.3 2 0.1 35 0.6 240 12.7 
To estimate the number of ultimately successful projects, one can apply an assumed rate of success to the pending 
projects listed in the table above.    In Table 21 below, we estimate a total attrition rate assuming that that the historical 
attrition rates serve as a proxy for the attrition from the pending capacity.34 This calculation is made and applied by 
round and sector. 
Table 21. Assumed Total Capacity Reaching Commercial Operation: CL&P Rounds 1 and 235 
Event Category 
Fully Executed 
Projects Currently 
Operating 
Assumed to Reach 
Comm. Operation 
Assumed % Reaching 
Comm. Operation 
# MW # MW # MW # MW 
Round 
1 
Large 
ZREC 
21 12.2 12 6.3 13 7.5 60% 61% 
Medium 
ZREC 
47 8.8 30 5.0 31 5.2 65% 60% 
Small 
ZREC 
214 9.2 115 3.5 165 6.3 77% 69% 
Round 2 
Large ZREC 19 12.3 3 1.4 14 7.5 75% 61% 
Medium 
ZREC 
70 14.2 25 4.7 65 13.1 93% 92% 
Small ZREC 277 13.4 35 0.6 262 11.5 95% 86% 
Clearly, the attrition rates in Round 2 are well below those in Round 1 for most categories.  However, using the 
methodology described above, one could expect more than 1/3 of the total capacity entering into Large ZREC contracts 
to fail to reach completion.  To address the overall project attrition issue, CT PURA recently revised the program rules to 
discourage speculative bidding and encourage voluntary self-policing of the project pipeline.  These changes move up 
the timeline for performance assurance delivery, require an affidavit from the land-owner acknowledging an agreement 
with a single project (to prevent multiple bids per site), and provide a 20 percent performance assurance refund for 
projects that voluntarily terminate before the required in-service date. 
To help understand whether the reported weighted average price of selected bids is indicative of successful project 
prices, or whether speculative bidding causes disproportionate dropout of lowest bids, we examined the weighted 
average bid price for projects that have not yet dropped out compared to the average across the full pool of executed 
contracts.  If speculative bidding was a pervasive problem that distorts the reliability of selected price data, one would 
expect that the weighted average price of completed projects would be higher than the weighted average across all 
selected projects.  Table 22 below provides this comparison for the CL&P bids and contracts awarded in the first two 
rounds of the program. 
                                                          
34
 Percent attrition for pending projects equals the quantity of terminations divided by the sum of terminations and operating 
projects (i.e., projects that have reached a definitive end-point).   
35
 Data summary provided by Northeast Utilities January 27, 2015. 
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Table 22. Weighted Average Bid Prices for All, Selected and Completed CL&P Projects36 
Event Category 
Weighted 
Average BID 
price/REC 
Weighted 
Average Price/ 
REC for all 
selected projects 
Weighted 
Average 
Price/REC for 
‘active’ projects37 
Year 1 RFP 
Large ZREC $138.03 $101.36 $104.13 
Medium ZREC $179.85 $149.29 $146.83 
Small ZREC $164.22 $164.22 $164.22 
Year 2 RFP 
Large ZREC $87.86 $76.63 $83.49 
Medium ZREC $106.75 $93.65 $88.85 
Small ZREC $103.01 $103.01 $103.01 
The current snapshot data above – which is incomplete, since additional attrition is expected - reveals that for Large 
ZREC projects, the weighted average price of completed projects is, in fact, higher than that of the full selected bid pool.  
For the Medium ZREC category, the opposite is true.  A possible explanation for this is that while some speculative 
bidding may be taking place among larger projects, the diversity of sites and associated challenges for medium projects 
creates an environment in which bid price is not the primary driver of project success or failure.    This metric will be 
worth watching as the pending projects move to either completion or termination, to get a more complete picture of 
the true prices yielded by the program. 
Based on participation (both in number and prices of bids) in Round 3, it appears the race to the bottom has slowed 
considerably, though it is unclear if this is a result of the program maturing or of the new rules propagated by CT PURA.  
In general, the level of competition is dropping noticeably from round to round.  While it is difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions, this could be due to either saturation of good solar sites (i.e. independent of the incentive mechanism) or 
competitors leaving the market (perhaps due to the insufficient margins, a direct result of the incentive mechanism).  It 
is worth highlighting that Round 3 is the first round in which additional solicitations were required for any category, a 
significant departure from the oversubscription of the previous two rounds.  Looking ahead, there are three additional 
procurements planned for 2015, 2016 and 2017.  It is likely that attrition from early rounds of the program will shift 
additional budget into these procurements, and that an additional year (or more) of solicitations may be required to 
fully spend the committed funds.  This budget shift may also help to offset the higher bid prices expected in 2017 
following the expected loss of ITC and preserve a smoother annual installed capacity trend. 
It is our expectation that regardless of the availability of the ITC, ZRECs will continue to be priced well above Class I RECs. 
Whether EDCs choose to retire ZRECs to meet their own Class I REC obligations or resell them into the market, the 
companies are allowed to recover the full costs of the program from distribution ratepayers.  While the RECs are 
purchased at above-market prices, the program does promote the development of in-state resources, which is largely 
absent from the broader Class I market.  With this comes in-state jobs and other indirect economic benefits, reliability 
benefits, and fuel diversity for Connecticut ratepayers.  The competitive procurement approach seeks to achieve this 
suite of benefits at the lowest possible cost to ratepayers.  The fixed income stream provides more certainty to projects 
trying to secure financing, and ultimately driving a lower cost of capital and lower total development cost.  This is why, 
at the surface, the ZREC program appears to drive development at a cost well below that of market-based programs like 
the Massachusetts SREC markets. 
                                                          
36
 Data summary provided by Northeast Utilities January 27, 2015. 
37
 Active projects are competed and pending. 
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It is unclear whether the attrition that has occurred in the market to date has been at the bottom of the cost stack, such 
that the weighted average bid cost represents an artificially low program cost, but we expect the EDCs to release 
analysis of this issue in the near future.  There are likely some less obvious economic impacts associated with the 
competitive procurement approach particularly one with infrequent solicitations.  In contrast to procurement mandates, 
such as RPS tiers or standard offers, which allow for a relatively steady stream of sales, design, financing and installation 
workflow that is conducive to establishing long-term jobs, episodic procurements represent bursts of activity that are 
difficult to staff for, often leading to short-term jobs and greater use of mobile labor.   
2.5.5 Summary Observations and Lessons Learned 
In its first three rounds of procurements, the ZREC program has successfully contracted for the full budgeted amount for 
both EDCs (although Round 3 required a second solicitation in some categories), almost all of which has been for solar 
PV projects.  Similarly, the Small ZREC procurement has been heavily oversubscribed at the fixed price in both of the first 
two rounds.  All of these contracts have come at rates well below spot prices for SRECs in Massachusetts.  However, 
there are additional complexities. 
First, the ZREC program contracts project RECs for 15 years, compared to the 10-year eligibility of an SREC II project.  
Thus, the EDCs are paying above-market rates for Class I RECs for an additional five years.  It is also not clear that the 
market can actually support robust development at the prices that have been offered to date.  The single procurement 
per year fosters an environment of speculative bidding, with developers hoping the economics pencil out before the 
development window closes.  Low commitment hurdles and collateral requirements do little to prevent this behavior.  
While the EDCs argue that the single procurement is necessary to control the administrative costs of the program, the 
market has already seen long delays and high attrition rates from projects selected in the first two rounds.  
Municipalities have also countered the administrative cost claims with complaints that the current system often results 
in a great deal of effort being put into projects that are ultimately not selected and shelved for another year (if ever 
revived).  The state has promulgated rules to help limit attrition and reduce termination lag time, but it remains to be 
seen how effective this will be.  It seems very unlikely that the measures will address the issues raised by municipalities. 
Ultimately, the shortfalls of Connecticut’s ZREC program could potentially be avoided in Massachusetts if addressed 
from the beginning.  As a larger market, there should be more opportunities in Massachusetts for more regular 
solicitations, and requiring higher development hurdles for bidders is simply a matter of policy design.  If done correctly, 
it is reasonable to believe that enacting a program similar to the LREC/ZREC program in Massachusetts could achieve 
similar levels of development at a lower cost to ratepayers and with greater certainty for developers than the SREC 
market structure currently offers. 
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2.6 New Jersey Electric Distribution Company Contracting, Direct Ownership and Financing 
Programs  
2.6.1 Introduction 
New Jersey has consistently had one of the most robust state solar markets in the United States. This market growth has 
been driven by a succession of policies over the past several years, from a series of rebate programs in the latter part of 
the last decade to the current solar carve-out in the state’s renewable portfolio standard (RPS). The current state-wide 
renewable goal is 17.88 percent by 2021 while the current RPS requires 4.1 percent to the state’s retail electricity to 
come from in-state solar by 2028 (Assembly, New Jersey State and General, 2012).38 This compliance obligation, and the 
annual schedule to reach it,  have changed on several occasions over the past  years through legislative action in 
response to greater than anticipated solar market growth causing SREC market price volatility.  
As with several other East-coast states with large solar markets, New Jersey has a deregulated energy market and 
participates in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization. The state has four investor owned utilities, Public Service 
Electric & Gas (PSE&G), Rockland Electric Company (RECO), Jersey Central Power & Light (JCP&L) and Atlantic City 
Electric (ACE). Of these, PSE&G is the largest electric distribution company in the state, supplying a little over 50 percent 
of the state’s load in 2012 (State of New Jersey, Board of Public Utilities, 2009). 
Unlike the Massachusetts SREC market, the New Jersey market obligation is legislatively fixed and does not include an 
SREC price floor. This has, in part, contributed to significant market volatility (in terms of both the pace of development 
and SREC price) and SREC incentive price uncertainty for project owners. During the state’s transition from a rebate-
based market to an SREC solar incentive market model, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJBPU) convened a 
stakeholder process to explore programmatic methods for supporting solar financing within the SREC market model. At 
the time, there was concern that an SREC market model without predictable cash flows from SREC sales would hinder 
market development as project developers would be unable to secure adequate financing. In response to these 
concerns, three utility-sponsored programs were developed to ensure some portion of New Jersey solar installations 
would benefit from long-term SREC price certainty. (State of New Jersey, Board of Public Utilities, 2009) These are:  
 The PSE&G Solar4All initiative 
 The PSE&G solar financing initiatives 
 The ACE, RECO and JCP&L long-term solar contracting programs 
These ancillary programs are the focus of this policy brief.  
2.6.2 Policy Description 
2.6.2.1 Solar4All Program 
The Solar4All program is a direct utility solar ownership program implemented by PSE&G. This initiative was originally 
approved in July 2009 and allows PSE&G to procure 80 MW of solar on brownfields, grayfields, and urban enterprise 
zones. The program also authorized installation of PV on company-owned utility poles (State of New Jersey, Board of 
Public Utilities, 2009). The second iteration of Solar 4All was approved by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities in May 
                                                          
38
 New Jersey has defined a solar goal for 2028 but currently only has an established state-wide RPS goal for 2021. The state’s 2021 
solar goal is 3.47% 
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of 2013. This phase of the program is focused on utility ownership of PV systems on underutilized land such as 
brownfields and landfills as well as implementation of pilot tranches of utility-owned PV designed for electricity system 
resiliency, underutilized government facilities and parking lot applications. Table 23 below shows the expected total MW 
of PV installed and owned by PSE&G in the Solar4All Extension program.  
Table 23. PSE&G Solar4All 
Market Segment Total Solar4All Extension MW 
Landfills and Brownfields 42 MW 
Underutilized Government Facilities 1 MW 
Grid Security/Storm Preparedness 1 MW 
Innovative Parking Lot Applications 1 MW 
PSE&G recovers its investment in the Solar4All program as it would other utility infrastructure investments and by selling 
energy generated by Solar4All systems into the market. Any revenue from sale of energy or SRECs from the systems are 
refunded to ratepayers through reductions in the company’s overall Solar4All cost recovery mechanism. In its most 
recent program filings with the NJBPU, PSE&G argued that the program promoted a number of key public policy goals 
including:  
 Solar development on otherwise unused brownfields and landfills; 
 In-state job creation;  
 Assist with the development of a market for new solar applications. (State of New Jersey, Board of 
Public Utilities, 2013)  
The Solar4All extension program has also been structured in order to help alleviate potential SREC market oversupply. 
As part of the stipulation authorizing the initiative, PSE&G agreed to stagger system installations over several years in 
order to prevent market oversupply that could significantly decrease SREC market prices (Belden, Michaelman, Grace, & 
Wright, 2014). The structure of this program may help support market stability in future years by providing ongoing 
market support during times of limited market activity or by reducing market SREC supply during oversupply conditions. 
Additionally, the competitive nature of the utility solicitations for each solar installation may support state-wide goals of 
lowering overall SREC compliance costs. An initial analysis concluded that, once completed, that program would increase 
annual ratepayer costs by an average of 0.329 percent (State of New Jersey, Board of Public Utilities, 2013). 
2.6.2.2 PSE&G Solar Loan Program 
In addition to operating the Solar4All program, PSE&G has implemented a series of solar financing initiatives. Currently 
in the third iteration of the program, the Solar Loan III Program provides participating PV system owners with the ability 
to finance a portion of the upfront cost of their systems and repay the debt with SRECs at a predetermined price. PSE&G 
has been authorized to provide loans for 97.5 MW of PV under the latest program funding round. In an effort to 
promote market diversity, this capacity is allocated to four project types:  
 Large non-residential systems (>150kW <= 2 MW); 
 Small non-residential systems (<= 150kW); 
 Residential systems; 
 Aggregations of residential systems; 
 Landfills and Brownfields (<= 5MW). 
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PSE&G conducts regular solicitations (four to six times a year) in which system owners bid an SREC floor price into a 
competitive solicitation. This floor price is the minimum value that SRECs transferred to PSE&G will receive to pay off the 
solar program loan. If market prices for SRECs should increase above the awarded system floor price, SRECs transferred 
to PSE&G will be monetized at the higher market price, allowing system owners to pay back their loans more quickly. 
Systems which bid the lowest floor prices are awarded loans until the available capacity for the solicitation round has 
been fully allocated. Solar loans for the program have a 10-year tenor and a fixed interest rate of 11.179 percent. 
Administrative fees associated with the costs of the program are paid by winning bidders and incorporated into the total 
loan amount.  
Most solicitation tranches under the Solar Loan III Program have been undersubscribed with the notable exception of 
the Landfill and Brownfield market segments during the first two rounds of the program.  Table 24 below lists the 
weighted average SREC floor price for winning bidders for the first five Solar Loan III Program rounds. The first 
solicitation took place in late 2013 with the fifth solicitation awarding contracts in December 2014. 
Table 24. Solar Loan III Average Weighted SREC Prices 
System Size 
Solicitation 
#1 
Solicitation 
#2 
Solicitation 
#3 
Solicitation 
#4 
Solicitation 
#5 
Large non-residential systems (>150kW <= 2 MW) $177 $205 $209 $195 $195 
Small non-residential systems (<= 150kW) $235 N/A $256 $230 $245 
Residential systems $258 $262 $275 $274 $276 
Aggregations of residential systems N/A N/A $214 $214 N/A 
Landfills and Brownfields (<=5MW) N/A $188 N/A N/A N/A 
Once transferred to PSE&G, SRECs are sold into the market and revenues from these sales are used to offset program 
costs. Any costs associated with the program not recouped by PSE&G directly from program participants are recovered 
through the state’s RGGI surcharge mechanism (State of New Jersey, Board of Public Utilities, 2013). In its filings, PSE&G 
estimated that the average non-participating ratepayer would see a maximum bill increase of $2.12 annually due to the 
Solar Loan III Program.  
Average prices in the Solar Loan III Program have not decreased over the course of the program and have been 
significantly higher than publicly available SREC spot market prices (SRECTrade, 2015). Additionally, most of the 
solicitation tranches have been consistently under-subscribed, potentially due to the relatively high interest rates 
offered.    
2.6.2.3 EDC Solicitation Programs: 
As part of initial efforts to support financing availability for solar PV projects participating in the state’s SREC market, 
ACE, JCP&L and RECO proposed to jointly implement a long-term SREC contracting program. The first iteration of this 
program was launched in August of 2009. Under this first-phase program, the participating utilities held eight 
coordinated solicitations over a two-year period. Solicitation participants bid SREC prices for long-term purchase 
contracts (10-15 years). In order to support market diversity, the program had solicitation tiers for small systems (0-
50kW), medium sized systems (50-500kW) and large systems (0.5-2MW). (New Jersey Economic Development 
Corporation, 2011). Winning solicitation bidders were awarded contracts based on as-bid prices. As SRECs were 
generated, the distribution companies pooled SRECs obtained through the program with SRECs from the PSE&G 
initiatives (see above) and sold them into the market on a quarterly basis.  
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In the first phase of the program, ACE, JCP&L and RECO signed long-term SREC contracts totaling 63.4 MW. Average 
contracted SREC prices ranged from a high of $460 per MWh to $232 per MWh. (Rutgers Center for Energy, 2012).  
Table 25 below shows the weighted average SREC price for solicitations in each of the utility territories by year.  
Table 25. Weighted Average SREC Price (2010 – 2012)
39
 
Energy Year ACE JCP&L RECO 
2010 $373 $407 $460 
2011 $425 $423 $384 
2012 $253 $232 $380 
As part of extended efforts to reduce market price volatility and support long-term financing for PV systems, the NJBPU 
authorized a second phase of this solicitation program in May of 2012. This program will launch in 2015 and will have a 
similar structure to the earlier program. The total expected capacity procured through the new initiative is 180MW over 
a three-year period and, as with previous program iteration, the solicitations will have separate tiers to help promote 
market diversity (State of New Jersey, Board of Public Utilities, 2013).  
2.6.3 Key Interactions 
The ancillary policies discussed in this profile exist within the framework of the New Jersey solar RPS carve out. 
Additionally, solar PV systems in New Jersey typically qualify for net metering, although some larger PV systems in the 
state sell power directly into the PJM wholesale market. These ‘grid-supply’ projects were a major driver of market 
growth, but recent legislation has moved to cap development in this market segment and require NJBPU approval for 
project through a first-in-time approval process.40 State net metering laws allow for single-customer meter aggregation 
for government entities, but do not support broader virtual net metering.   
2.6.4 Impact and Observations 
New Jersey has consistently had one of the largest solar PV markets in the United States over the past several years. This 
market has been driven largely by the state’s solar carve out in its renewable portfolio standard. The ancillary policies 
discussed in this section have supported public policy priorities related to the state’s solar market including creating 
long-term price certainty for a segment of the state’s PV system owners and increasing state solar capacity through 
utility-owned PV systems. These programs, through regular procurements, have helped foster market stability and have 
been coordinated to ensure that they do not promote SREC market price volatility. It should be noted, however, that the 
New Jersey solar market has experienced periods of volatility, particularly in late 2011 and early 2012 when the market 
grew rapidly as developers attempted to secure expiring federal incentives while taking advantage of high expected 
future SREC values (Belden, Michaelman, Grace, & Wright, 2014).   
Market interest for these ancillary programs has been mixed, with some program solicitations being oversubscribed 
while others have received limited market interest. For instance, the market response to the latest iteration of the 
PSE&G loan programs has been less competitive in some market categories than others. A full analysis of the drivers 
behind this market dynamic is beyond the scope of this summary, however the complexity of the program as well as the 
relatively high interest rate (11.179 percent) may serve to limit participant interest, particularly amongst less 
sophisticated prospective residential PV owners.   
                                                          
39
 This data represents the latest available data. New solicitation rounds have been approved, but have not yet been implemented.  
40
 This market regulation is analogous to the “Managed Growth” market segment in the Massachusetts SREC II program.  
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Each of the three policies of interest have competitive aspects that promote incentivizing least-cost systems. Systems 
installed through the PSE&G direct ownership program are purchased through a competitive procurement process. 
Similarly, both long-term contracting programs conduct regular competitive solicitations, awarding contracts to the most 
competitive bids. Additionally, the latest iteration of the PSE&G solar loan program includes a competitive component 
that awards long-term SREC contracts on a competitive basis. As with all competitive procurement programs, some 
proportion of systems that have been awarded contracts will not be built. This can happen for a number of reasons, 
from developers bidding overly aggressively in order to win contracts to technical issues that were unknown at the time 
of the solicitation. Contract failure rates for the programs discussed in this profile are not available, however this 
concern is worth further exploring if Massachusetts policymakers move forward with similar competitive bidding 
programs.   
The New Jersey EDCs aggregate and re-sell the SRECs procured through these programs on a quarterly basis through a 
market auction mechanism. Proceeds from this auction are applied to the costs of the program, lowering the overall 
ratepayer cost for these initiatives. During periods when the auction price is above the average price paid by through the 
EDC programs, ratepayers may see a net benefit on their bills. During periods when the auction prices are lower than the 
average contract prices, these programs would add costs to the distribution portion of a ratepayer’s bills. In accounting 
for the costs and benefits of these programs, it is critical to remember that ratepayers ultimately pay the costs of 
supplier RPS compliance, meaning that any savings seen on the distribution portion of ratepayer’s bill due to high SREC 
prices attained in the auction may be reduced through higher supplier RPS compliance costs.  
The ancillary policies described herein support the New Jersey SREC market by promoting long-term incentive price 
certainty and creating a utility-supported sub-market. These programs have helped moderate potential solar market 
volatility in New Jersey. The competitive nature of both the utility long-term contracting programs and the PSE&G 
financing program have established incentive levels through price competition. Two of these three ancillary policy 
mechanisms have analogues in the current Massachusetts solar market framework, with Massachusetts EDCs able to 
own their own solar generation and the pending solar MassCEC/DOER supported residential solar loan programs.41 
Similarly, the price floor mechanism in the Massachusetts SREC market is intended to create long-term SREC price 
certainty, a goal of the New Jersey EDC long-term contracting program. 
 
                                                          
41
 Additionally, the Massachusetts Section 83A long-term contracting program within the Class I market has similarities to the New 
Jersey EDC solicitation programs.  
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2.7 Vermont SPEED Standard Offer 
2.7.1 Introduction 
Vermont established the Sustainably Priced Energy Enterprise Development (SPEED) Standard Offer Program to 
encourage the development of, and enable financing for, renewable energy distributed generation in the state.  Through 
the SPEED Standard Offer Program, Vermont provides long-term contracts of between 15 and 25 years, depending on 
the technology, to qualifying renewable energy generators less than or equal to 2.2 MW.  Initially, contracts were 
awarded at an administratively-determined, fixed, standard offer price, akin to a feed-in tariff.  Subsequent program 
changes converted the program to one in which contracts are awarded through a competitive bidding process (subject 
to a price cap). While Standard Offer remains in the program name, it remains a competitive process.  The SPEED 
Standard Offer Program operates under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Board (PSB). The Vermont Electric Power 
Producers Inc. (VEPP Inc.) was selected as the program facilitator, and is responsible for both managing competitive 
procurements and administering the contract payments and collections through the state’s utilities.  The program began 
in 2009 with a 50 MW target and now includes legislative authority for up to 127.5 MW of contracts with solar, wind, 
biomass, landfill gas, farm methane, and hydroelectric generators by 2022. The SPEED Standard Offer program has 
created an active market for distributed generation in Vermont (Vermont SPEED Homepage, 2015).   
VEPP Inc. began accepting applications for the initial 50 MW target in October 2009. The PSB implemented a lottery to 
assign applications accepted during the first day of the solicitation with random positions in the queue. Within minutes, 
applications were received far in excess of this programmatic cap. The PSB received over 200 applications, totaling more 
than 190 MW, during the program’s first week. The applications were primarily from solar PV projects.  In response, the 
PSB determined that no single technology should comprise more than 25 percent of the initial project queue, and 
required that such technology caps be reviewed regularly thereafter.  This 25 percent technology cap remained in place 
until 2011, when the PSB elected to take projects off the waiting list by simply alternating between solar and wind 
projects until the program’s initial 50 MW was fully subscribed (SPEED Program Rule, 2015).   
The SPEED Program was established in 2005 under 30 V.S.A. § 8005 and § 8001 to promote long-term contracting with 
renewable generators and the development of in-state resources.  It set renewable energy development goals which, if 
not met, would trigger adoption of an RPS. The first 50 MW of the Standard Offer Program was added as part of the 
Vermont Energy Act of 2009 (Act 45).  The Vermont Energy Act of 2012 (Act 170) expanded the Standard Offer to 127.5 
MW and mandated the use of a market-based mechanism to establish contract prices, which had previously been 
administratively determined.    Unlike the rest of the region, Vermont’s utilities continue to operate as vertically-
integrated monopolies without providing retail choice. As such, the production and cost of Standard Offer contracts are 
allocated to Vermont’s four largest utilities42 as well as the Vermont Public Power Supply Authority on behalf of the 
state’s 14 municipal utilities (Vermont PSB Implementation of Standard Offer Program for SPEED (Dockets 7523 and 
7533), 2015).   
Overall, Vermont has created a strong policy environment for small renewable energy generators.  It is difficult, 
however, to secure permits and public acceptance for larger projects.  There is a robust net metering policy, including 
aggregate net metering, which is applicable to projects less than or equal to 500 kW43 and is available in all utility 
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 Green Mountain Power, Burlington Electric Department, Vermont Electric Cooperative, and Washington Electric Cooperative. 
43
 Up to 2.2 MW for military installations. 
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territories up to 15 percent of peak demand.44  Net excess generation not used within twelve months is granted to the 
utility. The net metering customer retains all RECs (but is given the option to grant them to the utility).  Act 99 of 2014 
made several changes to the net metering rules intended to promote small-scale solar generation. First, the Act allows a 
utility to, at its own discretion, continue to accept solar net metering systems of 15 kW or less without the PSB’s 
approval upon reaching the 15 percent cap. For other net metering systems, the utility can file a petition to raise the 
utility-specific cap with the PSB. Further, pursuant to Act 99, solar net metering systems of 15 kW or less will continue to 
receive a net metering rate of 20¢/kWh, while other net metering systems will receive a reduced rate of 19¢/kWh for no 
less than 10 years. Net metered systems are not eligible for the SPEED program. In the absence of rebates and other 
direct or performance-based solar incentives, net metering credits and the sales of RECs to RPS Class I markets in other 
states (e.g. Massachusetts) have been the major drivers for net metered solar projects in Vermont. When combining net 
metering credits, sales of RECs and reduction in technology costs, this revenue now appears sufficient to stimulate 
considerable behind-the-meter development activity. 
Over the last several years, the state and local utilities have also offered a series of renewable energy tax credits, 
renewable energy adders, and numerous grant and loan programs, many of which flow through the Clean Energy 
Development Fund,45 to support the state’s SPEED goal of 20 percent statewide renewable electricity sales by 2017.46  
The CEDF was established in 2005 through Act 74 (30 V.S.A. § 8015) with a goal of increasing “the development and 
deployment of cost-effective and environmentally sustainable electric power sources (Clean Energy Development Fund 
Home, 2015). The CEDF was historically funded through contributions from Vermont Yankee and is currently funded 
through periodic allocations from the Vermont Legislature.  Due to budget limitations, the 30 percent solar business tax 
credit expired in 2012, although the 7.2 percent personal investment tax credit remains.  CEDF grant and loan programs 
are offered periodically through competitive solicitations. 
Vermont has yet to establish a Renewable Portfolio Standard, although such a policy was recently proposed in the 2015 
legislative session.  Presumably, all Standard Offer contracts will be eligible to help fulfill some aspect of a future 
Vermont RPS. 
The Standard Offer Program has generated a large amount of development activity across the state relative to the scale 
of state load – particularly for solar.  Successful projects range in size from residential installations to the 2.2 MW 
program cap.  While a significant amount of new capacity (approximately 45 MW) has been successfully installed, the 
program has also been characterized by substantial project attrition, described in detail below, as new market entrants 
grapple with the challenges of putting together successful renewable energy projects.  This frequent project failure has 
been managed through the use of technology-specific waiting lists, from which projects are called upon when program 
capacity becomes available.  The migration from administratively-determined prices to a market-based, RFP-driven 
structure appears to be reducing attrition by requiring developers to post security and have a better handle on all 
aspects of project feasibility prior to bidding (VT H.702, 2014, 2015). 
2.7.2 Policy Description 
The SPEED Standard Offer Program provides long-term contracts to qualifying renewable energy projects as follows:   
                                                          
44
 Or the utility’s 1996 peak demand, whichever is greater.  This net metering cap was recently increased from 4% of peak demand. 
45
 Which is housed within the Department of Public Service. 
46
 Vermont also has a total renewable energy target schedule, which requires 55 percent of each retail electricity provider’s annual 
electric sales to be met by renewable energy during the year beginning January 1, 2017, increasing by an additional 4 percent each 
third January thereafter, until reaching 75 percent on January 1, 2032. (Clean Energy Development Fund Home, 2015) 
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 Landfill gas (15 years) 
 Biomass, farm methane, hydroelectric, and wind (20 years) 
 Solar (25 years) 
During the early program years, pricing was administratively-determined, similar to a feed-in-tariff, on an annual basis 
through a regulatory docket process. Contracts were awarded on a first-come, first-served basis.  This annual price-
setting process created a substantial time and cost burden on regulators and stakeholders. Since 2013 (as a result of the 
Vermont Energy Act of 2012), all pricing has been determined by competitive bidding – with price caps set at avoided 
cost on a technology-specific basis, with the exception of farm methane projects.   This change was made to conform the 
program to clarifications issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) in 2010 decisions which 
prohibited standard-offer rates established under state law from exceeding the PURPA avoided cost, but authorized 
states to employ a "multi-tiered" technology-specific avoided-cost structure in a standard offer program that takes into 
account state-law requirements to purchase electricity from particular sources of energy.47  The solar avoided cost price 
cap is levelized, while all other technologies allow annual escalation of no more than 1.6 percent on no more than 30 
percent of project cost.48  Both the avoided cost price caps and the RFP process are established by the PSB. There is one 
competitive solicitation per year.  Awards are made based on price, assuming all other eligibility criteria are met.  Once a 
contract is awarded, projects have 24 months (solar and wind) or 36 months (all other technologies) to achieve 
commercial operation.  All production is compensated at the successful bid price.   
The programmatic goal of 127.5 MW has annual allocation targets, which are further divided by technology.  Initially, the 
MW allocation for each technology was set at no more than 25 percent of the initial project queue. In June 2011, the 
PSB revised the technology guideline requiring the SPEED facilitator to admit projects on an alternative basis from the 
solar PV and wind waiting lists until the program was fully subscribed. The state is currently developing a new 
technology allocation methodology. The first 50 MW was made available in 2009 and – after significant project 
attrition49 – was fully subscribed by early 2013 using the waiting list method described above to refill the program 
whenever project failure occurred.  Incremental program MWs are offered through annual RFPs as follows:  5 MW per 
year for 2013-2015, 7.5 MW per year for 2016-2018 and 10 MW for 2019 through 2022. Each year, a portion of 
incremental capacity is reserved for ownership by Vermont utilities.  This capacity is referred to as the Provider Block. 
The Provider Block is set at 0.5 MW for 2013-2015, 1.125 MW for 2016-2018 and 2.0 MW for 2019-2020.  The SPEED 
statute allows for the possibility of exceeding the annual and total programmatic targets, to the extent that projects 
which are determined to provide sufficient benefit to the distribution system are not counted toward the programmatic 
MW cap.  The PSB developed a screening framework regarding transmission-constrained and distribution-constrained 
areas to guide such determination. In May 2014, the PSB determined that there were no constrained areas where 
renewable generation projects would provide sufficient benefits with the potential exception of the Rutland area. The 
PSB directed Green Mountain Power (distribution company of the Rutland territory) to develop a Reliability Plan to 
identify whether SPEED standard offer projects could provide sufficient benefit to enhance system reliability in Rutland. 
As of the time this report is published, the Rutland area Reliability Plan has not yet been published.   
Competitive bids are capped at an administratively-determined avoided cost, by technology, which is updated annually 
by the PSB.  The PSB process is public and largely driven by stakeholder inputs. Stakeholders are invited to provide cost, 
performance and other market data and propose financing models consistent with FERC’s rules to determine the 
                                                          
47 Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Et.al 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (July 15, 2010); Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Et.al 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059 (Oct.21, 2010) 
48
 To reflect the impact of inflation on operating and maintenance expenses. 
49
 As of September 23, 2014, over 35% of project capacity were withdrawn or deleted from the queue.   
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avoided cost (based on an efficiently sized and located facility) for each technology. The PSB will conduct a series of 
stakeholder discussions spanning multiple months to identify the appropriate avoided cost calculation methodology and 
prices. Such a process may be considered burdensome and costly, considering that new capacity development resulting 
from each of the program’s annual solicitations is only 5 to 10 MW. Further, battles among stakeholders over 
appropriate models for avoided cost calculation in early rounds of the program have given way to less contentious and 
less involved proceedings focused on updating avoided costs in recent years.  
Solar projects must bid a levelized price beneath the levelized cost cap.  All other technologies may bid escalating prices, 
so long as such prices neither exceed the avoided cost cap nor escalate more than 30 percent of the project cost at more 
than 1.6 percent per year.  Pricing also may not be front-loaded and decrease over the term of the contract.  Under the 
RFP selection process, projects are ranked according to a levelized bid price.  In its evaluation, the SPEED administrator 
uses a 9.75 percent target after tax return on equity as a discount rate to calculate and compare levelized bids.50 Solar 
has a flat avoided cost schedule that maintains at the levelized cost cap for 25 years (the assumed project life).  
The PSB set fixed, 25-year, Standard Offer rates for solar projects as follows: 
 2009: 30.0 ¢/kWh 
 2010: 24.0 ¢/kWh 
 2011: 24.0 ¢/kWh 
 2012: 27.1 ¢/kWh 
The solar avoided cost rate, serving as the price cap for the RFP process, for both 2013 and 2014 is 25.7 ¢/kWh. The 
increase from 2011 to 2012 was likely, in part, due to the state ITC reaching its cap. 
In order to encourage legitimate, realistic bidding and mitigate attrition, the PSB implemented a security requirement in 
the competitive procurement program. Projects submitting bids must include security of $10/kW of proposed AC 
capacity.  This security is returned to projects that are selected and that achieve commercial operation.   Projects that 
bid successfully but fail to execute the Standard Offer contract within 15 days of notification forfeit their security. The 
initial (non-competitive) program rounds did not include a security requirement, which may have unintentionally 
attracted highly speculative projects into the queue – only to increase the percentage of attrition later on.  While it is 
too early to draw conclusions about whether the current security requirement has addressed this problem, only one 
(out of seven) projects selected by competitive bid has withdrawn from its Standard Offer contract to date. 
In between contract execution and commercial operation, projects must demonstrate development progress.  For 
example, a complete application for a Certificate of Public Good must be submitted to the PSB within one year51 of 
executing a Standard Offer contract.  As previously stated, solar projects must achieve COD within 2 years, and all other 
projects within 3 years.  The SPEED facilitator has no authority to grant extensions. 
2.7.3 Key Interactions 
Within Vermont, renewable generators may elect to participate in either the Standard Offer or Net Metering Programs, 
but may not participate in both.  Standard Offer contracts convey all energy, capacity and, with the exception of farm 
methane projects, renewable energy certificates (RECs) to the contracting utilities.   Standard Offer projects may qualify 
to participate in other CEDF incentive programs, such as the loan program and the Solar & Small Wind Incentive 
                                                          
50
 This is intended to approximate the Vermont utilities’ weighted average cost of capital. 
51
 Except for hydroelectric projects requiring a license from FERC. 
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Program. Under the current design, Standard Offer projects are counted toward the SPEED goal of generating 20 percent 
of 2017 statewide retail electric sales from new renewable resources.  Outside of Vermont, the policy interactions are 
more complicated and not fully resolved.  Since Vermont has no binding RPS, RECs produced under the SPEED Standard 
Offer program are frequently sold to RPS-obligated entities for compliance in other New England RPR markets.  Recently, 
this practice became the subject of CT Docket 15-01-03, initiated to clarify the treatment of RECs associated with the 
Vermont SPEED resources under the Connecticut RPS and other potential double-counting situations. 
2.7.4 Impacts and Observations 
Since its launch in 2009, 23 solar PV systems totally approximately 33.9 MW have been commissioned under the 
Vermont SPEED program. 13 projects (23.4 MW) are currently under review by the PSB, under development or have 
been issued all necessary permits, but are not yet constructed. 
Overall, the program has stimulated some competition in the market. In 2013, 34 proposals representing 60.4 MW were 
received in response to the 5 MW solicitation. In the most recent round, 18 proposals, totaling approximately 32.75 MW 
competed for 5 MW of available capacity. All except one of the bids were for solar PV projects.  The program has 
demonstrated that long-term, fixed price, and creditworthy contracts can enable financing and drive down costs. The 
ten lowest cost bids (all solar) received under the 2014 RFP ranged in price from 11.87 to 14.20 ¢/kWh for 25-year fixed 
price contracts. This is compared to a bid price range of 13.40 to 16.90 ¢/kWh received under the 2013 RFP.  The price 
cap in both years was 25.7 ¢/kWh.   
Figure 12. Ten Lowest Cost Projects (All Solar) Selected Through 2013 and 2014 RFPs 
 
This range of bidding, within a group of only the ten lowest-priced projects, demonstrates the existence of some 
spread in project costs (or desired returns), that the lowest cost bid and the average bid price are likely to differ, and 
suggests caution in extrapolating the lowest  bid price to a program with larger targets.  All else equal, the lowest price 
in such a shallow market may be difficult to replicate at the larger volumes of projects that would be expected if such 
an approach were executed Massachusetts. Rather, these bids appear to represent the market’s low-hanging fruit, at a 
diversity of project costs – the lowest of which may or may not ultimately be developable.  On the other hand, the 
authors have observed that multi-round or multi-year competitive processes have often exhibited some price 
convergence over time, potentially indicators of both the impact of increased competition to reduce prices, the 
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tendency for overly aggressive bidders to leave a market in which profit margins are insufficient, and the tendency for 
lowest cost businesses to bid towards a market clearing price that becomes better understood over time. 
The initial phase of the Standard Offer program demonstrated great success in facilitating market diversity and 
promoting local job growth. The program supported deployment of a healthy mix of small and large scale projects, 
pursued mostly by local developers. As the program evolved to a competitive procurement model, smaller systems were 
no longer able to compete on price with larger installations, especially against national players, who are more 
sophisticated and can participate at lower costs. Of the seven projects selected in the 2013 and 2014 RFPs, six projects 
were larger than 2 MW and only two projects are by Vermont-based developers. This trend, combined with infrequent 
solicitations (i.e. once per year) for relatively small quantities of contracts (between 5 and 10 MW per year, which may 
translate into only two to five projects per year), is not conducive to driving permanent in-state jobs. The following table 
demonstrates the difference in project diversity between the original standard offer program and the competitive 
procurement program to date. 
Table 26. Solar PV Project Sizes, Standard Offer Program versus Competitive Procurement Program 
 
Standard Offer Competitive Procurement 
Project Size (kW) 
Number of 
Projects 
Capacity (kW) 
Number of 
Projects 
Capacity (kW) 
≤15 5 48 - - 
>15 -100 12 705 - - 
>100 – 250 11 1,753 1 130 
>250 – 500 7 2,549 - - 
>500 – 1000 6 5,300 - - 
>1000 – 2000 14 24,954 2 4,000 
>2000 13 28,472 4 8,660 
Total 68 63,781 7 12,790 
Further, the program has also proven that ample challenges exist between submitting an application and executing a 
contract. Numerous projects have been removed from the list of approved and contracted projects. As of September 
2013, 35 percent (22.3 out of 63.8 MW) of the projects initially selected through the Standard Offer program had 
withdrawn from the queue.  Many of these were small or medium-sized systems. A higher percentage of projects have 
failed than the percentage of MW that have reached service.  As shown in Table 27, 56 percent of the projects initially 
selected through the Standard Offer program have so far failed, while only 22 percent have reached in-service and an 
equal percentage are still pending.  Thus if a similar percentage of pending projects withdraw as have withdrawn to 
date, the failure percentage could end at approximately 67 percent of total projects. 
Table 27. SPEED Standard Offer Project Success Rate (As of September 23, 2014)52 
Project Size (kW) 
Number of 
Selected 
Projects 
In-Service Withdrawn Active 
≤15 5 0 5 0 
>15 -100 12 6 6 0 
>100 – 250 11 1 9 1 
>250 – 500 7 0 7 0 
>500 – 1000 6 0 3 3 
                                                          
52
 This table does not include projects from the 2013 and 2014 SPEED competitive RFP.  
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>1000 – 2000 14 4 3 7 
>2000 13 4 5 4 
Total 68 15 38 15 
Percentage 100% 22% 56% 22% 
Since the program became competitive, only one project has dropped out so far. This change may be attributable to a 
combination of reasons. One primary factor is the new $10/kWh proposal security requirement designed to mitigate 
speculative bidding. Another factor that may lead to higher project success rate is the program’s switch to a competitive 
procurement model, which favors more sophisticated players.  However, given that none of the selected projects are 
currently operational, the project success rate may change in the future. Further, as the procurement volume increases 
in later years, the effectiveness of the proposal security and the competitive program in impeding attrition may become 
more apparent.   
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2.8 Value of Solar Tariffs 
2.8.1 Introduction 
In the heat of a nation-wide debate regarding cross-subsidization of net metering, the need for a more accurate and 
transparent method for capturing the value of services provided in each direction (customer to utility and utility to 
customer) is becoming apparent. Value of Solar Tariffs (VOST) are a rate design approach aimed at exposing the cost and 
benefits of distributed solar generation, allowing more informed policy and investment decision making. (Fine, Saraf, 
Kumaraswamy, & Anich, 2014). So far, there are two examples of VOST implementation – in the state of Minnesota and 
the City of Austin, Texas - both of which operate under a vertically-integrated monopoly market structure.  
In 2012, Austin Energy, a publicly-owned utility, became the first U.S. utility to replace net metering with a VOST for 
residential customers only. The tariff was designed to compensate customers for the value of solar generation they 
produced in support of the utility’s 2020 local solar generation goal of 100 MW (Austin Energy, 2013). The Minnesota 
legislature enacted Chapter 85 in 2013 with the intent to provide maximum encouragement to distributed generation 
while protecting ratepayers and the public. The bill directs the state Department of Commerce, in conjunction with the 
Public Utilities Commission, to establish a methodology for determining the value of solar and authorize the states’ 
public utilities to provide VOST as an alternative option to net metering. (Minn. Statute § 216B.164, Subd. 10, n.d.) 
2.8.2 Policy Description 
VOST is a rate design approach modeled after, and adapted from, a net metering tariff in structure, but with elements of 
a standard-offer or feed-in tariff approach. Solar customers enter into long-term value of solar tariffs with distribution 
utilities to receive compensation for onsite generation. Under both VOSTs and net metering, customers purchase 
electricity from utilities at retail rates. Unlike traditional net metering, VOSTs do not compensate a solar customer’s 
generation at the retail rate. Instead, the generation is compensated based on a calculated value of solar rate in dollars 
per kilowatt hour.53 In this regard, VOSTs are sometimes called a bi-directional rate design as it calculates the value of 
electricity provided from solar customers to utilities and from utilities to solar customers separately. (Bird, et al., 2013)  
The VOST rate is derived from an analysis designed to determine the net benefit associated with distributed solar 
generation. VOST rates developed to date have been utility-specific. In Austin, the rate was determined by Austin 
Energy, a city-owned utility. In Minnesota, the state regulator was responsible for creating a methodology for 
determining the value of solar. Utilities can then apply the methodology to establish a VOST, subject to state approval, 
as an alternative to net metering. (Minnesota Department of Commerce, n.d.). Typical components to be considered in a 
VOST calculation include: 
 Avoided energy costs 
 Transmission and distribution service costs 
 Ancillary service costs 
 Avoided environmental costs 
 Societal benefits (e.g. economic growth and health benefits) 
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 In Minnesota, net excess generation is credited to the customer’s next monthly bill for up to twelve months. After twelve months, 
any unused credits will be eliminated. Austin Energy allows net excess generation to be rolled over to the next year. 
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VOSTs should be updated on a regular basis to reflect changes in energy costs and other market conditions. Both Austin 
and Minnesota’s VOSTs are subject to annual review. In Minnesota, utilities are required to recalculate the tariff for new 
systems on an annual basis and file the revised tariff for state approval.54 Table 289 shows Austin Energy’s VOST rates 
for 2013 and 2014. The rate change was mainly driven by decline in natural gas prices, along with changes in loss 
savings, transmission savings and assumed project life.  
Table 29. Austin Energy Value of Solar Rates 
 ($/kWh) 2013 2014 
Value of Solar Rate $0.128 $0.107 
As an alternative to net metering, VOSTs are nominally targeted to residential and small C&I customers that are 
traditionally eligible for net metering. The Minnesota VOST, for example, has a 1-MW system cap.  Austin Energy initially 
had a system size limit of 20 kW. However, the size cap was eliminated in August 2014, and all residential solar systems 
are now eligible for the VOST. (Resolution No. 20140828-157, 2014).  There are no aggregated program caps in either 
program. 
2.8.3 Key Interactions 
As an alternative to traditional net metering, VOST can be implemented with a suite of solar policies that are proven 
compatible with net metering. On a broader scale, VOST can replace net metering as an additional support for small and 
medium scale solar projects, while large PV systems continue to rely on RPS, competitive procurements and some tax 
incentives. All VOST projects can participate in state RPS and solar carveouts.55 In Austin and Minnesota, there are no 
provisions that prevent VOST projects from receiving rebates and other direct upfront payments. The interaction 
between VOST and other performance-based-incentives, such as feed-in tariffs and competitive long-term contracts, is 
more ambiguous. Depending on whether policymakers view VOST as utility bill offsets or an actual incentive policy, it 
may affect whether VOST and traditional PBIs are treated as complimentary or mutually exclusive policy options. (Bird, 
et al., 2013) 
Regarding tax incentives, some have expressed concern regarding whether VOST is considered a buy-all, sell-all 
approach, which could potentially affect system owners’ ability to obtain some tax credits that have onsite generation 
thresholds. Some have argued that VOSTs are a buy-all, sell-all approach as it involves customers paying for all electricity 
consumption at one rate and being compensated for all generation at a different rate. Other commentators have argued 
that, like net metering, VOST is an offsetting credit for customer generation, and hence, is not a buy-all, sell-all design. 
The federal Internal Revenue Service is currently conducting a formal review on the tax implications of VOST. 56  
                                                          
54
 In Minnesota, the VOST for existing systems is locked-in for the life of the solar PV system. (Fine, Saraf, Kumaraswamy, & Anich, 
2014) 
55
 In Minnesota, RECs generated from VOST facilities are owned by public utilities. (Minn. Statute § 216B.164, Subd. 10, n.d.) This 
requirement is established based on Minnesota’s non-competitive market structure and will not apply to VOST in a competitive 
market, such as Massachusetts.   
56
 In August 2013, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (the firm) filed a legal memo with the Alliance for Solar Choice 
regarding the tax implications of feed-in-tariffs and value of solar tariffs. The firm noted that Section 25 D Credits requires 80 
percent of the generation to be used onsite. The firm argued that FITs and VOSTs framework require the sales of all customer 
generation, and hence, could jeopardize a resident’s eligibility to receive Section 25 D Credits. (The Solar Alliance for Solar Choice, 
2013).  At that time, Austin Energy asserted that VOST is an offsetting credit for customer generation, and a sale of all output from 
customer generators to  Austin Energy is not involved. (Bird, et al., 2013). In September 2014, an Austin homeowner filed an 
Information Letter Request with the federal Internal Revenue Service to address the tax impacts of Austin Energy’s VOST. The IRS 
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2.8.4 Impacts and Observations 
VOST can be implemented as a replacement or an alternative to net metering. In Minnesota, utilities are provided with 
the options to switch to a VOST approach. Since the VOST methodology was established in April 2014, no utilities have 
yet proposed a VOST with the state.  In Austin, where residential VOST is mandated, there is insufficient data to date to 
draw statistical conclusion on the effectiveness of VOST in Austin. As a result, there is very little industry experience to 
go on, particularly in locations with modest insolation and competitive markets.  However, it is observed that there has 
been accelerated growth in the market sector, while rebate levels continue to decline since VOST implementation. There 
have been talks to extend VOST to the commercial sector. (Rabago, 2014)  
Figure 13 . Austin Energy Residential Solar Installation and Rebate Trends 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
will formally review the tax implications of Austin Energy’s VOST. At time this section is written, the IRS has yet not issued a decision 
(The Solar Alliance for Solar Choice, 2014). 
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1 Introduction 
The U.S. solar market has grown substantially over the past several years, from an estimated 1.2 GW of 
total capacity in 2009 to nearly 20 GW by the end of 2014 (SEIA, 2015). This market growth has not been 
uniform across the country, with some states having substantial solar PV generating capacity installed 
and others having virtually none. The economic viability of PV systems depends on a range of inputs 
including system installed costs, ongoing operational costs, federal incentives, power production values, 
and state or utility incentives. The Task Force has expressed an interest in understanding the 
relationship between state solar programs and actual deployment of solar, and whether it might be 
reasonable to expect solar development even in the absence of significant state programs. The purpose 
of this task is to provide a representative analysis of the level of solar development in states that do not 
have a state-level incentive program (Massachusetts Net Metering Task Force, 2014).     
2 Methodology and Analysis 
In order to provide a nuanced discussion of the effects of state-level solar incentives on solar market 
development, this analysis was divided into three components. Since net metering may be a critical 
component of solar market development, and the Task Force has been asked to provide 
recommendations to the legislature on the future of net metering in the Commonwealth, this analysis 
includes a review of solar market development in states that do not have net metering. Additionally, this 
task reviewed solar market development in states that have similar characteristics to Massachusetts in 
terms of the economic value of solar production per kilowatt-hour and expected solar system output 
given state-level solar insolation. Finally, the project team reviewed recently announced large-scale solar 
installations in states and utility territories that do not have substantial solar incentives. A more detailed 
review of the analytical approaches and results of each of these tasks is provided below.   
2.1  Review of market development in states without solar incentives or net 
metering 
Net metering allows utility customers with on-site distributed generation to offset their electricity usage 
by exporting excess power to the grid and to receive 
credit for exported power on their utility bill (Mass DPU, 
2015). Net metering rules vary significantly across U.S. 
jurisdictions with some states and utilities providing full 
retail value for power exported to the grid while others 
provide compensation at some fraction of full retail 
value. To date, 44 states have adopted state-wide net 
metering in some form. Table 30 below show the U.S. 
states that have not had state-wide net metering during 
Table 30. States without state-wide  
net metering (IREC & Vote Solar, 2014) 
State 
Idaho 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Tennessee 
Alabama 
Mississippi 
South Carolina 
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the period of interest in this analysis.57  
Solar market development has been limited in 
states without net metering. Table 31 below 
shows the cumulative solar installations in 
each of these states as of 2013. As the table 
shows, Idaho, South Dakota, Alabama, 
Mississippi and South Carolina all have less 
than 10 MW of cumulative solar installed as of 
the end of 2013. Tennessee, which does have 
solar incentive programs provided through the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Texas, 
which has a solar market driven, in part, by municipal utility solar procurements, have more substantial 
installed capacity than the other states. Massachusetts has been included in Table 31 for reference 
purposes.  
Given the significant diversity of states in this analysis, cumulative state solar capacity has been 
normalized in Table 2 to account for the size of the state’s total power consumption. Total state solar 
capacity in 2013 in watts was divided by the total state electricity sales in GWh. This provides a better 
comparison between states without net metering and Massachusetts. As this comparison shows, the 
normalized cumulative PV watts per GWh of electricity sales shows that the Massachusetts solar market 
is an order of magnitude larger than any solar market without net metering, suggesting that net 
metering is a critical component to solar market development.  
2.2 Review of market development in states with net metering, but modest 
solar incentives 
Numerous states have implemented diverse programs in addition to net metering in an effort to 
encourage the development of solar markets. These efforts range from modest benefits such as 
reductions in sales and property taxes to more lucrative incentives such as rebates and performance 
based incentives. Analyzing the effect of state-level incentive policies on solar market development is 
key to understanding if and how Massachusetts’ solar market could evolve in the absence of state-level 
solar incentives. While future market dynamics would be highly dependent on a number of state-specific 
factors and future solar installed costs, evaluating the solar market development in states that are 
similar to Massachusetts but lack major solar incentives does provide an indicator of potential market 
dynamics in the absence of state-level incentive support.  
Solar PV system economics are influenced by several state-specific factors beyond incentives, most 
notably the potential production of the system (i.e., the solar resource in the state) and the retail value 
                                                          
57
 In December 2014, South Carolina’s Public Utilities Commission received a settlement agreement for a statewide 
net metering program, but this has not yet been approved and the policy has not been implemented. 
Table 31. Total Solar Market Capacity in 2013 in 
Massachusetts (Sherwood, 2014) 
State 
2013 Cumulative 
MW 
2013 W/GWh 
Electricity Sales 
Idaho 0.7 29 
South Dakota 0.0 0.0 
Texas 215.9 587 
Tennessee 64.8 675 
Alabama 1.9 22 
Mississippi 0.3 6 
South Carolina 8.0 101 
Massachusetts 445.0 8,167 
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of each kWh produced by that system. The combination of these two factors provides a proxy for the 
potential value of PV systems excluding state and federal incentives in each state.  
In order to conduct a comparative analysis of state-level solar market development that is most relevant 
to the Massachusetts context, the project team identified 19 states that have a similar combination of 
retail electricity prices and solar resources to Massachusetts. This was done by calculating the expected 
value of power produced by a 1 kW system in each state by multiplying the expected production a PV 
system in that state by the average retail value of power.58,59  
               
                                                                                 
This calculation resulted in a hypothetical value for the power generated by a 1 kW PV system in each 
state in the absence of state-level incentives.  States with low solar resource, but high retail power 
values, may have expected power production values that are similar to that in states with high solar 
resources, but low retail power prices. To illustrate this phenomenon, example calculations are provided 
below for Vermont and Nevada--two states with very different solar resources and retail power prices, 
but similar expected PV system expected production values.  
                                                       
                                                        
Table 32 shows the 19 states where the combination of state-level solar resource and state-level retail 
power value most closely aligns with Massachusetts.  
                                                          
58
 The retail value of power used in this analysis was based on the average state-wide retail power price for all 
customers in the state between 2008 and 2012 (EIA, 2015). While different customer classes may pay substantially 
different retail rates within a state and even within separate utility territories, for the purposes of this analysis, 
state-level average power prices provide an adequate proxy for more granular power price data.   
59
 The average state-wide solar PV capacity factor was based on National Renewable Energy Laboratory data. PV 
systems within a state will have highly variable production profiles based on site-specific factors such as 
orientation and system shading, however state-level capacity factor estimates provide a reasonable estimation of 
system production and are adequate for the purposes of this analysis.  
60
 Hawaii, with high retail electricity costs and relatively high solar insolation, had an average annual retail 
electricity value from a 1kW PV system of $418, making it a significant outlier.  
Table 32. Average Annual Retail 
Electricity Value  
from a 1 kW PV system60 
State $/kW State $/kW 
CA $206 MD $158 
CT $204 NV $155 
NY $184 VT $149 
NJ $181 ME $147 
MA $172 NM $144 
NH $169 FL $144 
RI $169 CO $139 
DE $165 TX $135 
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As the table shows, the expected value of PV system production 
in many northeast states, with their relatively high retail power 
prices, is higher than that in many states in the south and southwest that have greater solar resources 
but lower retail power values. The 19 states identified as having the most similarity to Massachusetts 
with respect to the combination of solar resource and retail power prices were further examined to 
determine how state solar market development differed between states with major solar incentives and 
those without.  
For the 19 states identified as having the most similar non-incentive solar market condition (i.e., the 
combination of solar insolation and retail electricity prices), the project team reviewed available state-
level solar incentives. Solar incentives in each of the analyzed states were classified as major or minor 
based on a qualitative review of the incentive type, incentive value and volume of available incentives. 
For example, some states have renewable energy incentives available, but do not have incentives 
specifically reserved for solar. These states would be classified as having minor solar incentives. 
Conversely, some states have created specific solar or distributed generation [DG] targets as part of 
their renewable portfolio standard. These states would be classified as having major solar incentive 
programs.  
Data on 2013 cumulative solar capacity for each of the 19 states of interest were normalized based on 
total retail electricity sales in order to compare solar market activity in states of dissimilar sizes. This was 
accomplished by dividing the cumulative state solar capacity in 2013 by the total retail electric sales in 
that year (EIA, 2015; Sherwood, 2014). Additionally, 2013 RPS solar (or DG) targets were researched 
(DSIRE, 2015). For some states with major incentive programs, explicit annual solar goals were not 
available while in others, solar targets were an explicit part of the RPS policy. Table 33 below shows both 
the 2013 solar/DG targets along with the 2013 adjusted solar market capacity in solar watts per GWh of 
sales.  
Table 33. State Solar Market Incentives and 2013 Metrics 
State 
Major/Minor 
Incentive 
Major Incentive 
State 2013 
DG/Solar Goal 
Annual Solar 
Value w/o 
Incentives 
2013 
W/GWh 
AZ Major State RPS that includes DG carve out 1.20% $162 20,651 
CA Major 
Utility-supported rebate and long-term 
contracting programs as part of RPS 
Major incentive;  
no %age target 
$206 20,171 
NJ Major SREC obligation as part of state RPS 0.80% $181 15,921 
NV Major Energy portfolio standard with solar carve-out 0.90% $155 12,070 
NM Major RPS with solar carve out 2.00% $144 11,068 
MA Major SREC obligation as part of state RPS 0.38% $172 8,167 
VT Major Solar-specific long-term contracting program 
Major incentive;  
no %age target 
$149 7,460 
CO Major State DG carve out in RPS 1.25% $139 6,690 
DE Major SREC obligation in state RPS 0.40% $165 5,590 
MD Major SREC obligation in state RPS 0.25% $159 2,833 
DC $163 GA $134 
AZ $162 KS $120 
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CT Major Utility-supported ZREC programs 
Major incentive;  
no %age target 
$204 2,596 
NY Major 
NYSERDA supported rebates and long-term 
contracting through RPS 
0.34% $184 1,677 
DC Major SREC obligation in district RPS 0.50% $163 1,488 
RI Major 
Utility-supported long-term contracting 
program, recently increased targets 
Major incentive;  
no %age target 
$169 976 
NH Minor 
State has RPS solar carve out, however credit 
price caps are not differentiated from other 
renewable technologies 
0.20% $169 873 
GA Minor Limited utility-based programs 0.00% $134 835 
FL Minor Limited utility-based rebate programs 0.00% $144 620 
TX Minor 
No major state-wide solar incentive; some 
utility-specific programs and contracts 
0.00% $135 587 
ME Minor No major solar incentives 0.00% $147 448 
KS Minor No major solar incentives 0.00% $120 28 
In order to determine whether state-wide solar policies--and therefore incentives resulting from those 
policies--or non-incentive factors such as in-state solar resource and retail power prices were major 
drivers of market development, scatter plots were developed that graphed market penetration against 
average non-incentive solar system annual value as well as market penetration against state-wide solar 
goal. These graphs are shown in Figure 14 and Error! Reference source not found..  
Figure 14. Adjusted 2013 PV Market Capacity    Figure 15. Adjusted 2013 PV Market Capacity vs.                   
vs. Average Annual Solar Non-Incentive Value    2013 State RPS Solar/DG Target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the figures show, non-incentive annual solar value had limited relationship to total solar market 
penetration in the states analyzed, while state-wide solar goals had a more robust linear relationship to 
solar market penetration. As would be expected, states with more significant solar goals in 2013 had 
more in-state solar capacity than states with smaller or non-existent solar goals. This result suggests 
that, during the period reviewed and for the states analyzed, state-level policies in the form of solar RPS 
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solar market development and that states that have substantial solar potential, but did not have 
incentive policies, had not developed significant solar markets.  
2.3 Discussion of select recent publicly announced utility scale solar projects 
The results in the previous two sections relied on data from 2013, the most recently available state solar 
installation dataset. During the past year, several utilities have announced large-scale solar projects in 
states without significant solar incentives. These announcements have frequently promoted that the 
long-term contract prices associated with these installations are competitive with traditional fossil 
power sources. Beyond these announcements, little public data is available about the overall costs of 
these systems, the incentives they may be monetizing, and other contract details. Recently announced 
systems include a 150 MW 25-year power purchase agreement between Austin Energy and Recurrent 
Energy for below $0.05 per kWh (Wesoff, 2014), more than 320 MW of solar in Utah qualified under an 
avoided cost program through Rocky Mountain Power (First Wind, 2014), and a 10 MW PV system in 
Kentucky that was approved by regulators as a hedge against future national carbon regulations 
(Tincher, 2014). These and other recently announced projects in states that do not have robust solar 
incentive programs are indicative of the improving economics of solar. That said, the context for these 
installations is significantly different from the current Massachusetts market, particularly with respect to 
installation size. Solar PV systems benefit from significant economies of scale and the recently 
announced low-cost solar power contracts have been in locations where very large, utility-scale solar 
arrays are viable.  
3 Conclusion 
As the analysis in this section shows, historical solar market development has been largely dependent on 
state-level policies in the United States. States that do not offer net metering have historically had highly 
limited solar market development compared to Massachusetts. Additionally, state-level targets and 
incentives have been a major driver of solar market development to date. As the analysis in this section 
shows, states that have not had robust solar incentives and targets, but have adequate solar potential, 
have seen limited market growth compared to similar states with solar incentives and binding targets. 
This suggests that, for the time being, state-level solar policies may be critical to future solar market 
growth in the U.S. Finally, a number of utility-scale PV systems have been recently announced in states 
without major incentives. These systems have purportedly signed contracts at prices competitive with 
fossil fuel generators. While these systems are very large and are able to capture significant economies 
of scale, unlike systems currently installed in the Massachusetts market, they do point to a potential 
future under which solar PV is less dependent of state-level incentives.   
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Executive Summary 
Objectives 
Section 7(b) of Chapter 251 of the Acts of 2015 directs the Massachusetts Net Metering and Solar Task Force to “assess 
and report to the legislature on the costs and benefits of the existing net metering framework from the perspectives of 
the customer-generator, non-participating ratepayers and the citizens of the commonwealth at large.” Task 3 of the 
Task Force scope of work further directs the consultants to compare the cost and benefits of current Massachusetts net 
metering and solar incentive policy to other policies from those different stakeholder perspectives. This report serves to: 
 Evaluate the costs and benefits of the current solar and net metering incentive landscape; 
 Compare the current policy landscape with alternative future policy ‘paths’ and inform the Task Force and policy 
makers regarding the impact of changes to net metering and solar policy in Massachusetts; and 
 Calculate and present the costs and benefits of each future policy path from specified stakeholder perspectives, 
through the current level of policy targets (1600 MWDC of solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity in Massachusetts) and 
beyond. 
Study Components and Methodology 
In order to determine the costs and benefits associated with alternatives to Massachusetts’ current solar policies, the 
Net Metering and Solar Task Force seeks to evaluate the costs and benefits of those alternatives relative to a baseline 
policy future. To do this, this study examines both 1) the impacts of existing systems and 2) the forecasted impacts of 
future systems under three policy futures:  
- “SREC Policy” – Policy in this scenario would remain the same as under current law and policy, save for the sub-
scenarios in which the baseline is extended to include a third Solar Carve-Out program (SREC-III). Incentives would 
remain market-based, tradable SRECs modulated by existing (and, for SREC-III, forecasted) Solar Alternative Compliance 
Payment (SACP) and Solar Credit Clearinghouse Auction (SCCA) trajectories that serves as a price ceiling and soft floor. 
- Policy Path A – Under Policy Path A, the SREC programs are replaced by a set of declining-block and performance-based 
incentives that decline over time for small projects (≤ 25 kW dc), and through competitive bidding for the large projects 
(> 25 kW dc). Additionally, net metering credits, where available, are limited strictly to the generation component of 
customer rates.  
- Policy Path B – Under Policy Path B, the SREC market structure is replaced by 1) an incentive that reflects an upfront 
payment based on the expected lifetime performance of the PV system (similar to programs in New York and California) 
for small projects and 2) a similar declining-block incentive to that proposed in Policy Path A for large projects. Net 
metering credits in this scenario would reflect the full generation, transmission and distribution values customers 
currently receive. 
The study also breaks out these policy futures into sub-scenarios for further analysis based on: 
- Whether the MW target is expanded to 2500 MW (or remains at 1600 MW);  
- Whether the aggregate net metering caps under current law remain in place or are removed. 
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Given these policy futures and associated sub-scenarios, the analysis calculates the market impacts associated with 
each, including the total megawatts (MW) installed by type of installation, the total impact to SREC prices under the 
existing (and hypothetical) Carve-Out programs, the total solar incentives as part of Policy Paths A&B, all for both 1) 
when net metering caps are reached and 2) when total MW targets under each sub-scenario are reached. 
The study also breaks the total costs and benefits associated with each of these policy futures and sub-scenarios into the 
following categories: PV System Costs; Solar Policy; Behind-the-Meter Production in the Billing Month; Net Metering 
Credits Beyond the Billing Month; Electric Market; Electric Investment Impacts; and Externalities and Other impacts. 
Finally, per the legislation creating the Task Force, each component of the costs and benefits associated with solar PV 
was considered for each of four key perspectives: 
- Non-owner participants that benefit from (but do not own) solar PV systems; 
- Solar customer-generators that own and/or operate solar PV systems; 
- Non-participating ratepayers that do not directly participate in solar PV programs; and 
- The citizens of Massachusetts at large, the aggregate impacts accruing to in-state entities. 
Key Takeaways and Observations 
Overall 
 Under all scenarios, Massachusetts reaches its current goal of 1600 MW of PV by 2019.   
 Under all scenarios, the benefits of the solar program exceed the costs by more than 2 to 1. The benefit:cost 
ratios for the citizens of Massachusetts at large range from 2.2:1 to 2.7:1. 
 All future scenarios examined would be less expensive than the current SREC-I and SREC-II program. 
 The choice of policy path affects both the costs and benefits and the type of systems that will be built.  Paths 
that include net metering caps will result in a higher percentage of smaller, onsite systems; paths without net 
metering caps will result in a higher percentage of larger systems. 
SREC Policy Baseline 
Market Impacts: Under the SREC scenarios analyzed in this study, the SREC-II goal of 1600 MW by 2020 could be 
reached as early as 2018, while a hypothetical SREC-III goal of 2500 by 2025 could be met as early as 2020 or 2022, 
depending on whether net metering caps are removed. In addition, in part due to the declining cost of solar PV, the total 
cost of the Carve-Out relative to total solar deployment is expected to decline with each successive Carve-Out program, 
and the cost of a hypothetical SREC-III program is no exception. In the SREC-driven scenarios in which net metering caps 
are kept in place, small installations are expected to dominate the market. However, the rapid growth enabled by the 
SREC programs and virtual net metering could lead to a more volatile Massachusetts solar market toward end of the 
decade, as net metering caps and step-downs of the federal investment tax credit built into existing law are reached. 
Costs and Benefits: While the SREC programs are expected to come at a net cost to non-participating ratepayers of $2.7-
$2.9 billion over 25 years, these programs are also expected to provide $7.0-$8.8 billion in net benefits to the citizens of 
Massachusetts over the same period, depending on the scenario analyzed. Customer-generators and non-owner 
participants are likely to enjoy a net benefit ranging from $2.2-$3.8 billion and $734-$809 million, respectively. 
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Policy Path A 
Market Impacts: In all Policy Path A scenarios, larger installations tend to be built out, especially those currently 
classified as “Managed Growth” installations.  This is a shift from the SREC Policy net metering cap future which has no 
Managed Growth installations built after SREC-II is complete and is dominated by under 25 kW projects.  The status of 
net metering caps under Policy Path A is crucial to project mix.  When net metering is uncapped and available virtually 
net metered PV installations would have significant cost advantages and therefore dominate the mix of projects built. 
Regardless of net metering status, relative to the SREC Policy scenario, under Policy Path A the market reaches a more 
stable equilibrium at a lower growth level through 2025. 
Costs and Benefits: Depending on the scenario, Policy Path A is expected to reach the 2500 MW goal by 2025 at a 
reduced net cost to non-participating ratepayers and reduced net benefit to citizens of Massachusetts at large relative 
to the SREC Policy pathway. Customer-generators and non-owner participants also realize a reduced net benefit relative 
to the SREC Policy pathway. Further, if net metering is not capped, the total net cost to ratepayers is lower than if caps 
remain in place. The specific net benefit values of Policy Path A relative to the SREC policy baseline are explored below.  
Policy Path B 
Market Impacts: In broad terms, Policy Path A and B are relatively similar in terms of the installations incented to be 
built. While installations under 25kW will remain relatively constant between Policy Path A and B, they remain 
significantly lower than in the SREC Policy future, despite the fact that these installations will also reach grid parity by 
the early 2020s. In addition, the degree to which Community Shared Solar and virtually net metered low income housing 
(VNM LIH) installations are enabled by the program is dependent upon the availability of net metering. Policy Path A and 
B are also similar in that each creates a more stable market at a lower rate of growth than the SREC Policy future, but 
Policy Path B is somewhat more volatile, given that it is a market-based program. 
Costs and Benefits: The 25-year net costs to non-participating ratepayers and net benefits to Massachusetts citizens at 
large associated with Path B are elevated somewhat relative to Path A, but are both lower on net relative to the SREC 
Policy baseline. The net benefits accruing to non-owner participants and customer-generators are also higher relative to 
Policy Path A. Notably, under an uncapped Policy Path B scenario, the total net benefits to non-owner participants are 
significantly higher than even the SREC Policy baseline, even as the expected costs to ratepayers are reduced. The 
specific net benefit values of Policy Path A relative to the SREC policy baseline are explored below. 
Discussion of Findings 
Build-out under Each Scenario 
Figure 16 shows the projected subsector market share in each policy future after 2016.  No policy future is projected to 
reach the level of share of Managed Growth as has been seen in the past.  Almost 20% of the cumulative installs through 
the end of 2016 are projected to come from the ≤ 25 kW subsector.  In attaining the 2500 MW goal, this proportion 
declines slightly in all policy futures except SREC capped, which builds almost three times the cumulative installations in 
the ≤ 25 kW subsector as was seen in SREC capped scenario through 2016.  In all policy futures cumulative installations 
in the Building Mounted subsector increase.  The net metering policy clearly drives the cumulative installations of VNM 
LIH and CSS. In capped scenarios neither of these project types will be built, but when net metering is uncapped all 
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scenarios show a hefty fraction of VNM LIH and CSS installs.  The incentive structure of Paths A and B promotes more 
project diversity with and without net metering as compared to the SREC policy. 
Figure 16: Subsector Market Share Comparison by Policy Scenario 
 
Quantified Costs and Benefit Results 
Table 34 and Table 35 summarize the results of the quantified cost and benefit analysis for each policy scenario, as 
follows:  
 Net Present Value of Costs – measured in 2015 $ million 
 Net Present Value of Benefits – measured in 2015 $ million 
 Benefit to Cost (B:C) Ratio – illustrates the trade-off between the cost and benefit to a perspective under each 
policy. A ratio larger than 1 indicates that the benefit to the perspective is greater than the cost.  
 Net Benefits to Citizens at Large to Net Costs to Non-Participating Ratepayers (NB(C@L):NC(NPR)) Ratio – 
illustrates “which future justifies the subsidy paid by non-participating ratepayers with the greatest net benefits 
to the Commonwealth at large?” 
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Table 34: Quantified Cost and Benefit Results and Ratio: SREC (Capped), Policy A (Capped), and Policy B (Capped) to 2500 MW 
     
Table 35: Quantified Cost and Benefit Results and Ratio: Policy A (Capped) and Policy B (Capped) to 2500 MW 
       
 
Comparing Cost and Benefit Results by Perspective 
 NOP benefits include value of production (on-site and net metered), land lease and PILOTs/property taxes.  
Variations in benefits to NOPs between policy scenarios are mostly a function of the proportion of projects using 
virtual net metering. State and federal income taxes make up the total costs to NOP.  NOP total benefits and 
total costs are relatively small in comparison to other perspectives. 
 CG benefits and costs drive profitability.  The largest costs to CGs are system installed costs, ongoing O&M, and 
taxes.  Direct solar incentive revenues make up almost 30% of total benefits in some policy scenarios.  Other 
major benefit sources are virtual net metering and federal ITC, which makes up 10 to 12% of CG benefits 
depending on the scenario. 
 NPR costs and benefits tell the degree of subsidy that they are bearing.  Benefits to NPRs are similar across the 
policy scenarios.  Major cost components to the NPR perspective include direct solar incentive payments, which 
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make up about 50% of total costs.  Other large cost components include non-generation components of on-site 
generation and VNM. 
 Massachusetts Citizens at Large (C@L) costs and benefits are the justification to have a solar policy.  Costs to 
C@L include federal income taxes, direct incentives, and solar policy administrative and transaction costs.  The 
largest benefits to C@L are system installed costs retained in state, avoided generation capacity costs, and 
generation value of on-site generation. 
Comparing Cost and Benefit Results by Policy Scenario 
 Policy Path A (Uncapped) would translate non-participating ratepayer’s subsidy to the greatest net benefits to 
the Commonwealth at large. Among the six policy scenarios, Policy Path A (Uncapped) has the highest 
NB(C@L):NC(NPR) ratio of 4.69. 
 Policy Path A (Uncapped) represents multiple perspectives’ best interest. Among the six policy scenarios, Policy 
Path A (Uncapped) has the highest B:C ratios for two perspectives (non-owner participants and non-participating 
ratepayers). SREC (Capped) has the highest B:C ratio for customer generators. Policy Path B (Uncapped) has the 
highest B:C ratio for the Commonwealth at large.  
 Non-participating ratepayers fare better under Policy Path A or B. Non-participating ratepayers receive B:C 
ratios below 1 across all policy scenarios, although the ratio increases when moving away from the SREC 
scenario. This shows that, while a subsidy is paid by non-participating ratepayers for each policy, Policy Path A 
and Policy B requires less subsidy than the SREC program to build the same amount of solar.  
It is important to note that the result of non-participating ratepayers costs exceeding benefits over the entire 
time horizon since 2010 is largely driven by inclusion of the legacy programs, SREC-I and to a lesser degree 
SREC-II.  The subsequent programs – SREC-III, Policy Path A and Policy Path B, each are progressively more 
cost-effective than the legacy programs.  While the scope of the analysis did not allow for rolling up costs in 
this manner, inspection of the results suggests that part or all of these policies may have a B:C ratio near or 
exceeding 1.0, which would indicate any subsidies being offset by tangible internalized benefits.    
Availability of net metering incentives is crucial to non-owner participants. The B:C ratios for non-owner participants 
are significantly higher under Policy Path A (Uncapped) (6.27) and Policy Path B (Uncapped) (6.17) than under other 
scenarios.  This can be explained by the dependence of non-host-owned projects (such as Community Shared Solar and 
low-income housing with virtual net metering) on the availability of virtual net metering. 
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Acronym Glossary 
  
C@L Citizens of the Commonwealth at large 
CG Customer-Generator 
CSS Community shared solar 
DBI Declining block incentive 
DRIPE Demand reduction induced price effect 
EDC Electric Distribution Company 
ELCC Electric Load Carrying Capacity 
EPBI Expected Performance Based Incentive 
FCM Forward Capacity Market 
ICR Installed Capacity Requirements 
ISO-NE Independent System Operator (New England) 
kW kilowatt  
kWh kilowatt-hour 
LIH Low-income Housing 
MW Megawatt 
MWh Megawatt-hour 
NM Net energy metering 
NMC Net metering credit 
NOP Non-Owner Participant 
NPR Non-Participating Ratepayer 
PBI Performance-Based Incentive 
PV Photovoltaic(s) 
REC/RECs Renewable energy certificate(s) 
SACP Solar alternative compliance payment 
SREC/SRECs Solar renewable energy credit(s) 
VNM Virtual net metering 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Objectives: Framework and Boundaries of Analysis 
The Massachusetts Net Metering and Solar Task Force (“Task Force”) was created by Senate Bill 2214, which was signed 
into law August 6, 2014. Among other responsibilities, This Act requires the Task Force to “assess and report to the 
legislature on the costs and benefits of the existing net metering framework from the perspectives of the customer-
generator, non-participating ratepayers and the citizens of the commonwealth at large.”61  Task 3 of the Task Force 
consultant’s scope of work is to “Analyze the costs and benefits of current Massachusetts net metering and solar 
incentive policy and compare to other policies from the perspective of groups the customer-generator, non-participating 
ratepayers and citizens of the commonwealth at large, provided that the task force may further specify groups.”  
Further, Task 4 of the scope of work was to “provide a range of options for appropriate structures for providing the 
support to reach the 1600 MW goal and provide the opportunity for additional development”. 
The purpose of this report is threefold: 
 To evaluate the costs and benefits of the current solar and net metering incentive landscape.  This includes the 
interaction between the current solar policy – a Solar Carve-out from the Commonwealth’s Class I Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS) which utilizes a tradable market for Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SREC)s – and the 
current net metering policy, which caps the quantity of ‘behind-the-meter’ distributed renewable energy 
generators at a specified percentage of each distribution utility’s loads for ‘public’ and ‘private’ installations.62   
 To compare the current policy landscape with alternative future policy ‘paths’ and inform the Task Force and policy 
makers regarding the impact of changes to net metering and solar policy in Massachusetts. This includes two alternative 
future solar policy paths selected for analysis through consultation between the Task Force and consultants, under two 
alternative net metering futures, limited to current statutory caps, and without any net metering cap (referred to herein as 
‘uncapped’).
63
 
-  
 To calculate and present the costs and benefits of each future policy path from specified stakeholder perspectives, 
through the current level of policy targets (1600 MWDC of solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity in Massachusetts) and beyond. 
As discussed further below, in order to capture impacts of interest to Task Force members and allow for a more meaningful 
consideration of costs and benefits to citizens within the Commonwealth, a fourth perspective was added to those 
identified in statute: that of non-owner participants. 
                                                          
61
 See Section 7(b) of Chapter 251 of the Acts of 2014 (https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2014/Chapter251) and the 
Net Metering Task Force Framing Memorandum (http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dep/about/final-nm-task-force-framing-
memo.pdf) 
62
 The current public sector and private sector net metering caps are set at 5% and 4% of a distribution company's historical peak 
load respectively. See Section 5 of Chapter 251 of the Acts of 2014 
(https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2014/Chapter251) and 200 CMR 18.00 
(http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoomAPI/api/Attachments/Get/?path=14-104%2f14104A_order_App_A.pdf).   
63 Class I net metering systems (≤10 kW on a single-phase circuit or ≤ 25 kW on a three-phase circuit) are not counted against the aggregated program caps and 
therefore can continue to net meter under the capped scenarios. 
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Costs and benefits of interest relate both to the impacts which relate to the quantity of solar PV in Massachusetts (which 
are in most respects independent of the policy future chosen), and the costs and benefits that differ between futures.  
While this report considers both absolute and relative costs and benefits, the Task Force was clear in prioritizing those 
costs and benefits that differ between futures: 
The language in the legislation regarding “costs and benefits” is not intended for us to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of achieving this 1600 MW goal, but directs us to consider the relative costs and benefits of 
policy options to achieve the goal, as well as the overall cost and benefits of the existing net metering 
framework from the perspective of multiple customer groups.64 
Many of the absolute costs and benefits considered are the same (or nearly so) between alternative policies reaching 
similar quantities of solar in MA.  Those most important are those that clearly differ, e.g. solar policy payments and net 
metering transfers.65   
1.2 Cost-Benefit Perspectives: An Overview 
When evaluating the costs and benefits of energy programs or policies, it is important to remember that costs and 
benefits do not have a single objective value. Since electric power generation, transmission, distribution (as well as 
conservation) have an impact on an economy and society on multiple levels, multiple “objective” and equally valid cost-
benefit values can be accounted for from multiple perspectives. And the costs to one party may be benefits to other 
parties (and vice versa). 
Perspectives of interest can include both “participants” that are directly affected by or benefiting from the program, as 
well as non-participants, including both electric ratepayers, as well as others who may be affected indirectly as non-
participants.  
The Task Force in consultation with the consultants has explicitly identified four cost-benefit perspectives to account for:  
 Participants (including two subcategories): 
 Customer-generators (CG), which includes individuals and businesses owning and operating grid-tied solar PV 
systems;  
 Non-Owner Participants (NOP), which includes other entities that directly benefit from solar PV installations.  
 Non-participating Ratepayers (NPR), which includes all utility customers not participating in a solar PV program; and 
 The citizens of the Commonwealth at large (C@L), which includes all citizens of Massachusetts, including all participants 
and non-participating ratepayers. 
The term “customer-generator” frequently refers to owners of solar PV systems, but can sometimes be used 
interchangeably in utility tariffs to refer to both owners and non-owning customer beneficiaries. Given that a large 
number of on-site (as well as off-site and “virtually” net metered) solar PV systems in Massachusetts and elsewhere are 
owned and operated by third parties (referred to herein as 3rd-party owners, or 3POs), a clearer definition of “customer-
                                                          
64
 Net Metering Task Force Framing Memorandum. 
65
 Little can be learned from analysis of market price effects, avoided emissions or transmission system impacts between different 
solar policies of similar scale, so cost or benefits proportional to quantity of solar PV were analyzed once for a proxy build-out 
schedule and applied equally on a per-unit basis to all cases, a reasonable simplification allowing the consulting team to focus on the 
Task Force’s priorities. 
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generator” is beneficial to the analysis. At the request of DOER, the analysis also includes the perspective of the non-
owner participant in a solar program or other arrangement. Table 36 below describes the types of individuals and 
businesses that are both solar customer-generators and non-owner participants. 
Table 36: Summary of Four Perspectives 
Participants 
NPR: Non-participating 
Ratepayers 
(within MA) 
C@L: Citizens of MA at Large 
NOP: 
Non-Owner Participants 
GC: 
Customer-generators 
(Including Host- and 3rd-Party 
(3PO) System Owners) 
Including individuals, 
businesses, governments 
and non-profits that receive 
economic benefits through 
solar PV transactions with 
3POs, and communities 
receiving property tax or 
similar benefits: 
• Communities hosting 
PV 
• Net Metering Credit 
(NMC) off-takers 
• Hosts of systems 
purchasing electricity 
from 3POs or selling 
Virtual net metering 
credits (VNMCs) 
Individuals, businesses, 
governments and non-profit 
organizations  that own an 
eligible solar PV system for 
self-supply as “host owners” 
or “public owners” and 
receive net metering credits, 
as well as 3POs, businesses 
that own eligible systems and 
sell energy to participants as a 
third party.  
Customers of electric 
distribution companies 
(EDCs) and competitive 
suppliers that do not own or 
contract for energy from a 
dedicated distributed solar 
PV system or receive direct 
bill savings that may accrue 
electric system benefit or 
cost as a result of net energy 
metering. 
Sum of all in-state 
participants and in-state non-
participants.  Individuals 
including both non-
ratepayers and both 
participating and non-
participating ratepayers that 
may accrue economic, 
environmental or other social 
benefit or cost as a result of 
solar PV. 
The set of four perspectives described here are defined in such a manner that, if all cost and benefit components were 
able to be quantified, all impacts would be captured other than dollars flowing out of state.  As discussed above and 
further below, however, this analysis does not include macroeconomic indirect and induced benefits.  And further, there 
are certain cost and benefit components that are not captured because they are ether difficult to quantify, controversial 
in nature, small and therefore ignored, beyond the scope of this engagement.  Several of these cost components are 
addressed qualitatively, so that readers may consider their role in the overall analysis were they able to be included.  
The analysis treats customer-generators (CGs) themselves as in-state entities, but then treats (or apportions) the dollars 
that flow to both in- and out-of-state investors (owners and lenders).  Further, it apportions dollars spent on equipment 
and labor both in- and out-of-state. 
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1.3 Baseline for Comparing the Costs and Benefits of Alternative Policy Futures 
In order to establish an appropriate baseline for comparing costs and benefits of various policy futures from multiple 
perspectives on a per-unit basis, it is important to consider the counterfactual to the alternatives being considered, i.e. 
compared to what?  Most studies of solar policy compare solar PV to the absence of a solar policy in which solar PV 
would displace the marginal fossil fuel (in New England, primarily natural gas).  However, the current solar policy is 
structured as a ‘carve-out’ from the Massachusetts Class I Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).  This means that the 
solar policy operates within the Class I RPS; the existence of the carve-out reduces the net Class I RPS obligation to be 
met by other Class I RPS sources. 
From this perspective, if Massachusetts load-serving entities (LSEs) subject to the Class I RPS obligation were able to 
procure sufficient Class I-eligible Renewable Energy Credit (REC) supply (assumed to be sourced primarily from land-
based wind projects at the margin), then the solar would in effect be displacing such wind power (most likely located in 
Northern New England), in terms of its power market and emission impacts, and the purchase of Class I RECs for RPS 
compliance.  On the other hand, of the obligated LSEs were unable to procure sufficient Class I REC supply because 
developers were unable to develop sufficient volumes of wind power to meet RPS targets, then the solar PV in 
Massachusetts would be displacing primarily natural gas generation in terms of its power market and emission impacts, 
and the payment of Class I Alterative Compliance Payments (ACPs) for RPS compliance.  
This study considers these two frameworks as extremes: 
- The Carve-out Framework (solar vs. wind):  In this framework, it is assumed that in the future, if not for the 
solar carve-out or any alternative Massachusetts solar policy, sufficient supply from land-based wind would 
be built, with corresponding Class I RECs purchased sufficient to meet the Class I RPS.  With this as the policy 
baseline, adding solar displaces wind power, a zero emission resource with a materially different production 
profile, and avoids LSE payments for Class I RECs. It is assumed that prior to 2018, in the absence of the 
Massachusetts solar carve-out policy, no more wind could be built: the past supply mix is held constant, and 
prior to 2018 it is assume no more wind could be brought forth, so until 2018, solar is assumed to displace 
natural gas; thereafter.  This framework represents the low end of emission reduction, market price effects 
(i.e. energy market price suppression), and avoided Class I REC costs. 
- The Incremental Solar Framework (solar vs. natural gas): In this framework, it is assumed in the future that 
in the absence of Massachusetts solar PV policy, not enough wind power can be successfully sited or built to 
fulfill the Class I RPS obligation.  In this case, solar PV avoids burning natural gas.  This framework represents 
the high end of emission reduction and market price impacts, as well as avoidance of higher cost Class ACPs 
Class I RPS shortfalls. 
A more realistic future than either of these extremes is somewhere in between.  For purposes of this analysis, costs and 
benefits are calculated under both frameworks and their results are presented based on a 50%/50% weighting of the 
extremes.  The results are later tested to understand the sensitivity of the results to either extreme. 
1.4 Analysis Timeline and Installed Capacity Targets 
This analysis seeks to answer the question: how much has the SREC program in combination with net metering and 
virtual net metering of solar PV systems in the state cost and benefited stakeholders since their outset, compared to if 
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we had no such policies? In order to assess the costs and benefits of the current policy, this analysis commences in 2010, 
at the commencement of the SREC-I policy, the initial tier of the Massachusetts solar carve-out.  The analysis therefore 
consider the costs and benefits of consisting of a common past, the SREC-I and SREC-II solar carve-out ties since their 
inception in 2010 and 2014, respectively, to the present, and then a series of alternative policies into the future.  In 
considering past costs and benefits associated with solar PV already operating, the analysis incorporates a series of sunk 
costs constant across all futures.  This information is informative but has no value to future policy alternative decisions.  
Instead, it characterizes costs of policies to date as a benchmark for identifying trends (improvement over time) and 
benchmarking the performance of future alternatives. 
The analysis horizon selected considers a period of installations from 2010 through 2025, plus an assumed 25 year solar 
PV project life, taking the full analysis out through 2050.  It is important to note that the current policy target of 1600 
MWDC of solar PV is expected to be reached well before the initial target date of 2020 (as discussed further below), and 
that most of the progress towards 1600 MW will be made before the 30% Federal Income Tax Credit (ITC) steps-down to 
10% for businesses and 0% for residences at end of 2016, and likely before any policy change could be implemented.  It 
is also important to observe that if a transition from SREC-II to a new policy is made prior to reaching 1600 MW, the 
SREC-II policy build-out and associated SREC-II prices will change.  In contrast, SREC-I quantities are now firmly 
established and associated SREC unaffected by any change short of abolishing the SREC-I policy (which we assume is not 
on the table). 
 As noted in Section 1.1, the Task Force was interested in examining the opportunity for additional development, i.e. 
solar PV build-out beyond 1600 MW.  For the purposes of this analysis, in consultation with the Task Force an arbitrary 
target was established of reaching 2500 MW by the year 2025.  Each alternative policy future was tuned to target 
approximately 2500 MW under ‘base case’ assumptions.  Setting a constant MW target across alternative policy futures 
allows comparison of costs and benefits without conflating impacts driven by the volume of production (which drives 
many benefits) and the solar and NM incentive costs, and this avoids masking important policy impacts that differ by 
virtue of different penetration.  If instead we had held incentives constant (and let the MW vary), net metering capped 
paths would experience a much slower build-out in all cases except for a competitive solicitation, under which annual 
targets can be set and maintained.. 
There is nothing special about 2500 MW or 2025, other than an analysis assumption.  The choice of these benchmarks is 
not intended to suggest them as recommendations.  However, the reader should note that 2500 MW by 2025 
represents a substantial contraction of the Massachusetts solar PV market’s annual build-out rate from its present 
levels.  It is important to keep in mind that some sectors would not be largely impacted by net metering policy changes 
and would continue to be viable, while others would no longer be viable.  It is expected that the industry would contract 
with the ITC step down and hitting caps on net metering, all else held constant, until solar costs decline materially.  It is 
also important to point out that conditions under each future considered will lead to a different build-out trajectories.   
Modeling results are driven in large part by fixing a target of 2500 MW and trying to set incentives so they reach that level in 2025, 
and tallying what will be built under those circumstances and at what cost.  Results are assess for costs and benefits through 1600 
MW, as well as to 2500 MW. 
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1.5 Limits to this Analysis 
Several boundaries to the analysis were established, either by time and budget constraints, modeling complexities, or 
Task Force decisions.  Limits to the analysis include the following: 
 Not a full macroeconomic analysis. This analysis does not considers indirect and induced macroeconomic 
impacts in the Massachusetts economy, nor does it quantify job additions or losses relating to solar PV and net 
metering policy alternatives..   
 Not a ‘value of solar’ study. While this report shares many common cost and benefit components, it should not 
be construed explicitly as a “value of solar” study.66 
 Retail Rate Structures Held Constant.  The analysis assumed no change in retail rate structures from the 
present, with respect to any shift from components billed on a per-kWh basis to fixed charges, customer 
charges, or the establishment of minimum bills.  Task Force determined that rate design is important but best 
addressed before the DPU.  A future shift in rate structure away from kWh charges would reduce the avoided 
cost or revenue realized for behind-the-meter or net metered solar PV projects.  Such changes would in turn 
diminish PV system economics, leading to a slower build-out and a potential shift among installation types 
unless solar incentives were increased to match (as might be the case under Paths A and B discussed further 
below). 
 Targeted incentives to support solar PV projects that support or benefit the Distribution system were not 
considered.  In Task Force discussions and surveys, higher incentive for supporting projects that support the 
Distribution system had near unanimous support.  However, the electric distribution companies (EDCs) point out 
that there is not currently system-wide information on which to base modeling if such installations.  There 
appears to be wide support among Task Force members that targeting incentives in this manner could provide 
additional net benefits.  However, this is seen as an area for further study and a tactic that could be layered into 
any potential future policy. 
1.6 Structure of This Document 
The Task 3 report is organized as follows.   
 Section 2 presents the description of the future policy scenarios, or ‘policy paths’, examined.   
 In Section 3, technical factors which permeate a number of cost and benefit components of the analysis, 
including solar PV contribution to peak reduction and loss reduction, are described.  
 Section 4 describes the various cost and benefit categories and components analyzed.   
 In Section 0, the projected solar PV build-out trajectories are presented, including (i) the incremental MWDC 
installation by program under each policy path, as well as (ii) the build-out under each scenario by SREC-II 
project type subsector, demonstrating that different policy choices lead to notably different build-out results. 
 Section 6 summarizes the projected per unit solar policy incentives under both the SREC and alternative 
performance-based incentive structures.  
                                                          
66
 In recent years, a variety of state-level policy makers and stakeholders have requested formal analyses of the value of solar PV as 
part of ongoing state policy discussions. These “value of solar” studies generally examine the specific benefits and costs of solar to 
the market, the utility’s grid and/or society at large. 
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 In Section 7, the costs and benefits under the current SREC policy approach (including an “SREC-III extension”) 
are presented. 
 Comparative cost and benefit results are presented by perspective, across each of the alternative policy futures, 
in Section 8. 
 Section 12 provides a summary comparison of the quantified costs and benefits across policy scenarios, 
including calculation of benefit to cost and other useful summary metrics. 
 Section 9 includes a discussion of certain cost and benefit components that are treated qualitatively in nature, 
in particular jobs impacts and resiliency. 
 A sensitivity analysis of certain factors that are treated parametrically if found in Section 10. 
 Section 11 summarizes the projected avoided fuel use and emissions results. 
 Finally, Section 12 includes conclusions, take-aways and observations to assist the Task Force in making its 
recommendations, as well as limitations of the analysis and suggested areas of further study.  
Appendices are included with the following information: 
 Appendix A: Key Assumptions (PPT) 
 Appendix B: Detailed Cost and Benefit Result Tables (PPT) 
 Appendix C: Policy Path A&B Modeled Incentives (PPT) 
 Appendix D: C-B Components (Word) 
 Appendix E: Distribution and Local Transmission Deferral (Word)  
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2 Scenarios: Current Policies and Alternative Futures 
This analysis compares the impact of a solar carve-out policy to two alternative policy futures. A reference case 
(“Current Policy” case) was developed to calculate the expected impact resulting from current solar and net metering 
policies in Massachusetts. An extension of the current SREC policy, modeled as a distinct SREC-III tier, was also modeled 
to reflect the costs and benefits of allowing the current policy approach to continue to 2500 MW.  In addition, two 
alternative solar policy cases (“Alternative Policy Path A,” and “Alternative Policy Path B”), described further below were 
modeled.   
In total, a series of six policy combinations, or futures, were modeled – consisting of three alternative solar policy and 
net metering pricing approaches, combined with two alternative approaches to net metering caps – over two capacity 
targets (to 1600 MW and to 2500 MW).   
 Solar policy – solar-specific policy incentive and programs designed to reach the installed capacity target within the defined 
timeline, including: 
o the SREC carve-out approach;  
o Policy Path A, which consists of a 15-year performance-based incentive (PBI) distributed through a declining block 
incentive (DBI) for small solar PV installations and a 15-year PBI distributed through a competitive bidding process 
for larger solar PV installations; 
o Policy Path B, which consists of an expected PBI structured as a rebate for small solar PV installations and a 15-year 
PBI distributed through a declining block incentive (DBI) for larger solar PV installations; 
 Net metering policy –  
o net metering rates as established under current law, or an alternative paying just the generation portion of rates; 
and 
o different availability of net metering caps for each customer class and project type: a “capped” scenario represents 
a policy future where existing net metering caps will not be increased; an “uncapped” scenario represents a policy 
future where existing caps are removed and net metering will be available indefinitely. 
 Installed capacity target – defined as the target megawatts of PV capacity installed, tallied through 1600 MW and through 
2500 MW. While the annual MW targets under each policy scenario was selected to bring the total installed MW to 2500 
MW by the end of 2025, note that under SREC and declining block incentive (DPI) policy types, once established, economics 
and market response may not keep to the target schedule. 
The SREC uncapped future (requiring modeling of an SREC-III policy in an environment devoid of net metering caps) was 
subjected to preliminary analysis; because its modeled behavior was so radically different from other alternatives (for 
example, reaching 2500 MW by 2020) and introduced other modeling complexities67, it was not further subjected to the 
full benefits and costs analysis. 
These futures are summarizes in Table 37, and described further through the remainder of this section. 
                                                          
67
 Under this case, DOER’s supply-responsive demand formula is projected to break down due to extremely high installation growth 
rates at the end of the program. 
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Table 37: Scenarios Taxonomy: Policy Paths Modeled
 
Notes on Table 37:  
1. SREC-II truncated at 12/31/16 
2. Starts when 1,600 MW is reached 
3. Ignores very small quantity of cap space expected to be available in 2017 (~ 25 MW) 
4. Remember, NM Capped ≠ NM Eliminated:  when capped, small systems can still net meter, and sized-to-load still avoid retail value 
Large-scale CSS, Offsite Low Income as we know them no longer viable once NM capped 
2.1 Current Policy Component of “SREC Policy” Case (SREC-I and SREC-II) 
For the “Current Policy” case, the current SREC-I and SREC-II are modeled through their envisioned conclusion, reaching 
the 1,600 MW installed solar PV capacity in total, after which no new solar policies will be introduced.  This case serves 
as the reference case for comparing the impacts of other policy designs. A capped net metering scenario, where existing 
net metering caps will not be extended once reached (systems ≤ 25 kW will continue to be eligible for net metering), and 
an uncapped net metering scenario were examined. The uncapped scenario is expected to accelerate the solar 
installation rate, thereby shortening the timeline for achieving the 1,600 MW target.   
2.2 Extension of Current Policy in “SREC Policy” Case (SREC-III) 
The “Extension of Current Policy” Case represents a policy future where the solar carve-out continues to be the primary 
driver of solar PV deployment in Massachusetts. This case assumes that the solar carve-out program will be extended to 
achieve an aggregate program goal of 2,500 MW by 2025. It is assumed that the extension will be implemented as a 
distinct third phase of the solar carve-out program (SREC-III) rather than an extension of the existing SREC-II, as changing 
targets to SREC-II would impact the economics of past investments. SREC-III is designed to achieve an installation of 900 
MW of solar PV over the remaining time between the 1,600 MW target is reached under SREC-II and the end of 2025. 
However, as shown in Section [cross-ref] below, the nature of the policy makes it amenable to surpassing its targeted 
timetable if the economics of market sectors other than the ‘managed growth’ sector allow for ample development.  
The SREC-III policy is assumed to be characterized by extending the trend of SACP and floor price declines from those 
built into SREC-II policy.  Additional information about the definition and modeling of SREC-III is included in Appendix A.  
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The “Extension of Current Policy” case was only modeled for the full benefits and costs analysis under a net metering 
capped scenario, where net metering caps are assumed to be full by the time the 1,600 MW is reached and SREC-III is 
launched.  
2.3 Alternative Policy Paths 
Following the consulting team’s presentation of future policy options and Task Force feedback, consultation and 
deliberation under Task 4, two alternative policy paths were developed to allow for comparing the impact of different 
policy design approaches to the current solar carve-out policy. These are labeled as alternative Policy Path A and 
alternative Policy Path B.  Each of these policy paths is defined by varying a set of both solar and net metering incentive 
features.  Furthermore, each has been cleaved into two distinct solar incentives that differ in approach within as well as 
between each policy path, one for small installations under 25 kW, and another for larger installations. In bifurcating the 
incentive structures in this manner, the Task Force intended to acknowledge its agreement on the challenges of applying 
a competitive model to smaller installations.  The 25 kW cutoff was elected as a modeling convenience which enabled 
the assumption that virtually all small installations would not be counted against net metering caps (as is the case under 
current statute).  However, the Task Force understands this cutoff to not be set in stone, and some expressed interest in 
a cutoff at some higher kW level. 
In order to simplify modeling while revealing maximum learning, both policy paths assume that SREC-II will be truncated 
on December 31, 2016 notwithstanding (and not reaching) the current 1,600 MW target. It is further assumed that the 
new policies prescribed in each path will take effect on January 1, 2017 after the end of SREC-II and the federal ITC 
“cliff”. While some other form and timing of transition may be desired, it is assumed that all projects coming online 
before this cutover date are installed under the SREC regime, net metering compensation scheme and selected net 
metering cap treatment, and all installations thereafter under the new incentive regime. Each alternative policy path is 
designed to achieve 2,500 MW of installed solar capacity, and in modeling each, the consulting team designed the 
incentive amounts to reach 2500 MW by the end of 2025 under the base case projections for solar PV installed costs, 
operating costs and retail rates.68  The Task Force requested on testing each policy path under two variations, with the 
current statutory net metering caps and with all net metering caps removed.69 
Selection of the two policy paths was informed by the policy path survey and related discussions. Both paths utilize 
policy design features intended to drive down the cost premium of solar over time and while providing solar PV 
installations with sufficient revenue to attract investment.  These policy paths were selected to (i) test a diversity of solar 
incentive payment structures deemed appropriate for different market segments; and (ii) represent different 
perspectives of stakeholders. In electing these paths, the Task Force considered these policy paths to be fairly extreme 
“goalposts”. Path A is labeled as an EDC-Centric Future featuring Competitive Solicitations and Net metering Credit 
                                                          
68
 Under the Declining Block Incentives portions of both paths, the ultimate build-out rate could vary materially under different cost 
and retail rate futures.  In contrast, a competitive solicitation regime as assumed under Policy Path A (Large) can set specific targets 
and therefore can more predictably meet specified annual MW targets. 
69 While there is an interest in understanding the impacts of a minimum bill policy, the Net Metering Task Force agreed that the effort to design and analyze a 
minimum bill policy would be extensive and beyond the scope of this study. Further, such an analysis would depend heavily on the details. As a result, minimum bill is 
not modeled in both policy paths but addressed through illustrations under Task 5. Further, the Task Force agreed that it would be the most appropriate for the DPU 
to conduct a study on the design and applicability of a minimum bill policy. 
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(NMC) Value Reduction, and represents many of the features favored by the electric distribution companies (EDCs) and 
others most interested in minimizing the cost of solar support (although not uniformly meeting any particular Task Force 
member’s wish list).  Policy Path B is labeled as an Open Declining Block Incentive (DBI) approach, and is more closely 
aligned with solar industry participants’ and advocates’ preferences for an ‘open policy’ (without an EDC and solicitation 
gatekeeper role on what gets built) structured to spur increased development. Members of the task Force 
acknowledged that the selection of these goalposts was intended to inform, but understood them to be extremes 
between which some future compromise might lie. The key features of Policy Paths A and B are described at a high level 
in Table 38 and Table 39 respectively. 
Table 38: Policy Path A: EDC-Centric Future Featuring Competitive Solicitations and NMC-Reduction 
 
Table 39: Policy Path B: Open Incentive, DBI with Safety Valve 
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A key feature of both policy paths is that they target the size of the combined solar and net metering incentive to 
effectively provide investors in solar PV installations what they need by in solar incentive after considering the value of 
value of both… i.e., if net metering revenues are unavailable or reduced, the solar incentive would be larger, while if 
retail rates increased, the solar incentive would shrink.    
For ease of comparison, the eligibility and segmentation of the PBI incentives under Policy Paths A and B were defined to 
track the SREC-II Market Sectors shown in Table 40.  These definitions were selected by the Task Force as a convenience, 
and were not meant to preclude alternative segmentation choices. 
Table 40: SREC-II Market Sectors 
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The following sections describe each policy path, their policy design features and modeling characteristics. Detailed 
methods and assumptions for the policy paths can be found in Appendix A.  
2.4 Policy Path A: An EDC-Centric Approach 
Policy Path A is designed to achieve 2,500 MW of installed solar capacity by 2050 through a combination of Declining 
Block Incentive (DBI) for small installations and competitive solicitations targeted at larger installations, each segmented 
into different market sectors. This policy path is considered an EDC-centric approach as it provides EDCs with more 
control over the solar PV market (through competitive procurement) compared to Policy Path B, where all incentive 
rates are administratively set. The reduced net metering credit rate structure also aligns with EDCs’ view on how 
customer generation should be credited.  
2.4.1 Solar Policy 
Policy Path A is comprised of a performance-based Declining Block Incentive (DBI) program for small installations 
(systems <25 kW) and a performance-based competitive solicitation program for large installations (systems ≥ 25 kW).  
2.4.1.1 Performance-Based Declining Block Incentive (DBI) Program (Small) 
Unlike the larger project competitive program described below, the performance-based DBI (sometimes referred to 
herein as the PBI/DBI for short) is an open incentive available to a subset of projects that are currently eligible to be 
qualified for Market Sector A under SREC-II. Specifically, residential and small commercial (G-1) systems that meet the 
<25 kW system size threshold will be eligible to participate in the DBI program. The program will be divided into two 
segments: (i) Residential and (ii) Non-Residential. The allocation of annual MW capacity target among the two segments 
is determined based on the projected MW distribution among the segments under SREC-II as projected through 
December 31, 2016.  
The DBI is made up of a series of equal-sized incentive “blocks” (i.e., the MW available for each block will be constant 
over time) defined by Block Incentive Prices (measured in $/MWh). Each Block is sized at 50% of the allocated segment 
annual target. After a block is fully subscribed, the incentive price declines to a lower level based on a predefined 
schedule until it is fully subscribed, and so on.  While these Block Prices vary by EDC territories (as requested by the Task 
Force in order to equalize attractiveness across EDCs), all participants will compete for capacity under the same Block. 
The initial Block Price is derived based on the levelized 15-year incentive required to build a benchmark project (selected 
by the consulting team) within the segment. The required combined incentive is universal across all EDC territories. The 
difference between the required incentive and the typical retail rate for an EDC is the offered solar incentive, or the 
EDC-territory-specific Block Price. The offered Block Price will decline per Block at a fixed rate predetermined based on 
an economic modeling exercise that accounts for projected annual installed cost decline and future retail and wholesale 
rate revenue. The DBI is understood to include a “Safety-Valve” feature, which means that the offered solar incentive 
may be adjusted upward based on an established administration process if market conditions or other factors warrant 
such an adjustment. This feature is not modeled in this analysis as it does not affect the modeling under a single cost 
forecast.   
2.4.1.2 Performance-Based Competitive Solicitation Program (Large) 
The performance-based Competitive Solicitation program is offered to all remaining solar PV systems too large to 
participate in the DBI. The program is divided into four segments defined based on current market sector definitions 
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under SREC-II. The allocation of annual capacity target is the remainder of the total annual targets required to reach 
2500 MW by 2025, after allocation of capacity to the small program.  Of this remaining capacity, the MWs available are 
allocated among the four segments as shown in Table 41. It should be noted that under the capped net metering 
scenario, community-shared solar and low-income housing projects under Sector A are assumed to be unviable once the 
net metering caps are reached. In this situation, 15% of the MW allocation was shifted from Sector A to the “Other” 
sector, as discussed further in Appendix A.  
Table 41: Definition of Program Segment 
Competitive Solicitation Program 
Segment 
Corresponding SREC-II Market Sector 
% Annual MW 
Allocation, NM 
Uncapped Scenario 
% Annual MW 
Allocation, NM 
Capped Scenario 
Sector A Sector A (systems ≥ 25 kW only) 25% 10% 
Sector B Sector B 25% 30% 
Sector C Sector C 25% 30% 
Other Managed Growth 25% 30% 
While it is assumed that the competitive solicitation will occur three times a year (a frequency assumed sufficient to 
allow for establishment of permanent in-state jobs),for modeling purposes it is treated as occurring four times per year 
(as the model is built for calendar quarters).  Systems within each segment across all EDC territories will compete head-
to-head based on price for each round of solicitation. Participants will bid at a levelized combined incentive (i.e., solar 
incentive plus the typical EDC rate within each territory). Selected projects will enter into a 15-year long-term contract 
(or convey under a tariff) to sell RECs and (where not consumed on-site) energy to the EDC of which territory the project 
is located. The selected project will receive payment for its production at a level that equals the difference between the 
bid price (i.e. the levelized combined incentive) and the EDC rate for the given year.70 While selected bidders will be paid 
as bid, it is expected that the market will learn after the first several rounds and the most cost-effective projects will 
eventually bid up toward the clearing price.71  
As observed in other states, competitive procurements can put downward pressure on profit margins and convey 
advantage to scale. This phenomenon is typically associated with national players achieving scale economies and access 
to lowest cost equipment, financing, overhead, etc., potentially to the disadvantage of smaller, more local market 
participants.  There is only anecdotal evidence on the degree of this impact, so it was not explicitly reflected in the 
projected costs and benefits in this analysis.  
2.4.2 Net Metering Rates 
Policy Path A provides a variation to the existing net metering program. It assumes that all on-site physical consumption 
and energy deemed to offset usage within the current billing month will be credited at a total avoided rate. Beyond that 
level, generations will receive only the G(eneration) component of rate for any excess production. For Virtual Net 
                                                          
70
 Note in the uncapped scenario where net metering is available the combined incentive is still based on the EDC rate for assuming 
that the project is sized to load and all of its kWhs are consumed on-site during the billing month.   
71
 The authors’ extensive experience studying and modeling such procurements suggests that this dynamic should be expected.  As a 
result, the projected bid prices received are taken as the midpoint between the fully-differentiated threshold incentive modeled as 
needed, and the price of the last (most expensive, marginal) bid awarded. 
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Metering customers, any excess generation after the billing period roll-forward will be credited at the wholesale rate 
(whether conveyed under Qualifying Facility (QF) rates or directly through participation in the wholesale market).  
2.5 Policy Path B: Open Incentive 
Policy Path B is made up of two Declining Block Incentive DBI) programs that are supported by the current net metering 
rate structure. Given that incentive levels are administratively predetermined across all market segments, EDCs do not 
determine who receives an incentive under this policy path, or when. A DBI approach is by definition designed to reach a 
2,500 MW installed capacity target with no defined timeline – reaching a target when economics dictate - although for 
this analysis, the program incentives and their rate of decline were calibrated to reach 2,500 MW by 2025 to allow for 
cost and benefit comparison across alternative futures.  
2.5.1 Solar Policy 
Policy Path B is comprised of two DBI programs. An “Expected” Performance-Based DBI program is available for small 
installations (systems <25 kW). A Performance-Based DBI Program is available for remaining installations (systems ≥ 25 
kW).   
2.5.1.1 “Expected” Performance-Based Declining Block Incentive (EPBI) Program 
The EPBI is modeled after New York’s Declining Block Incentive program. Unlike a conventional PBI where incentives are 
awarded post-installation based on actual system production, the EPBI provides upfront incentives in the form of a 
rebate based on “expected” production over a 15-year period.72 As with the small component of Policy Path A, the 
program is offered to systems smaller than 25 kW that are currently eligible to be qualified for Market Sector A under 
SREC-II. These include residential systems, and non-residential systems.. The program is split into a Residential Segment 
and a Non-Residential Segment based on the projected MW distribution among the segments under SREC-II as projected 
through December 31, 2016.  
The EPBI is made up of a series of equal-sized Blocks. Each Block is set as 50% of the allocated segment target. Unlike the 
DBI under Policy Path A, each Block is defined by EDC-territory-specific Block Prices measured in $/kW (as opposed to 
$/MWh). The initial Block Price (or offered EPBI) is calculated based on the levelized 15-year incentive payment from the 
expected production of a benchmark project within each segment. The combination of the offered EPBI and the 
levelized 15-year typical retail rate payment within the applicable EDC is universal across all EDC territories. All systems 
within the same segment across all EDC territories will compete for the same Block. The offered Block Price will decline 
per Block at a fixed rate predetermined based on an economic modeling exercise that accounts for projected annual 
installed cost decline, set in combination with the Large component of Path A to reach 2500 MW by 2025. Similar to the 
Policy Path A DBI, a “Safety-Value” feature, which allows for an upward adjustment to the offered solar incentive at the 
administrator’s discretion is included. Again, this feature is not modeled in this analysis.  
2.5.1.2 Performance-Based Declining Block Incentive (DBI) Program  
                                                          
72
 An EPBI would conveys RECs to the EDCs for 15 years, but have some form of ‘clawback’ of incentive for underperforming systems, 
as an incentive for installing reliable systems.  This approach minimizes the need to finance and provides certain tax and other 
benefits because the incentive remains performance-based even though offered as a rebate.  It is intended to combine desirable 
features of a PBI and a rebate program and ease administration as well. 
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The Policy Path B DBI for large installations is structured identically as the Policy Path A DBI for small installations. The 
available total MWs under this program are divided into four segments in the same proportions as for Policy Path A, as 
shown in Table 8.  It should be noted that under the capped net metering scenario, community-shared solar and low-
income housing projects under Sector A are assumed to be unviable once the net metering caps are reached. In this 
situation, 15% of the MW allocation was shifted from Sector A to the “Other” sector, as discussed further in Appendix A.  
As explained in Section 2.4.1.1, each Block is set as 50% of the allocated segment annual target and is defined by $/MWh 
Block Price. For each segment, the initial combined incentive is set as the levelized 15-year incentive required for a 
benchmark project. Subsequent declines in the DBI are calibrated to achieve the target 2500 MW by 2025.  The initial 
Block Price is the difference between the combined incentive and the typical retail rate for each EDC, thereby the Block 
Price is specific to each EDC territory. However, projects from all territories will compete under the same Block.  
2.5.2 Net Metering Policy 
Policy Path B adopts the same net metering rate structure as it is currently defined. Net excess generation will be 
credited the current components of retail rate (i.e., generation, transmission, transition, and net distribution as 
applicable). Virtual net metering customers will receive net metering credits for excess generation after the billing 
period roll-forward based on the current framework and rates.  
3 Technical Factors 
The impact of solar PV in reducing the need for generation capacity, as well as the ability to reduce the need for 
transmission and distribution investment or reduce tariff charges, depends on solar PV’s impact on peak demands.   The 
impact of solar PV on various measures of peak contribution, and therefore the ability of solar to avoid such capacity-
related investments, is sensitive to the time of system peaks, the production profile of solar PV, and often the quantity 
of solar PV installed.  Likewise, distributed generation located close to load can create a benefit of avoiding energy losses 
in the transmission and/or distribution system, compared to supplying that same load from distant generators 
interconnected to and/or shipping electricity over the high voltage transmission system to load.  To account for this 
impact, where applicable, some of the cost and benefit components discussed herein are adjusted to reflect the 
appropriate level of energy loss avoidance.  Each of these overarching technical factors is discussed further in this 
section.  
3.1 Solar PV Impact on Avoiding Generation, Transmission or Distribution Capacity 
ISO New England applies a statistical measure of peak contribution – called Claimed Capability - to all generation.  Each 
generator receives a value for Summer Claimed Capability (SCC) for June through September, and for Winter Claimed 
Capability (WCC) for the other eight months of the year which determines the amount of capacity the generator earns 
for the ISO’s Forward Capacity Market (FCM).  For intermittent generation, such as solar PV, the ISO rules grant 
capability based on the mean production during certain Intermittent Reliability Hours.  Solar earns a value during the 
summer, but during the winter capability period the peak occurs after dark.  To the degree that generation sources 
participate in the FCM they may internalize a monetary value for generation capacity.  Because the Intermittent 
Reliability Hours (discussed in Appendix A) are static (or for so long as they are static), the value that solar PV earns in 
the FCM is not sensitive to the quantity of solar PV installed.  
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In contrast, the actual impact of solar PV on peak demands for generation capacity (including reserves) depends on the 
solar fleet’s actual ability to impact peak demand.73  For generation capacity, this impact is a function of the impact in all 
hours.  From the perspective of planning for generation capacity - meeting the Installed Capacity Requirement (ICR) – 
and for the purpose of planning for transmission and distribution facilities, distributed solar generation’s impact on peak 
demands is driven by the interaction of the applicable load-based drivers and the aggregate production of the 
distributed solar PV fleet.   
The timing of solar PV production is highly coincident with system summer peak hours, but it is not perfectly coincident.  
Furthermore, since solar PV does not produce the same value in every hour, the capacity impact of added solar PV at 
different times of day varies. Once solar PV installations become material in magnitude, distribute solar PV can have the 
impact of shifting the time of peak demand, and at sufficiently large penetrations, adding further solar PV will have no 
incremental impact on peak reduction.   
Figure 17 below illustrates the impact of solar PV at current (2014) penetrations and at 2500 MW (DC) penetration on 
Massachusetts distribution company aggregate loads for an illustrative summer peak day.  As can be seen, with 
increased penetration the timing of the peak shifts to later in the day.  Likewise, Figure 18 below shows the impact of 
typical peak-day solar PV production on ISO New England peak loads at current (2014) penetrations and at 2500 MW 
(DC) penetration on the ISO’s 2014 peak day.  As can be seen, the same quantity of solar PV has somewhat different 
impacts on peak demands at the state and ISO levels. The illustrative proxy solar production profile modeled is a 
representative weighted blend of four solar PV system types (residential roof-mounted, commercial roof-mounted, 
ground-mounted and canopy) at an indicative location in Worcester, MA. 
 
 
Figure 17: Illustrative Impact of MA Distributed Solar on MA Distribution Company Peak Day, in 2014 and 2025 
                                                          
73
 As shown herein for a sample year, solar has a high coincidence with summer peak demand in Massachusetts and ISO New 
England, at least at current penetration levels.  While a multi-year analysis is beyond the scope of this study, another recent analysis 
– the 2015 Maine Value of Solar Study (Clean Power Research, LLC; Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC; Perez Richard; Pace Law 
School Energy and Climate Center, 2015) looked at a multi-year period and found peak reduction impacts to vary somewhat year to 
year without altering the basic relationship, so the single year results shown herein should be treated as illustrative. 
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Figure 18: Illustrative Impact of MA Distributed Solar on ISO-NE System Peak Day, in 2014 and 2025 
 
For purposes of this study, the impact of Massachusetts solar PV on the following metrics was calculated: 
 ELCC_ISO: System generation (i.e. the impact on installed capacity reserves) and transmission peaks 
 Massachusetts Distribution-Level Peak Reduction 
 The calculated impact on Regional Network Service (RNS) tariff monthly peak loads 
 The FCM Summer Claimed Capability (SCC) 
 The FCM Weighted Average of Summer and Winter Claimed Capability (where the WCC is zero) 
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The impact over a range of penetrations from zero to 2500 MW (DC) was examined, to allow for proper attribution of 
solar PV’s peak reduction value at each level of installations over the study horizon.  The results are shown in Figure 19.  
As can be seen, the value of solar in the ISO New England FCM is small (8.7% of DC nameplate for the proxy system) and 
insensitive to penetration.  In contrast, the ELCC-ISO, Distribution Peak and RNS Tariff values decline with increasing 
solar PV penetration as peaks are shifted over time into later hours.  The values are initially high because solar PV has a 
strong coincidence with the current time of summer peaks.  However, it can be inferred from this figure that at much 
higher penetrations, the peak generation demand would be shifted into nighttime hours with no further impact on peak 
reduction (an impact of high solar penetration frequently depicted in the now famous “California Duck Diagram”)74.   
Generation peak reduction values (the blue line) are somewhat higher than the distribution peak values (the red line), 
which in turn are higher than the RNS tariff impact. Importantly for the purpose of this study, the FCM values are well 
below the calculated impacts on reducing system peaks, and this the ICR, until PV penetrations are well in excess of the 
2500 MW outer bound used in this study.  For the avoided generation value of capacity, the difference (while positive) 
between actual impact on peak reduction (actual reduction to the ICR) and that quantity monetized in the FCM market 
by participating solar PV facilities represents an externality benefit of reduced generation capacity costs to all citizens of 
Massachusetts.   
                                                          
74
 California Independent System Operator, Demand Response and Energy Efficiency Roadmap: Maximizing Preferred Resources, 
December 2013.  http://www.caiso.com/Documents/DR-EERoadmap.pdf  
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Figure 19: MA Solar PV Peak Reduction Metrics per MW Installed, as a Function of MW Installed PV 
 
To account for expected values of solar PV impacts at various penetrations, the factors summarized in Figure 19 are 
applied in calculating applicable cost and benefit components.  
3.2 Avoided Loss Factors 
For some of the cost and benefit components in this study, solar PV at the distribution level has the impact of avoiding 
energy losses in the transmission and/or distribution system that would otherwise be experienced in moving distant 
generation injected onto the regional transmission grid to load in Massachusetts.  Losses are higher at peak times than 
off-peak times, as losses are a function of the square of the current flowing over a circuit. Using the average and peak 
loss factors provided by some of the Massachusetts EDCs (see Appendix A), average statewide energy losses were 
calculated in every hour75, and this data was in turn used to estimate statewide average solar PV production-weighted 
energy losses.  The loss factors used in this study are shown in Table 42.  The average and peak loss data by utility used 
to calculate these statewide loss factors is found in Appendix A. 
Table 42: Statewide Weighted Average MA DG Solar Avoided Electric Loss Factors 
Loss Level Loss Factor 
                                                          
75
 Using a best-fit square function aligning with average hourly and peak values. 
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MA Avg. Peak T&D 8.62% 
MA Avg.  Peak D 7.34% 
MA Avg. Production-Wtd Energy T&D 5.58% 
MA Avg. Production-Wtd Energy D 4.72% 
Where applicable, to account for the expected impact on reduction of losses of solar PV, an appropriate peak or 
production-weighted energy loss adjustment factor is applied in calculating costs or benefit components. 
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4 Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis 
As noted in Section 1, this study is intended to explore the relative, in tandem with the overall, costs and benefits 
associated with net energy metering.  As noted in the final Task Force Framing Memorandum,  
The language in the legislation regarding “costs and benefits” is not intended for us to evaluate the costs and benefits of achieving this 1600 MW 
goal, but directs us to consider the relative costs and benefits of policy options to achieve the goal, as well as the overall cost and benefits of 
the existing net metering framework from the perspective of multiple customer groups. 
More specifically, this analysis illustrates how these costs and benefits compare, in both relative and overall terms, 
across different alternative policy futures, from the four cost-benefit perspectives (non-owner participant, customer-
generator, non-participating ratepayers, and citizens  of Massachusetts at large) described in Section 1.2. 
4.1 Overview of Cost Benefit Categories and Subcategories 
The cost and benefit framework addresses seven broad categories of costs and benefits.  These seven categories can be 
subdivided into two groups, as follows: 
4.1.1 Ratepayer & Participant Costs and Benefits 
Ratepayer and participant cost and benefit impacts experienced directly include those incurred and accruing to both 
participants and non-participants in solar and net energy metering policies.  They fall into four categories as follows: 
 Solar PV System Costs: The direct costs associated with PV systems; 
 Solar Policy: Massachusetts’ (and Federal) public policies and programs related to renewable energy and solar PV; 
 Behind-the-Meter (BTM) Solar Production within a Billing Month: The on-site and “behind the meter” solar PV production 
that reduces customer bills during the billing month; and 
 Net Metering Credits (NMC, from Net Metering Beyond the Billing Month & Virtual Net Metering (VNM): Net metering 
credits gained by customers as a result of solar PV production exceeding a customer’s usage during a given month from an 
on-site or remote VNM installation. 
These costs and benefits will differ significantly across the alternative policy futures explored in this study, particularly 
given that SREC, Policy Path A and Policy Path B have very different solar PV incentive structures and approaches dealing 
with net metering credits. In addition, each of these categories has multiple subcategories of costs and benefits, which 
have a diverse array of impacts on the four cost-benefit perspectives analyzed. 
4.1.2 Secondary Costs and Benefits 
In addition to the net ratepayer and participant values, solar PV can also cause three broad categories of costs and 
benefits to accrue broadly to each of the four perspectives on a secondary market and societal basis. Specifically, solar 
PV can result in secondary impacts to: 
 Electric Market(s); 
 Electric Investment Impacts; and  
 Externalities and Other Impacts. 
These impacts are primarily a function of the amount of solar PV installed in Massachusetts, and therefore will be quite 
similar across the different scenarios to the extent that they each reach 2500 MW in a similar timeframe.  To the degree 
their values differ, this will be primarily driven by the variation in solar PV deployment between the futures studied.   
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4.1.3 Cost and Benefit Components and Level of Analysis 
Within each of these categories, there are a number of individual cost and benefit components that comprise the 
individual impacts to be considered.  Table 43 below illustrates the subcategories associated with these three categories 
of secondary costs and benefits. A color coding of these broad categories by color code and hue is used throughout to 
aid the reader in following the various components of this complex analysis.   
Table 43: Cost and Benefit Categories and Components 
Category Subcategory Code Analysis 
PV System 
Costs 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 Quantitative 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 Quantitative 
Lease Payments CB1.3 Quantitative 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 Quantitative 
ROI (to lenders & investors) CB1.5 Quantitative 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6a Quantitative 
     MA Income Taxes CB1.6b Quantitative 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a Quantitative 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b Quantitative 
Solar Policy 
Direct Incentives  CB2.1 Quantitative 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs  CB2.2 Quantitative 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 Quantitative 
Solar Policy Incremental Admin. & Transaction Costs  CB2.4 Quantitative 
Behind-the-
Meter 
Production 
During the 
Billing Month 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 Quantitative 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 Quantitative 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 Quantitative 
Other Retail Bill Components (Transition, EE, RE) 
CB3.4 Quantitative 
Net Metering 
Credits Beyond 
the Billing 
Month 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 Quantitative 
Virtual NM CB4.2 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 Quantitative 
Virtual NM Administrative Costs CB4.4 Qualitative 
Electric 
Markets 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Energy CB5.1 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Capacity CB5.2 Qualitative 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Line Losses CB5.4 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 Quantitative 
Electric 
Investment 
Impacts 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Investment – Local CB6.2 Quantitative 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline CB6.4 Qualitative 
Externalities 
and Other 
Avoided Environmental Costs CO2, NOx and SOx  CB7.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Fuel Uncertainty CB7.2 Qualitative 
Resiliency CB7.3 Qualitative 
Impact on Jobs  CB7.4 Qualitative 
Policy Transition Frictional Costs CB7.5 Qualitative 
Given the scope, tight timelines, limited budget, and other practical limitations, not all of costs and benefits of solar PV 
are quantified herein. This is the case, in part, because the data needed to undertake a study of this type requires a wide 
variety of data sources that may or may not be easily or reliably quantified. As a result, this study includes a mix of three 
types of data: 
 Quantitative data derived from detailed analysis for the purposes of this study. 
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 Parametric assumptions that represents an “educated guess” made in order to estimate the impact when quantitative data 
is difficult to verify or unavailable (later, we run sensitivity analyses on many of these parametric assumptions in order to 
assess the potential impact of uncertainty for the applicable components); and 
 Qualitative data and information that represents a generalized assessment of a particular category and/or sub-category of 
costs and benefits, but not included in the summation of cost of benefit.  
Certain major outputs included in more expansive economic analyses that are not fully quantified in this analysis 
include: 
 Indirect macroeconomic impacts, which (in this case) include the costs and benefits incurred broadly outside of the solar 
industry as a result of current policies and alternative policy futures;  
 Induced macroeconomic Impacts, or the changes in spending, economic behaviors or habits as a result of the 
direct and indirect costs and benefits. 
- Impacts identified as addressed qualitatively will be discussed in a generalized sense later in this report. Table 43 shows 
which cost and benefit components are quantified, and which are dealt with qualitatively. 
In order to clearly illustrate the “flows” or distribution of costs and benefits associated with each policy future, each 
component of costs and benefits discussed in this section has a table describing how that cost and benefit category 
manifests as either a cost or benefit (or both) from each of the four perspectives.  These tables also identify whether 
quantitative or qualitative analysis is performed for this study, and in some instances, whether a parametric assumption 
is used in estimating a quantified impact; the manner in which it is being used, and whether the result accrues as a 
benefit, cost, or is not considered to be either from each of the four cost-benefit perspectives. Table 44 below presents a 
key to understanding when each type of data is being used, and if that result is a cost or benefit to the perspective in 
question, within the sections that follow. 
Table 44: Key to Cost and Benefit Description Tables 
 
 
4.2 Category 1: PV System Costs 
The first major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the cost of grid-tied solar PV 
systems eligible for net metering. The nine subcategories of costs and benefits contained within PV system costs are as 
follows 
Subcategory Code Analysis 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 Quantitative 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 Quantitative 
Lease Payments CB1.3 Quantitative 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 Quantitative 
ROI (to lenders & investors) CB1.5 Quantitative 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6a Quantitative 
     MA Income Taxes CB1.6b Quantitative 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a Quantitative 
Classification Benefit Cost N/A  
Type of Information  Quantitative (Bold) Parametric (Underlined) Qualitative (italics) 
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Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b Quantitative 
Refer to Appendix Appendix D: Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis for a detailed description of each subcategory.   
 
Table 45 below illustrates how these subcategories accrue as direct costs or benefits to the four perspectives analyzed. 
Table 45: PV System Cost Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspec
tive 
Subcategories Accruing as Benefits to 
Some or All With Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Costs to 
Some or All With Perspective 
Non-Owner 
Participants 
(NOP) 
- Lease Payments 
- PILOTs/Property 
Taxes 
- MA and Federal 
Income Taxes 
Customer-
Generators 
(CG) 
- ROI to 
Lenders/Investors 
- MA Residential RE Tax 
Credit 
- Federal Incentives 
(ITC) 
- System Installed Costs 
- Lease Payments 
- PILOTs/Property 
Taxes 
- MA and Federal 
Income Taxes 
Non-
Participating 
Ratepayers 
(NPR) 
- MA Income Taxes - Federal Income Taxes 
- Federal Incentives 
(ITC) 
- MA Residential RE Tax 
Credit 
Citizens of 
the 
Commonwe
alth at Large 
(C@L) 
- System Installed Costs 
- Lease Payments 
- PILOTs/Property 
Taxes 
- MA Income Taxes 
- ROI to 
Lenders/Investors 
- Federal Income Taxes 
-  
4.3 Category II: Solar Policy  
The second major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
complying with Massachusetts’ RPS pertaining to solar PV systems eligible for net metering. The four subcategories of 
costs and benefits part of solar policy costs include: 
Direct Incentives  CB2.1 Quantitative 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs  CB2.2 Quantitative 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 Quantitative 
Solar Policy Incremental Admin. & Transaction Costs  CB2.4 Quantitative 
Refer to Appendix Appendix D: Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis for a detailed description of each subcategory.  In 
general, the value of these costs and benefits will vary dramatically across policy futures, given that the incentive 
components of each policy future vary the most across perspectives. The table below illustrates how these 
subcategories accrue as direct costs or benefits to the four perspectives analyzed. 
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Table 46: Solar Policy Impact Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Costs to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- N/A - N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Direct Incentives - Solar Policy Incremental Admin. and Transaction 
Costs 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs - Direct Incentives 
- Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs 
- Solar Policy Incremental Admin. and Transaction 
Costs 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
(C@L) 
- Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs - Direct Incentives 
- Solar Policy Incremental Admin. and Transaction 
Costs 
4.4 Category III: Behind-the-Meter Production within the Billing Month 
The third major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the cost of grid-tied solar 
PV systems eligible for net metering. The four subcategories of costs and benefits contained within the category of 
behind-the-meter production include:  
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 Quantitative 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 Quantitative 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 Quantitative 
Other Retail Bill Components (Transition, EE, RE) CB3.4 Quantitative 
Refer to Appendix Appendix D: Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis for a detailed description of each subcategory.  In 
general, the value of these costs and benefits will vary somewhat across policy futures, given that the treatment of 
behind-the-meter production in each policy future can vary due to changing installation mix and volumes.   
The table below illustrates how these subcategories accrue as direct costs or benefits to the four perspectives analyzed. 
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Table 47: BTM Production within the Billing Month Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Costs to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- Generation Value of On-Site Generation 
- Transmission Value of On-Site Generation 
- “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-Site 
Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) 
- N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Generation Value of On-Site Generation 
- Transmission Value of On-Site Generation 
- “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-Site 
Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) [1] 
- N/A 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Generation Value of On-Site Generation - Transmission Value of On-Site Generation 
- “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-Site 
Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Generation Value of On-Site Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) 
- N/A 
[1] SREC Policy & Policy Path B Only 
4.5 Category IV: Net Metering Credits beyond the Billing Month (Including Virtual Net 
Metering) 
The fourth major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
net metering credits beyond the billing month pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The four subcategories 
of costs and benefits associated with net metering credits beyond the billing month costs include: 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 Quantitative 
Virtual NM CB4.2 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 Quantitative 
Virtual NM Administrative Costs CB4.4 Qualitative 
Refer to Appendix Appendix D: Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis for a detailed description of each subcategory.  It is 
important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount and types of solar PV installed and producing, and 
vary materially between different policy futures. However, these specific values are assumed to be the same per 
megawatt-hour (MWh) across all policy futures, given that total amount of PV production across all scenarios does not 
vary dramatically.  The table below illustrates the cost and benefit subcategories within this category accruing (on net) 
to each perspective. 
Table 48: Net Metering Credits beyond the Billing Month (Including Virtual Net Metering) Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits 
Subcategories Accruing as 
Costs 
Non-Owner Participants (NOP) - Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month 
- Virtual NM 
- N/A 
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Customer-Generators (CG) - Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month 
- Virtual NM 
- Wholesale Market Sales 
- N/A 
Non-Participating Ratepayers (NPR) - N/A - Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month [1] 
- Virtual NM 
- VNM Admin Costs 
Citizens of the Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month 
- Virtual NM 
- Wholesale Market Sales 
- VNM Admin Costs 
[1] SREC Policy and Path B Only 
4.6 Category V: Electric Market 
The fifth major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
avoided wholesale energy market costs pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The five subcategories of 
costs and benefits contained within avoided electric market costs include: 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Energy CB5.1 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Capacity CB5.2 Qualitative 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Line Losses CB5.4 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 Quantitative 
Refer to Appendix Appendix D: Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis for a detailed description of each subcategory.  It is 
important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount of solar PV installed and producing. However, these 
specific values are assumed to be the same per megawatt-hour (MWh) across all policy futures, with these values scaled 
to the actual solar PV production volumes projected in each instance.  The table below illustrates the cost and benefit 
subcategories within this category accruing (on net) to each perspective. 
Table 49: Electric Market Impacts Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Costs 
to All or Some With Perspective 
Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- N/A - N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Avoided Generation Capacity Costs 
- Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges [1] 
- N/A 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Energy 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Capacity [1] 
- Avoided Generation Capacity Costs (and Avoided 
Capacity Reserves) 
- Avoided Line Losses 
- Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges [1] 
- N/A 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Energy 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Capacity [1] 
- Avoided Generation Capacity Costs (and Avoided 
- N/A 
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(CC@L) Capacity Reserves) 
- Avoided Line Losses 
- Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges [1] 
[1] Explored qualitatively 
4.7 Category VI: Electric Investment Impacts 
The sixth major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
avoided electric infrastructure investment costs pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The four 
subcategories of costs and benefits contained within avoided electric investment costs include: 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Investment – Local CB6.2 Quantitative 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline CB6.4 Qualitative 
Refer to Appendix Appendix D: Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis for a detailed description of each subcategory.  It is 
important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount of solar PV installed and producing. The table below 
illustrates the cost and benefit subcategories within this category accruing (on net) to each perspective. 
Table 50: Electric Investment Impacts Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Costs 
to All or Some With Perspective 
Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- N/A - N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - N/A - N/A 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Remote Wind 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Local 
- Avoided Distribution Investment 
- Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline Investment [1] 
- N/A 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Remote Wind 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Local 
- Avoided Distribution Investment 
- Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline Investment [1] 
- N/A 
[1] Explored qualitatively 
4.8 Category VII: Externalities and Other 
The final major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
avoided external costs and other costs to society pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The five 
subcategories of costs and benefits contained within externalities and other costs include: 
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Avoided Environmental Costs CO2, NOx and SOx  CB7.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Fuel Uncertainty CB7.2 Qualitative 
Resiliency CB7.3 Qualitative 
Impact on Jobs  CB7.4 Qualitative 
Policy Transition Frictional Costs CB7.5 Qualitative 
Refer to Appendix Appendix D: Components of Cost/Benefit Analysis for a detailed description of each subcategory.  It is 
important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount of solar PV installed and producing. The table below 
illustrates the cost and benefit subcategories within this category accruing (on net) to each perspective. 
Table 51: Externalities and Other Impacts Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits 
Subcategories Accruing as 
Costs 
Non-Owner Participants (NOP) - N/A - Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Avoided Fuel Uncertainty [1] - Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
Non-Participating Ratepayers (NPR) - Avoided Environmental Impacts - Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
Citizens of the Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Avoided Environmental Impacts 
- Avoided Fuel Uncertainty [1] [3] 
- Resiliency [1] [3] 
- Impact on Jobs [1] [3] 
- Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
- Impact on Jobs [1] [2] 
- Resiliency [1] [2] 
[1] Explored qualitatively 
[2] (Qualitative) potential cost component 
[3] (Qualitative) potential benefit component 
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5 Projected Solar PV Build-out under Each Scenario 
In this Section, the projected solar PV build-out trajectories are presented, including (i) the incremental MWDC 
installation by program under each policy path, as well as (ii) the build-out under each scenario by SREC-II project type 
subsector, demonstrating that different policy choices lead to notably different build-out results. 
5.1 Comparing Solar Build-out Trajectories 
5.1.1 SREC Policy Future – Capped  
With current net metering caps, the SREC-II market is projected to experience a burst of activity implementing projects 
under the project cap and before the step-down of the Federal ITC, allowing almost 1350 MW of the 1600 MW target to 
be reached by the end of 2016 and the full 1600 MW filled by the end of 2018.  It is important to note that, due to 
several simplifying assumptions (described in Part A of Appendix A, Key Assumptions), the modeled build rate may be 
moderately faster than likely to be experienced. 
In the SREC capped policy future, 2500 MW are installed by 2022 with four years of the SREC-III program installations 
after reaching 1600 MW in 2018.  Net metering caps are substantially reached in 2017 and annual installs never reach 
2015 and 2016 annual installation rates thereafter.  As can be seen in Figure 20, despite modeling SREC-III using annual 
MW targets from the DOER’s compliance obligation formula designed to smoothly reach 2500 MW by 2025 with a 
modestly inclining annual build rate from the annual build rate in the last year  of SREC-II (2018), the projected 
economics of projects – all in market segments in which quantities are not ‘managed’ – outstrip the targets to reach 
2500 MW by 2022. 
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Figure 20: SREC Capped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year by Program 
 
 
5.1.2 SREC Policy Future – Uncapped 
In a future without net metering caps, modeling of the SREC-II market results in a greater acceleration of build-out and 
hitting 1600 MW in the first quarter of 2018.  This growth is driven by the combined economics of the solar policy 
incentive and net metering values, and overcomes  ITC cliff..  Again, despite modeling SREC-III using annual MW targets 
designed to smoothly reach 2500 MW by 2025 with a modestly inclining annual build rate the economics of SREC-III in 
an uncapped environment overtake the annual targets and result in the 2500 MW goal being reached in Q1 2020 after 
only eight quarters of SREC-III.  Net metering caps are not applicable in the uncapped policy future which allows annual 
installations to rebound to pre-ITC cliff build rates after a slight drop in 2017 The rebound is so strong over 400 MW are 
projected to be installed in 2019 (see Figure 21). 
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Figure 21: SREC Uncapped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year by Program 
 
 
As noted earlier, the SREC policy continued to 2500 MW is not modeled further for benefits and costs, as it reaches 2500 
MW so quickly as to not provide a useful point of comparison to other policy futures, and because it led to a number of 
other complicating factors from a modeling perspective. 
5.1.3 Policy Path A – Capped 
In the Policy A capped policy future, SREC-II is truncated after Q4 2016, after which net metering caps are assumed to 
not be available for modeling simplicity76.  Cumulative installed totals reach 1600 MW in 2019.  Annual incremental 
installations incline steadily until the 2500 MW goal is reached in 2025.  The competitive solicitation approach for large 
installations under Path A substantially controls the pace of installation to provide for a stable and slightly growing 
annual build rate after the initial contraction required to spread almost 1200 MW of installations over nine years (see 
Figure 22). 
                                                          
76
 After 2016 there is about 30 MW of net metering cap space available that is ignored for modeling simplification, which does not 
materially impact the results.  
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Figure 22: Policy A Capped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year by Program 
 
 
5.1.4 Policy Path A – Uncapped 
Under the Policy A uncapped policy future, SREC-II is truncated after Q4 2016, at which point about 700 MW were 
installed under SREC-II, about 40 MW more than in the capped scenario.  1600 MW is reached in 2019, the same year as 
in the Policy A capped scenario though the uncapped scenario hits 1600 MW very early in 2019, while the capped 
scenario hits 1600 MW in mid-2019.  This is a function of the engineered growth rate to meet 2500 MW in 2025 which 
means overall slightly lower annual incremental installations in the uncapped scenario. 
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Figure 23: Policy A Uncapped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year by Program 
 
 
5.1.5 Policy Path B – Capped 
Under the Policy Path B capped scenario future, SREC-II is truncated after Q4 2016, after which net metering  is assumed 
to be no longer available for> 25 kW projects for modeling simplicity.  1600 MW is reached in 2019 and 2500 MW is 
reached in Q2 2025.  Incremental annual installations after 2016 are fairly consistent because of modeled optimization 
of incentive levels and DBI annual decline rates, yet are more volatile in Policy B than Policy A because of the incentive 
structure.  This difference is covered in more detail later in this section. 
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Figure 24: Policy B Capped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year by Program 
 
 
5.1.6 Policy Path B – Uncapped 
Under the Policy Path B uncapped scenario future, SREC-II is truncated after Q4 2016.  1600 MW is reached in 2019 and 
2500 MW is reached in Q2 2025.  As under the capped scenario, the buildout rate is somewhat more volatile than under 
Path A. 
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Figure 25: Policy B Uncapped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year by Program 
 
 
5.2 Solar Build-Out Market Share Projections by SREC-II Market Sector 
In this Section, the projected solar PV build-out trajectories are presented by SREC-II Market Subsector, including (i) 
subsector market share MWDC installation and percentage of cumulative installations under each policy scenario, as well 
as (ii) incremental MWDC installations per year under each policy scenario, and (iii) a comparison of the MWDC cumulative 
installed by market subsector and percent installed under each policy scenario before 2016 and after to 2025. 
As shown in Figure 26, the cumulative installations of the common past of all policy futures is made up of almost 40% 
Managed Growth installations.  No other policy future builds close to this amount of managed growth.  In the common 
past through 2016, about 14% of total build-out is expected to come from a near-term boom in construction of larger 
ground-mounted projects in the Community Shared Solar (CSS) and virtual net metering Low-Income Housing (VNM LIH) 
subsectors, two market segments heavily or entirely dependent on the mechanics of virtual net metering for their 
existence.  Almost 20% of the cumulative installs through the end of 2016 are projected to come from the <= 25 kW 
subsector.  In getting to 2500 MW, this proportion declines slightly in all policy futures except SREC capped, which builds 
almost three times the cumulative installations in the subsector seen in SREC capped to 2016.  In all policy futures 
cumulative installations in the Building Mounted subsector increase.  The net metering policy clearly drives the 
cumulative installations of VNM LIH and CSS since in capped scenarios neither of these project subsectors will have 
projects installed (with the exception of a small sliver of small on-site rooftop affordable housing projects). 
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Figure 26: SREC-II Subsector Market Share Comparison by Policy Scenario 
 
In the following subsections, the evolution of subsector market share is depicted under each policy scenario.  As can be 
seen, the evolution of the market under these different futures can spell material changes for specific market sectors.   
 
5.2.1 SREC Policy Future – Capped  
Under the SREC capped policy future, there is a sharp decline in incremental annual installations in 2017 after net 
metering caps are reached for public NM bucket  and the ITC expires.  After net metering caps are reached, the majority 
of SREC-II installations are in the <= 25 kW and Building Mounted subsectors.  Figure 28: SREC Capped Subsector Market 
Share Comparison Before and After 2017Figure 28 shows that <= 25 kW installations make up almost 60% of cumulative 
installs after 2016. While this change appears dramatic, as can be seen it requires a sustained annual increase in annual 
build rates, but at a rate that is not dramatically above the rate of increase for those sectors in some past years.  While 
economics dictate this market shift, it likely strains the ability of the subsector to maintain such a sharp and steady 
growth rate.  It also presages a domination of the future market by installations with the highest average installed cost, 
leading to the slightly counterintuitive result that a capped future could have a higher total cost than an uncapped 
future with a lower average per Watt installed cost. 
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Figure 27: SREC Capped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year 
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Figure 28: SREC Capped Subsector Market Share Comparison Before and After 2017 
 
Figure 28 underscores that the dramatic market share growth in small and Building Mounted subsectors comes at the 
expense of MG projects, CSS, VNM LIH, landfill, brownfield and other ground-mounted systems who lose the ability of 
net metering. 
5.2.2 SREC Policy Future – Uncapped 
As can be seen in Figure 29, under the SREC uncapped policy future, there is a slight decline in annual incremental 
installations in 2017 after ITC expires for most project types.  With no net metering caps, Community Shared Solar (CSS) 
and virtually net metered low-income housing (VNM LIH) together make up over 30% of the cumulative installed 
capacity after 2016.  This trend contributes to the 2500 MW target being met rapidly in 2020.  Figure 30 shows that the 
market subsector composition remains relatively the same after 2017 except for having less managed growth.  Managed 
growth installations are replaced by CSS and VNM LIH as well as more landfill and brownfield projects.    
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Figure 29: SREC Uncapped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year 
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Figure 30: SREC Uncapped Subsector Market Share Comparison Before and After 2017 
 
 
5.2.3 Policy Path A – Capped 
As shown in Figure 31, under the Policy Path A capped policy future, there is a steep drop off in incremental annual 
installations after SREC-II is truncated after Q4 2016.  The more moderate growth after 2017 is a result of the 
engineered growth rate in Policy A necessary to meet the 2500 MW goal in 2025.  The largest difference between Policy 
A capped and SREC capped is that Managed Growth projects continue to be built under Policy A, whereas additional MG 
projects are not needed under the SREC-III policy i.77  In this scenario, CSS and VNM LIH are not feasible without net 
metering.  Landfills, brownfields, and Managed Growth projects fill this gap since they are feasible with a combined 
incentive even when relying on wholesale market prices.  As in other capped policy scenarios, with the loss of net 
metering, there is an increase in on-site load dependent projects like Building Mounted and Solar Canopy. 
                                                          
77
 Note: while SREC-III does not require additional MG projects to reach 2500 MW, the way in which Policy A (and Policy B) are being 
modeled is that each Sector is assigned  a 25% share of the MW goal to reach 2500 MW (after assigning a portion of the share to 
small projects).  So while Policy Paths A & B might not need MG to reach 2500 MW the MG sector gets to participate regardless.  
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Figure 31: Policy A Capped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year 
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Figure 32: Policy A Capped Subsector Market Share Comparison Before and After 2017 
 
 
5.2.4 Policy Path A – Uncapped 
Under the Policy A uncapped future, Figure 33 shows that there is a similar project mix to the SREC uncapped policy 
future except for Managed Growth being built in Policy A.  Again the engineered growth via quotas in the bid system 
cause a drop off after SREC-II is truncated in order to meet the 2500 MW goal in 2025.  Under this policy future, 
Managed Growth cumulative installations decline and brownfield, landfills, Building Mounted, CSS and VNM LIH 
subsectors make up the difference.  <= 25 kW subsector cumulative installations decline. 
 178 
 
Figure 33: Policy A Uncapped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year 
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Figure 34: Policy A Uncapped Subsector Market Share Comparison Before and After 2017 
 
 
5.2.5 Policy Path B – Capped 
As shown in Figure 35, under the Policy B capped future there is a similar build-out shape to Policy A aside from the 
incremental installation variability seen after 2017, as well as the project mix.  CSS and VNM LIH are not installed after 
2016 since there is no net metering.  Managed Growth, landfill, and brownfield subsector projects are built instead and 
are feasible with wholesale rates because of the Policy B combined incentive structure.  Towards the end of Policy B 
program, the growth rates increase since there is no additional incentive needed beyond the retail rates (for sized to 
load projects) or wholesale rates (for large ground mount projects).  In Policy B there is a higher potential for volatility 
than in Policy A since Policy Path A guarantees a specific amount for 85% of targets for all but small.  While installation 
rates in Policy B could be made flat with perfect foresight, in the real world the declining block incentive has the 
potential to create material volatility if the rate of incentive decline tracks faster or slower than the rate of cost of entry 
evolution.   
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Figure 35: Policy B Capped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year 
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Figure 36: Policy B Capped Subsector Market Share Comparison Before and After 2017 
 
 
5.2.6 Policy Path B – Uncapped 
Under the Policy B uncapped future, the overall build-out rate looks similar to those of Policy B capped because of the 
engineered growth rate after 2017.  As in Policy B capped, the spike in installations after 2023 is a function of a zero 
incentive requirement, completely driven by net metering rates revenue which by then is sufficient revenue to support 
many installation types.  There is a faux decline in 2025 since targets are met in Q2 2025.  Installs could actually grow at 
an accelerated rate in this year unless the program qualification somehow serves as a ‘gate-keeper’ for market entry.  
Figure 38 shows that VNM LIH and CSS cumulative installations increase after SREC-II is truncated.   
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Figure 37: Policy B Uncapped to 2500 MW Incremental Installations per Year 
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Figure 38: Policy B Uncapped Subsector Market Share Comparison Before and After 2017 
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6 Solar PV Incentives 
The Solar PV Incentives differ per the policy definitions.  For the SREC policies the solar PV incentives are comprised of 
the Solar Renewable Energy Credits which are the market based tradable certificates which are a component of the 
supply-responsive demand formula and floor price auction mechanism all part and parcel of SREC-I and SREC-II.    
As described above, Policy Paths A & B use a different approach; all are based on fixed-price performance-based incentives 
distributed via either open declining block incentive or EDC-conducted competitive solicitation.  For purposes of this study, we have 
established initial DBI prices and rates of decline that attempt to match the level of incentive that would induce installation growth 
to 2500 MW by 2025.  These incentives are in addition to the implicit value of avoiding retail energy charges for sized-to-load solar 
projects, or the explicit net metering incentives of virtual net metering or roll forward beyond the billing month net metering.  
Incentives were projected for 2 small segments and 4 large segments for Policy Paths A and B, and because the incentive structure is 
intended to equalize gross payments across different utilities, a set of prices was established for each of 6 EDCs.  In order to not 
unduly burden the reader, we describe here the results for two segments of Policy Path A (Small Residential and Large Sector A).  
The assumed incentive levels for all of these segments and EDCs for both Policy Paths A and B are shown in Appendix C for Policy 
Paths .   
6.1 Projected SREC Prices, CG Revenues and NPR Costs 
In order to estimate SREC prices in the past, present and future, the following combination of information and forecasting was used.   
 Modeled estimates of SREC prices using SEA’s proprietary Massachusetts Solar Market Study fundamentals analysis of 
resulting in supply, demand and ultimately SREC spot prices, as well as floor-price auction dynamics.   
 Historic spot SREC prices as well as research on 3, 5 and 10 year forward strip prices used to hedge both generator and load 
serving entity SREC price risk.   
 Forward strip prices were calculated as a function of projected spot prices 
As displayed in Figure 40, sometimes CGs sell directly to LSEs, in that case we assume the revenue to CGs and the cost to LSEs (and 
ultimately the NPRs) is equivalent.  In other cases, CGs sell to market makers or participate in the Floor Price Auction and the 
revenue to CGs and the cost to the NPRs are not equivalent.  In these cases the Market Makers absorb the difference, in many cases 
by being the buyer of the SRECs long-term and offering the CGs a price hedge.  Market Makers do so with the goal of making a 
profit, but in turn take on the SREC price volatility risk.  
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Figure 39: Schematic Diagram of Hedging Transactions within the SREC Carve-out Market 
 
 
6.1.1 Net Metering Capped (SREC-I, II and III) 
Figure 40 displays the historic and projected SREC pricing with net metering capped at present levels.  As can be seen prices decline 
more or less steadily as a function of SACP and auction floor declines for SREC-II and SREC-III.  These declines in turn result in lower 
prices for forward strip hedges (and less revenue to CGs and less costs to NPRs).   
Figure 41 displays the annual realized SREC revenue to CGs and costs to NPRs, the difference being (for the most part) revenue to 
market makers and to a much lesser degree SACP payments and transaction costs.  On a 2015 NPV basis, the aggregate revenue to 
CGs is $3.383 billion while the NPV costs to NPRs is $3.970 billion, a ratio of 0.85.   
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Figure 40: 
Historic and Predicted SREC Spot Prices with Net Metering Caps Unchanged from Present Policy  
 
 
Figure 41: Annual Realized Costs NPRs and Revenues to CGs with Net Metering Caps Unchanged from Present Policy  
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6.1.2 Net Metering Uncapped (SREC-I, II and III) 
Figure 42 displays the historic and projected SREC pricing with net metering uncapped.  Again, prices decline more or less steadily as 
a function of SACP and auction floor declines for SREC-II and SREC-III.  Prices for the SREC-III program are higher for the uncapped 
scenario than the capped SREC-III scenario, in part because the supply-responsive demand mechanism is overwhelmed by strong 
growth in supply.  The sharp increases in supply cause sharp increases in demand which then can’t be met when the program 
reaches the SREC-III cap of 2500 MW.   
Figure 43 displays the annual realized SREC revenue to CGs and costs to NPRs for the uncapped scenario; the difference being for the 
most part revenue to market makers and, to much lesser degree, SACP payments and transaction costs.  On a 2015 NPV basis the 
aggregate revenue to CGs is $3.434 billion while the NPV costs to NPRs is $4.016 billion a benefit cost ratio of 0.86.   
Figure 42: Historic and Predicted SREC Spot Prices with Net Metering Uncapped  
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Figure 43: Annual Realized Costs NPRs and Revenues to CGs with Net Metering Caps Uncapped  
 
 
6.2 Policy Path A 
6.2.1 Policy Path A: Small Residential DBI/PBI 
The combined incentives for projects are set at the level so that residential projects can be built, and as possible at 
projected solar costs and retail rate levels, reach their portion of the 2500 MW target in 2025 with more or less 
moderate growth from the start in 2017.   The initial solar incentive level is based on the difference of the combined 
incentive level less the retail rate for the host utility in 2017.  As the combined incentive blocks decline and retail rates 
increase, the solar incentives drop with each successive round.  Unitil has the lowest solar incentive as it has the highest 
rates for avoided kWh avoided charges.  Conversely National Grid has the lowest residential rates for avoided kWh 
charges, thus the highest incentives.   
Incentive prices hit zero when there is parity with the avoidable kWh portion of retail rates (we will refer to this as retail 
rate parity for the purposes of this incentive).  Unitil has the highest retail rates, thus hits parity first.  We do not allow 
incentives to be negative.  “Gating”, the restriction on program participation, is the only thing that stops the market 
from taking off.  One could imagine that sized to load customers in this sector would not participate in the program post 
2023 because avoiding retail rates is sufficient incentive for solar development. 
Figure 44 and Figure 45 display the $/MWh incentives for the Path A Capped Small Residential and the Path A Uncapped 
Small Residential program.  As residential customers can always net meter regardless of the cap and we assume that 
90% of the production is sized-to-load for a residential project, the results are almost identical.  
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Figure 44: $/MWh Incentives for the Path A Capped Small Residential Program  
 
 
Figure 45: $/MWh Incentives for the Path A Capped Small Residential Program  
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6.2.2 Policy Path A: Large Competitive PBI – Sector A 
The Policy Path A large competitive sectors show similar characteristics across the four SREC-II Market Sectors for which 
distinct solicitations with their own targets are run.   
The Sector A, NM capped scenario is just Solar Canopy, Emergency Generation, and on-site Affordable Housing projects 
as VNM Affordable Housing and Community Shared Solar projects are no longer viable (as we know them today) without 
VNM.  The $/MWh incentive results are shown in Figure 46.  While the combined incentive over time decreases, it never 
reaches the level where additional solar incentives are not needed.   
Figure 46: $/MWh Incentives for the Path A Capped Large Sector A Program  
 
Figure 47 shows the $/MWh incentives but this time for the uncapped scenario for Policy Path A that now includes 
VNM-dependent projects (CSS and VNM Affordable Housing).  As can be seen, for a project sized to load78 the combined 
incentive needed from the marginal bidder becomes lower than the combined incentive in approximately 2019.  In this 
case the project growth would take off except that we assume that net metering availability is restricted to only 
program participants.  As the model (which presumes a degree of perfect foresight) did not allow for bids to fall below 
the projected levelized retail rate revenue (which would signify a negative solar incentive),  more and more of the sized-
to-load projects will bid at prices equal to projected levelized retail rate revenue for their required Combined Incentives.  
                                                          
78
 Within Sector A, with net metering values reduced to wholesale rates, oversized projects are no longer competitive. 
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Figure 47: $/MWh Incentives for the Path A Uncapped Large Sector A Program  
 
This modeling approach, which impacts all four large sectors to differing degrees, has some interesting impacts.   The 
model assumes that a project cannot bid, via competitive solicitation, lower than the levelized 15-year value of Rate-
Based incentives (“Levelized Rates”) it is forecasted to receive.  Because of this, the Combined Incentive which the 
marginal bidder bids is, in some cases, lower than the projected Levelized Rates offered in certain utilities (e.g.: National 
Grid and Unitil).  The result of this is that, when the marginal Combined Incentive and a utility’s Levelized Rates cross, 
additional projects in said utilities can no longer compete in the solicitation (again e.g., National Grid and Unitil).  This 
shifts installations, over time, to the utilities with the lowest Levelized Rates.  
With perfect foresight, projects would not bid to participate at a lower revenue than they could receive by simply 
building an installation and receiving full retail rates.  Because rates are projected to rise, but not guaranteed to do so, in 
practice, we would expect that many projects, not having perfect foresight, would accept a fixed combined revenue 
stream below forecasted retail revenues.  As a result, the model likely results in more costly projects and a less cost-
effective mix than would be experienced.   
See Appendix C for results for Sectors B, C and D in net metering capped and uncapped scenarios.  
6.3 Policy Path B 
6.3.1 Policy Path B: Small Residential DBI/EPBI  
Small Residential Path B differs from Path A in that the incentives are an Expected PBI, or an upfront rebate in $/kW with  
the revenue stream from the solar system assuming some level of kWh production.  The trajectory of the incentives 
required are very similar to Policy Path A small residential (see Figure 48); it reaches grid parity in approximately 2023 
for most utilities.  The uncapped scenario is exactly the same as the capped scenario (see Figure 49).   
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Figure 48: $/kW Incentives for the Path B Capped Small Residential Program 
 
 
Figure 49: $/kW Incentives for the Path B Uncapped Small Residential Program 
 
 
6.3.2 Policy Path B: Sector A DBI/PBI 
The Policy Path B large sectors show similar characteristics to each other.   
Again just like Policy Path A, within Sector A the capped scenario is just Solar Canopy, Emergency Generation, and on-
site Affordable Housing projects, as VNM Affordable Housing and Community Shared Solar projects are no longer viable 
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(as we know them today) without VNM.  The $/MWh incentive results are shown in Figure 50.  Under the DBI incentive 
structure, the combined incentive steps down as each DBI block target is reached.  Unlike Policy Path A, the program 
does reach a level where solar incentives (beyond retail kWh rate levels) are not needed.   
Figure 50: $/MWh Incentives for the Path B Capped Large Sector A Program  
 
 
Figure 51 shows the $/MWh incentives, but this time for the uncapped scenario for Policy Path A, and now includes 
VNM-dependent projects (CSS and VNM Affordable Housing).  Again the solar incentive needed from the marginal 
bidder drops to zero very quickly, as CSS and VNM Affordable Housing can exist with just the VNM revenue.   
While not shown here (See Appendix C), Sector C and Sector D capped projects are modeled to receive wholesale QF 
rates and thus would need solar incentives to 2025 and beyond.   
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Figure 51: $/MWh Incentives for the Path B Uncapped Large Sector A Program  
 
 
6.4 Caveats to Modeling Results 
The discussion of perfect foresight and Policy Path A bid modeling in Section 6.2.2 exposes a modeling artifact which 
may serve to overstate the cost-effectiveness of Policy Path A, Uncapped.  It applies in some of the other sectors but to 
a lesser degree than in Sector A.  The reasons this would overstate cost-effectiveness (compared to Policy Path B) is 
because under Policy Path B, projects with the highest retail kWh charges will continue to build until the end of the 
program.  In contrast, in Policy Path A, when the marginal bid falls below the projected levelized retail rate value, 
projects in EDCs with the highest retail rate values cannot win bids and are foreclosed from installation.  This cleaves off 
solar and net metering incentive payments in EDCs with the highest retail kWh charges, resulting in not over-
incentivizing via net metering projects which are so incentivized in Policy Path B. 
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7 Cost and Benefit of the Current (SREC) Policy 
This Section presents and compares the cost and benefit of the current SREC Policy across the four perspectives under 
three different policy scenarios: SREC Policy to 1,600 MW (Capped), SREC Policy to 1,600 MW (Uncapped) and SREC 
Policy to 2,500 MW (Capped). As noted in previous Sections, this Study does not include a cost and benefit analysis for 
SREC Policy to 2,500 MW under an uncapped net metering scenario.  
7.1 SREC Policy 1600 MW  
Results presented here cover projected results of SREC-I and SREC-II when allowed to run its full course.  Results are 
similar for the capped and uncapped scenarios.  This occurs for two reasons. 
1. Most of the 1600 MWs are built before the constraints of net metering caps have a material impact on the 
market; and 
2. Under a capped scenario, residential/small building-mounted systems that could continue to take advantage of 
net metering continue to be built after the cap reached for other sectors. 
7.1.1 Capped 
Results for the capped scenario are summarized in in A Figure 52, which shows (in the bar chart) the height of the bars 
as NPV 2015$, and also shows as data labels the NPV $/MWh, which are in proportion to the height of the NPV bars (all 
having the same MWH denominator). 
Across the four perspectives, non-owner participants (NOP), the beneficiaries of lease payments, property tax or PILOT 
payments, or PPA or net metering discounts, would experience substantial net benefits, based on the difference 
between NPV benefits of $1.0 billion and costs (comprised of tax liabilities on the benefits) of NPV $281 million under 
SREC Policy to 1,600 MW (Capped).  
From the Customer-Generators (CGs) perspective, the difference between benefits and costs (always a net benefit) 
represents returns to equity and debt investors, and can be thought of as profit margin (a portion of which assumed to 
stay in state and flow to C@L).  CGs are projected to experience benefits (comprised of all sources of revenue) of NPV 
$9.3 billion compared to costs of $7.05 billion.   
Non-participating ratepayers (NPRs) fund the incentives, so it is no surprise that they incur net costs.  NPV costs are $6.6 
billion compared to benefits of $3.766 billion.  While the table below does not break out the relative costs and benefits 
of SREC-I vs. SREC-II, SREC-II is notably more cost-effective than SREC-I, so a larger pro-rata share of the cost-to-benefit- 
differential is attributable to SREC-I.   
The perspective of citizens of the Commonwealth at Large (C@L) experiences material net benefits, the source of which 
vary from scenario to scenario.  Total NPV benefits of $10.2 billion compare to total NPV of net costs79 of NPV $4.5 
billion.  
                                                          
79
 Note that the way the costs and benefits are rolled up, and particular cost or benefit component can be characterized as either a 
cost or a benefit.  For some cost or benefit components, there are both costs and benefits which either cancel (netting to zero) or 
result in a net cost or benefit for that individual component.  In a very few instances, this calculation approach can lead to slightly 
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Discussion of the detailed components of the costs and benefits can be found in Section 8. 
A Figure 52: Cost and Benefit of SREC Policy to 1,600 MW (Capped) by Perspectives 
 
 
7.1.2 Uncapped 
Under the net metering uncapped SREC policy through 1600 MW, the results are summarized as follows, for each 
perspective: 
NOPs, the beneficiaries of lease payments, property tax or PILOT payments, or PPA or net metering discounts, would 
experience substantial net benefits, based on the difference between NPV benefits of almost $1.1 billion and costs 
(comprised of tax liabilities on the benefits) of NPV $285 million.   
From the CG perspective, they are projected to experience benefits of NPV $9.2 billion (slightly less than under the 
capped s scenario) compared to costs of $6.6 billion.  This reflects a different mix of generation units more heavily 
weighted towards larger projects with lower $/kW installed costs, resulting in an increased profit margin. 
NPRs fund the incentives, with of NPV costs at $6.6 billion compared to benefits of $3.65 billion, a similar but slightly 
higher net cost that corresponds in part by the higher profit margin to CGs but is also attributable to other dynamics.     
The C@L perspective experiences material net benefits, the source of which vary from scenario to scenario.  Total NPV 
benefits of $10.2 billion compare to total NPV of net costs of NPV $4.1 billion, making this scenario more attractive on 
net to C@L. This is due to a larger share of more cost-efficient installations (e.g.,  medium and large commercial 
systems) that can be supported by net metering under the uncapped scenario.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
counterintuitive results, which become more intuitive once this netting is understood.  See Section 4 and Appendix D for a 
description of how individual cost and benefit components are calculated for each perspective to see where this netting occurs.   
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Figure 53: Cost and Benefit of SREC Policy to 1,600 MW (Uncapped) by Perspectives 
 
 
7.2 SREC Policy 2500 MW, Capped 
Results presented here cover projected results of SREC-I and SREC-II when allowed to run its full course through 1600 
MW, plus the projected SREC-III policy, with net metering capped.  As noted earlier, SREC-III was not analyzed for costs 
and benefits in a net metering uncapped future. 
Figure 54 retains the same overall shape as A Figure 52 and Figure 53, but the numbers reveal some important impacts.  
With the SREC Policy expanding to 2500 MW in the net metering Capped scenario, it is not a surprise that It has higher 
total cost than reaching the 1600 MW targets.   However, it is quite notable that all the $/MWh costs are lower and all 
the $/MWh benefits are lower for the 2500 MW scenario as well. This is in large part because SREC-III would be more 
cost-effective than its predecessors.  
NOPs, the beneficiaries of lease payments, property tax or PILOT payments, or PPA or net metering discounts, would 
experience a similar level of benefits at $1.1 billion as at 1600 MW, but experience an increase in costs (tax liabilities) of 
NPV $318 million.  It is clear why the NOP net benefits decrease, as there are fewer opportunities for non-owners to 
participate and yield substantial benefits when net metering is mostly unavailable.   
CGs are projected to experience benefits of NPV $12.7 billion, reflecting the construction of a larger fleet, compared to 
costs of NPV almost $8.8 billion.  These results reflects a different mix of generation units more heavily weighted 
towards smaller projects with higher $/kW installed costs. 
Interestingly, the net costs (costs less benefits) to NPR at 2500 MW are lower than the net costs at 1600 MW under 
either capped or uncapped scenarios, showing that for SREC-III, the incremental benefits exceeded the incremental 
costs from the NPR perspective.   
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From the C@L perspective, net benefits increase with increasing volume of installations, even though the drivers of the 
costs and benefits to this perspective change with shifting installation mix.   Total NPV benefits grow to almost $14.4 
billion, compared to total NPV of net costs of NPV $5.5 billion.   
 
Figure 54: Cost and Benefit of SREC Policy to 2,500 MW (Capped) by Perspectives 
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8 Comparisons of Cost and Benefit Results by Perspective 
This Section compares the costs and benefits of each of the four perspectives as well as the total NPV of total costs and 
benefits for each policy scenario in each of the four perspectives. 
Please note that wherever the cost benefit component stacks are presented (Table 52, Table 53,Table 54, and Table 55 
and Appendix B) every row will be either a cost or a benefit.  However, many rows have both costs and benefits that 
either net to zero and are not shown, or have a net benefit or net cost with a smaller absolute value because of netting 
costs and benefits within that cost or benefit component.  In a very few instances, this calculation approach can lead to 
slightly counterintuitive results, which become more intuitive once this netting is understood.  See Section 4 and Appendix 
D for a description of how individual cost and benefit components are calculated for each perspective to see where this 
netting occurs. 
8.1 Total Costs & Benefits, NOP Perspective 
Non-owner participants (NOPs) are beneficiaries of policies – landowners receiving land lease payments, towns receiving 
property taxes or PILOTs, and PPA/NMC offtakers.  So it is no surprise that this perspective includes mostly benefits.  
Table 52 is an illustrative table of the stacked costs and benefits from the NOP perspective in the SREC capped policy 
future.  Similar tables for other scenarios can be found in Appendix B.  Under the current policy, VNM is the largest piece 
of the benefits stack, followed by lease payments, avoided rates from displacing on-site load, and property taxes in that 
order.  The only costs to NOP are taxes.  As opposed to the benefits in the SREC capped scenario presented in Table 52, 
in an uncapped policy scenario, VNM benefits to NOP are higher and the benefits from on-site generation lower because 
of the shift in project mix to more cost effective, VNM-intensive projects.  Costs stay fairly the same across policy futures 
but vary depending on the variance of project mix driven by net metering policy.  With net metering, public offtakers are 
the most attractive as large projects qualify for Class II net metering.  Without net metering, there would only be public 
offtakers if projects were sited on public buildings or sites with load (e.g., city wastewater treatment plants).  Thus 
aggregate tax costs tend to be higher in capped policy scenarios.  NOP costs and benefits are smaller relative to those of 
other perspectives.  Variation among policy scenarios is mostly a function of the project mix (amount of taxable 
offtakers and VNM projects). 
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Table 52: Comparing NOP Detailed Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped 
 
Figure 55 shows the NPV of total costs and benefits from the NOP perspective for each policy future.  As we keep the y-
axis scale equal for the analogous figures for all four perspectives (to ease visual comparisons) the NOP total costs and 
benefits bars appear very short compared to the y-axis  as the sums are relatively small compared to other perspectives.  
Total benefits of Policy B uncapped are slightly more than those in other policy futures.  This is mostly a function of a 
shift in project mix to more VNM projects which provide the most benefits to NOPs.   
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Figure 55: Total NPV Costs & Benefits, NOP Perspective 
 
8.2 Total Costs & Benefits, CG Perspective 
In the customer generator (CG) perspective, the costs and benefits (revenues) drive profitability of the CG.  Table 53 is 
an illustrative table of the stacked costs and benefits from the CG perspective in the SREC capped policy future.  Similar 
tables for other scenarios can be found in Appendix B.  Under the current policy, the difference between NPV of total 
costs and total benefits to the CG is $2.2 billion.  Profits to CG are $3.7 billion in the SREC capped to 2500 MW policy 
future, a $1.3 billion increase over the additional 900 MW.  Not surprisingly, in all policy scenarios, the total profitability 
of CG increases when the 2500 MW goal is met as compared to having a 1600 MW target.  The largest component of CG 
benefits come from the direct incentives.  In the case of SREC capped to 2500 MW, more than 30% of total CG benefits 
come from direct incentives.  After direct incentives, much of the benefits, or revenues, come from the VNM value, and 
the avoided kWh charges..  In all policy futures with a 2500 MW goal, the federal ITC makes up about $1.3 billion of total 
CG benefits, ranging from about 10% to 12% of the NPV of total benefits.  In uncapped policy futures, the VNM benefits 
are a large driver of increased revenues.  In Policy A and Policy B capped scenarios, wholesale market sales will replace 
VNM benefits since projects which receive wholesale market value of generation are not viable in SREC scenarios. 
The largest costs to CG are the system installed costs, ongoing O&M, and taxes.  The system installed costs do not vary 
much across policies except for being about $400 billion higher in the SREC capped to 2500 MW scenario than other 
policy futures to 2500 MW.  This is because of the larger amount of <= 25 kW installation in this scenario as compared to 
others which have a higher installed cost per kW.  Ongoing O&M costs also do not vary significantly across policy 
futures.  Taxable income of CGs vary across policy futures depending on types of project being built.  In the SREC policy, 
CG taxable income is much smaller because the taxable generation value is less since small projects make up the 
majority of installations (and residential customers will not incur extra tax liability for avoiding electricity charges). 
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Table 53: Comparing CG Detailed Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped 
 
 
Figure 56 shows the NPV of total costs and benefits from the CG perspective for each policy future.  CG profitability is 
highest in the SREC capped to 2500 MW scenario.  Total costs to CG are highest in the Policy B uncapped scenario mostly 
because of higher income taxes in Policy B.  The total profit to CG does not vary greatly between Policy A and Policy B, 
capped and uncapped scenarios.  This is because of the more moderate direct incentive benefits CG receive in these 
policies.  Overall, Policy A and B total benefits and costs are similar. 
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Figure 56: Total NPV Costs & Benefits, CG Perspective 
 
 
8.3 Total Costs & Benefits, NPR Perspective 
The relative costs and benefits to non-participant ratepayers (NPRs) shows the degree of subsidy they are bearing and 
from which components costs are coming.  Table 54 shows the detail NPV costs and benefits from the NPR perspective 
for the SREC capped policy scenario.  Similar tables for additional policy cases can be found in Appendix B.  In the current 
policy, SREC capped to 1600 MW, the total cost to NPRs is about $2.95 billion.  More than 50% of the NPR total costs are 
from direct incentive payments.  Other large costs are non-generation components of on-site generation and VNM.  
Differences in direct incentive costs are one of the largest drivers of overall costs to NPR between policy scenarios.   
The largest benefit to NPRs in all policy scenarios is the avoided generation capacity costs at about $2.1 billion, or about 
40% of total benefits.  Additionally, variance in displaced RPS Class I compliance costs has a small impact on the total 
benefits to NPRs.  More Class I compliance costs are displaced in Policy A and B because each MWh is displaces a full 
Class I REC whereas in the SREC policy, some MWh produce less than a full SREC (sectors B, C, and D).  Avoided 
environmental impacts are also a significant benefit across all policy scenarios.  
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Table 54: Comparing NPR Detailed Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped 
 
 
Figure 57 shows a comparison of the total NPV costs and benefits to NPRs in the different policy scenarios.  The largest 
cost scenario is SREC capped to 2500 because of the magnitude of direct incentive payments in comparison to Policy A 
and B incentive payments.  Benefits to NPRs are similar across policies with the same MW target.  The total benefits to 
NPRs have little variation across policy futures with the same MW target.  This observation suggests if the goal is to 
improve the NPR B:C ratio more emphasis should be put on reducing total costs to NPR than modifying policies to 
improve benefits. 
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Figure 57: Total NPV Costs & Benefits, NPR Perspective 
 
 
8.4 Total Costs & Benefits, C@L Perspective 
This section looks at the costs and benefits to the citizens at large (C@L).  The conclusions drawn from analysis of the 
costs and benefits from the C@L perspective is what may or may not justify having a solar policy.  Massachusetts citizens 
at large encompasses all Massachusetts citizens and organizations and is generally a superset of other categories.  Table 
55 shows the detail NPV costs and benefits from the NPR perspective for the SREC capped policy scenario.  Similar tables 
for additional policy cases can be found in Appendix B.  In the current policy, the net benefits to C@L is $5.5 billion.  The 
costs to C@L include federal income taxes, direct incentives, and solar policy administrative and transaction costs.  The 
largest benefits to C@L are system installed costs retained in state, avoided generation capacity costs, and generation 
value of on-site production.  In the current policy, SREC capped to 1600 MW, system installed costs make up about one-
fifth of the total benefit to MA C@L, exemplifying that in-state system installed costs are a large driver of overall 
benefits of solar policy.  System installed costs are similar across policy futures.  Direct incentive costs are highest to 
C@L in the SREC capped scenario but more federal taxes in other policy futures reduces the total cost difference among 
policies. 
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Table 55: Comparing C@L Detailed Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped 
 
 
Figure 58 shows a comparison of the total NPV costs and benefits to C@L in the different policy scenarios.  The policy 
which has the most benefits to C@L is SREC capped to 2500 MW.  The total benefits and costs of policies to 1600 MW 
because the marginal impacts on C@L after truncating SREC-II are small.  For policies targeting 2500 MW, capped 
scenarios have slightly more total benefits to C@L and more total costs to C@L.  This is because on-site generation has 
more generation value to C@L than VNM.  This difference is even larger in Policy A because VNM only receives the 
wholesale value of energy sent to the grid.. 
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Figure 58: Total NPV Costs & Benefits, C@L Perspective 
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9 Qualitative Discussion of Impacts on Employment and Resiliency  
While detailed quantitative analyses of employment impacts and resiliency are beyond the scope of this analysis, these 
are both issues of importance with respect to potential net benefits of solar in Massachusetts, and they are both 
discussed in this Section. 
9.1 Solar Energy Employment Impacts 
9.1.1 Introduction to Solar Jobs in Massachusetts 
In its 2014 Massachusetts Clean Energy Industry Report, the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center (MassCEC) estimates 
that the state solar industry employs just over 12,100 workers (MassCEC, 2014), while the Solar Foundation’s national 
Solar Jobs Census found a similar, but slightly lower number, estimating 9,200 solar jobs in Massachusetts in the same 
year (The Solar Foundation, 2014). Industry-wide employment figures such as these are useful to understand the total 
number of Massachusetts workers engaged with solar on a day-to-day basis.  However these figures do not reflect the 
total economic and employment impact of solar in the Commonwealth.  
There are a range of different categories of job losses and gains associated with solar project development beyond 
direct solar employment. The following section provides an estimate of employment impacts derived from project 
development, and reviews other efforts to analyze jobs impacts. Jobs impacts of any energy policy can vary widely based 
on the analysis methodologies used and the analysis inputs and assumptions. A macroeconomic analysis of the 
employment effects of the proposed solar policy options is beyond the scope of this report. Within the framework of the 
Task 3 analysis, jobs impacts accrue to citizens of Massachusetts at large and do not have directly impact participants or 
non-participating ratepayers.  
9.1.2 Categories of Job Impacts 
- Solar development has employment impacts that go beyond jobs in the solar industry itself. Economic impact analyses 
typically categorize economic and employment impacts into three primary groups. These impact categories can have 
either positive or negative net state-wide job impacts. The job impact categories are: 
-  
 Direct Impacts. In the context of solar project development, these are jobs that relate directly to the construction and 
installation, or operations and maintenance, of a solar project. This job impact category has a high likelihood of creating in-
state jobs as employers may be unlikely to bring in temporary workers from other states into a stable solar market. Policies 
that create local boom and bust development cycles, however, may create conditions conducive to bringing in out-of-state 
crews and thereby reduce this effect.    
 Indirect Impacts. These refer to fields or industries that support or supply direct economic activity related to the solar 
industry, such as manufacturing jobs that provide construction materials or various professional services that support 
construction activities. Some of these job impacts are less likely to be in-state, as there are a limited number of 
Massachusetts solar system component manufacturers. For some developers with offices in Massachusetts, indirect jobs 
impacts in the Commonwealth would be higher than for developers with out-of-state offices that serve Massachusetts. 
 Induced Impacts. These result from increased spending due to new direct and indirect jobs in the state. Induced impacts 
can also result from utility bill savings or incentive payments, which can create increased economic activity. These impacts 
would also include associated job losses from industries that see reduced revenues because solar installations (such as 
existing power plant operators).  
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-  
- Employment impacts are often discussed in terms of job-years, which allows employment impacts of varying types to 
be compared directly. The creation of ten full-time jobs for one year would have an impact of ten job-years, as would 
the creation of twenty half-time jobs for one year or the creation of one full-time job for ten years. 
9.1.3 Jobs Impacts from Project Development 
The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed a series of Jobs and Economic Development Impact 
(JEDI) models (NREL, 2015), which provide employment impact estimates of discreet renewable energy projects or 
project portfolios, including solar PV. JEDI model outputs include direct, indirect, and induced labor and economic 
impacts. Induced labor impacts in these models only reflect increased spending that results from direct and indirect 
labor, not from customer energy savings or macroeconomic effects from subsidy payments. These models may be used 
to provide an estimate of total employment impacts due to solar project development and operation, though the 
models does not provide a complete picture of the employment impacts of solar development. 
Table 56 below summarizes the per-MW employment impacts of project development in Massachusetts found in the 
NREL JEDI model. The type—or more directly, size—of projects that are built as the Massachusetts solar market 
continues to develop will have an impact on the magnitude of employment impacts. Large amounts of smaller systems 
will have larger labor requirements, and therefore larger employment impacts, than a smaller number of larger projects 
that result in the same total installed capacity. 
Table 56: JEDI Job and Economic Impacts per MW from Solar Construction in Massachusetts 
  
Direct 
Impacts 
Indirect 
Impacts 
Induced 
Impacts 
Total 
Impacts 
Residential 
Retrofit 
Job-Years 12.6 13.9 8.6 35.1 
Economic 
Output 
$1,306,744 $2,601,706 $1,254,690 $5,163,140 
Residential 
New 
Construction 
Job-Years 13.1 12.3 7.5 33.0 
Economic 
Output 
$1,211,691 $2,349,393 $1,101,407 $4,662,491 
Small 
Commercial 
Job-Years 8.7 15.6 9.6 33.9 
Economic 
Output 
$1,258,112 $2,776,536 $1,416,989 $5,451,636 
Large 
Commercial 
Job-Years 8.3 10.2 6.9 25.4 
Economic 
Output 
$1,187,304 $1,562,838 $1,022,818 $3,772,960 
Utility 
Job-Years 5.2 4.9 3.7 13.8 
Economic 
Output 
$752,040 $726,279 $553,870 $2,032,189 
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Based on state data on projects participating in Massachusetts SREC I and SREC II programs (DOER, 2015), 728 MW of 
solar has come online in Massachusetts since 2008. Using the JEDI jobs factors above,80 this amount of solar 
development has created an estimated 14,762 total job-years in the state.81 
Table 57: Estimated Project-Related Employment Impacts from Massachusetts Solar Development to Date 
 
MW 
Installed 
Direct 
Job-Years 
Indirect 
Job-Years 
Induced 
Job-Years 
Total 
Job-Years 
Residential 97 1,230 1,356 836 3,422 
Small 
Commercial 26 224 403 249 876 
New Commercial 182 1,512 1,852 1,260 4,625 
Utility 423 2,178 2,077 1,584 5,839 
Total 728 5,145 5,688 3,929 14,762 
293 MW of statewide solar capacity was installed in 2014. Using the same jobs factors, these projects created an 
estimated 5,883 job-years through direct, indirect, and induced employment impacts.  
Critically, this analysis does not include potential wider economic impacts of solar development. For instance the overall 
cost of any SREC or other PBI payments to project owners would be a transfer of value from all ratepayers to specific 
system owners. The overall jobs impacts of these transfers would depend on how and if these benefits were spent in the 
Massachusetts economy. Similarly, reduced energy costs for individual utility customers from solar installations also 
result in benefits and costs flowing both to and from all ratepayers and specific solar system owners. Also solar 
installations create state-wide economic and job benefits in the form of reduced wholesale energy market prices and 
avoided environmental compliance costs, however the reduction of power purchases from these systems may create 
jobs impacts for non-solar power generators that may or may not be located in Massachusetts.  (The full range of 
potential economic costs and benefits of particular solar policy options is discussed elsewhere in this section). 
9.1.4 Effects of Policy Options on Jobs Impacts 
Solar policy choices will have dynamic effects on overall local job impacts. For instance, policies that favor smaller 
systems, with greater labor inputs are more likely to result in greater direct job impacts than policies that support large 
ground mounted systems with lower total labor input. That said, polices that support a higher proportion of smaller 
systems may result in higher overall incentive requirements, increasing the overall cost of a policy, creating negative 
induced job impacts as utility customers as a whole see increased charges resulting from higher incentive values. The 
balance of these costs and benefits would determine the overall net jobs created in a state by these policies.  
Additionally, other policy choices may favor the creation of in-state vs. out-of-state jobs. For instance, a number of 
states have implemented solar incentive policies designed to encourage installation of locally-manufactured solar 
                                                          
80
 This analysis assumes that non-residential projects smaller than 50 kW are small commercial projects, projects from 51 to 1000 
kW are large commercial projects, and projects over 1 MW are utility-scale projects. 
81
 Note that this number cannot be compared directly to the MassCEC’s and Solar Foundation’s estimates above, which are 
estimates of the number of workers employed in the solar industry at a given point in time rather than the estimated number of 
total direct, indirect, and induced job-years in Massachusetts that have been created as a result of solar development in the state. 
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components. One such policy was implemented by the MassCEC as part of the Commonwealth Solar program, where 
added incentives were provided for the use of Massachusetts-manufactured system parts. The net impact of these 
incentive adders, again, depends on the incremental costs of these incentives to ratepayers and the total number of jobs 
supported in-state by these incremental incentive costs. It may be difficult for states to create permanent in-state 
manufacturing jobs in the solar industry using these mechanisms as state-level markets may be insufficient to support 
manufacturing facilities that need to compete with global system component manufacturers.  
Finally, the flow of benefits both in and out of the state will depend on the nature of entities installing systems in the 
state. For instance, small local installer may have all their employees in-state, including system designers, sales staff and 
back-office employees. Policies that create market growth that supports these firms over larger national firms, with 
many of the above listed functions performed out-of-state, could lead to greater local job impacts. Again, this effect 
could be reduced if local firms have higher overall cost structures that require higher incentives, leading to greater 
overall policy costs to ratepayers. Some states, such as Delaware, have provided incentive adders for the use of in-state 
installation firms. The overall effects of these adders has not been analyzed and would require substantial 
macroeconomic analysis in order to determine whether these bonus incentives resulted in net job benefits.  
 
9.2 Resiliency Impacts   
Resilient solar, a term used to describe solar with off-grid capabilities, can provide services to both the host-customer, 
surrounding community and the grid. Cities across the United States have deployed resilient solar in their emergency 
planning processes. Community centers and critical infrastructure with resilient solar have continued to operate during 
emergencies, and business models have emerged using the value stream provided by ancillary services by these 
installation. This section highlights the benefits of resilient solar in several categories and the effects of these costs and 
benefits on customer generators and citizens of Massachusetts at large.  
9.2.1 Host Sites and Community Resilience  
In the event of an outage, resilient solar installations are able to provide long-term power supply for critical loads by 
leveraging a battery backup system. Many critical facilities in the community, such as hospitals and public safety 
facilities, already maintain backup generators that allow for continued, if limited, operations in the event of a power 
outage. However, in the event fuel is unable to be delivered, these diesel generators will only serve a host facility as long 
as there is available fuel supply. Resilient solar systems can be installed in tandem with existing backup generators to 
reduce fuel consumption, thereby increasing the total amount of time the facility can run disconnected from the grid.  
Recognizing this benefit, a number of local governments have pursued resilient solar installations for critical facilities. 
For instance, the City of Baltimore has integrated resilient solar into its Disaster Preparedness and Planning (DP3) for 
hospitals, shelters and other critical facilities in recognition of the unique benefits provided by resilient solar, while 
Boston has utilized off-grid solar along key evacuation routes as part of its emergency preparedness process. 
To date, efforts to quantify the impacts of the back-up capacity value of resilient solar at a large scale have been limited 
as the specific context of each installation is unique and dependent on local electricity market factors. For instance the 
incremental benefits of a resilient solar installation may be personally substantial for a homeowner with a system that is 
able to operate during a lengthy power outage; however, the economic value to both the homeowners and citizens of 
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the Commonwealth at large is difficult to quantify. Similarly, the cost and benefits of a resilient solar facility on a private-
sector property would depend on the likelihood of a number of factors including the potential economic losses from a 
power failure along with the likelihood that business operations could be sustained in the event of a local power failure, 
even if power to the facility is maintained.  
Critical community facilities with life and health safety obligations, such as hospitals, community shelters and public 
safety facilities may be appropriate sites for resilient solar installations as the consequences of power outages at these 
sites could include potentially life threatening situations. For these types of installations, the benefits of resilient solar 
installations accrue to both the facility owners and to the public at large as these sites can maintain operations that 
support their communities during an emergency. The full value of this benefit would be challenging to quantify for a 
range of reasons including the fact that many critical community facilities such as hospitals typically have backup 
generators that allow for limited off-grid operations, and that resilient solar installations provide redundancy to those 
already-existing systems.   
9.2.2 Ancillary Grid Services – Demand Response, Frequency Regulation and Increased Renewables Grid 
Integration Capacity 
Solar and wind are intermittent resources, and their electricity supplied to the grid can vary significantly based on short-
term weather conditions. Batteries lower this intermittency by providing power even if system output changes in 
response to changing weather conditions. Solar installations with battery backups create distributed generators which 
can behave as a dispatchable resource. Battery power can also be used to provide demand response at the host facility 
or to participate in frequency regulation markets if the installation has an inverter to distinguish between serving on-site 
load, the grid or critical loads. There is currently a 2.5 MW solar microgrid in Vermont with 4MW of storage, which 
participates in the frequency regulation market of ISO New England.  
These additional value streams may be a significant future driver for resilient solar installations. SolarCity, one of the 
largest PV installers in the United States, recently commented that they are regularly providing commercial customers 
affected by demand charges with financially viable project proposals that integrate battery backup systems (Wessoff, 
2015). As both solar and battery costs continue to decline, the deployment of cost-effective resilient solar installations 
that provide off-grid operational capacity along with other benefits could substantially change the Massachusetts PV 
market.   
The ancillary grid services provided by resilient solar installations can result in benefits for both customer generators and 
the citizens of Massachusetts at large. If customer generators are able to monetize a portion of the benefits described 
above, the system’s benefits may outweight the additional costs associated with resilient solar installations. Similarly, by 
providing grid support services such as demand response and frequency regulation capabilities, resilient solar may be 
able to provide grid services at a lower cost than could be provided by alternative sources. The full stream of costs and 
benefits and how they might accrue within the wider electricity market will likely be highly dynamic and dependent the 
specifics of how the electricity market in New England evolves over the coming years. Additionally, if policies provide 
additional incentives for resilient solar installations, any benefits which might accrue to the citizens of Massachusetts at 
large from these installations would be netted against the added costs associated with incentivizing these systems.  
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10 Sensitivity Analyses 
10.1 Sensitivity to Selected Class I RPS Carve-out Framework 
As discussed in Section 1.3, the results presented herein are based on an assumed 50%/50% weighting of the two 
bounding assumptions of solar PV substitution impact, displacing onshore wind in the event sufficient wind supply is 
developable to meet Class I RPS demand, and displacing natural gas in the event insufficient wind could be developed 
and the Class I RPS would fall short,  In this section, we test the sensitivity of the results to this assumption by calculating 
results based on either extreme.  Only two perspectives were impacted by this choice, NPR and C@L.  Impacts are 
volume-sensitive, not policy-sensitive.  The results of this sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 59.  As can be seen, the 
maximum variation in these assumptions can vary the total Benefits to each perspective of about NPV $$600 million. 
Figure 59: Framework Sensitivity Analysis Results  
 
 
10.2 Parametric Sensitivity Analyses 
As described in Section 4.1.3, a number of factors, or parameters, were developed or assumed for this analysis that are 
subject to a degree of uncertainty.  For each of the parameters described in Table 58, a ‘base’ assumption was 
developed, but in addition, the sensitivity of the results to variations in the selected assumption were also explored.  
Where data was available, the base parameters were developed based on available public sources and supplemental 
literature research.  For other assumptions, the base value represents an educated parametric estimate.  
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Table 58: Summary of Parameters used in Analysis 
 
To test the magnitude of impact of each parameter, a parametric sensitivity analysis was be conducted. Table 59 
summarizes the results of a +10% sensitivity analysis for each parameter for Policy Path A to 2500 MW (Uncapped).82 
The change in NPV (measured in $million) from the base case for each perspective is summarized in the table. The 
values in columns “C” represent the difference in NPV of costs and the values in columns “B” represent the difference in 
NPV of benefits from each perspective shown. A positive value indicates an increase in NPV from the base case, while a 
negative value indicates a reduction in NPV from the base case. During the parametric sensitivity analysis, only one 
parametric sensitivity was tested at a time , with all other assumptions held constant.  The value of a 10% parametric 
assumption analysis with a linear scalar input assumption is that it is easy to do the mental math to adjust the result to 
any level of variation.  For a purely illustrative example, if one believes that the percent of system installed costs should 
be 20% higher than the base assumption, one could double the result to understand the potential impact of varying this 
parameter. 
As shown below, a +10% sensitivity would not impact the cost side of the analysis for any of the four perspectives (not a 
surprise, as the calculation of benefits for these factors tends to be more uncertain then the more readily calculated 
benefits). Non-owner participants would also not be affected by the sensitivities. Increasing the fraction of solar PV 
monetizing its value in the FCM by 10% would increase the benefits to customer generators. Further, increasing any PV 
system cost parameters or the fraction of solar PV monetizing its value in the FCM by 10% would reduce the benefits to 
non-participating ratepayers, but increase the benefits to the Commonwealth at large. Lastly, higher electric investment 
impact parameters (except the scalar derating factor applied to distribution level energy losses avoided by solar PV) 
would result in greater benefits to both non-participating ratepayers and the C@L at the same rate. Increasing the scalar 
                                                          
82
 For one set of parameters, a figure different from 10% was selected: The two parameters related to Avoided Transmission 
Investment – Remote Wind were explored with alternative assumptions representing a larger spread based on a recent proprietary 
analysis performed by Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC. 
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derating factor applied to distribution level energy losses avoided by solar PV would, on the other hand, result in less 
benefits to those two perspectives. This analysis suggests that the parameters for which the benefit calculations are 
most sensitive include the percent of system installed costs assumed retained in state, and the percent of the aggregate 
return to debt and equity investors retained in state. 
Table 59: Parametric Sensitivities (Policy Path A to 2500 MW Uncapped), NPV Million $ 
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11 Fuel Use and Emission Reductions 
11.1 Fuel Usage Reductions 
Figure 60 and Figure 61 show the amount of natural gas, oil and coal displaced by 1600 MW and 2500 MW of solar 
capacity. In both cases, it is assumed that Massachusetts solar would displace natural gas until 2018. Starting from 2018, 
Figure 60 assumes solar would displace wind under RPS Class I in the absence of a solar carveout policy. Figure 61 
assumes solar would instead be displacing natural gas assuming there is not enough wind developed to meet the Class I 
compliance from 2018 onward. As shown in the graphs, the second framework would result in a larger fuel use 
reduction impact of solar. Interestingly, the deployment of 2500 MW of solar capacity would lead to a slight increase in 
oil use under the carveout-successful framework.  
Figure 60: Fuel Use Reductions under Carveout-Successful Framework  
 
Figure 61 – Reductions under Carveout Shortfall Framework 
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11.2 Emissions Reductions 
The following graphs represent the amount of NOX, SO2 and CO2 displaced by 1600 MW and 2500 MW of solar capacity. 
Both graphs assume Massachusetts solar would be displacing natural gas until 2018. After 2018, Figure 62 assumes solar 
would continue to displace RPS Class I compliance met by wind in the absence of a solar carveout policy. Figure 63 
assumes Massachusetts is unable to develop enough wind to meet its RPS Class I compliance starting 2018. As a result, 
Massachusetts solar would displace natural gas. As shown below, solar would have a greater emissions reduction impact 
under the second scenario.  
Figure 62: Emissions Reductions under Carveout-Successful Framework 
 
Figure 63: Emissions Reductions under Carveout Shortfall Framework 
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12 Conclusions and Key Take-Aways 
This section compares the quantified cost and benefit across policy scenarios, focusing on the 2500 MW scenarios.  It 
first provides some caveats when comparing results across policy scenarios and then with this context presents and 
compares the results. 
12.1 Comparison of Quantified Cost and Benefit Results across Policy Scenarios 
Table 60 through Table 62 presents the NPV of costs and benefits for each policy scenario. A benefit to cost (B:C) ratio is 
derived for each perspective under each policy scenario. The ratio illustrates the trade-off between the cost and benefit 
to a perspective under each policy. A ratio larger than 1 indicates that the benefit to the perspective is greater than the 
cost. The higher the ratio, the greater the benefit compared to the policy’s cost. The B:C ratio can help inform which 
policy scenario may be preferred by a perspective. Where multiple policy paths have similar B:C ratios for a particular 
perspective, a preference among may be driven by other objectives. 
In addition to the perspective-specific B:C ratio, another metric -  Net Benefits to Citizens at Large to Net Costs to Non-
Participating Ratepayers ratio (NB(C@L):NC(NPR)) ratio - is also derived for each policy scenario. While not a traditional 
cost and benefit analysis metric, contrasting the ratios across policy scenarios can quantitatively answer the question 
“which future justifies the subsidy paid by non-participating ratepayers with the greatest net benefits to the 
Commonwealth at large?” Together the B:C ratio and the NB(C@L):NC(NPR) ratio can be used to identify preferred 
policies from a benefit/cost perspective. All else being equal, the larger this ratio the stronger the justification the 
benefits to the Commonwealth justify additional burden on the NPRs.  As such, substantial B:C ratios and a high 
NB(C@L):NC(NPR) ratio can highlight preferred outcomes. It should be noted that while not all costs and benefits are 
quantified in this analysis, and there are other objectives (such as cost-effectiveness, jobs, diversity of installation types 
and beneficiaries) to weigh and balance, all else equal, the higher the ratio, the more preferable a policy is to the 
Commonwealth at large. 
12.1.1 Non-Owner Participants (NOPs)  
As shown below, the benefit to non-owner participants significantly increase under the alternative policies (to 2500 
MW) when net metering caps are removed. The B:C ratios for non-owner participants are 6.27 and 6.17 under Policy 
Path A (Uncapped) and Policy Path B (Uncapped) respectively. This significant shift is primarily driven by the availability 
of net metering incentives, which facilitates market participation by non-owners.   Without net metering incentives 
(capped scenario), non-host-owned models, such as Community Shared Solar and low-income housing projects with 
virtual net metering, would no longer be viable once the net metering caps are reached. Compared to the SREC policy, 
both alternative policy paths (when uncapped) provide greater support for Community Shared Solar and low-income 
housing projects as they are more competitive than smaller-scale projects within Sector A.  Between the two alternative 
policies, Policy A has the lower NPV of costs to NOPs. This is a result of a large share of Community Shared Solar and 
low-income housing projects, which drive down the tax costs to non-owner participants. Although Policy Path A 2500 
MW (Uncapped) has a lower NPV of benefits compared to Policy Path B, when balanced with the low NPV of cost, Policy 
Path A ends up with a slightly higher B:C ratio.  However, the Policy Path A and Policy Path B B:C ratios are similar 
enough that other factors not quantified in this analysis may swing non-owner participants’ preference.   
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12.1.2 Customer Generators 
Across all policy scenarios, SREC 
proves to be the most beneficial 
policy path for customer generators. 
The SREC (Capped) scenario has the 
highest B:C ratio (1.42) for customer 
generators among all cases. While 
moving away from SREC is shown to 
be less profitable for customer 
generators, the B:C ratios are still 
above 1 across all policy scenarios.   
Any of these policies are designed to 
provide enough gross margin to meet 
threshold returns; if it is modeled as 
built, then it is view as financially 
viable by the CG. 
Not surprisingly, the removal of net 
metering incentives under a capped 
scenario would lower the margins as 
shown across all policies. The B:C 
ratios, however, do not vary largely 
across capped and uncapped 
scenarios, which indicates that the 
existence of net metering is a much 
smaller factor to customer generators 
(in aggregate) than to non-owner 
participants (in aggregate).  
12.1.3 Non-Participating 
Ratepayers 
Non-participating ratepayers receive 
less than 1 B:C ratio across all policy 
scenarios. This is not surprising, as it 
simply demonstrates that there is a 
subsidy for solar, which is getting paid 
by non-participating ratepayers. 
When moving away from the SREC 
scenario, the B:C ratio increases. This 
is driven by both lower NPV of costs 
and higher NPV of benefits under the 
alternative policies. As reflected in 
Caveats for Result Interpretation 
Although the results contained in this report have been rigorously vetted, 
some caution should be taken in interpreting the results across different 
scenarios (i.e., Capped and Uncapped), and also across different Policy Path 
options (i.e., Policy Path A v. Policy Path B.).  Below are description of several 
major assumptions/modeling artifacts that can somewhat obfuscate such 
cross-comparison.  
 The modeling overstates the cost-effectiveness of Policy Path Uncapped 
future as is described in detail in Section 6.4.  
 Lack of Technical Capacity in Path A, Sector A-Large, Capped: This factor 
affects comparison of Path A and Path B Capped Scenarios, and 
comparison of Path A Capped and Uncapped scenarios.  Under Path A, 
Capped Sector A (without CSS and VNM LIH projects), simply does not 
have the technical potential to hit the originally planned 25% of 
aggregate program goal target.  In order to hit a 10% target, very high 
incentive levels (+$600/MWh, more than double Sector B, C, & MG), had 
to be initially set.  A different, lower target would lower comparative 
costs. 
 Lost Technical Capacity, as a Result of No Negative Bid Assumption:  
This factor affects comparison of Path A and Path B Capped Scenarios.  
Under Path A, the model assumes that a bidder cannot bid lower than 
the projected Levelized 15-yr value of Rate-Based Incentives (“Rate 
Values”). This means that, at a certain point (where marginal bid 
intersects with rate Values), projects in certain utilities are foreclosed 
from being able to effectively compete in the auction.  This in turn can 
distort results, as resource potential associated with supply curve ‘blocks’ 
in utilities with high retail per kWh rate values are “lost”, requiring the 
model to move further down the supply stack (increasing costs) to hit 
solicitation quotas. In reality, this “lost” technical capacity would likely 
simply migrate to another utility.   
 Volatility, Costs, and Interaction with Open-Enrollment v. Quota 
(Solicitation) Based Programs: Under the solicitation based program 
(Path A-Large), the number of MWs which successfully bid in each 
quarterly solicitation can be volatile.  This volatility is primarily a result of 
Failure Rates (which lend to needs for additional installs in subsequent 
years), as well as “Price is Right” type installation assumptions (which 
rolls any unsolicited MW into the next quarters solicitation). This in turn 
means that costs can actually increase quarter to quarter (even though 
COE is declining), as the EDC would have to move further up the supply 
curve to hit quotas.  In practice, such effects are likely to be more muted 
than the modeled results. Although the DBI/PBI and EPBI Programs also 
experiences volatility in MW installs quarter to quarter, because the 
these programs are not “quota” based (and incentives are fixed), this 
volatility does not have the same impacts on incentive costs that it does 
under the solicitation approach (i.e., Path A Large). 
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the NPV of costs, Policy Path A and Policy Path B require less non-participating ratepayer subsidy to build the same 
amount of solar than the SREC policies.  
Policy Path A (Uncapped) has the highest B:C ratio (0.75) across all alternative policy scenarios, followed by Policy Path B 
(Capped) (0.71), then Policy Path A (Capped)(0.69) and Policy Path B (Uncapped)(0.68). This outcome demonstrates 
Policy Path A’s ability to build the most cost-effective mix of projects when net metering is available. Without net 
metering, a larger share of residential and building-mount projects will dominate the market, increasing the per-unit 
cost to get solar built. This explains why Policy Path A (Capped) has the highest NPV of costs among the four alternative 
policy scenarios.  
The impact of net metering availability is reversed under Policy Path B. This is because a portion of Sector A allocation is 
redistributed to other more cost-effective sectors when community shared solar and virtual net metered low-income 
housing projects are no longer viable in the absence of net metering incentives (capped scenario). The cost to build solar 
is therefore lower under the capped scenario than under the uncapped scenario, while the NPV of benefits are similar 
for both the capped and uncapped scenarios.  
12.1.4 Citizens of the Commonwealth at Large 
The B:C ratios for the Commonwealth at large are similar across all policy scenarios, ranging between 2.3 and 2.7. Policy 
Path A (Capped) has the lowest ratio. This is a result of higher incentive costs and administrative fees driven by a larger 
market share of smaller and more expensive residential and building-mounted projects in the absence of net metering 
incentives. SREC policy has the highest NPV of benefits, although it is offset by a relatively high NPV of costs due to the 
high incentive required to build solar under the SREC program. The NPV of benefits are similar across the alternative 
policy scenarios. Since Policy Path B (Uncapped) has the lowest NPV of costs driven by a more cost-effective market 
share of solar installations, it has the highest B:C ratio and may be the preferred policy path for the Commonwealth at 
large perspective.  
Table 60: Quantified Cost and Benefit Results and Ratio by Perspectives: SREC  
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Table 61: Quantified Cost and Benefit Results and Ratio by Perspectives: Policy Path A  
      
Table 62: Quantified Cost and Benefit Results and Ratio by Perspectives: Policy Path B 
      
12.1.5 Comparing Policy Scenarios 
Among the six policy scenarios, Policy Path A (Uncapped) has the highest B:C ratios for two perspectives (non-owner 
participants and non-participating ratepayers).  Additionally, Policy Path A (Uncapped) also has the highest 
NB(C@L):NC(NPR) ratio (4.69) across all scenarios. This results from a relatively low NPV of costs to non-participating 
ratepayers driven by competitive solicitation with the support of net metering incentives. Following Policy Path A 
(Uncapped), Policy Path B (Capped) and Policy Path B (Uncapped) have the second and third highest NB(C@L):NC(NPR) 
ratios. The SREC (Capped) scenario has the lowest NB(C@L):NC(NPR) ratio among all six policy scenarios.  
We are hesitant to pick a preferred policy path for a number of reasons: 
1. As discussed above the modeling leads to some culling of some over-incented projects and thus improving the 
B:C ratios (again see Section 6.4) for the Policy Path A (Uncapped) which artificially improves its 
NB(C@L):NC(NPR) ratio compared to the other scenarios. 
2. All the other caveats described in the text box presented earlier in this section.   
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3. The foundation assumptions of each of the Policy Paths.  It is unclear how much Policy Path B or SREC-III would 
improve if they too only reimbursed VNM at the G rate.  
4. The qualitative factors that need to be taken into consideration. 
Nonetheless the modeling has brought into focus many implications of policies as presented throughout this report and 
next in the balance of Section 12. 
12.2 Key Takeaways & Observations 
Throughout the analysis, a list of key takeaways and observations have been identified that may guide interpretation of 
findings from this report.  
12.2.1 SREC Policy  
 Future policies should not be judged on the sunk costs of past policies – It is apparent from the cost and 
benefit analysis that SREC-I is much more costly than SREC-II or subsequent policies will and/or should be. Such 
cost should not be included in the determination of the impact of future polices as it would amplify the policy 
costs and distort the C:B metrics.  
 In-state spending and avoided capacity costs are important drivers to benefits of the Commonwealth at large 
– This is apparent from the parametric sensitivity analysis, which shows that increasing the share of local 
installed cost and O&M expenditures would significantly increase the benefits to the Commonwealth at large. 
The same conclusion can be drawn for avoided capacity costs.  
 T&D charges avoided by onsite generation and VNM charges are significant in all scenarios and it is 
understandable that the utilities are concerned about the impacts of the current incentive framework.  
 Virtual net metering is a very effective tool for supporting project and participant diversification – Virtual net 
metering allows lower cost projects, such as community shared solar and low-income housing, which can 
leverage economies of scale to be built. 
 There is not a huge difference in costs to NPRs vs. revenue to CGs under the current SREC program, 
nonetheless ultimate costs to NPRs could decrease significantly with LSEs participation in the auction.  
 In the uncapped scenarios, the DOER’s price demand response auction mechanism is at risk of being 
overwhelmed with growth and leaving SREC prices near the SACP for more than 2 years in a row.   
12.2.2 Policy Paths A and B 
 Solar growth can occur at lower margins in a no-SREC future – Current combination of SREC policy and net 
metering framework is providing large margins for a diverse array of project types and participants. From 
analysis of Policy Paths A and B, it is apparent that growth can still occur at lower margins. 
 Net metering and virtual net metering incentives are necessary to support more cost-effective project mix, 
but such incentives can be offered at a lower level – As mentioned in several occasions above, net metering 
caps will change the project mix dramatically to more onsite and less cost effective project mix as it will drive 
smaller onsite projects. Under capped scenarios, community shared solar and low-income housing projects, 
which rely on virtual net metering will no longer be viable once the current net metering cap is reached. It 
should be noted it is both feasible and economical to retain the net metering mechanism in order to allow for 
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virtually-net-metered projects, but at an incentive less than the current net metering credit rate (e.g. phasing 
down, or at retail generation only or at QF wholesale rates), as indicated by the results under Policy Path A 
(Uncapped).  
 Other objectives not quantified in the cost and benefit analysis may drive preference – While Policy Paths A 
and B show improved B:C metrics compared to the SREC policy, several policy futures have similar enough B:C 
ratios for particular perspectives that other objectives described in this report but are not quantified in the cost 
and benefit analysis, such as diversity of project types and beneficiaries, may drive preference.   
 
Finally, it is important to note that the result of non-participating ratepayers costs exceeding benefits over the 
entire time horizon since 2010 is largely driven by inclusion of the legacy programs, SREC-I and to a lesser 
degree SREC-II.  The subsequent programs – SREC-III, Policy Path A and Policy Path B, each are progressively 
more cost-effective than the legacy programs.  While the scope of the analysis did not allow for rolling up 
costs in this manner, inspection of the results suggests that part or all of these policies may have a B:C ratio 
near or exceeding 1.0, which would indicate any subsidies being offset by tangible internalized benefits.    
 
12.3 Limitations of this Analysis and Areas for Further Study 
Throughout the analysis, a number of issues that may be of interest to stakeholders but which fell outside the prescribed 
scope were identified. Listed here are additional analyses and research areas which might merit further study.  These 
issues fall under two categories:   
 Potential Sensitivity Analyses: These potential sensitivity analyses could be accomplished, with additional 
effort, using the approach and models used in this study, but with differing inputs.   
 Potential Extensions of Analysis: These potential extensions of the analysis would explore additional factors 
that were beyond the scope of this analysis 
12.3.1 Potential Additional Sensitivity Analysis  
Most input factors used in this analysis are projections subject to a degree of uncertainty.  For some, the potential 
variation is modest and the degree of uncertainty is not potentially material to the analysis.  Other exogenous factors 
may be subject to material uncertainty, and variations from the base assumptions used could yield different absolute 
and/or relative costs of benefits.  The following introduces several variables identified throughout the analysis as 
sensitivities of potential interest.    
12.3.1.1 Installed Cost Forecast 
A single installed cost forecast was used in this analysis.  Different costs would influence the Massachusetts solar supply 
curve and lead to different policy response and build-out, in absolute and possibly relative terms.  In addition, since 
various components of Policy Paths A and B are derived from the installed cost forecast, changing the forecast would 
yield different policy impacts. It is expected that different installed cost futures would affect the build-out rate for DBIs 
thereby changing the policy timeline (i.e. when the 2,500 MW installed capacity target is reached). Different installed 
cost futures would also translate to different SREC prices and clearing prices for competitive solicitations under Policy 
Path A.  A sensitivity varying the installed cost forecast could highlight the level of impact different solar cost futures 
have on each policy path.  
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12.3.1.2 Financing Costs 
Different financing cost assumptions were not included in this analysis as beyond the scope of this study. A sensitivity 
analysis using different financing cost assumptions could shed light on the impacts to the SREC policy and the alternative 
policy paths, such as required incentives, build-out rates, and project mix, under different market perspectives and 
expectations.  One are of interest identified but not fully explored is the potential convergence of the costs of financing 
under SREC policies compared to long-term PBI incentives under Policy Paths A and B.  As solar costs fall and the 
proportion of revenue dependent on SRECs relative to other revenue sources shrink, the impact of SREC price 
uncertainty on cost of capital would be expected to fall, potentially converging as cost premium shrinks. 
12.3.1.3 System Orientation  
Optimizing PV system orientation, such as the azimuth and tilt angle, could maximize the energy output and capacity of 
the representative PV fleets used in the analysis. Identifying maximum energy and maximum capacity fleets could 
maximize the benefits realized from solar PV, but the implication of different system orientations is uncertain without 
further research and study. As evidenced in the Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study, maximum energy and 
maximum capacity fleets could have higher avoided energy costs than fleets representing more diverse blends of PV 
resources. The study also shows that the maximum capacity fleet could allow greater transmission peak load reductions 
compared to other fleets. However, maximum energy and maximum capacity fleets overall do not result in higher value 
of solar when all cost components, including social costs, are considered (see Figure 64). (Clean Power Research, LLC; 
Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC; Perez Richard; Pace Law School Energy and Climate Center, 2015)   
Figure 64: Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study Fleet Production Profile Sensitivity (Central Maine Power) 
 
12.3.1.4 Retail Rate Design 
The results of this analysis presume no change to retail rate structures in Massachusetts, holding constant the 
proportion of total retail rates recovered through per kWh charges avoidable through on-site solar generation and net 
metered systems.  In addition, no minimum bill was assumed.  It was made clear by the Task Force that there is 
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significant interest among some stakeholders in shifting some portion of distribution rates from kWh charges to kW 
charges or customer charges, or implementation of minimum bill.  Task Force members agreed that this topic was best 
explored within a DPU-adjudicated venue.  Analysis could be performed with changes in retail rate structure along these 
lines, revealing their impact on the results include program costs and benefits from the perspectives of the various 
stakeholders.   
12.3.1.5 Exogenous Variables 
The values of some cost and benefit components are dependent on future wholesale or retail rate trajectories, the value 
of capacity the FCM market, and the impact of current and future carbon regulation impact on energy market locational 
marginal prices, to name a few.  Sensitivity analysis could be performed on these exogenous variables to explore their 
potential impact on the costs and benefits from the perspectives of the various stakeholders.   
12.3.1.6 Alternative Role of Municipal Light Plants 
This study assumed that Municipal Light Plants participate in the Policy Path A and B programs in the same manner as 
investor-owned EDCs.  If MLP-located projects were ineligible, or MLPs did not offer analogous NM policies to those 
offered by EDCs, then the results would differ.  
12.3.1.7 Consider the Impact of ITC Qualification Risk  
This study ignored the potential impact on project developers of Federal ITC qualification peril at the ITC’s incentive cliff on January 
2017. In practice, projects that are exposed to completion and interconnection risk (risk of not interconnecting by this date) are 
likely to forego pursuit of their projects.  While this study analyzed the expected installation and interconnection delays, it did not 
reflect developer and investor aversion to this risk, which is likely to cause them to leave an ample margin of error and forego 
pursuit of projects forecasted in this study to proceed that were at risk of missing the deadline due to potential variation in project 
timelines. A sensitivity analysis could explore this potential phenomenon, which would likely reveal a slower buildout than shown 
herein. 
12.3.1.8 Variations in Detailed Design of Policy Paths A and B 
This analysis revealed some design nuances within Policy Paths A and B which might in retrospect be defined differently to drive 
more optimal results.  Additional analysis might consider altering some design features to examine the impacts on benefits and 
costs, possibly resulting in more optimal policy design.  One example might be to allocate fewer MW to the Sector A large segments 
under Policy Paths A and B in the event that net metering is capped.  Another might be relaxing the modeling constraints on Paths A 
to allow bids below levelized retail rate value. 
12.3.2 Potential Extensions of Analysis 
Several areas of interest for potential further study were identified throughout the analysis, including those discussed 
below. 
12.3.2.1 Macroeconomic Analysis 
All industry experience suggests that competitive procurements could alter market diversity, which in turn can impact 
the fraction of customer-generator revenue that is ultimately retained in state. The impact of different policy designs on 
the distribution of in-state versus out-of-state solar ownership and investment, hence cash flow within and outside of 
state, was only explored parametrically in this study but warrants further analysis. Further, an input-output model could 
shed light on the induced economic impacts (both positive and negative) and net job creation benefits among different 
policy options, which are not indicated in this analysis.   
12.3.2.2 Refinement of Analysis Cost and Benefit Rollup 
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The scope of this study required tallying costs and benefits of the current and future policies across their durations, commencing in 
2010 with SREC-I.  The results make clear that successive solar policies following SREC-I are progressively more cost-effective, 
providing reduced level of incentive support and subsidy, and increasing relative benefits.  The total costs and benefits incorporate 
the common, past and projected impacts of solar installed through committed ‘legacy’ programs (SREC-I and SREC-II up until the 
point at which future policy paths may diverge).  If the analysis were to instead (or in addition) tally just the costs and benefits of 
future policies beyond the point of common legacy commitments, the differences in benefit:cost ratios from the various 
perspectives would likely be more stark, and it is possible that from the NPR perspective, the B:C ratios cold approach or surpass 1.0.  
The analysis framework unfortunately masks this potentially important result, but this information could be calculated with 
additional effort.    
12.3.2.3 Targeted Solar Incentives to Desirable Solar Locations  
Targeted incentives to support solar PV projects that support or benefit the Distribution system were not considered in this analysis.  
Analysis could be performed to examine the relative costs and benefits of either encouraging location of projects at desirable points 
on the EDC’s distribution systems (potentially requiring substantial engineering analysis on the part of EDCs)   
12.3.2.4 Consider Distribution System Saturation  
In this analysis, distribution system saturation was not studies or assumed.  However, in practice, certain areas of the 
EDC systems are likely to experience a degree of saturation leading to much higher interconnection costs.  Additional 
analysis of distribution system saturation could be performed to more accurately reflect the likelihood of somewhat 
higher interconnection costs or diminishing numbers of locations where solar is economically attractive to build.  
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Errata 1 and 2 
 
ERRATA 1: the calculations in the April 27, 2015 final report, and the, cost and benefit Roll-Up Master spreadsheet 
distributed to Task Force members, erroneously included both a fixed 33% peak reduction factor for the two T&D 
investment deferral line-items shown below, as well as the correct Distribution-Level Peak Load Reduction values.  In 
other words, the reductions to impact to take account of solar PV’s peak coincidence were applied twice.   
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 
These were the only components of the analysis that were calculated under a distinct analysis and then transferred into 
the rollup.  The result is that the benefits calculated for both of these benefits were reports as 1/3 of what they should 
have been.  The impact on the total benefit:cost metrics are small; the revised metrics as initially presented in the 
executive summary (Tables 1 and 2) and Section 12 (Tables 27 – 29) of the report, are shown below.  The only changes 
increase the NPR and C@L benefits to a modest degree.   
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ERRATA 2: The values appearing in the detailed cost and benefit components for Avoided Transmission Investment and 
Avoided Distribution Investment – Local, in the roll-up master spreadsheet provided to task force members, were 
reversed.  The total costs and benefits are unaffected by correction of this reversal, as impacts affecting the same 
perspectives were simply placed in the wrong rows.   
An amended roll-up spreadsheet is provided along with this Errata Report, with totals appearing in the correct rows. 
Referring to the earlier roll-up master spreadsheet provided to Task Force members, the reader may for each of these 
tables simply read the figures labeled as  
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 
to be  
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 
and vice versa. 
 
ERRATA 3: The same two benefit component line items were omitted from the cost and benefit component detail tables 
appearing in Section 8 and Appendix B of the Task 3 report.  These line items only impact the NPR and C@L perspectives 
as benefits.   
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 
This issue only occurred in extracting the values from models for creating report tables in Section 6 and Appendix B.  The 
correct totals of benefits and costs were used in deriving all totals used in calculating benefit to cost ratios throughout 
the report. 
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Tables 21 and 22 from the Task 3 Report are also in error and the corrections appear here.  A corrected Appendix B is 
also provided below. 
Table 2163: Comparing NPR Detailed Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped (ERRATA) 
 
Table 22: Comparing C@L Detailed Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped (ERRATA) 
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1 Introduction and Summary 
In order to conduct the modeling in Task 3, the Task Force first had to select the potential futures, or 
“policy paths”, to be modeled. To make this selection, the Task Force used the following process. Based 
on the research conducted in Tasks 1 and 2, stakeholder objectives as expressed in the focus groups 
conducted in Task 0, and public comment, the consulting team developed an initial set of 7 potential 
policy paths.  These paths were discussed at the Task Force meeting on February 12, 2015. After the 
meeting, additional Task Force feedback on the paths was solicited through a survey, and a narrowed 
set of 3 options was presented to the Task Force on March 5, 2015.  At that meeting, the Task Force 
modified the options and selected the set to be modeled.  
In selecting these policy paths, the Task Force members made an explicit distinction between selecting 
paths for modeling and selecting paths for potential implementation.  For the modeling exercise, the 
Task Force’s objective was to choose paths for which the modeling would generate useful information. 
The selection of a path for modeling is not an indication that a majority, or indeed any, of the Task Force 
members would like to see that path implemented. 
2 Initial Set of Policy Path Options 
Based on the research conducted in Tasks 1 and 2, stakeholder objectives as expressed in the focus 
groups conducted in Task 0, and public comment, the consulting team developed an initial set of 7 
potential policy paths.  These paths were each described along the dimensions listed in the table below. 
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Table 64. Dimensions 
Dimension Description 
Solar - Small 
Treatment of small solar, including structure of incentive (e.g., 
rebate or performance based incentive), and process for 
awarding incentive (e.g., first-come-first-served or competitive 
solicitation) 
Solar - Large 
Treatment of large solar, including structure of incentive (e.g., 
rebate or performance based incentive), and process for 
awarding incentive (e.g., first-come-first-served or competitive 
solicitation) 
Distribution 
Mechanisms for allocating support for solar, e.g., targeting by 
geography or system type 
Net metering Rules for net metering for solar generation up to on-site load 
Virtual net metering 
Rules for net metering for solar generation in excess of on-site 
load 
Net metering caps and 
timing of transitions 
Whether to keep, extend, or remove net metering caps; timing 
of transition to new incentive structure 
Targets/constraints Whether targets are based on a MW goal or a budget 
Quantity target/timeline Program MW target and timeline (e.g., 1600 MW by 2020) 
Using these dimensions, the consulting team developed seven potential policy paths for presentation to 
the Task Force.  Each path was designed to prioritize an objectives identified by one of the Task Force 
members and was based on an incentive system in place in another state.  The paths are summarized in 
the Table below.  They are described in detail in the PowerPoint presentation delivered to the Task 
Force on February 12, 2015. 
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Table 65. Initial Set of Policy Paths 
Policy Path Description Analog 
1. SREC Program 
Modifications including 
Long-Term Contracting Pilot 
Keep the current incentive model but make 
adjustments that reduce costs while 
maintaining benefits 
MA SREC-II Program, NJ PSE&G 
loan program, proposed 
National Grid SREC pilot (2013) 
2. Competitive Solicitations 
Incentives set based on results of regular 
competitive solicitation to ensure only the 
most cost effective installations are built, 
minimizing ratepayer impacts 
RI Renewable Energy Growth, CT 
ZREC 
3. Orderly Market Evolution 
Offer declining block incentive (DBI) to create 
market certainty and lower cost of financing 
while transitioning away from state 
incentives 
CA Solar Incentive (CSI), NY 
Megawatt Block Program 
4. Sustained Growth 
Adapting to Market Changes 
Incentives rates automatically adjust (up or 
down) to market conditions through volume-
based price setting 
CA Renewable Market Adjusting 
Tariff (ReMAT)  
5. Maximize federal 
incentives w/ Managed 
Growth Boost  + Sustainable 
Growth 
Incentives rates automatically adjust (up or 
down) to market conditions through volume-
based price setting 
Add tailored incentive for “managed growth” 
sector to capture max federal incentives 
before 2017 
CA Renewable Market Adjusting 
Tariff (ReMAT)  
6. Prioritize Distribution 
System 
Target PV to support & enhance needs of the 
distribution system 
Max system owners contributions the 
distribution system 
Hybrid w/ CT ZREC budget 
approach 
7. Maximize Installed MW 
within Defined Budget 
 
Apply measures to drive down cost premium, 
while limiting outlays to preset budget 
CT ZREC; RI DG Growth Program 
3 Survey of Task Force Members 
In order to gather further input from the Task Force members, they were issued an online survey.  The 
survey asked the Task Force members to indicate the policy path they most wanted to see modeled, 
either by selecting one of the paths presented at the February 12 meeting or by creating their own 
policy path.  The survey also asked the Task Force members to provide their opinions about some of the 
individual potential policy elements.  
The survey responses provided useful insight into the preferences of the Task Force members. The 
survey responses regarding the preferred policy path are set out in table below.  Additional detail 
regarding the survey responses is available in the PowerPoint presentation delivered to the Task Force 
on March 5, 2015. 
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Table 66. Policy Path Preferences in Survey Responses 
Defined Paths Combination Paths 
Path Responses Path Responses 
1. SREC Program Modifications incl. LT 
Contracting Pilot  
0 
2. Competitive Solicitations + 
4. Sustained Market Growth 
1 
2. Competitive Solicitations 1 
3. Orderly Market Evolution + 
4. Sustained Growth Adapting to Market 
Changes 
5 
3. Orderly Market Evolution 2 
2. Competitive Solicitations + 
3. Orderly Market Evolution 
1 
4. Sustained Growth Adapting to Market 
Changes 
1 
2. Competitive Solicitation + 
6. Prioritize Distribution System 
1 
5. Maximize federal incentives w/ Managed 
Growth Boost  + Sustainable Growth 
1 
Other: Competitive process with defined 
budget 
1 
6. Prioritize Distribution System 0   
7. Maximize Installed MW within Defined 
Budget 
0 
  
No opinion 1   
 
4 Final Set of Policy Paths for Modeling 
The consulting team used the survey responses to develop a revised set of three policy paths for the 
Task Force to consider at its meeting of March 5, 2015.  Through discussion at the meeting, the Task 
Force members distilled those options into two policy paths for modeling. Those paths are set out in the 
table below. 
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Table 67. Initial Set of Policy Paths 
Dimension 
Path A.  EDC-Centric: Competitive 
Solicitations 
Path B. Open 
Solar – Small: type Performance-Based Incentive 
Expected-Performance-Based 
Incentive 
Solar – Small: Setting 
Declining-Block Incentive with safety 
valve 
Declining-Block Incentive with safety 
valve 
Solar – Large: type Performance-Based Incentive Performance-Based Incentive 
Solar – Large: Setting Competitive solicitation 
Declining-Block Incentive with safety 
valve  
Geographic distribution 
Solar (not NM) incentives vary by EDC but MW are a statewide block with ex-post 
$ reconciliation between EDCs to equalize cost impact 
Differentiation by market 
sector 
Based on SREC-II 
Sized-to-Load Net Metering 
(rate applicable to billing 
period roll-forward)  
G rate 
Current components of retail rate 
VNM Credit Structure 
(applicable to net excess 
after roll-forward) 
W/S rate 
Current framework and rates 
VNM Project type limitations n/a n/a 
VNM size limitation n/a Keep current 
NM Caps 
Variations: (A-i) No Caps; (A-ii) Current 
Caps 
Variations: (B-i) No Caps; (B-ii) Align to 
match reaching 1,600 MW target 
Timing of solar transition 1/1/17 Once 1600 MW reached 
Targets and timeline 
Set targets ramping up to 2500 by 2025 
(proxy for possible ‘budget-limited’ 
approach)  
2500 MW with no hard timeline; 
calibrate modeled incentives to match 
2500 by 2025 as best possible 
Minimum bill n/a 
Disposition of RECs Assume RECs minted as Class I and resold into market  
These policy paths were used for the modeling performed in Task 3. 
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1 Executive Summary 
A utility minimum bill policy was proposed in 2014 as part of a legislative package to modify the current Massachusetts 
net metering policy. Minimum bills have been implemented in a number of U.S. jurisdictions as a mechanism to recover 
costs from utility customers with either low monthly consumption or onsite generation. These mechanisms have been 
designed to ensure a minimum customer contribution from all ratepayers and to reduce the potential impacts of 
customer cross-subsidization. Minimum bills may differ from other bill mechanisms such as customer charges and 
demand charges in that they can be designed to only impact a limited segment of utility customers, leaving rates and 
charges for customers who regularly exceed the minimum bill unaltered.  
This report reviews the theory behind the minimum bill mechanism, evaluates the impact of minimum bills in other 
states and models the potential impact of a minimum bill on a representative PV system in Massachusetts. Key findings 
include:  
 Residential minimum bills that have been implemented in other states have, to date, been relatively 
modest, ranging from $1.77 per month in one California jurisdiction to $25 per month for large 
customers of one Hawaii utility. 
 Minimum bills have been implemented in some of the most robust solar markets in the country, 
suggesting that these mechanisms, at the rates implemented, are not fundamentally incompatible 
with PV market growth. Where implemented, these bill provisions have typically preceded solar 
market expansion, in some cases by several decades.  
 Cash flow modeling of a Massachusetts residential PV system shows that the impact of a minimum bill 
policy will vary significantly based on the size of the PV system relative to the annual load of a home 
and the minimum bill level.  
 Modeling also indicates that fixed minimum bills could have a greater impact on lower consumption 
utility customers compared to customers with average consumption assuming both are subject to the 
same minimum bill charge.83 
The next section of this report discusses the theory behind minimum bill policies and provides background information 
on how net metering charges are recovered by Massachusetts utilities. The third section of this report reviews minimum 
bill policies in other U.S. states. Section 4 of this report reviews the results of a cash flow model that examined the 
impacts of multiple potential minimum bill rates on a representative PV system.    
2 Minimum Bill Introduction and Background 
Minimum bill policies have recently been discussed in a number of U.S. jurisdictions as a tool for electric utilities to 
recover costs from customers using the distribution system but with low net consumption. In part spurred by net 
metering customers with distributed generation that can significantly reduce monthly bills, these policies have been 
proposed as a mechanism to reduce both utility lost revenue and ratepayer cross-subsidization associated with net 
metering. Typically, this mechanism has been proposed as an alternative to other fixed cost recovery mechanisms such 
as increased customer charges.   
Minimum bills (sometimes referred to as minimum bill charges, minimum charges, or minimum monthly contributions) 
as defined by the Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) are charges that set a billing threshold under which a customer’s 
monthly bill cannot be further reduced through the application of net metering credits or consumption reductions. After 
                                                          
83
 The minimum bill modeled under this analysis was based on minimum bill structures implemented in other states. New and 
innovative minimum bill designs could be developed in order to address specific concerns related to equity impacts.  
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establishing a minimum bill threshold, ratepayers whose bills exceed this value see no increased costs or changes in 
their bill. Ratepayers whose monthly bills are below the minimum bill threshold are required to pay the dollar value of 
the threshold. This mechanism ensures electric distribution companies a minimum revenue per customer per month 
(Lazar, 2014). Minimum bills as defined in this report differ from traditional fixed customer charges in that they only 
affect low usage customers whose monthly consumption is below the minimum bill threshold while other customers 
whose monthly bills exceed the threshold value see no change in either their monthly bill or the ratio of costs recovered 
through fixed and volumetric charges. Notably, the use of minimum bills as a potential mechanism to address utility cost 
recovery issues related to distributed generation is a relatively new area of national discussion and a range of minimum 
bill structures could potentially be developed including innovative designs that differentiate minimum bill levels based 
on customer load.     
2.1 Net Metering, Volumetric Rates and Utility Cost Recovery 
Volumetric rates traditionally have been used to recover both variable costs (e.g., electricity supply) as well as portion of 
a utility’s fixed costs (e.g., distribution system investments) for residential and small commercial customers. Figure 65 
below shows a simplified breakdown of cost recovery components for a hypothetical utility residential rate. As the 
diagram shows, both fixed cost and variable-cost components are recovered through volumetric charges while a smaller 
portion of the total costs are recovered through fixed monthly customer charges.  
Figure 65. Generic Residential Rate Design Example
84
 
 
The recovery of fixed utility costs through volumetric rates (as opposed to demand-based rates or fixed charges) 
promotes energy conservation while eliminating the need for more advanced metering equipment and complicated rate 
designs. However, recovering fixed costs through volumetric rates allows low-usage customers to pay less of the fixed 
cost of service associated with their consumption.  This can cause distribution system costs to disproportionately shift 
from lower-usage ratepayers to the remaining ratepayers (PG&E, 2014). As the number of solar net metering customers 
increases across the country, public utility commissions, solar advocates, utilities and others are working to balance the 
benefits and costs of distributed generation in the context of existing volumetric rate designs which can shift fixed 
distribution system costs to customers without net metered systems.  
As a counter to this view, some solar advocates have argued that shifting of utility system costs between ratepayers 
within a rate class or between rate classes is not unique to net metering and that cost shifts between customer types 
that further public policy goals have a well-established history of broad-based support. In many states, charges related 
to energy efficiency, renewable energy and low-income programs shift costs and benefits between participating and 
non-participating ratepayers. These cost shifts have been deemed acceptable by legislators and regulators as furthering 
broader public policy goals (Kennerly, Wright, Laurent, Rickerson, & Proudlove, 2014). 
In focus group sessions conducted as part of Task 1 some stakeholders expressed the view that current net metering 
policies created cost shifts between ratepayers that require either new rate structures or the implementation of a 
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 In this figure “Energy” refers to a per kWh charge as opposed to an energy supply charge.  
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minimum bill policy. Other stakeholders said that new approaches to net metering are not needed and that costs 
associated with current rate structures are acceptable given the public policy goals that net metering rates support.  
In addition to reducing cost shifting between net metering and non-net metering customers, minimum bills can also be 
used as a mechanism to reduce utility lost revenue due to customer on-site generation. This feature of a minimum bill 
threshold policy is less relevant in Massachusetts as each of the state’s investor owned utilities has existing cost 
recovery mechanisms that enable recovery of lost revenues associated with net metering.  
A minimum monthly contribution mechanism was introduced as part of the draft legislation negotiated between some 
members of the solar stakeholder community and the Massachusetts investor owned utilities during the final months of 
the 2014 legislative session. Section 94J of H 4185 defined a minimum bill as:  
For all rate classes of each distribution company, the [Department of Public Utilities] shall review and 
approve a minimum monthly contribution to be included on a customer’s total bill that ensures each 
customer contributes each month a reasonable amount toward the costs of the electric distribution system 
that are not caused by volumetric consumption. Minimum monthly contributions may differ by rate class 
and by amount of customer load within each rate class. The [Department of Public Utilities] may exempt or 
modify the minimum monthly contribution for the low income rate class (Massachusetts General Court, 
2014).  
Similarly, the proposed legislation included language in the same section that required the minimum bill 
contribution to be applicable to all customers within a rate class regardless of whether or not they owned 
renewable energy facilities:  
The [Department of Public Utilities] shall ensure that any minimum monthly contributions approved in a 
revenue neutral rate design filing are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner so that customers with 
renewable energy generating facilities are subject to the same monthly contributions as customers who do 
not have onsite renewable energy generating facilities (Massachusetts General Court, 2014). 
2.2 Minimum Bills vs. Increased Customer Charges 
One potential mechanism to reduce cost shifts associated with low-demand customers and volumetric rates is to 
increase fixed monthly customer charges while lowering volumetric charges in a revenue neutral fashion. This approach 
would allow utilities to recover their fixed distribution system costs through fixed rates that are likely better aligned with 
the costs of serving customers than variable rates. There are, however, several potential drawbacks to this approach 
that run counter to well established public policy goals. For instance, reducing volumetric charges while increasing fixed 
charges reduces a customer’s economic incentive to conserve energy, and so may drive increased energy consumption 
(Lazar, 2014). Additionally, increasing traditional fixed charges that apply to all customers within a rate class will likely 
disproportionately impact low-use, lower income customers (CPUC, 2014).  
Alternatively, minimum bills overcome one of these challenges by leaving volumetric kWh prices unaltered, while 
increasing charges on a small subset of ratepayers whose consumption does not meet the minimum bill threshold. This 
mechanism may, however, result in bill increases for low income customers with limited electricity consumption. For 
this reason, establishing a minimum bill threshold that does not create unintended adverse effects for low income 
customers may require careful consideration of the appropriate rates or specific exemptions for those customers.  
Adapted from methodology found in Lazar 2014, Table 1 below shows the total cost for different customer consumption 
levels for three hypothetical rate structures. The first scenario in the table is a reference case with a low customer 
charge and higher kWh electricity charge. The second scenario illustrates an increased customer charge applied to all 
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ratepayers with a reduced per kWh charge. The third example is a minimum bill charge set at $20 per month with a 
small reduction in per kWh charges. For each of these cases, the total costs recovered from customers is identical.   
Table 68. Comparison of residential fixed cost recovery scenarios85 
 
kWh 
Consumption 
Low Customer 
Charge 
High Customer 
Charge 
Minimum Bill 
Charge 
Customer Charge  $5 $20 $5 
Minimum Bill    $20 
Per-kWh Charge  $0.10 $0.0802 $0.096 
Customer 
Consumption 
10 $6.00 $20.80 $20.00 
100 $15.00 $28.02 $20.00 
200 $25.00  $36.05  $24.27  
500 $55.00  $60.11  $53.17  
1,000 $105.00  $100.23  $101.35  
1,500 $155.00  $140.34  $149.52  
2,000 $205.00  $180.45  $197.69  
Total Costs Recovered $566.00  $566.00  $566.00  
Under the high customer charge scenario, all customers in the low consumption tiers pay higher monthly bills while 
high-use customers pay substantially lower monthly bills. Under the minimum bill scenario, monthly bills for customers 
with the lowest usage increase compared to the low customer charge case, but other customers see a modest cost 
reduction resulting from slightly reduced volumetric charges. This example illustrates how a minimum bill mechanism 
can be applied to increase cost recovery from very low consumption consumers without increasing costs for other 
customers or significantly reducing volumetric charges. This case also illustrates the challenge of calibrating a minimum 
bill threshold so as not to unduly impact low income customers. In the example, the two lowest-tier consumption 
customers (10kWh and 100kWh)86 see higher bills under the minimum bill scenario compared to the reference scenario, 
but the third lowest consumption tier (200kWh) sees a slight bill reduction compared to the reference case.  
2.3 Net Metering in Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, customer generators have the ability to reduce their utility bills either through installation of on-site 
generators or through the application of net metering credits from off-site generators (aka., virtual net metering). Net 
metering credits applied to customer bills can reduce utility bills significantly and customers have the ability to roll over 
the monetary value of excess credits for use in future billing periods. These bill credits can be used to offset all bill 
charges including demand charges, customer charges and other costs, allowing customers to pay their entire monthly 
bills through the application of net metering credits (Massachusetts DOER).  
Investor owned utilities (IOUs) in Massachusetts recover their allowed base revenue, including lost revenue associated 
with customer net metering (for both on-site net metering and virtual net metering) through either a Revenue 
Decoupling Mechanism (RDM) or through a Net Metering Recovery Surcharge (NMRS).87 RDMs establish a fixed annual 
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 Adapted from Lazar 2014. The numbers in this example are for illustrative purposes only and may not be reflective of specific 
conditions in Massachusetts.  
86
 For reference, the average National Grid residential customers uses around 600 kWh per month. Few customers are likely to have 
consumption in the 10 to 100 kWh per month range.  
87
 Unitil, WMECO and NSTAR recover net metering-related revenues through a NMRS, while National Grid recovers its net-metering 
related lost revenue through its RDM.  WMECO, National Grid, and Unitil are decoupled, and therefore recover their annual target 
revenue on a reconciling basis; these companies are therefore not negatively impacted by lost sales from increased distributed 
generation.  Currently, NSTAR Electric is not decoupled, and so does not recover lost distribution revenue from reduced sales due to 
increased distributed generation.   
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revenue requirement for a utility and allow the utility to recover those revenues through an adjusting per kWh charge 
that increases or decreases with changes in customer consumption and other factors.88 This mechanism is intended to 
make utilities indifferent to the customer activities that may either increase or reduce consumption such as energy 
conservation measure installation, on-site generation or electric vehicle adoption.  Recovery of net-metering related lost 
revenue is one of many components associated with this charge. NMRSs are a more proscribed charge that allows a 
utility to recover lost revenue and other costs associated with providing net metering service through an incremental 
charge on all kWh sales in their territory. In Massachusetts, both these revenue recovery mechanisms are regulated by 
the DPU and reconciled on an annual basis. National Grid currently uses a RDM mechanism to recover its net metering 
associated lost revenues. WMECO and Unitil use a combination of NMRSs and RDMs to recover their net metering costs 
and lost revenues. NSTAR exclusively uses an NMRS for net metering cost recovery.  
Over the past several years, as more customers have taken advantage of net metering, these RDM and NMRS charges 
have increased to allow utilities to recover the increasing loss of revenue associated with distributed generation growth. 
Table 2 below shows the most recent effective NMRS and RDMs for residential customers of the Massachusetts investor 
owned utilities. Total aggregate distribution charges are listed as well for reference. As noted above, net metering 
associated costs contribute to RDM charges, however RDMs are structured to recover costs from a much broader range 
of utility activities than just net metering. 
Table 69. Current NMRS and RDM rates for Massachusetts IOUs89 
Utility Territory 
Current 
Residential 
NMRS per kWh 
Current 
Residential 
RDM per kWh 
Current Total 
Residential  
Distribution 
Charge (First 
Block) per kWh 
Eversource - Western Mass Electric Company $0.00172 $(0.00280) $0.04006 
Fitchburg Gas & Electric (d/b/a  Unitil) $0.00199 $0.00638 $0.11220 
Eversource – NSTAR BECO $0.00200 N/A $0.08287 
Eversource – NSTAR Cambridge Electric $0.00360 N/A $0.08196 
Eversource – NSTAR Commonwealth Electric $0.00199 N/A $ 0.09280 
National Grid N/A $0.0006990 $0.07161 
These revenue recovery mechanisms protect Massachusetts utilities from lost revenues associated with net metering, 
eliminating one barrier to wider adoption of customer-sited generation. Under its current structure, net metering does, 
however, create distributional effects between net metering customers and non-net metering customers. For instance, 
as part of its 2015 NMRS request, NSTAR requested to recover $30.8 million in costs associated with net metering. As 
per NSTAR’s net metering tariff, this value includes:  
(1) The value of any net metering credits paid to customers the previous year; 
(2) Lost distribution revenue associated with on-site power consumption by net metered customers; 
(3) The total amount under-recovered costs during the previous year under the NMRS mechanism. 
These costs are reduced by revenues received by NSTAR for power sold into the ISO-NE market from Class II and III net 
metering generators.  
                                                          
88
 NMRSs can also be used to provide credits back to customers in the event utilities over-recover their costs in a given year.  
89
 (WMECO, 2015), (Unitil, 2015), (National Grid, 2014) 
90
  This rate includes a portion of National Grid’s Capital Expense tracker, the reconciliation of the prior year’s RDM balance, along 
with any effects on billed revenue from the economy and/or weather, which is more than simply lost revenue and net metering 
credits for the prior calendar year. 
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Recent filings by National Grid as part of their annual RDM filings indicated that $40.1 million in net metering credits 
were provided to customers in 2014 while $12.2 million was recovered through sales of electricity to ISO-NE from Class II 
and Class II net metered generators. As of this writing, the cost associated with lost distribution revenues from displaced 
customer consumption has not been published (National Grid, 2015). 
Recovery of these charges represents a cost to non-participating ratepayers and a benefit to customer generators. 
Under these cost/revenue recovery models, as participation in net metering increases over time, the shift in costs 
associated with net metering will increase.  
Some analysts have argued in other states that net metered customers provide additional benefits to the utility system 
that benefit non-participating customers and that are not monetized in simplified net metering cost recovery 
frameworks. Potential benefits that are not accounted for in the Massachusetts NMRS model could include avoided 
transmission and distribution investments. If these avoided utility costs were integrated into the NMRS cost recovery 
framework, total recoverable net metering costs could be lower. In theory and over the long term, the costs avoided by 
the installation of customer-sited generation are accounted for by a RDM where any avoided costs to the distribution 
system associated from customer generators would result in lower applicable RDM charges. The total net change in a 
RDM charge due to integration of customer-sited generation, however, would include a range of both costs and 
benefits, meaning the net effect on these charges could be either an increase or a decrease in rates depending on the 
magnitude of the applicable system costs and benefits.      
3 Minimum Bill Policies in Other States 
A number of other states have either implemented or are actively exploring implementing minimum bill mechanisms. To 
date, the policies that have been implemented have included relatively modest minimum bills, ranging from $1.77 per 
month in one California utility territory to up to $25 per month in Hawaii.91 These states have some of the most robust 
solar markets in the United States, suggesting that minimum bills, as implemented, are not fundamentally incompatible 
with solar market development. The following section reviews experiences in these and other states. 
3.1  Minimum Bill Policies in California 
California’s investor owned utilities have small, longstanding minimum bill rates. Similarly, several California municipal 
utilities have implemented minimum bills or have recently increased fixed charges in part as a result of increased 
customer DG adoption. The following two sections discuss these California utilities.   
3.1.1 Current and Future Investor Owned Utility Policies  
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), California’s three 
largest investor-owned utilities have established residential minimum bill policies in place. This alternative to fixed 
charges was first authorized in a 1981 California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) ruling (CPUC, 2014).  These charges 
are billed as daily minimum meter charges and are meant to help utilities cover fixed costs for transmission, distribution, 
billing and metering. The current fee structure for each of that state’s IOUs is summarized in Table 70 below. 
                                                          
91
 Task force members have suggested that minimum bills may be higher in vertically integrated utility territories. The limited 
number of cases reviewed in this report do not allow for a definitive conclusion to be reached on this question.      
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Table 70. California IOU Minimum Bill Charge Structures92 
Utility 
Minimum Charge 
($/meter/day) 
Total Monthly (30-
days) 
PG&E $0.14784 $4.435 
SDG&E $ 0.170 $5.10 
SCE93 $0.059 $1.77 
Some California utilities additionally provide separate, reduced minimum bill charges for qualifying low-income 
customers as well as separate rates for multi-family residences. Given the longstanding nature of these minimum 
charges and their relatively modest rates, and the fact that California has been a leading solar state for many years, it is 
unlikely that these minimum bill mechanisms have significantly impacted the growth of customer-sited generation in 
California.  
In October 2013, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 327 (AB 327) which has a number of implications for the 
future of the state’s solar market development and net metering programs. The bill marked the start of a regulatory 
reform process by removing restrictions which had previously limited changes to residential rates. This shift was 
motivated by inequities and cost shifts in the existing rate structure. AB 327 requires the state’s current net metering 
program to end by July 1, 2017 or when investor owned utilities (IOUs) reach their existing program caps. Existing net 
metered generators would continue to receive net metering credits at the retail rate under the current program for the 
useful life of their system. However, new generators will be required to use a new uncapped net metering program 
which will be designed through a CPUC processes.  The CPUC is expected to announce the details of the revised net 
metering program, which will feature a standard contract, before 2016. Additionally, AB 327 allows for utilities to file for 
new rate design proposals including fixed charges or minimum bills capped at $10/customer (CPUC, 2014).  
During the stakeholder process that resulted in the CPUC’s residential rate design recommendations, a number of 
stakeholders made arguments for and against minimum bill policies. For instance, utility stakeholders argued that fixed 
charges were superior to minimum bill programs as they better reflect cost causation principles that ensure fairness 
amongst ratepayers. Similarly, utility stakeholders argued that allowing distributed generators to avoid fixed customer 
charges amounted to an arbitrarily set incentive. Additionally, stakeholders in favor of fixed charges argued that these 
mechanisms did not necessarily reduce customer incentives to invest in energy efficiency and that volumetric charges 
set to recover fixed utility costs may lead to customer energy efficiency investments that were not cost effective from 
the societal perspective. Proponents of minimum bills argued that these mechanisms have the benefit of reducing free 
ridership without altering the economic incentive for most customers to invest in energy efficiency (CPUC, 2014).  
In the CPUC’s Staff Proposal for Residential Rate Structure, the CPUC stated that a minimum bill could be considered as 
an alternative to a fixed charge for utilities if the minimum bill was initially capped at $10/month per customer and 
$5/month for low-income customers. Any minimum bill rate could adjust with inflation over time. The CPUC agreed with 
commenters that a minimum bill would prevent free ridership from zero or low-consumption customers, and not unduly 
penalize other ratepayers (CPUC, 2014). In the case of either a fixed charge or minimum bill thresholds, the Commission 
would require that the charge reflect the cost of service for customer classes, prevent significant erosion of incentives 
for conservation, and minimize burdens on low-income customers. The CPUC will begin to consider new fixed charges or 
minimum bills this year as utilities make revised residential rate proposals.  
3.1.2 California Municipal Utility Programs 
In addition to the IOU minimum bill programs, two municipal utilities, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) and 
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) have existing fixed charge or minimum bill policies in place 
that establish non-zero minimum monthly contributions. Both SMUD and LADWP have a significant penetration of net 
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 (PG&E, 2015), (SDG&E, 2015), (SCE, 2014), (SCE, 2014) 
93
 SCE has a separate minimum bill rate for multi-family residential customers of $0.044 $/meter/day. 
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metering customers, with LADWP having over 12,000 installations as of April 2014 (LADWP, 2014). The details of their 
programs are discussed below.  
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) 
As part of its strategy to stabilize revenues, LADWP began a rate reform process in 2008, which included revenue 
decoupling (City of Los Angeles, 2012). As part of this process, LADWP instituted a minimum charge for some residential 
customer rates (City of Los Angeles, 2012).  Los Angeles has one of the most robust municipal solar markets in the 
United States and, as of July 2014, had the most net energy metering customers of any municipal utility in the country 
with over 12,000 installations (LADWP, 2014).  LADWP has offered solar incentives since 1999, and currently offers a 
declining block incentive program for its customers (LADWP, 2015). LADWP’s net metering program credits excess 
generation at the retail rate, though the utility has proposed studying other policy alternatives before the current 
program ends in December 2016 (LADWP, 2014).  Solar systems up to 1MW can qualify for the program and virtual net 
metering is not allowed under current net metering rules. Net metering credits cannot be used to reduce a customer’s 
bill below the minimum charge (DSIRE, 2014). Thus, if a customer is low or zero usage, they still have to pay the 
minimum charge associated with their rate class. For residential customers using Standard Residential Rate (R1-A), this 
charge is currently $10. This $10 minimum bill has been in effect since at least 2009. Figure 66 below shows the annual 
applications from the LADWP solar program from 2009 to 2015. During this period, solar installations in LADWP’s utility 
territory have grown substantially, suggesting this minimum bill mechanism has not been a substantial barrier to market 
growth during this period.  
Figure 66. Applications for LADWP Solar Incentive Program 2009-2014 
 
LADWP has proposed additional rate reforms to unbundle residential rates into generation, distribution and 
transmission components so that net metering credits can be applied to the most appropriate portion of customer bills. 
This was proposed in order to prevent further cost-shifts after the net metering program expands beyond the current 
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) 
SMUD installed the nation’s first utility scale solar system in 1984, and has remained supportive of solar energy 
development. The municipal utility offers net energy metering for distributed generators up to 1 MW in size, and a 
community solar program called Solar Shares. SMUD compensates excess generation at the retail rate and exempts 
distributed generators from standby charges (SMUD, 2010). SMUD also provided a feed-in-tariff for solar energy until 
the program reached capacity in 2010. Residential systems now qualify for a $500 upfront payment incentive. As of 
January 2015, SMUD had processed over 5,000 applications for its incentive programs (SMUD, 2015). 
During a recent review of its rates, SMUD found that 75 percent of residential customers were not paying their full cost 
of service. The utility is currently undergoing a residential rate reform process to allow rates to more accurately reflect 
cost of service. SMUD intends to shift entirely to time-of-use residential rates by 2017, and is undergoing a process to 
reduce its tiered residential rate system.  
In addition to rate reform, SMUD began increasing its System Infrastructure Fixed Charge (SIFC) in 2012 in order to help 
recover the fixed costs of serving utility customers. These increased fixed charges were matched with reductions in 
volumetric kWh charges. SMUD’s board approved these changes to more closely align with the cost to serve each 
customer. This charge is assessed on all bills and is set to escalate to $20 for residential customers by 2017 to cover 100 
percent of customer and distribution costs. The current residential fixed charge has risen to $16 from $7.20 per 
customer in 2011. As a fixed charge, the SMUD SIFC is not a minimum bill policy as defined in this report as the charge, 
when implemented, led to a rate increase for all customers regardless of consumption. However, like a minimum bill, 
the SIFC cannot be avoided through net metering credits or conservation (SMUD, 2015). 
Despite not being structured as a minimum bill, this rate mechanism can provide some limited insight into the potential 
effects of a minimum bill policy on solar market development. SMUD’s fixed charge has increased gradually since 2012 
for all rate classes. Despite this, SMUD has continued to see a growth in applications for its solar program. Figure 67 
below shows the annual number of residential solar program applications between 2010 and 2014 along with the 
applicable residential SIFC charge. As the figure shows, the number of solar program applications continued to grow as 
the charge increased, suggesting that the charge has not been a significant barrier to local solar market growth. Notably, 
this simplified analysis does not take into account changes to solar installed costs over this time period or reductions in 
SMUD incentives which likely have more significant influences on solar market growth rates.  
Figure 67. SMUD PV Program Applications and SIFC Charge Rates 2010-2014 
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3.2 Minimum Bills in Hawaii 
Hawaii has one electric holding company (collectively known as the HECO Companies) that serves three separate utility 
territories, Hawaii Electric Company (HECO), Maui Electric Company (MECO), and Hawaii Electric Light Company 
(HELCO). The state has the highest per-capita solar penetration in the United States, with more than 10 percent of 
residential customers having PV installations in some utility territories (Wesoff, 2014). Driven by high fuel costs, 
electricity prices in Hawaii are some of the highest in the nation, with average residential electricity prices ranging 
between $0.39 and $0.46 per kWh in 2013 (HECO, 2014).  Hawaii has had robust utility solar incentives over the past 
decade, with Hawaii utilities offering both a feed-in tariff program and net metering (HECO, 2014).  
Each of Hawaii’s IOU territories includes minimum charges in each of their tariff rates. These charges have been in place 
since before the development of the state’s solar PV market. For residential customers, minimum charges are in addition 
to the monthly customer charges and must be paid in the event that customer consumption drops below the minimum 
charge threshold. Customers that exceed the monthly minimum bill are not subject to any additional monthly charges as 
a result of this mechanism. Table 4 below shows the current minimum charges for each of the three Hawaii IOU 
territories for the residential rate.  
Table 71. Residential Minimum Charges for Hawaii IOU Territories (HECO, 2014) 
 
Single Phase Minimum  
Charge per Month 
Three-phase Minimum  
Charge per Month 
Hawaii Electric Co. (HECO) $17.00 $23.00 
Hawaii Electric Light Co. 
(HELCO) 
$20.50 $25.00 
Maui Electric Co. (MECO) $18.00 $22.50 
Minimum charges for demand metered customers are defined as the sum of the customer charge and any applicable 
demand charges. Because these minimum charges for demand metered customers are effectively the same as the 
charges that would be paid by any customer in the rate class regardless of consumption, they are fundamentally 
different from the minimum charge structure that is applied to residential rates. This minimum charge structure 
effectively ensures that standard demand charges cannot be bypassed through conservation or net metering.   
Hawaii has seen robust solar market growth over the past several years.  Figure 4 shows the cumulative PV capacity in 
the HECO Company territories between 2005 and 2014. Given this aggressive market growth, the relatively high 
minimum bill charges applied to distributed generation customers do not appear to have created a significant barrier to 
solar market development. Critically, these relatively high minimum charges are being applied in a market with 
substantially higher retail electricity prices than seen in mainland U.S. utility territories, potentially mitigating any effects 
of the charges on solar market development.   
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Figure 68. Cumulative PV Capacity in MW in HECO Company Territories (HECO, 2015) 
 
In January 2015, the HECO Companies submitted a request to the Hawaii Public Utility Commission for approval of a 
Transitional Distributed Generation Plan as part of ongoing efforts to reform the utility business model in the state to 
increase renewable energy generation. The transitional plan recommended significant changes to the existing net 
metering framework, including transitioning from full retail rate net metering to generation payment rates set equal to 
the utility’s avoided fuel cost. This proposal has received a significant negative response from the solar stakeholder 
community in Hawaii and is currently the subject of ongoing regulatory consideration. At the same time, Hawaii’s IOUs 
have proposed, as part of the state’s broader renewable energy transition process, to move towards a rate structure 
with higher minimum charges and lower volumetric rates. The HECO Company’s initial filing proposed illustrative 
minimum residential charges of $55 for customers without on-site generation and $71 for customers with on-site 
generation. In the example offered, these higher minimum charges would be offset by lowering electricity rates from 
$0.34 per kWh to $0.26 per kWh for residential customers (HECO, 2014). The final outcome of this reform proposal is 
currently pending.  
3.3 Ongoing Net Metering Cost Recovery Discussions in Other States 
Discussions about the future of net metering and the potential applicability of minimum bills are ongoing in a number of 
states. The following section provides background information on several of these state-level policy discussions.  
3.3.1 Arizona 
In 2013, Arizona Public Service (APS) went before the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) with two proposals to 
address ratepayer cost-shifting resulting from their existing net metering program. In support of this request, APS 
indicated that it received an average of 500 net metering applications per month and estimated that each system 
resulted in $800-$1,000 in added costs to non-ratepayers annually (Arizona Corporate Commission, 2013). As part of the 
regulatory proceedings, solar advocates submitted a study which concluded that the benefits of DG systems exceeded 
the costs and argued that net metering under-compensated DG generators (Arizona Corporate Commission, 2013). APS 
proposed transitioning net metering customers to time of use rates with demand charges or shifting DG customers to a 
buy-all, sell-all approach to address these costs.94 APS’s proposed demand charges under either of the existing 
residential rate structures significantly eroded savings for net metering customers (Arizona Corporate Commission, 
2013). Several protests were filed which stated the APS analysis excluded the benefits of DG, and that such changes 
were more appropriately addressed by a rate case. 
                                                          
94
 Under a buy-all, sell-all approach, distributed generation owners sell the entirety of the generation of their system to the grid, 
using no self-generated power on site. 
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The ACC noted that existing studies of the value of DG were inconclusive and that imposition of demand charges or a 
tariff approach for DG customers would be more appropriately addressed in a rate case. The ACC rejected both of APS’s 
proposals in favor of an interim adjustment to APS’s Lost Fixed Cost Recovery Mechanism of $.70/kW, resulting in a 
revenue neutral charge for all new systems installed after December 31, 2013. Existing generators would not be subject 
to any changes until after APS’s next rate case in 2015 (Kennerly, Wright, Laurent, Rickerson, & Proudlove, 2014).  
In addition to the APS rate design discussions, the Salt River Project (SRP), an Arizona public power provider, has recently 
approved a new demand charge on solar customers as part of a broader rate restructuring effort. Reports have indicated 
that this new solar demand charge could increase residential solar customer’s bills by $50 per month. SolarCity, a 
national solar installation company with a significant presence in Arizona, has filed a lawsuit in an effort to block 
implementation of the new solar demand charge (Pyper, 2015). 
3.3.2 Kansas 
In 2014, Kansas legislators voted to continue the state’s net metering program with modifications. House Bill 2101 
allowed utilities to submit proposals to the Kansas Corporation Commission on minimum bills, time of use rates or other 
rate structures for DG after July 1, 2014 (Legislature of the State of Kansas, 2014). As of yet, however, Kansas’ IOUs have 
not proposed a minimum bill or other cost recovery mechanism to the Commission. The bill also reduced the eligible 
system size for net metering. Residential size caps decreased from 25 to 15 kW, commercial systems sizes dropped from 
200 to 100 kW and non-profit or public sector systems are now capped at 150 kW. The bill also reduced the credit for 
excess generation from the retail rate to avoided costs. Systems installed prior to July 1st, 2014 are grandfathered under 
the current program until 2030. In April 2014, Kansas had approximately 200 net-metered systems. The bill was 
considered a compromise in Kansas since the original proposal would have eliminated the state’s net metering program 
(Uhlenhuth, 2014).  
3.3.3 Oklahoma 
In April 2014, the Oklahoma legislature passed Senate Bill 1456 which was designed to prevent the cross-subsidization of 
distributed generators by other ratepayers. The law enables utilities to impose fixed charges solely on DG customers in a 
rate class as long as the charge is justified. Utilities are allowed to submit proposed tariffs to the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission (OCC) by the end of 2015 (Oklahoma Senate, 2014). The law was later clarified via an Executive Order in July 
2014. The Executive Order stated that the OCC could consider alternative policy choices, such as minimum bills, time of 
use rates and demand charges before implementing fixed charges. At present, no tariffs have been proposed to the 
OCC. As of July 2014, Oklahoma IOUs had approximately 350 DG customers (Oklahoma Secretary of State, 2014). 
3.3.4 Texas 
The Texas Public Utility Commission allows Retail Electricity Providers (REPs)95 to assess minimum or low usage charges 
on customers with low consumption (Public Utility Commission of Texas, 2014). This threshold is defined by each REP. A 
study by the Texas Ratepayers’ Organization to Save Energy documented that the number of Texas retail electricity 
providers assessing minimum usage fees grew from 36% to 81% between 2011 and 2013. In most cases, the usage fees 
trigger when customers use 1,000 kWh or less of electricity and range in price from $6-$20. These fees tend to be 
disclosed in the terms of service for each provider (Biedrzychi, 2013). The cumulative capacity of solar installations in the 
state grew by 307% between 2011 and 2013, however a limited portion of this growth was behind the meter systems 
(IREC, 2014). Texas does not currently have a statewide net metering policy. Given the significant difference in the local 
solar market and electricity service delivery market structures between Texas and Massachusetts, direct comparisons 
between the states is difficult.   
  
                                                          
95
 Texas has transitioned to a retail electric competition model under which REPs provide service through regulated Transmission 
and Distribution Utilities (TDUs) allowing REPs them to offer full service electric generation, transmission and distribution services 
for retail customers (Public Utility Commission of Texas, 2014).  
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4 Minimum Bill Modeling 
In order to explore the dynamics of a potential minimum bill both on individual customer utility charges and PV system 
economics, a simplified PV system cash flow model was developed. To isolate the potential impacts of a minimum bill 
policy and evaluate a range of policy and system parameters, modeling was conducted on a representative residential 
PV system. A series of sensitivity analyses were conducted to explore how different minimum bill levels might lead to 
different project cash flow parameters and utility charges. Modeling outputs included total utility charges recovered, 
simple payback and internal rate of return (IRR). The following sections review the assumptions and results of this 
modeling exercise. Critically, the results of this section are specific to the system type modeled and the assumptions 
used. The production, economics and on-site load parameters are unique for each PV system in Massachusetts, with no 
two systems being alike. The results found in this section were developed with the intent of informing the 
Massachusetts net metering task force regarding the dynamics of a potential minimum bill policy. This is not intended as 
a minimum bill rate setting exercise or as a conclusive exploration of the merits of a minimum bill policy over other 
potential policy mechanisms.  
4.1 Modeling Parameters 
The following section describes the major modeling parameters used to evaluate the potential effects of a minimum bill 
on utility costs recovery and PV system economics.  
4.1.1 Onsite Load 
The National Grid basic service R-1 hourly load data from 2013 was used as the modeled home electricity consumption 
under this task (National Grid, 2015). This system-wide hourly load curve data was normalized on a percentage basis and 
scaled to create two hourly annual load curves, one for a home using an average of 600 kWh per month (“Average 
Consumption”) and another for a home using an average of 300 kWh per month (“Low Consumption”). This corresponds 
to an average National Grid residential customer and a low-usage customer. These scaled hourly load profiles were 
transformed to create monthly load profiles for each of the two load cases. Figure 69 below shows the two monthly 
electricity consumption profiles used in the modeling.  
Figure 69. Modeled Monthly Consumption Profiles 
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4.1.2 PV System Parameters 
The modeled system was assumed to have a 20-year life. PV system parameters were adjusted National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory’s PVWatts program to develop a monthly kWh production profile for a residential PV system that 
aligned with historic Massachusetts PV system production (DOER, 2015). Solar insolation data from Worcester, Mass. 
was selected for developing the production profile. Table 72 below shows the default PVWatts parameters while Figure 
70 below shows the monthly PV production profile for a representative 1kW system.  
Table 72. PV System Modeled Parameters  
PV System Assumptions 
Production Profile 
PV Watts Standard Assumptions  
for Worcester, MA 
Array Tilt 35 Deg 
Array Azimuth 190 Deg 
System Losses 24% Percent 
Inverter Efficiency 96% Percent 
DC to AC Size Ratio 1.1  
System Degradation 0.50% Percent per year 
Annual production 1,180 kWh/kW 
For the minimum bill analysis, a range of system sizes were used to evaluate the potential effects of differing minimum 
bill levels on multiple PV system sizes. For the analysis, four system sizes were evaluated for each of the two 
representative home load cases. These system sizes were modeled to cover 120%, 100%, 80% and 60% of a 
homeowner’s annual load. Table 73 below shows the system sizes modeled for each of the site annual consumption 
cases.  
Table 73. PV System Sizes Modeled 
PV Production to Annual 
Consumption Ratio 
Average Consumption 
Case 
Low  Consumption Case 
120% 7.32 kW 3.66 kW 
100% 6.10 kW 3.05 kW 
80% 4.88 kW 2.44 kW 
60% 3.66 kW 1.83 kW 
Table 72 below shows the monthly PV system production profile for a 6.1 kW system with the annual load profile for the 
average home load case. Under this scenario, the PV system provides 100 percent of the annualized electricity 
consumption.  
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Figure 70. 6.1 kW PV System Monthly Production and Average  Consumption Monthly Profile 
 
4.1.3 Financial Assumptions 
Across Massachusetts, there is significant variation in PV system ownership models and financing structures. In order to 
best isolate the potential effects of a minimum bill on PV system economics and eliminate potential confounding effects 
related to system economic financing assumptions, the modeled systems in this analysis assumed a cash purchase by 
the homeowner. While this assumption represents only one of many potential ownership and financing models 
currently used in Massachusetts, and may not represent the majority of residential PV systems currently in the 
marketplace, it was chosen as a simplifying assumption that would allow for a more straightforward exploration of a 
minimum bill on the dynamics of PV system economics. As such, the investment return values presented as outputs to 
this analysis may not be representative of typical returns currently seen for PV system in Massachusetts.  
In order to model a range of potential system paybacks and investment returns, three cost cases were modeled. 
Individual cases were examined assuming $3, $4 and $5 per watt system installation costs. This represents a broad range 
of potential system costs that is representative of the range of system prices reported in the latest DOER SREC II public 
dataset. One assumption that was made in order to simplify the analysis is that PV system costs do not benefit from 
economies of scale. A homeowner purchasing a 7.3 kW system may be able to benefit from a lower per watt price than 
the same homeowner purchasing a 3.7 kW system. This effect was not modeled and would tend to improve the 
economics of larger systems relative to smaller systems in the analysis.    
4.1.4 Utility Bill Parameters 
Modeled utility bill parameters were based on National Grid R-1 distribution rates (National Grid, 2015). Distribution 
rates for net metering credits from exported power do not include the energy efficiency and renewable energy charges 
per current statute, regulations and tariffs. Separate basic service supply rates were modeled for winter periods 
(November through April) and summer periods (May through October). Basic service rates for summer and winter 
periods were based on the average basic service rates for those periods over the last five years. A five-year average was 
chosen instead of the most recent year basic service rates in order to lessen the effects of recent high winter basic 
service rates on modeling. Additionally, a $4 customer charge was applied to each monthly period modeled. All utility 
bill elements were escalated throughout the analysis at a 1.89% annual rate.     
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Table 74. Electricity Bill Component Parameters 
Electricity Value of Production and Utility Bill Components 
Starting Customer Charge $4.00 National Grid R-1 Customer Charge 
Starting Distribution Rate for 
On-site Consumption 
$0.07426 
$0.08008 
National Grid R-1 Distribution Rates96 
Starting Distribution Rate for 
Monthly Exported Power 
$0.0611 
National Grid R-1 Distribution Rate 
 minus EE and RE Charges 
Staring Basic Service Supply 
Summer (May - October) 
$0.0753 Average of last five years97 
Starting Basic Service Supply Winter 
(Nov - April) 
$0.0999 Average of last five years
98
 
Utility Bill Escalation Factor 1.89% Annual Escalator for All Bill Components99 
4.1.5 Minimum Bill Parameters 
Four minimum bill cases were modeled: $4, $10, $25 and $50.100 These values were selected for the sole purpose of 
providing a sensitivity analysis of the potential impacts of a minimum bill and do not represent suggestions for a 
Massachusetts minimum bill. Additionally, a base case without a minimum bill was modeled. Like the other bill 
components, the minimum bill was assumed to escalate yearly at 1.89%. The minimum bill was structured as the non-
zero lowest potential bill threshold for each month modeled. During months in which there was a calculated utility bill 
that exceeded the minimum bill, previously banked net metering credits, if available, were first used to reduce the utility 
bill, either to the minimum bill threshold or until the banked net metering credits were fully used. Any remaining 
required utility bill, either at the minimum bill level, or in excess of the minimum bill, was assumed paid by the customer 
during that month. During months in which the calculated bill based on monthly consumption was below the minimum 
bill threshold, the utility customer was assumed to pay the minimum bill. The difference between the minimum bill paid 
and what the bill would have been without the minimum bill was carried forward for use in future months. Additionally, 
in months in which production resulted in a net export of power, net metering credits were calculated and any excess 
credits were similarly rolled over into the next monthly period. Minimum bill payments are assumed to be paid to the 
distribution utility and not passed on to electricity suppliers. From the perspective of the PV system owner, this does not 
affect project economics. This minimum bill structure was modeled as an example that most closely approximates 
minimum bills in other states. New minimum bill designs could be developed and implemented in Massachusetts that 
would have different parameters, and Task force members representing the Massachusetts utilities have suggested that 
innovative minimum bill structures that are tailored to a customer’s load and/or differentiate between on-site and 
virtual net-metered systems could be a potentially appropriate approach. 
4.1.6 Incentive Assumptions  
Modeled PV systems were assumed to benefit from both the 30% federal residential renewable energy tax credit and 
the Massachusetts residential renewable energy income tax credit. Both these tax incentives were assumed to be fully 
monetized in April during the year after the installation of the system. Additionally, the modeled system benefited from 
SREC revenues over the first ten years of the system life. SRECs were assumed to be monetized at the SREC auction price 
floor with payments for 12 months of SRECs occurring once a year after the close of the auction.    
                                                          
96
 National Grid’s R-1 rate is structured as an inclining block structure, with kWh consumption over 600kWh having a different tariff 
rate than consumption under 600kWh.  
97
 (National Grid, 2015) 
98
 (National Grid, 2015) 
99 20-year average residential annual utility cost increase 1994-2013 from (EIA, 2015). Each bill component has different cost drivers and likely escalation (or de-
escalation) rates, however determining likely component-by-component cost escalation rates is beyond the scope of this analysis.  
100
 These correspond to the current National Grid customer charge and 2.5, 6.25 and 12.5 times the customer charge value 
respectively.   
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4.1.7 Other Simplifying Assumptions 
In order to isolate the potential effects of a minimum bill, a number of simplifying assumption were made in developing 
the model. For instance, random annual fluctuations in onsite load or PV system output were not modeled and instead a 
consistent annual onsite load and PV production pattern was used.  Adding annual variations in production and 
consumption have the effect of altering minimum bill dynamics potentially creating more or less annual net metering 
credit carryover. Additionally, the model does not include ongoing costs associated with system operations and 
maintenance or potential future inverter replacement. The modeled system is installed on January 1st of 2015 and 
different system modeling start dates could affect early-year model outputs, system paybacks and rates of return. This 
simplified model also assumes that system owners are not monetizing cumulative excess generation through the 
Schedule Z credit transfer mechanism. The implications of this assumption are discussed later in this section. Finally, all 
utility bill components are assumed to escalate at the same rate, in reality market conditions and regulatory cases will 
cause these components to increase (or decrease) at different rates.  
This analysis does not examine potential minimum bill dynamics on non-residential utility customers. Given the 
significant variation in customer loads and rate structures for non-residential utility customers, modeling a 
representative building that could provide generalized insights to the Task Force would be difficult. Additionally, 
minimum bills for commercial customers in other jurisdictions have typically been designed as non-bypassable demand 
charges, making them highly customized to the specific circumstance of each utility customer.101 This analysis also does 
not explore other unique residential cases such as seasonal second homes or community shared solar. In particular, the 
effects of minimum bills on community shared solar customers may be similar to the low-consumption case discussed in 
this section, although these similarities would likely only apply to certain community shared solar ownership models.  
4.2 Modeling Results 
4.2.1 Minimum Bill Dynamics 
Each of the modeling parameters were run as part of 40 unique cases. Results showed that combinations of minimum 
bill levels, relative PV system sizes and total home consumption resulted in three distinct patterns. These three scenarios 
are illustrated below.  
Under one scenario, illustrated in Figure 71 below, PV production leads to excess generation and banking of net 
metering credits during spring and summer periods. The blue line represents the customer’s total utility bill for each 
month while the red line is the cumulative value of the customer’s banked net metering credits. Under this scenario, the 
customer banks credits during the spring and summer months while credits are used in the late fall and winter months. 
This banking cycle occurs on an annual cycle and the customer does not build up a bank of credits that are carried 
forward for multiple years. This credit banking dynamic can result in customers paying the minimum bill during certain 
period of the year and paying higher bills during period of low PV production when the net metering credit bank has 
been full expended.  
                                                          
101
 The use of monetarily denominated net metering credits in Massachusetts that can be applied to non-volumetric charges allows 
commercial customers to reduce demand-related portions of their utility bills. Some states do not have similar net metering 
structures, and instead denominate net metering credits volumetrically, making commercial minimum bills in those states less 
relevant, as customers under those circumstances cannot avoid demand charges through net metering. 
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Figure 71. Five-Year Utility Bill Dynamics - $4 Minimum Bill – System Sized to 100 Percent of Average Consumption Load Case 
 
The second common bill dynamic is illustrated in Figure 728. Under this scenario, the PV system is sized smaller than the 
home’s annual load. The customer’s monthly bill rises and falls with seasonal changes in PV system production and onsite-
load. Despite having a $4 minimum bill, under this case, the homeowner has no months in which a minimum bill is paid as 
that total utility bill always exceeds the minimum bill. Net metering credits are not banked under this scenario.  
Figure 72. Five-Year Utility Bill Dynamics - $4 Minimum Bill – System Sized to 60 Percent of Average Consumption Load Case  
 
The final common dynamic occurs when either the system is over-sized to the home load or when the minimum bill is 
high enough to cause the homeowner to always pay the minimum bill. Under this combination of factors, illustrated in 
Figure 9, the PV system continually generates net metering credits which are not monetized. As a result, the net metering 
credit bank grows over the life of the system. Notably, this is the same scenario customers with systems sized greater 
than their annual loads experience today even without a minimum bill. In the simplified modeling scenarios developed 
for this task, the net metering customer in this scenario does not take advantage of the opportunity to bilaterally sell 
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excess net metering credits through the Schedule Z mechanism. A homeowner could gain a financial benefit from these 
unused credits by selling them to another utility customer, although the value at which these credits could be monetized 
in a bilateral net metering credit sale is unknown and would dictate the total financial loss, if any, resulting from this 
dynamic.  
Figure 73. Utility Bill Dynamics - $4 Minimum Bill – System Sized to 120 Percent of Average Consumption Load Case  
 
 
4.2.2 Effect of Minimum Bill on Total Utility Bill  
To test the effect of different minimum bill levels on the overall utility bill paid by system owners, model runs were 
conducted for each of the system size cases and minimum bill levels. Both the average and low consumption home cases 
were modeled for each system size and minimum bill condition. First year, five-year and 20-year cumulative utility bills 
were calculated. These represent the total utility bills paid by customers including all customer charges, distribution 
charges and supply charges. The following tables show the results of this modeling. These results do not explicitly 
allocate utility bill costs between electricity suppliers and distribution utilities, however it is assumed that, during 
periods when a minimum bill is paid, those charges are paid exclusively to the distribution company without passing 
along funds to electric suppliers. A separate analysis is provided in the appendix of this report showing the total 
distribution portion of the customer bill for the average consumption case over the same time periods (see Figure 12). 
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 Average Consumption Case 
 
 Low Consumption Case  
Year 1 
Utility 
Bill 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 $23 $67 $133 $300 $600 
 
1.2 $13 $57 $123 $300 $600 
1 $66 $88 $149 $314 $600 
 
1 $57 $68 $131 $300 $600 
0.8 $291 $291 $291 $333 $605 
 
0.8 $169 $169 $169 $304 $600 
0.6 $520 $520 $520 $520 $621 
 
0.6 $284 $284 $284 $313 $600 
 
              
             
Years 
1-5 
Total 
Utility 
Bill 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 $23 $268 $636 $1,558 $3,116 
 
1.2 $13 $259 $626 $1,558 $3,116 
1 $399 $403 $652 $1,571 $3,116 
 
1 $324 $326 $634 $1,558 $3,116 
0.8 $1,557 $1,557 $1,557 $1,591 $3,120 
 
0.8 $903 $903 $903 $1,562 $3,116 
0.6 $2,739 $2,739 $2,739 $2,739 $3,136 
 
0.6 $1,494 $1,494 $1,494 $1,571 $3,116 
 
              
             
Years 
1-20 
Total 
Utility 
Bill 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 $23 $1,172 $2,897 $7,210 $14,421 
 
1.2 $13 $1,163 $2,887 $7,210 $14,421 
1 $2,889 $2,889 $2,913 $7,224 $14,421 
 
1 $2,021 $2,021 $2,895 $7,210 $14,421 
0.8 $8,063 $8,063 $8,063 $8,063 $14,425 
 
0.8 $4,608 $4,608 $4,608 $7,215 $14,421 
0.6 $13,326 $13,326 $13,326 $13,326 $14,441 
 
0.6 $7,240 $7,240 $7,240 $7,243 $14,421 
These cases illustrate the potential dynamics of a minimum bill across a wide range of minimum bill thresholds. Under 
some conditions, total utility bills are unaffected by the addition of a minimum bill mechanism. In other cases, increasing 
minimum bill levels lead to significantly higher total utility bill collections. It is also notable that at higher minimum bill 
levels, customers pay the same cumulative utility bills regardless of the size of their PV systems. This effect is most 
pronounced in the $50 minimum bill categories where all customers, regardless of the size of their PV system or onsite 
load pay nearly the same utility bill.  
Despite the increased costs for several of the cases with the implementation of a minimum bill compared to the no 
minimum bill case, customers in all cases see significant savings as a result of their solar installations regardless of the 
minimum bill. For reference, the modeled one-, five- and twenty-year total utility bills for the average-use customer 
without a solar PV system would be $1,214, $6,303 and $29,175 respectively. Each of these values is more than twice 
the modeled cumulative utility bill for the $50 minimum bill case.  
This analysis only takes into account the total utility bill collections over the course of the analysis periods. As mentioned 
above, minimum bills can significantly change the timing of utility bill payments within an analysis period. For system 
size and load combinations where net metering credits are on an annual cycle in which credits are banked during 
periods of high production and fully utilized during months of low production, this would tend to decrease the monthly 
bill variance. The effect of this delay in monetizing system production is discussed in greater detail in the system 
financial analysis section of this report.   
The same data is provided below in a different format that illustrates the relative increase in total utility bill for each 
system size and building consumption case relative to the no minimum bill case for that scenario. 
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 Annual Consumption 
Average Consumption Case 
 
 Low Consumption Case  
Year 
1 
Utilit
y Bill 
PV/Loa
d Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
 
PV/Loa
d Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 1.0 3.0 5.9 13.3 26.6 
 
1.2 1.0 4.3 9.3 22.6 45.2 
1 1.0 1.3 2.3 4.8 9.1 
 
1 1.0 1.2 2.3 5.3 10.6 
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.1 
 
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 3.5 
0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 
 
0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.1 
 
             
 
             
Years 
1-5 
Utilit
y Bill 
PV/Loa
d Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
 
PV/Loa
d Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 1.0 11.9 28.2 69.1 138.1 
 
1.2 1.0 19.5 47.2 117.3 155.8 
1 1.0 1.0 1.6 3.9 7.8 
 
1 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.8 9.2 
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
 
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 3.4 
0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
 
0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.1 
 
             
 
             
Years 
1-20 
Utilit
y Bill 
PV/Loa
d Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
 
PV/Loa
d Ratio 
$- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 1.0 52.0 128.4 319.6 639.3 
 
1.2 1.0 87.6 217.4 543.0 721.1 
1 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 5.0 
 
1 1.0 1.0 1.4 3.6 6.9 
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 
 
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.6 3.1 
0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
 
0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
As the data shows, the total change in utility bill over the time periods analyzed is highly dependent on the system size 
relative to total site load (PV/Load Ratio). For many of the scenarios, a minimum bill leads to no increase in total utility 
bills, while in others, the increase is potentially substantial on a percentage basis. Systems sized to produce the total 
annual onsite load and those sized to produce more than the total onsite load see an increased utility bill at all minimum 
bill levels in the 1 and 1-5 year timeframes. Alternatively, systems undersized to total load do not see any increase in 
total utility bill under the $4 and $10 minimum bill cases for all analysis timeframes. 
The above table also illustrates the disproportionate effect of a fixed minimum bill on customers with lower 
consumption. For cases where a minimum bill leads to an increase in total utility bill, the relative increase is typically 
higher in the low consumption case compared to the high consumption case.102 This effect could potentially be 
mitigated with a minimum bill structure that scales to the total on-site consumption. Under such a structure, homes 
with lower inherent consumption would be subject to lower minimum bill rates.      
An important simplification in this analysis is that system owners that generate excess net metering credits for over-
sized systems do not monetize those credits through bilateral net metering credit sales to other residents through the 
Schedule Z mechanism. System owners under this scenario could seek to monetize unused credits through this transfer 
mechanism. Therefore any increased utility revenue due to a minimum bill from an individual system owner may not 
lead to an overall utility-wide increase in bill collections as any unused net metering credits could be monetized by other 
utility customers, lowering their utility bills. Instead of increasing the net bill collections from net metering customers, a 
minimum bill may lead to an overall increase in the number of customers taking advantage of net metering (through the 
Schedule Z mechanism) with the total benefit available to any individual net metering customer being decreased.  
4.2.3 Effect of Minimum Bill on System Rates of Return and Simple Payback  
Minimum bills can potentially affect PV system economics in several ways. For instance, a minimum bill can delay a 
system owner’s ability to monetize the production of their PV system by several months, potentially lowering total 
                                                          
102
 The effect is not seen in the Year 1 case due to the effects of the utility bill in the first analysis month. The timing of the start of 
the analysis, in January, creates a high first-month utility bill that influences this analysis. 
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system investment returns and increasing simple paybacks. Additionally, as noted previously, a minimum bill can also 
prevent a system owner from monetizing the entirety of their system’s electricity production if the combination of 
system size and minimum bill threshold create a dynamic in which credits are continually banked.103 
In order to determine the potential financial impacts of a minimum bill on system economics, 20-year internal rate of 
return104 and simple payback (in years) were calculated for each of the modeling cases assuming $3, $4 and $5 dollar per 
watt installation costs. Both these financial metrics were included in the analysis as some residents may make decisions 
based on simple payback calculations while others may instead evaluate the systems lifetime rate of return. As 
mentioned above, this analysis included revenue streams from sources beyond utility bill savings including the 30% 
federal tax credit, the Massachusetts residential tax credit and SREC revenues. These components make up a significant 
portion of a system’s total financial value. 
Figure 10 below show the 20-year rates of return for a system systems built for $4 per watt scaled to supply various 
onsite loads. As the figures illustrate, the range of potential system rates of returns is larger for the Low Consumption 
scenario, ranging from 16.1% in the no minimum bill case serving 60% of the annual home load to a 2.4% rate of return 
for the $50 minimum bill case where the system is sized to supply 120% of household annual load. The Average 
Consumption case range from 14.6% to 8.1% indicating that the minimum bills have a smaller overall impact on system 
economics compared to the smaller household load scenarios.  
Figure 74. Internal Rates of Return for Two Residential Modeling Cases 
 
Figures 11 shows the simple payback for the same cases discussed above. As with the rate of return metric, the simple 
payback results show a wider potential range of paybacks for systems in the Low Consumption cases, ranging between 
5.0 years and 9.7 years indicated a greater sensitivity to minimum bill effects for the lower consumption customer 
case.105  
                                                          
103
 As previously mentioned, this loss could be mitigated by selling unused credits to other utility customers.  
104
 The internal rate of return for the system is the equivalent to the discount rate at which the net present value of the total 
investment would be zero.  
105
 The simple payback results show less overall variability in part because it is a less sensitive metric and because of the unevenness 
of system cash flow over the life of the system. For instance, SRECs are assumed to be monetized once a year after the SREC 
clearinghouse auction meaning that many of the modeled systems have the same simple payback values despite having differing 
overall cash flow profiles and internal rates of return.  
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Figure 75. Simple Payback for Two Residential Modeling Cases 
 
Additional scenarios for $3 and $5 dollar per watt installed costs are provided as an appendix to this report. In general 
the dynamics highlighted above are observed in these alternative cost cases.  
As this analysis shows, the effects of minimum bills on project financial returns is highly dependent on the level of the 
minimum bill, the overall home load, the system cost, and the relative size of the system to the home load. Even within 
this simplified case, the range of effects from these parameters is substantial. As previously mentioned in this section, 
modeling results that assume different parameters would significantly change modeling outputs. Given the significant 
variation in potential system configurations, utility rates, financing and ownership structures, and system costs, it is 
difficult to generalize what the potential effects an undefined minimum bill policy could have on the development of the 
Massachusetts solar market. Additionally, any lost system value stream that results from the implementation of a 
minimum bill could potentially offset through adjustments from other incentive programs. If a minimum bill were to 
significantly decrease system economics, increased SREC market prices could potentially compensate for these losses.  
4.2.4 Potential Impacts of a Minimum Bill on Virtual Net Metered Customers 
The modeling presented in this section represents a PV system sited on a homeowner’s roof. Massachusetts has one of 
the most expansive virtual net metering regulations in the nation, allowing net metering credits from PV systems 
anywhere within a customer’s utility territory and ISO load zone to be used to reduce their utility bill. This has facilitated 
a number of community solar ownership models and has also supported the development of large ground-mounted 
systems that produce credits that serve multiple utility accounts of the same customer. The dynamics of a minimum bill 
related to these installation types were not modeled under this task, however the imposition of a minimum bill on 
customers using virtual net metering could substantially mirror the effects seen in the residential minimum bill model.  
Whether a system is net metered or virtually net metered would only make a limited impact on project economics under 
a minimum bill. For instance, customers that over-size their net metering contracts relative to both their annual 
consumption and the minimum bill threshold would be unable to fully benefit from their net metering credit purchases.  
For community solar installations serving low-use customers, the effects would likely be similar to those seen in the low-
consumption case modeled above. From the perspective of PV system economics, having multiple net metering credit 
offtakers subject to a minimum bill could lead to a lower overall project size relative to the size of a system that could be 
developed without a minimum bill. For a large community solar installation, this effect could be overcome by increasing 
the number of participants taking advantage of the system, with each participant taking less of the systems overall 
production in order to avoid continually paying the minimum bill. Additionally, the effect of a minimum bill on the PV 
system exporting account, depending on the size of the minimum bill and the overall project size, could impact project 
economics.  
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The dynamics of utility revenue recovery, however, may have important differences depending on whether a PV system 
serves an onsite load or is used primarily for virtual net metering. Under virtual net metered system models, where 
systems serve minimal onsite load, utilities are able to recover the full value of the exported net metering credits 
(transmission, distribution and basic service supply costs, etc.). PV systems that predominantly serve on-site loads lead 
to lower overall increases in utility revenue recovery charges as the utilities may only recover lost revenue associated 
with lost base distribution revenues and not basic service supply costs for electricity that is used on-site. Minimum bill 
designs that account for these differences have not been implemented in other jurisdictions, however a minimum bill 
could be designed to address differences in associated utility system costs between virtual net-metered and on-site net-
metered systems.           
For large PV systems serving a single customer with multiple meters, minimum bill impacts on system economics would 
depend on the number of utility meters served, the system size, the minimum bill level and the overall consumption the 
customer can offset via net metering. If the customer has sufficient annual consumption to fully utilize all the system 
output and can assign net metering credits in a manner that avoids the minimum bill on each account, project 
economics may be only modestly affected by the minimum bill. Alternatively, if a customer with multiple meters does 
not have sufficient load to monetize the entirety of their system’s production without continually paying minimum bill 
levels, the economics of the project may be affected.  
5 Conclusions 
Minimum bill policies have been implemented in a limited number of jurisdictions across the country. These 
mechanisms have been used to ensure a minimum revenue is collected from all ratepayers within a rate class while also 
maintaining volumetric charges that promote energy conservation goals. Minimum bill policies have been implemented 
in some of the most active and growing solar markets in the United States, suggesting that these rates have not been 
incompatible with solar market growth. Critically, the existing policies examined under this task have established 
minimum charges at or below $25 a month. The potential effects of higher minimum bills, such as those recently 
proposed in Hawaii, on solar market develop is unknown at this time.  
Modeling of a hypothetical residential Massachusetts PV system shows that the potential effects of a minimum bill in 
the Commonwealth on both customer utility charges and PV system economics would be highly dependent on the 
specifics of how the minimum bill policy was defined and the specific parameters of the PV system. Under certain 
modeling conditions a minimum bill policy resulted in limited changes in total utility bill costs for the modeled system 
while under other conditions, a minimum bill was shown to significantly increase utility bill costs for PV system owners. 
Without a better defined minimum bill proposal, drawing conclusions about how a minimum bill could affect either 
utility cost recovery or PV market dynamics is not possible. Despite this, modeling results suggested that a minimum bill 
that was set at a fixed level for all customers within a rate class would be more likely to affect customers with lower 
consumption compared to those with higher annual consumption levels. Another key finding is that the size of a PV 
system relative to the annual load of a home significantly influences the overall impact of a minimum bill on system 
economics, with systems sized to meet more than the customer’s annual load seeing the greatest impacts from a 
minimum bill. Finally, potential effects of a minimum bill on PV systems with more complex ownership structures or on 
commercial PV system were not modeled under this task.  A minimum bill policy could potentially affect these market 
segments in ways not explored through the modeling completed in this section.    However, as with simplified model 
presented under this task, any impacts on utility bills, PV system economics and overall market dynamics would likely be 
highly dependent on the specifics of the minimum bill policy and the individual system parameters. 
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Results Appendix I 
Figure 12. 20-Year IRR and Simple Payback Matrix for Average Consumption Case 
 
  PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 18.7% 18.3% 17.7% 16.2% 13.3% 1.2             4.7             4.7             4.7             5.3             5.7 
1 20.1% 20.0% 19.7% 18.0% 14.8% 1             4.7             4.7             4.7             4.7             5.7 
0.8 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.4% 16.8% 0.8             4.7             4.7             4.7             4.7             4.7 
0.6 21.1% 21.1% 21.1% 21.1% 20.0% 0.6             4.3             4.3             4.3             4.3             4.7 
  PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 12.8% 12.5% 12.0% 10.6% 8.1% 1.2             6.3             6.6             6.7             6.7             7.7 
1 13.9% 13.9% 13.7% 12.1% 9.3% 1             5.7             5.7             5.8             6.7             7.5 
0.8 14.2% 14.2% 14.2% 14.1% 11.0% 0.8             5.7             5.7             5.7             5.7             6.7 
0.6 14.6% 14.6% 14.6% 14.6% 13.7% 0.6             5.7             5.7             5.7             5.7             5.7 
  PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 9.0% 8.7% 8.2% 6.9% 4.6% 1.2             7.7             7.7             8.0             8.7             9.7 
1 9.9% 9.9% 9.7% 8.3% 5.7% 1             7.6             7.6             7.7             7.8             9.3 
0.8 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.0% 7.3% 0.8             7.4             7.4             7.4             7.4             8.7 
0.6 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 9.6% 0.6             7.1             7.1             7.1             7.1             7.7 
$4 per 
Watt
$5 per 
Watt
Simple Payback (Years)20-Year IRR
$3 per 
Watt
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Figure 13. 20-Year IRR and Simple Payback Matrix for Low Consumption Case 
 
 
 
  
  PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 20.2% 19.4% 18.2% 14.9% 7.8% 1.2             4.7             4.7             4.7             5.7             6.7 
1 21.4% 21.4% 20.4% 16.6% 8.5% 1             4.2             4.2             4.6             4.7             6.7 
0.8 22.2% 22.2% 22.2% 19.1% 9.4% 0.8             3.7             3.7             3.7             4.7             6.7 
0.6 22.6% 22.6% 22.6% 22.2% 10.2% 0.6             3.7             3.7             3.7             3.7             5.7 
  PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 13.9% 13.2% 12.1% 9.2% 2.4% 1.2             5.7             5.8             6.6             7.3             9.7 
1 14.8% 14.7% 13.9% 10.6% 3.0% 1             5.7             5.7             5.7             6.7             9.7 
0.8 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 12.7% 3.7% 0.8             5.7             5.7             5.7             5.8             8.7 
0.6 16.1% 16.1% 16.1% 15.9% 5.0% 0.6             5.0             5.0             5.0             5.2             8.7 
  PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
PV/Load 
Ratio 
$0 $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 9.8% 9.2% 8.2% 5.5% -1.2% 1.2             7.6             7.7             7.7             9.2                -   
1 10.5% 10.5% 9.8% 6.8% -0.7% 1             6.8             6.9             7.6             8.7                -   
0.8 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 8.6% -0.1% 0.8             6.7             6.7             6.7             7.7                -   
0.6 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.3% 1.0% 0.6             6.7             6.7             6.7             6.7           10.7 
$5 per 
Watt
20-Year IRR Simple Payback (Years)
$3 per 
Watt
$4 per 
Watt
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Figure 14. Distribution Portion of Utility Bill for Average Consumption Case 
 
Year 1 
Utility 
Bill 
PV/Load Ratio $- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 $12 $56 $122 $300 $600 
1 $56 $65 $129 $300 $600 
0.8 $156 $156 $156 $301 $600 
0.6 $262 $262 $262 $307 $600 
 
       
      
Years 1-5 
Total 
Utility 
Bill 
PV/Load Ratio $- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 $12 $257 $625 $1,558 $3,116 
1 $314 $316 $632 $1,558 $3,116 
0.8 $834 $834 $834 $1,558 $3,116 
0.6 $1,377 $1,377 $1,377 $1,565 $3,116 
 
       
      
Years  
1-20 
Total 
Utility 
Bill 
PV/Load Ratio $- $4 $10 $25 $50 
1.2 $12 $1,162 $2,886 $7,210 $14,421 
1 $1,915 $1,915 $2,893 $7,210 $14,421 
0.8 $4,249 $4,249 $4,249 $7,211 $14,421 
0.6 $6,673 $6,673 $6,673 $7,218 $14,421 
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Appendix II Current Massachusetts Utility Rates 
Massachusetts utility rates, including all customer charges, demand charges, program charges and basic service supply charges are published by each utility 
company as rates are updated. Given the complexity of the many rate structures offered by the state’s four investor-owned utilities, those rate sheets are 
provided in the following links for reference:  
National Grid:  
 Nantucket Electric: https://www.nationalgridus.com/non_html/1114nant.pdf 
 National Grid: https://www.nationalgridus.com/non_html/1114meco.pdf 
Eversource East (former NSTAR territories) 
 Boston Edison: https://www.eversource.com/Content/docs/default-source/rates-tariffs/190.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
 Cambridge Electric: https://www.eversource.com/Content/docs/default-source/rates-tariffs/290.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
 Commonwealth Electric: https://www.eversource.com/Content/docs/default-source/rates-tariffs/390.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
Eversource West (formerly WMECO): https://www.eversource.com/Content/docs/default-source/rates-tariffs/1052.pdf?sfvrsn=6 
Unitil: http://unitil.com/sites/default/files/tariffs/E_dpu274_Summary_of_Rates_010115.pdf 
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Net Metering Task Force, Group A- Utilities 
1.20.15 
9:00-10:30 a.m. 
 Amy Rabinowitz, National Grid   Kerry Britland, Eversource  
 Brian Rice, Eversource  Laura Bickel, National Grid  
 Hayley Dunn, Eversource  Camilo Serna, Eversource 
 Richard Chin, Eversource  Andy Belden, Meister Consultants Group 
 Peter Zschokke, National Grid   Bob Grace, Sustainable Energy Advantage 
 Ian Springsteel, National Grid   Kathryn Wright, Meister Consultants Group 
 Timothy Roughan, National Grid   
 
As per a request from focus group participants, notes are attributed to speakers from each utility.  
Participants introduced themselves, and were informed the session would not be recorded. Participants 
were given the opportunity to provide additional written comments to supplement the call.  
1. Stakeholder objectives and priorities from the Task Force process 
 What are your goals and objectives for the task force? Of those, what is your most important objective 
and why? To the extent that goals or objectives may conflict, how would you prioritize? 
National Grid: We will be providing written comments by Friday, which will summarize our comments. 
Supportive of clean energy goals state has and helping meet 1600MW goal and anything that comes 
beyond that, but we must not lose sight of how we hit the goals and cost-effectiveness, particularly for 
NEM and SRECs. How can we redefine them to be more cost effective to ensure rate fairness, 
transparency and make sure customers are not paying anything above market prices? 
Eversource: We will also submit written comments. The state needs sustainable renewable programs 
which can be enjoyed by all customers, not a few. Ideal programs would be fair, cost-effective and 
competitive. 
2. Long term Massachusetts solar market goals 
The current stated goal of the Massachusetts solar policies is to reach 1,600 MW of installed solar 
capacity in the 2020 timeframe. Please discuss your perspective on this MW goal, its timing, and the 
appropriate objectives for the state solar market beyond the timing and quantity of this goal.  
National Grid: We think 1600MW is an aggressive, but achievable goal. It represents ~4% of energy 
supply and ~12% of peak demand. A lot of this will be based on our company’s ability to interconnect, 
overall development funding and the market. With the high incentive level we are going to achieve this 
goal early. Cited virtual net metering in particular because developers can choose the site location and 
then not contribute to system costs. The costs of the NEM and SREC programs need to be reduced to 
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increase net benefits. We also need to reduce payments to solar developers and investors, particularly 
those from out of state. 
Eversource: Believes that Mass. is paying well above market prices. SRECs and NEM are nearly seven 
times more than wholesale power and four times more than wholesale renewable programs. Mass.’s 
program costs three times Conn.’s program, which participant’s company also participates in. NEM 
customers are receiving $.50/kWh. There are better ways to structure the program- we need to develop 
an all-in cost per kWh of installed solar and accompanying cost-effectiveness goals. We’ve seen solar 
prices drop with increases in volume and manufacturing efficiencies and the level of incentives should 
be decreasing as well. Over the next few years, $7 billion will be paid above market costs to support 
solar development. 
Eversource: We looked at results under the ZREC program for 15-year contracts. CT has lower prices and 
lower NEM support. We also looked at other states. We compared this on a straight rate perspective. 
This is not apples to apples comparison, but if you were to do so, we find that the net cost of the ZREC 
program is less than MA no matter what perspective you take. 
National Grid: Agreed with Participant 10, and adds costs are high when compared with Rhode Island 
too. 
Eversource: We are looking at NEM around $0.15 credit plus basic service. The 2015 vintage for SREC-I is 
above 400 dollars. This gets us at or above $0.50/kWh, though in other years the amount has been 
lower. 
3. Perspectives on current net metering approach 
Solar PV systems in Massachusetts typically benefit from net metering with various system sizes and 
configurations receiving different net metering benefits. Additionally, volumetric caps to net metering 
have been revised through legislation on multiple occasions over the past several years. Please provide 
your perspective on the current Massachusetts net metering approach.  
National Grid: Current system is not well designed. There are two issues: cost shifts between customer 
classes and distributed generators (DG) only paying for a portion of their fixed costs. DG customers are 
receiving reliability services and the ability to transact and monetize solar energy. Other non-
transmission and distribution costs are not being recovered or shifted to others, such as the renewable 
and efficiency funds as well as other programs.  Once you add-in the VNEM concept these issues are 
made worse because it is a significant administrative burden for utilities. We have to transfer payments 
from generator to customer accounts, which is not related to how power is being produced or used. 
There may also be an issue with community solar providers and ISO New England rules. There was a 
challenge regarding settlement at the DPU in 2011, with the result being that some suppliers are 
dropping customers since they can’t serve them.  
National Grid: ISO defines a large unit SOGs as greater than 5MW. It’s not clear how they should be 
treated who should take ownership of these units. For customer’s that are interval-metered, suppliers 
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are being billed based on generation. The net metering credit is a construct which creates a mismatch 
between the suppliers and what ISO needs to register in the system. Anyone bidding into basic service 
will bid at a higher rate to take into account this issue. We are receiving 1,000s of applications for PV 
interconnections, and will likely cause higher basic service charges in the future to account for this risk. 
In the smart grid pilot, 2,200 of 15,000 have left basic service because of costs. Now is the time to 
consider this issue. Community solar providers should be administered by ISO New England and 
regulated by FERC as retail providers.   
National Grid: The NEM construct may be appropriate for giving solar a jump-start, but it is not 
sustainable for a long-term program. If you have every customer net metering to zero out their bills, no 
one is paying for the costs of the system. All PV systems are receiving same net metering credit value. 
Using 2015 rates, it can be shown that VNEM costs customers more than NEM coincident with customer 
load. VNEM results in a 40% higher cost than most behind the meter systems. VNEM uses distribution 
system and provides less benefit. 
4. Perspectives on current Massachusetts solar incentive model approach 
Massachusetts solar installations typically benefit from a range of incentives, including SRECs, federal 
tax credits and net metering being major contributors to system economics. Please discuss your 
perspective on the current mix of incentives other than net metering (and virtual net metering) available 
to Massachusetts solar systems with a particular focus on the Massachusetts SREC incentive. 
National Grid: SREC obligations put a higher cost on IOU customers than it should. Prices are not 
declining with time even though PV is cheaper. SREC-II narrowed the floor and ceiling with declining 
price, but SREC values are still too high and volatile. This creates artificial risk and financing difficulties. If 
we introduced competition based on cost and total development, it would help developers. A fixed rate 
would give customers a hedge value and should lower costs. The SREC program is high cost/high risk and 
induces boom-bust cycles. This makes it hard for solar development costs to come down effectively. A 
competitively procured amount of solar PV production would be better. 
Eversource: SREC incentives exceed what’s necessary to deploy solar in the state. CT, NJ and RI all have 
lower subsidies. We understand the need to provide price certainty, but believe transparency and 
competitiveness is key element. Having administratively set rates disrupts competition. We can still give 
appropriate incentives. Some amount of incentives should be set-aside and we should think about how 
much solar we can procure with a fixed budget. This is much like the CT approach. 
Eversource: In NJ, long-term contract support and banking have been able to augment the SREC 
program and stabilize market participants and the market, even without fixed floor. We think solar could 
be procured through RPS program without price support. Some market participants are sophisticated 
and should be able to manage this risk. We have seen this in NJ after the SREC program was changed. In 
the case of efficiency, incentives and rebates were introduced to jump start the market, but the goal 
was to reduce the incentives once the market is working. We need to think about how EE works and 
bring that to the next evolution of the SREC program. 
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5. Perspectives on other solar incentive models 
Other states have implemented a range of incentive program types in order to grow their solar markets. 
Several program types that you may be aware of include (but are not limited to):  
• Standard offer incentive programs (aka. feed-in tariffs)  
• Declining block incentive programs  
• Competitive procurements (aka. auctions or solicitations)  
There are also many variations on these approaches, as well as co-policies. Are any of these incentive 
program types of particular interest to you? Please discuss your impressions of these or other incentive 
program types that you may be aware of, and whether we should focus on particular incentive types 
that are of interest to you. How do you think the effectiveness of these incentive program types vary for 
different solar installation types (e.g. residential vs. utility scale)? What options would you like to see the 
consulting team consider and analyze for Massachusetts? 
 
Eversource: It is more about what parameters are needed instead of focusing on a single program 
having looked at other states.  A program should be fair, transparent, and appropriate to level of solar 
development in industry. DG should be incentivized based on known, measurable benefits and 
reevaluated and modified as policy goals are met. Externalities such as jobs and the environment should 
be treated consistently between the utility scale and DG. Any price above wholesale price should be 
regulated by DPU. We are supportive of the long-term contracting programs in CT. We also look to RPS 
programs to have transparent prices through bidding and no discrimination between project types. A 
tariff system would be easier administratively. We understand the difficulty of following bid schedule, 
and would be OK with a declining block incentive if the rates were set transparently and the schedule 
ends at 0. If RPS programs are retained, it should not have a floor, but instead should have these 
parameters. 
National Grid: In RI, renewable energy growth program is launched soon and will be ½ the cost of the 
MA program. All of the payments are under an approved tariff. Small and medium systems have a fixed 
–price performance based tariff. Non-residential systems receive a fixed payment for 20-years. 
Residential systems receive NEM credits and further incentives for performance. A public process sets 
rate annually based on the market and competitive procurements. Large solar systems must bid into a 
competitive procurement with a ceiling. During the last auction sizes ranged from 172kW to 1.25 MW. 
All-in $150-240/MWh bids. Most averaged $200/MWh. New York has used competitive solicitation for 
200 kW and up. That program has provided awards worth the equivalent of SREC price of $50 for 10 
years at a 10% discount rate. However, it doesn’t provide hedge-value. NY is moving to declining block 
program with a step schedule. This is less cost-effective compared to competitive model and insensitive 
to market changes and needed rates of return. Our view is that mix of standard PBI tariff rates for 
smaller systems and competitively set tariff rates for larger systems would be best. 
6. Perspectives on future use of net metering, as well as minimum bill provisions 
During the past year, efforts have been made to revise the framework for net metering in 
Massachusetts including the addition of a minimum bill for all electricity ratepayers. Please discuss 
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your perspective on the future use of net metering/virtual in Massachusetts and, to the extent you 
are able, what options or changes would you like to see and why? 
 
National Grid: Thinks a minimum bill would reduce inequities between ratepayers and would help NEM 
participants pay for their fixed costs and not impact the energy efficiency  incentive that volumetric 
rates provide. This would not fully resolve all of the issues with cost-recovery and cross-subsidization, 
but it can transition us to a world where people pay for what they are using from the utility system. 
Eversource: We have indicated problems we see with the current structure. Rate design should function 
based on cost allocation, efficiency, continuity, and fairness. We feel that net metering violates most of 
these. Without proper cost-allocation, we can’t meet state goals. We need new rate designs which 
disaggregate the benefits and costs of solar. We want to be able to get the data points we need to 
create a new rate design. This includes the power exported to our company, the power delivered to 
customers and the production of DG facilities. We need to recover fixed T&D costs at a level similar to 
non-DG customers. A separate generation transaction would be compensated – there are many 
different options. Another alternative is to develop valuation of solar methodology to compensate for 
energy being distributed. Then the incentives would come into play- we’ve discussed how they should 
be structured, and that they should decline over time. We also propose a new customer class with 
higher T&D customer charges, but it wouldn’t be subject to net metering. The bottom line is that we 
need to address this in a comprehensive manner with a formal regulatory proceeding which can 
determine appropriate rate design and benefits of DG. Regulatory bodies were established to do this. 
Eversource: We believe that the minimum bill is one method of rate design. NEM should reflect the 
DPUs principles, costs should be properly allocated to customers, and it should have customer 
protection designed into it. Separation between delivery and export of power will enable a better rate 
design. VNEM needs to be re-evaluated entirely.  
National Grid: Seconds that DPU is the right forum to balance all needs for rate design. As with every 
other rate change, a minimum bill would have to be customer class specific. 
Consultant: Do you have any feedback on if existing installations should be grandfathered for some 
period of time for rate changes? 
Eversource: It depends on what the rate design is and if it will accommodate existing facilities. Any 
design would have to take that into account. Difficult to explain without a specific example, but it should 
be a part of discussions.  
National Grid: Seconds Eversource’s thoughts. Open to a transition, but hard to say more without 
specifics. 
7. Perspectives on policy transitions 
A. At the 2nd Task Force meeting, it was suggested that analysis should account for uncertainty costs, 
(i.e., transition costs due to changing goals and programs.)  Please discuss qualitatively the nature 
 283 
 
of these costs as you see them, and whether and how you might suggest such costs could or should 
be quantified. 
 
B. Are there particular threshold milestones where it might make sense to consider policy transitions 
in order to minimize such costs? What other means are available to minimize such costs? 
Eversource: It is difficult to know what kinds of costs there might be. The marketplace is full of 
uncertainty. Some of the players are becoming sophisticated and should be able to deal with change. 
Programs are not expected to be exactly the same forever. Any program change should incorporate 
transition into design. The cost of running the existing program would likely be more than the transition 
cost. 
National Grid: Unclear of what the definition of uncertainty cost is in the question. Costs are being 
incurred today for the program and the distribution grid. Program participants in the future may be 
uncertain about what their benefits will be from the utility and for their generation. Certainly, clarity 
from the DPU would help about where we are going in the future as well as a timeline so everyone is 
familiar with rate design and other changes. We want for customers to pay for the services provided by 
grid and be compensated for the services they provide. We need a framework, clarity, time and 
customer fairness. If VNEM is taken to the extreme no one is paying for the grid. This can’t happen. 
Costs for one party are savings for another. Who is the right party to pay for the distribution grid? 
National Grid: The tighter the timeline, the less risk for all the parties involved. Long timelines leave 
more room for revisions. 
8. Utility- specific questions  
How would you propose a minimum bill calculation methodology be applied? What other models would 
you point to that are viable for achieving your objectives?  
 
National Grid: Minimum bill design to be addressed in the written comments.  
Eversource: We will provide written responses to questions and a separate attachment on the minimum 
bill. A minimum bill is less preferable than an appropriate rate design.  
With respect to FCM revenues for current Class II and III systems, for which utilities secure certain rights 
under net metering tariffs, please describe your current practices, and future plans.  
 
Eversource: Haven’t offered any NEM system into FCM. We don’t control those assets so we aren’t 
willing to assume risk of obligation of those systems. FCM value is still realized through a load reduction, 
perhaps not of quickly, but it is still there. We will continue to evaluate- if the risks could be addressed 
maybe it is an option. 
National Grid:  To date, we have not taken advantage of this, but it is under consideration. 
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Are utility system integration costs for solar projects now fully borne by project owners?  
 
National Grid: Significant O&M costs, taxes, tree trimming, not being paid by customers even if they are 
paying upgrade costs. This can be up to 6% of the costs, annually. This is a cost not being borne by DG 
customers. 1,000 customers applying for interconnection- the $50-70 per meter costs are not being 
recovered since the simplified process has no fees. There are also costs from issues arising around 
Schedule Z for utility staff. A minimum 2-3 FTEs work on this issue and that number will grow. 
 
Eversource: We will be providing data on O&M appropriate numbers. 
 
What are the expected potential impacts of Grid Modernization/Time-Varying Rates efforts on net 
metering value and framework?  
 
Eversource:  We are in the very early stages of thinking about implementation. Hard to assess the 
impacts without specifics. 
National Grid: We need to think holistically about costs incurred and recovery. What types of issues 
might arise from over or under recovering? What happens if customers over produce during a peak? 
National Grid: Our decision around TOU rates carries risks for the wholesale market. There is a 
disconnect between retail-TOU pilots and the way costs are incurred at the wholesale level. 
National Grid: We need to reflect on DG Forecast Working Group findings at ISO New England and the 
FCM for solar. 
What are your experiences in other state solar markets with alternative incentive models or policies in 
place?  
 
No further comments. 
 
Please describe your past and expected future participation in SREC floor price auctions.  
 
National Grid: We haven’t participated. We are in the market for SRECs prior to the auction and have 
typically gotten enough for load. To participate in the auction would be speculative since it would occur 
before the load was known. 
 
Eversource:  Our experience is similar. Our only demand for SRECs is to serve basic service load. We 
have a process for serving basic service load, and we don’t look at time horizons very far in the future. 
May be the case will be different in the future.  
 
What information can you make available to the consulting team to help us assess the role of avoided 
T&D cost (if/where applicable) and avoided distribution losses resulting from installation of distributed 
solar generation?  
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Information will be provided. 
9. Other topics 
Are there any major topics or perspectives related to the Task Force’s scope that we have not discussed 
today that you would like to comment on?  
Eversource:  Recognizes there is a challenge to address everything through legislative process and 
report. We need regulatory proceedings, and to reflect value that grid provides to the DG. The value of 
these systems can increase with increased utility involvement in deployment. We believe we provide 
more services to DG, such as reliability and compensation for variable outputs, frequency regulation and 
redundancy services, voltage, and start-up power. This needs to be key element of rate design and as 
initial element of the analysis. 
National Grid: Recommended EPRI’s paper on the Integrated Grid, and agreed with Eversource 
regarding the need to reflect the value of grid services. How will the consultant team get costs data from 
developers and host customers?  
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Net Metering Task Force Focus Group Interviews 
Group B- Utility Customers and Customer Advocates 
1.21.2015 
3:00 p.m-4:30 p.m 
 
 David Colton, Town Administrator, Easton  Andy Belden, Meister Consultants Group 
 Bob Rio, AIM Representative  Bob Grace, Sustainable Energy Advantage 
  Kathryn Wright, Meister Consultants 
Group 
1. Stakeholder objectives and priorities from the Task Force process 
 What are your goals and objectives for the task force? Of those, what is your most important objective 
and why? To the extent that goals or objectives may conflict, how would you prioritize? 
Participant 2- Would like to make sure the result continues to allow development of solar energy in the 
NEM/VNEM paradigm so that we can continue to reduce our costs of energy. Acknowledge that the 
subsidies need to be paid by someone. Regardless of what happens, public sector projects need to 
remain viable. As a secondary goal- alternative energy is important and we need to continue to diversify 
energy mix for well-being of planet. Third- Don’t think we want to see change in the way that electricity 
is produced, generated and distributed. The separation of distribution and generation companies has 
been good for MA. We do not want distribution companies to gain more control over generation assets, 
even if they are distributed. Utilities have demonstrated that they are overstretched with their existing 
priorities. 
Participant 1-  The goal is to find the best way to have a solar program. That may or may not be NEM. 
We need to review rate and incentives structures to ensure they are proper and not overly generous. 
We need to stay on the trajectory of increased solar. Acknowledges who is paying for subsidies is a huge 
issue as well as freeridership. In general, people don’t understand that the incentives are misaligned 
with the market. Our goal should be to look at the market and what it takes to develop solar and align 
incentives for people to install high-value installations. It is not clear what the implications for 
Massachusetts are or electric stability growth isn’t managed. 
2. Long term Massachusetts solar market goals 
The current stated goal of the Massachusetts solar policies is to reach 1,600 MW of installed solar 
capacity in the 2020 timeframe. Please discuss your perspective on this MW goal, its timing, and the 
appropriate objectives for the state solar market beyond the timing and quantity of this goal.  
Participant 1- Someone decided that 1600MW is the right number. It could be more or less. Getting to 
the goal doesn’t bother me, but it needs to be clear that this goal has some resemblance of what you 
need to ensure system reliability and an appropriate fuel mix. The NEM legislation that references 
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1600MW doesn’t mention 2020 so I don’t think we are held to that standard. If the incentives are 
aligned and we get there before then, then that’s OK. The location of solar and how we are using DG are 
more important than goal. Should consider incentives on a locational basis. An example, Nantucket 
Electric needs power. They have almost no back-up power in summer. Not sure what the attitude 
towards solar is in Nantucket, but solar could alleviate this problem. An installation is worth far more to 
society there. There are likely many other places where this is the case. For ISO New England, peak 
electricity needs are after the sun sets. Solar is not giving us the full benefit we need. We’d better off 
orienting panels to pick up sun in later hours and incentivizing systems which provide maximum benefit 
to grid needs instead of maximizing production. 
Participant 2- Agree with what was said, but also feels that the goal is too small. The program achieved 
the previous goal ahead of schedule. No one has demonstrated that there was negative impact from 
exceeding the previous goal. We’ve been very successful. Why are we setting this 1600MW goal? It’s 
arbitrary. We can generate more solar power in a broad approach and include targeted installations. 
There’s no need for one or the other or a real problem with exceeding the target.  
Participant 1- The problem is that the program blew through the goal so fast, it signals that something 
isn’t optimized. When you start getting to higher MW targets and higher costs, the grid might not be 
designed to handle that level of distributed power. The system has to be there to provide back-up 
service.  In a perfect world would like to see system modernized, but that’s not likely over the next few 
decades. Right now solar is not deferring generation or T&D. Cloudy days mean all of the solar users go 
back to drawing from the grid. 
Participant 2- When I see there’s that much work being completed, it is not necessarily a problem. That 
kind of program success is a good thing. Sure- maybe it needs to be directed and managed, and be used 
more efficiently, but we are not generating too much solar. 
3. Perspectives on current net metering approach 
Solar PV systems in Massachusetts typically benefit from net metering with various system sizes and 
configurations receiving different net metering benefits. Additionally, volumetric caps to net metering 
have been revised through legislation on multiple occasions over the past several years. Please provide 
your perspective on the current Massachusetts net metering approach.  
Participant 1- It was a home run for us. The program should be kept. 
Participant 2- On the 70% that you are not self-generating, it would be interesting to see how much 
extra you are paying on the 70% to get the lower rate on the 30%. You may pay additional fees on the 
70% than the savings you receive from the 30%. Since you are offsetting such a large amount you are 
not likely to be generating overall savings. Might be more relevant for smaller systems 
I am concerned that fixed costs of the system are not being served. I know people pursing CHP so they 
don’t have to pay into adders and tariffs. Yet if CHP breaks down, they still need the grid. Any costs not 
paid by DG are picked up by everyone else. None of these customers are paying for EE programs, 
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transmission, distribution, and low income programs. I know people that have gone completely off the 
grid, which has big implications in the short-term or long-term 
Participant 1- Has always felt that the system of tariffs and rates are almost like the federal tax code. It’s 
opaque. If we think that we as a society are moving towards RE and DG and that has an effect on 
distribution system, then that’s a problem. We need to fix the tariffs. The system is creating 
disincentives for renewables 
Participant 2- The utility system is 100-year old model. We have had piecemeal transformation.   
 Perspectives on current Massachusetts solar incentive model approach 
Massachusetts solar installations typically benefit from a range of incentives, including SRECs, federal 
tax credits and net metering being major contributors to system economics. Please discuss your 
perspective on the current mix of incentives other than net metering (and virtual net metering) available 
to Massachusetts solar systems with a particular focus on the Massachusetts SREC incentive. 
Participant 2- We have covered some of this. The system is a little bit complicated. Some municipal 
utilities have different ways of incentivizing solar. I don’t know if it is better, but it is certainly simpler. 
My question is are we unjustly enriching the wrong people? Where do the benefits flow? We support 
members pursuing incentive programs, and our members comment that the system is confusing and it is 
always unclear if they are getting the best deal. It would be better in the long-run if MA was more 
similar to other states. 
Participant 1 - Hoping to learn more about what’s going on in other states through the task force 
process. In terms of the SREC program, the only thing I can say with confidence is that it is way too 
complicated. 
Participant 2- I know that DPU is looking at TOU for basic service to push demand off-peak. I’m not  a 
huge fan. Currently, solar is paid the basic service rate. Basic service is a price projection for next 3 o 6 
months, while actual rate tends to be much lower. There is no reason why solar PV power being put into 
market should be compensated at a rate different from what it is worth, when you have to buy power at 
what it costs. You should get reimbursed for what the power is worth, and that would get rid of need for 
other programs. 
4. Perspectives on other solar incentive models 
Other states have implemented a range of incentive program types in order to grow their solar markets. 
Several program types that you may be aware of include (but are not limited to):  
• Standard offer incentive programs (aka. feed-in tariffs)  
• Declining block incentive programs  
• Competitive procurements (aka. auctions or solicitations)  
There are also many variations on these approaches, as well as co-policies. Are any of these incentive 
program types of particular interest to you? Please discuss your impressions of these or other incentive 
program types that you may be aware of, and whether we should focus on particular incentive types 
that are of interest to you. How do you think the effectiveness of these incentive program types vary for 
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different solar installation types (e.g. residential vs. utility scale)? What options would you like to see the 
consulting team consider and analyze for Massachusetts? 
 
Participant 2- Keep it simple. TOU rates, location-based compensation, or production-based 
compensation. Some municipal utilities compensate in this fashion, and it aligns the value of solar with 
its cost. The claim is that we are driving down the cost of solar, but there are protests when the 
incentive level is proposed to be dropped or needs to be dropped. It is unclear what’s actually true, but 
if the incentives are aligned, like I said, I’m indifferent to the model. 
5. Perspectives on future use of net metering, as well as minimum bill provisions 
During the past year, efforts have been made to revise the framework for net metering in Massachusetts 
including the addition of a minimum bill for all electricity ratepayers. Please discuss your perspective on 
the future use of net metering/virtual in Massachusetts and, to the extent you are able, what options or 
changes would you like to see and why? 
Participant 2- If people are compensated for the value of their power only,  we wouldn’t need a 
minimum bill, or if you are reimbursed your power costs only, then you would be paying for 
transmission and distribution costs only. National Grid and NSTAR are saying that someone has to pay 
for their back-up services, which means the transmission and distribution charge associated with your 
use of electricity.  
Participant 1- There are a lot of elements and tariffs on the electric bill. The credit needs to only be for 
power portion, and then you can still fund these other programs. A possible exemption might be energy 
efficiency. The design of the incentive is to get people to use less traditional power, these programs 
aren’t intend to make people use less solar or wind. Part of the incentive for solar should be that you 
might not have to pay that tariff. I’m not sure the credit should be stripped to just power. 
Participant 2- We could have a different distribution tariff or schedule for on-site generation. Maybe you 
would pay a little less since you are not utilizing all of the programs. I tend to agree that just because 
you have solar or wind, that does not mean you should use less energy or pay into the efficiency fund. 
There are still environmental impacts from producing the systems. Our goal should be efficient use of 
energy period. If you have 5MW CHP system, and you briefly use the grid, you still have unlimited access 
to EE funds, even though they haven’t paid very much into the system. Maybe we think about this 
further? We tend to look at these programs in a microcosm, but we need to look at all of the DG 
programs and their costs and think about reliability. 
6. Perspectives on policy transitions 
C. At the 2nd Task Force meeting, it was suggested that analysis should account for uncertainty costs, 
(i.e., transition costs due to changing goals and programs.)  Please discuss qualitatively the nature of 
these costs as you see them, and whether and how you might suggest such costs could or should be 
quantified. Are there particular threshold milestones where it might make sense to consider policy 
transitions in order to minimize such costs? What other means are available to minimize such costs? 
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Participant 2- You can refer to my earlier comments. I have no problem grandfathering during the 
transition. 
Participant 1- Agreed. 
Stakeholder Specific 
 
Please describe any concerns about low-income customer impacts and benefits of current 
Massachusetts solar policies. What changes could be implemented, consistent with overarching 
policy objectives, to mitigate these concerns?  
 
Participant 1- Just an observation: Many low-income housing developments have ideal roofs for solar 
PV. The building uses practically little electricity and there’s no incentive for the developer to pursue on-
site energy. If there were, the energy could be used to reduce the low-income electric bills in the 
building, which would be a good thing. If we are incentivizing solar, then why not try to maximize 
benefit? Low-income customers are paying electric bills, they are subsidizing solar elsewhere and not 
being able to access programs seems unfair. 
Participant 2- The incentives are completely misaligned for rentals.   
Please describe any concerns about other customer impacts and benefits of current Massachusetts solar 
policies. What changes could be implemented, consistent with overarching policy objectives, to mitigate 
these concerns?  
 
Participant 2- Cross subsidy is a problem to the extent that it is happening. Some people just aren’t 
going be able to participate in the program and that is a problem  
Participant 1- Even with ideal site conditions a system might not be cost-effective. It’s not for everyone. 
What are the expected potential impacts of Grid Modernization/Time-Varying Rates efforts on net 
metering value and framework?  
 
Participant 2- This is what I discussed earlier. There is a loophole since that excludes competitively bid 
customers. Participant doesn’t understand why solar wouldn’t be subject to the same system as other 
generators. Has no problem paying solar generators a lot of money in the summer. We need to align 
TOU and smart grid with right incentives to build solar systems not for the sake of building them, but 
help solve reliability concerns. 
Participant 1- I don’t have an opinion on this yet. 
9. Other topics 
Are there any major topics or perspectives related to the Task Force’s scope that we have not discussed 
today that you would like to comment on?  
Participants offered no further comments.  
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Net Metering Task Force Focus Group Interviews 
Group C- Solar Industry 
1.20.2015 
10:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m 
 Bill Stillinger, PV Squared, Representing  SEBANE  
 Fred Zalcman, SunEdison, SEIA  
 Janet Gail Besser, NECEC  
 Lisa Podgurski, Representing urban solar installers  
 Larry Aller, Next Step Living  
 David O’ Connor, SEBANE Kate Plourd, NECEC  
 Geoff Chapin, Next Step Living  
 Andy Belden, Meister Consultants Group 
 Bob Grace, Sustainable Energy Advantage 
 Kathryn Wright, Meister Consultants Group 
Participants introduced themselves, and were informed the session would not be recorded. Participants 
were given the opportunity to provide additional written comments to supplement the call.  
1. Stakeholder objectives and priorities from the Task Force process 
 What are your goals and objectives for the task force? Of those, what is your most important objective 
and why? To the extent that goals or objectives may conflict, how would you prioritize? 
Participant 7: There is a document that lays out many of the objectives we have discussed as a solar 
industry coalition. It does a good job of capturing goals and priorities of several of the members. 
Provided consultant with documents via e-mail. The primary goal should be to ensure balanced growth 
of MA solar market for 1600MW and beyond. We should also support continued job growth in cost-
effective way. 
Participant 5: We need to get a good report and recommendations to the legislature to address net 
metering and solar incentives so we can hit the 1600MW goal in a timely fashion. We need to encourage 
other DG as well. Recognizes that utilities have raised concerns about distribution impacts, and the 
Participant is open to understanding and addressing their concerns. However in the long or shorter-
term, there should not be caps. The incentives should be set-up to compensate for distribution impacts 
only. Hopes to find a win-win solution where EDCs can be partners in supporting DG. 
Participant 4: The document Participant 7 referred to does lay out goals and objectives. If I were to 
prioritize, it would be to create a long-term sustainable market place for solar in the Commonwealth 
and break the cycle where we return to legislature to raise caps. This creates a lot of market risk for 
solar developers who are looking for stable, scalable market. 
Participant 6: Seconds Participant 4. We can’t keep returning to legislature if we want to have steady job 
industry growth. Maybe we should just remove the cap to prevent going through this cycle again. 
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Participant: We have simple feedback. We must ensure that the consultants and Task Force do what the 
legislature prescribed, except the March 31st deadline, which may have to be adjusted. The operating 
words from the legislature of a stable and sustainable market are important to everyone on this phone 
call. 
2. Long term Massachusetts solar market goals 
The current stated goal of the Massachusetts solar policies is to reach 1,600 MW of installed solar 
capacity in the 2020 timeframe. Please discuss your perspective on this MW goal, its timing, and the 
appropriate objectives for the state solar market beyond the timing and quantity of this goal.  
Participant 1: 1600MW by 2020 has been discussed as a standard/goal we are moving towards, but 
given what’s likely to happen with ITC expiration in 2017, this will not be linear process. We will walk 
most of the path before 2017, presuming no changes. How can we get to a point where the market is 
close to goal by end of 2016? We can get the rest of the way with lower incentive rate. For longer-term 
objectives, it would be ideal to have a stable policy approach and trajectory that initially provides a 
similar level of value to market participants and then have smooth transition to a stand-alone market 
after achievement of the goal. This would be similar to what was achieved in CA, but MA is at an earlier 
stage of market. Perhaps, in the 2025 to 2030 timeframe. 
Consultant - What specifically do you mean when you refer to CA? 
Participant 1- They took 8-years with their declining block schedule, and it stepped down over time. 
They still have net metering in place, which is important. The declining block drove significant market 
volume to develop the stand-alone market. MA is earlier on trajectory. The first step is getting to 
1600MW goal without disrupting the market. Anything after 2016 has a 20-30% incentive cost due to 
expiration of federal tax credits. 
Participant 7- Agrees with much of what Participant 1 stated. But, the end state should be self-sustaining 
market for solar. DOER has avoided boom-bust seen in other SREC markets. There has been more stable 
growth. Over the next two years, steady state growth is projected to 1600MW. Hopes to see reasonable 
industry (e.g. 15-30% CAGR) and job growth. We can reevaluate at the 1600MW point and see where 
solar is relative to grid parity. What incentives will be needed to get the rest of the way? Perhaps value 
of solar rates rather than incentives. 
Participant is more focused on the transition to a new policy environment, and that we not further 
destabilize market by creating new constructs. Under SREC-II there are some markets where unfettered 
growth is possible, but most of growth in the market was under the managed growth sector, which is 
capped. Participant would suggest removing the cap on it before expiration of the ITC. 
Participant 1: We will make a lot of progress towards the 1600MW is two years if the market is not 
interrupted. I think we are both focusing on allowing the market to continue to function without 
interruption and uncertainty through the end of 2016. 
Participant 7- I would agree with that. 
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3. Perspectives on current net metering approach 
Solar PV systems in Massachusetts typically benefit from net metering with various system sizes and 
configurations receiving different net metering benefits. Additionally, volumetric caps to net metering 
have been revised through legislation on multiple occasions over the past several years. Please provide 
your perspective on the current Massachusetts net metering approach.  
Participant 1- Generally, we think the current NEM system is OK. A residential carve-out is a good idea, 
but community solar needs a carve-out too. We think community solar is a democratization of solar, and 
it should be a real priority. It fits new administration’s goal of energy justice. 
Participant 4- Agrees, and is supportive of the current NEM policy. We recognize that as solar 
penetration increases, different compensation schemes may be required based on a fair evaluation of 
system costs and benefits. This might be higher than retail value. With larger systems and VNEM 
systems, there’s the loss of the distribution component. We will need to see where system is relative to 
utility distribution system load and where the value is created. Locational effects need to be accounted 
for in the next paradigm- currently all systems are treated equally.  
Participant 6- In terms of NEM, we need to have it in MA, and we need to look at the caps. VNEM 
assures long-term stabilization of job and solar industry growth, which we need to keep in the mix. 
Participant 5- Agrees with earlier statements. It would be useful to hear from consultants as to how 
policies in other states have dealt with utility concerns about distribution costs, and how to incentivize 
market as cost-effectively as possible. There are implications for the utility concerns about the 
distribution systems and our desire to remove caps. 
Participant 7- Cap discussions in the legislature have been ongoing for several years. Utilities have 
traditionally made arguments that caps are technical caps for integration reasons. With 4185, the 
utilities were willing to remove the cap if they got a minimum bill. If we could get an idea of what is 
technically feasible for a solar penetration level from the utilities, it would be helpful. Minnesota said DG 
could serve 40% of retail load without major system impacts. In Massachusetts, we would be at less 
than 6%. It seems that this is an opportunity to explore technical constraints, if there are any. 
4. Perspectives on current Massachusetts solar incentive model approach 
Massachusetts solar installations typically benefit from a range of incentives, including SRECs, federal 
tax credits and net metering being major contributors to system economics. Please discuss your 
perspective on the current mix of incentives other than net metering (and virtual net metering) available 
to Massachusetts solar systems with a particular focus on the Massachusetts SREC incentive. 
Participant 5- We have a variety of members with many business models. Our members favor many 
different models, so we won’t weigh in on one. A key thing to consider for the task force and consulting 
team is if there are some models which are more efficient at achieving the same level of solar 
development? For all models, transition costs should be taken into account. 
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Participant 4- Our members were skeptical of the SREC program at first, and were concerned about the 
availability of long-term SREC off-taker agreements and incorporation of financial risk in the market. We 
have seen maturation of the market over past several years, financiers are getting more comfortable, 
long-term SRECs available and customers understand the market better. In total, many policy paradigms 
could support solar, but I think the MA model is promoting solar and delivering it. There may be tweaks 
to make the program more cost-effective. 
Participant 1- The current SREC policy was positive even before there was an increase in natural gas 
generation. SREC-II was much better than the first SREC-I model due to increased certainty. Let’s not 
change it by introducing risk and discouraging investors. SunRun and others pulled out dramatically 
when the program changed. We need to have clear market signals to make investors confident in the 
market. 
5. Perspectives on other solar incentive models 
Other states have implemented a range of incentive program types in order to grow their solar markets. 
Several program types that you may be aware of include (but are not limited to):  
• Standard offer incentive programs (aka. feed-in tariffs) – administratively set 
• Declining block incentive programs – volume-based 
• Competitive procurements (aka. auctions or solicitations) – competitive bids 
There are also many variations on these approaches, as well as co-policies. Are any of these incentive 
program types of particular interest to you? Please discuss your impressions of these or other incentive 
program types that you may be aware of, and whether we should focus on particular incentive types 
that are of interest to you. How do you think the effectiveness of these incentive program types vary for 
different solar installation types (e.g. residential vs. utility scale)? What options would you like to see the 
consulting team consider and analyze for Massachusetts? 
 
Participant 3 - A lot of the prior comments answered this question. SREC-II seems to be working. Any 
changes to that system have to be done carefully and not destabilize the current knowledge base and 
certainty in contracting. Earlier NY, CT, and RI solicitation programs were mentioned. Those would be 
drastic changes for MA, which I’m not in favor of. 
Participant 4- From our organization’s perspective, all of these incentive programs have strengths and 
weaknesses. Without breaking it down further, we are generally more in favor of the incentive delivery 
mechanisms where the market is more or less continually open (declining blocks or SRECs). This means 
the market is not tethered to utility or a central administrator’s solicitation process. There is a 
continuous business cycle, and developers are continuously selling projects. Greater transparency 
regarding incentive price is also helpful. 
Participant 5- Many of our companies operate in different states. As you think about the analysis, stay 
focused on what’s effectively delivering solar in different states. 
Participant 7- Echoes previous comments. An open market that is not tied to a procurement schedule is 
key. Generally, other models only make sense to consider post 1600MW and not within the next two 
years where we could not change without significant cost. There has been in-depth work by the 
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legislature and others to balance and achieve goals MA has for solar in the current program. We would 
be putting that goal achievement at risk. How much total uncertainty can the market absorb? The ITC 
will cause change in how tax equity participates. It will use a lot of bandwidth just dealing with that 
change.  PBIs are like an SREC market with a firm floor. If there was a firm committed floor, then it is just 
about setting appropriate prices. As an additional thought for the legislature, reducing permitting, 
inspection and maybe interconnection costs could be an incentive for the market as well. A lot of the 
soft costs on residential side are due to massively fragmented requirements city-by-city in the state. If 
there’s a way to consolidate, it might be worth putting on radar screen. 
6. Perspectives on future use of net metering, as well as minimum bill provisions 
During the past year, efforts have been made to revise the framework for net metering in 
Massachusetts including the addition of a minimum bill for all electricity ratepayers. Please discuss 
your perspective on the future use of net metering/virtual in Massachusetts and, to the extent you 
are able, what options or changes would you like to see and why? 
Participant 5- To the extent NEM can continue it should since it has supported development of solar. 
There are two concerns with that: cost effectiveness and distribution impacts. The QPQ of removing the 
cap is addressing the distribution concerns. We should work to resolve concerns. 
Participant 1- A minimum bill that can be increased over time will make it hard to sell solar. It would 
need to be small and capped, otherwise it could kill the motivation to go solar. The biggest impact is in 
the summer, so the bill would need to be calculated fairly. Does not see a minimum bill as 100% 
necessary, but understands we need something.  
Participant 7- An increasing minimum bill will destroy market security. It is unclear that a minimum bill 
will result in meaningful revenue to the utilities. The most at-risk members of the community may be 
impacted by a minimum bill, since low-income and elderly consumers are actively trying to reduce their 
bills. Overall the current NEM program is the best option that we have for progress through the end of 
2016. The market will continue to evolve, and we will need a fair and balanced process of calculating the 
benefits and costs solar provides to the grid. It takes time. It was done well in Austin and Minnesota. 
Open to having a discussion on next generation approaches, but the process needs to be inclusive. 
Participant 4- We supported 4185 last year, which did include consideration of minimum bills. Our 
support is contingent on an overall valuation of cost and benefits solar provides to customer, utility, 
grid, other ratepayers and society at large. Supports the notion of gradualism- any minimum bill has to 
be modest in amount relative to what customers are paying today. We are supportive of the concept if 
it’s a trade for uncapping net-metering. 
7. Perspectives on policy transitions 
D. At the 2nd Task Force meeting, it was suggested that analysis should account for uncertainty 
costs, (i.e., transition costs due to changing goals and programs.)  Please discuss 
qualitatively the nature of these costs as you see them, and whether and how you might 
suggest such costs could or should be quantified. 
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E. Are there particular threshold milestones where it might make sense to consider policy 
transitions in order to minimize such costs? What other means are available to minimize 
such costs? 
Participant 1- In any new market you will have less investment until the transition plays out, raising the 
cost of capital. Transitions need to be smoother. Once we pass 1600MW and the ITC fades, we need 
something to support the market to ease transition. It should not be radically different from the options 
in market now- we need companies and jobs not to be cut. 
Participant 4- To the extent we do experience another change in the incentive delivery mechanism, we 
will need time for industry to adjust. Robust grandfathering is necessary to the extent investment 
decisions have been made based on the current market system. 
Participant 7- Delays are a risk of transition since people will wait to see what will happen. SREC-II was 
not a major transition, but market grew 70% in 2013, and 2% in 2014. Without long-term visibility, any 
delays between now and the end of 2016 has a pretty clear cost. Any project delayed either loses 20% 
from the commercial ITC expiring or on residential side it loses 30% of its value. This is why it is of 
fundamental importance that the market be able to run through the end of 2016, unless we have some 
option that will provide 20-30% of the value of the system as an incentive. The transition needs to be a 
similar policy so the market can adjust. Any new program creates additional administrative burden. 
Participant 3 - Grandfathering is fundamental to any contemplated change and as well as a long lead 
time. 
Participant 4- It really is critical for customers now enrolled in NEM to continue to benefit from that 
arrangement. CA agreed that customers will continue to get NEM credits for the useful life of the 
system. This is critical for the market. 
8. Stakeholder Group Specific 
How (if at all) are FCM revenues currently monetized under the current policy environment? Do you have 
suggestions for improvements?  
Participant 4- From our perspective, if the system is NEM, then the utility has the right to the capacity 
payment. But, for the most part, the utilities have not bid those assets in. There has been reluctance 
because of the capacity values to date. Utilities are also uncomfortable being subject to performance 
penalties from assets they don’t own or control. This is detrimental to ratepayers- Close to 1000MW of 
solar is not being offered into capacity market. There could be a cost-sharing arrangement with 
developers to de-risk project from utility standpoint, or for developers to bid the projects in. 
Participant 7- This is not relevant for residential. From our experience to date it is not something that 
has emerged as a revenue stream or service from a residential purchase. I am not familiar with 
everything the third-party market does. There may be early efforts on the third-party ownership side, 
but I haven’t seen anything. The current market structure prohibiting pursuit of this, and customer 
knowledge of the FCM is low or non-existent. 
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Consultant – If obstructions were removed would FCM be of interest or are the risks too prohibitive? 
Participant 4- We may be bidding resources in the next auction- so not at all. Right now, capacity rights 
belong to the utility- it is unclear if the utility may exercise those rights with more generation online or 
higher FCM prices. 
What are your experiences in other state solar markets with alternative incentive models or policies in 
place?  
No additional comments beyond earlier discussion. 
What are the expected potential impacts of Grid Modernization/Time-Varying Rates efforts on net 
metering value and framework?  
Participant 5- We sees significant opportunities to support DG deployment with TOU rates, and  support 
TOU rates being made available. We need to send signals about the locational value of distributed 
resources. TOU can be a way to show that value. The value of solar and DG will be more available to 
system operators. This is something to keep in mind as policy changes, but not a near-term solution 
Participant 7- Agreed. On residential side, TOU rates can expand the power and effectiveness of the 
solar market, but if done wrong way it could damage it. If customers can opt-in or opt-out of TOU rates, 
it could open up west-facing rooftop systems which have been previously unviable. If it’s a mandated 
change with no grandfathering, it hurts customers who built their systems based on another rate 
structure.  
9. Other topics 
Are there any major topics or perspectives related to the Task Force’s scope that we have not discussed 
today that you would like to comment on?  
Participant 3- Must take public comment into account. There is a huge interest in preserving and 
expanding community-shared solar and equitable treatment for customers that are located in municipal 
power systems. No suggestions on how to move forward, but these have emerged as important. 
Participant 7- During the analysis for SREC-II, there was a discussion of different program options. When 
thinking about residential customer-owned systems, having a more guaranteed value stream has no 
impact on their cost of capital. Their cost of capital is determined by their credit score. This is just to 
remind the team to be aware that investments to increase SREC cash flow security don’t necessarily 
benefit residential solar. In the third-party market there are efforts by those players to line-up financing 
against those revenue streams. 
Participant 5 - Look at solar incentive models that work for variety of ownership structures. 
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Net Metering Task Force Focus Group Interviews 
Group D - Legislators 
1.9.2015 
10:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m. 
Attendees: 
 Christina Fisher –Senator Downing’s Office    Andy Belden, Meister Consultants Group  
 Eric Krathwohl – Appointee of Senator Bruce Tarr  Kathryn Wright, Meister Consultants Group  
 Stolle Singleton – Appointed by House Minority 
Leader, Bradley Jones 
 Bob Grace, Sustainable Energy Advantage 
 
Participants introduced themselves, and were informed the session would not be recorded. One of the 
participants noted that they would have to leave the call early. Participants were given the opportunity 
to provide additional written comments to supplement the call.  
 
1. Stakeholder objectives and priorities from the Task Force process 
 What are your goals and objectives for the task force? Of those, what is your most important objective 
and why? To the extent that goals or objectives may conflict, how would you prioritize? 
Participant 3: The task force should find an ideal mix of solar incentives to meet state goals with a 
caveat that any incentives should be distributed equitably so there’s no burden on non-participating 
ratepayers. There is a balance between meeting the goal and fairly distributing costs. 
Participant 1: Shares similar view to Participant 3. Personally and through conversations with an 
elected official, the task force needs to define clear costs and benefits of future solar development. 
Personal opinion of reading of legislation seems like the primary goal of the task force is to figure out 
the best way to hit 1600 MW. Hopes task force can set up policy market or framework for market to 
continue to provide benefits going forward in the long-term that is clear and consistent to minimize 
boom-bust cycles seen previously in renewable markets. 
2. What issues and concerns have your constituents expressed to you regarding the current net 
metering and/or solar policies?  
Beyond the goal of meeting a solar target, what are any other policy objectives that are important for a 
solar and net metering program to provide?  
 
Participant 2: Constituency consists of communities in Western Massachusetts that are active in solar 
market, and they felt that they were left out of the conversations during the last legislative session. 
They were also unsure about the minimum bill. The length and content of the final discussions about 
the bill also caused confusion. Constituents prefer to keep existing policies in place.  
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Participant 3: Emphasized the need for balancing incentives and costs, and a better understanding of 
ratepayer impacts. Balance of incentives and ratepayer impacts are needed. Low-income individuals 
also need to be able to access solar DG programs through avenues like virtual net metering. 
 
Participant 1: Based on personal conversations with the community, there is more interest in more 
solar. Participant’s state legislator would like to see more fairness, and recognizes growing interest in 
community solar. Programs need to be available to more people. Other goals to consider include 
economic development and jobs. The MassCEC has shown growth in employment in the clean tech 
sector in the state. Have to consider this issue- was not sure if the report to the taskforce will include 
impacts from additional solar development, but it is important. 
 
3. Long term Massachusetts solar market goals 
The current stated goal of the Massachusetts solar policies is to reach 1,600 MW of installed solar 
capacity in the 2020 timeframe. Please discuss your perspective on this MW goal, its timing, and the 
appropriate objectives for the state solar market beyond the timing and quantity of this goal.  
Participants did not have comments on this question 
4. Perspectives on current net metering approach 
Solar PV systems in Massachusetts typically benefit from net metering with various system sizes and 
configurations receiving different net metering benefits. Additionally, volumetric caps to net metering 
have been revised through legislation on multiple occasions over the past several years. Please provide 
your perspective on the current Massachusetts net metering approach.  
Participant 3: Believes that volumetric caps are necessary under the current structure since 
participating and non-participating ratepayers are funding incentive programs. Unless the structure is 
readjusted then the cap can’t be adjusted or lifted. This could be done by changing the credit level, for 
instance potentially crediting solar production at the wholesale rate. A minimum bill could also be 
explored to recover appropriate costs from solar customers. Does not think the current structure is 
ideal.  
Participant 1: Agrees that the current structure is not ideal. Caps have created boom-bust cycles and 
rushes to the queue without having viable projects. Programs fill up quickly and then development 
cycle halts. Can we eliminate caps? Studies are needed on DG and distribution system impacts as well 
as appropriate pricing for incentives. To the extent the net metering task force study and report could 
help refine these questions- it would be helpful. People are OK with paying their costs- a minimum bill 
might work.  Virtual net metering has also been important driver for many projects. This needs to stay 
in place.  
Participant 2: After listening to public comments, thinks virtual net metering is of significant concern 
across constituencies.   
5. Perspectives on current Massachusetts solar incentive model approach 
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Massachusetts solar installations typically benefit from a range of incentives, including SRECs, federal 
tax credits and net metering being major contributors to system economics. Please discuss your 
perspective on the current mix of incentives other than net metering (and virtual net metering) available 
to Massachusetts solar systems with a particular focus on the Massachusetts SREC incentive. 
Participant 3: Refrained from commenting since Participant was unclear of the program’s performance.  
Participant 1: The consultants may be able to help clarify. SREC-I and SREC-II have been critical to solar 
development. When SREC-I was depleted and SREC-II was not yet in place, development virtually 
halted. Everyone was waiting on the policy changes. Believes the current targeting strategy to 
encourage higher-value installations makes sense. The federal tax credit will expire soon- unless 
replaced, there will be a void. Unsure of how and if the state can deal with that in advance, but the loss 
of the incentive will have impact on development.  
Participant 2: Had to leave the call. 
6. Perspectives on other solar incentive models 
Other states have implemented a range of incentive program types in order to grow their solar markets. 
Several program types that you may be aware of include (but are not limited to):  
• Standard offer incentive programs (aka. feed-in tariffs)  
• Declining block incentive programs  
• Competitive procurements (aka. auctions or solicitations)  
There are also many variations on these approaches, as well as co-policies. Are any of these incentive 
program types of particular interest to you? Please discuss your impressions of these or other incentive 
program types that you may be aware of, and whether we should focus on particular incentive types 
that are of interest to you. How do you think the effectiveness of these incentive program types vary for 
different solar installation types (e.g. residential vs. utility scale)? What options would you like to see the 
consulting team consider and analyze for Massachusetts? 
 
Participant 3: Interested in declining block incentives to encourage solar at lower cost. Wondered if it 
was possible to adapt California and New York models for Massachusetts. Inquired on how competitive 
procurement applies to small-scale solar projects?  
Participant 3: Standard-offer contracts offer price certainty, but setting appropriate price over time is 
difficult. 
Participant 1: Expressed general familiarity with models, but not enough to comment specifically. Looks 
to consultants for guidance on these topics.  
7. Perspectives on future use of net metering, as well as minimum bill provisions 
During the past year, efforts have been made to revise the framework for net metering in 
Massachusetts including the addition of a minimum bill for all electricity ratepayers. Please discuss 
your perspective on the future use of net metering/virtual in Massachusetts and, to the extent you 
are able, what options or changes would you like to see and why? 
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Participant 3: Would be supportive of a minimum bill if an ideal price can be identified that supports 
solar development without cost shifts. Will the consulting identify an appropriate amount? Participant 
heard there was limited quantitative analysis on the bill during the last session. 
Participant 1: Net metering and virtual net metering are key to solar development.  It seems likely that a 
reasonable rate could be set. The legislation could develop a framework to be administered by DOER to 
adjust the bill over time. development, but needs to not be burdensome. Unsure if minimum bill would 
be helpful or appropriate. 
NMTF Consultant: Can we get feedback on degree to which grandfathering is appropriate for those who 
invested in solar? 
Participant 1: Would have a problem applying new charge to those who’ve made investments from a 
legal and fairness perspective. 
Participant 3: It makes a difference if it’s a rate adjustment vs. minimum bill. Grandfathering a rate 
adjustment would seem more fair if the rate reflects the cost 
Participant 1: Agreed. Looking at it as a homeowner with solar, to the extent that bills are offset, 
Participant would find it fair to charge for use of distribution system. The rate just needs to be correct. 
Will there be an analysis of the net metering credit rate in other states? 
8. Perspectives on policy transitions 
F. At the 2nd Task Force meeting, it was suggested that analysis should account for uncertainty costs, 
(i.e., transition costs due to changing goals and programs.)  Please discuss qualitatively the nature 
of these costs as you see them, and whether and how you might suggest such costs could or should 
be quantified. 
G. Are there particular threshold milestones where it might make sense to consider policy transitions in 
order to minimize such costs? What other means are available to minimize such costs? 
 
Participant 3: There will be costs to a transition, but the current system also has costs as well, and the 
state still has a target to achieve.  
Participant 1: To the extent possible, we must avoid having multiple transitions. If the taskforce can 
establish a framework for a longer timeframe, it would add some certainty. Policy changes lower 
investor confidence. How do you quantify initial policy transition cost? Unclear if that analysis is feasible. 
Participant 3: Seconds Participant 1. Need to develop longer term, predictable model for future for 
investor confidence and market development.  
Other topics 
Are there any major topics or perspectives related to the Task Force’s scope that we have not discussed 
today that you would like to comment on?  
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Participant 3: There’ve been recent reports about solar reaching grid parity in certain sectors. How have 
incentives impacted this? Has this or should this be discussed at the meetings?   
Participant 1: Taskforce already has a lot on its plate, and doesn’t have anything to add. Heard solar has 
reached grid parity in utility-scale projects, but since we are focused on smaller systems shouldn’t 
influence conversation or actions much. 
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Net Metering Task Force Focus Group Interviews 
Group F- Non-Task Force Members 
1.15.2015 
10:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m 
 
Attendees 
 Emily Rochon, MassSolar, Boston Community Capital   Stephen Eisenberg, SREC Trade  
 Nathan Phelps, Vote Solar   Stephen Pratt-Oro, Eastern Bank  
 Todd Ford, Hampshire COG   Andy Belden, Meister Consultants Group  
 Craig Wetmore, Bluewave   Kathryn Wright, Meister Consultants Group  
 Becky Merola, Noble Solutions   Bob Grace, Sustainable Energy Advantage 
 Jason Prince, Karbone   
  
Participants introduced themselves, and were informed the session would not be recorded. Participants 
were given the opportunity to provide additional written comments to supplement the call.  
1. Stakeholder objectives and priorities from the Task Force process 
 What are your goals and objectives for the task force? Of those, what is your most important objective 
and why? To the extent that goals or objectives may conflict, how would you prioritize? 
Participant 5: The objective is to develop sustainable policy for solar now and in the future. Policies 
should be substantive enough to include technologies and reach 1,600MW goal.  
Participant 4: Agreed with Participant 5, and added than an explicit effort be made to include low-
income communities and ratepayers, and creating a sustainable market beyond 1,600MW.  
Participant 7: Agreed with previous statements. The Net Metering Task Force (NMTF) also needs to 
ensure development is completed as cost-effectively as possible. It helps everyone if solar is subsidized 
as efficiently as possible, and puts less of a burden on ratepayers. 
Participant 1: The NMTF needs to take current market infrastructure into consideration from the 
financing of installations to service providers. The structure of the market, be it net metering or the 
SREC program, should change such that it does not impact market development or cause a market 
disruption. The policy also needs to be as cost-effective as possible. Current market has enabled 
Massachusetts to become market leader in solar and has led to a number of clean energy jobs in the 
state. 
Participant 8: Coming from the perspective of the retail electric market, existing retail contracts need to 
be acknowledged and considered before changing the RPS.  
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Participant 2: Cautions and reminds NMTF that wind energy projects in the state are not currently on 
track. Continued incentives for solar become more important since other renewable energy projects are 
not performing as well.  
Participant 9: Agreed with comments about stability. State needs to live with this model for a long time 
and aim for market stability. Encourage NMTF to observe the leadership role of municipalities have 
taken  and seek to retain that leadership  
Participant 6: The market needs stability, and existing projects and projects in pipeline should be 
grandfathered.  
2. Long term Massachusetts solar market goals 
The current stated goal of the Massachusetts solar policies is to reach 1,600 MW of installed solar 
capacity in the 2020 timeframe. Please discuss your perspective on this MW goal, its timing, and the 
appropriate objectives for the state solar market beyond the timing and quantity of this goal.  
Participant 4: 1,600MW is too small in light of the diverse market that SREC-II is trying to foster. Given 
the MWs developed in the previous years, DOER has had to throttle the managed growth sector. This 
impacts economic growth. 1,600MW is only 4% of electricity consumption in state. Need to think about 
the next stage of the market. Task force also needs to take into account the impacts of the Investment 
Tax Credit (ITC) expiration.  
Participant 9: The target is fine, but it is only one piece of the pie. Much of the money associated with 
solar development in past few years has flowed out of the state. Need to incentivize jobs and business 
within the Commonwealth instead of supporting the multi-national companies which have entered the 
market. 
Participant 7: 1,600MW is not enough of a high ceiling for development. The key idea is to foster 
development where it is cost-effective, and developers can build what they can to respond for the 
benefits of the GWSA and ratepayers. Fears that 1,600MW target throttles development instead of 
encouraging. Needs to be clear if it  is a binding constraint or an aspirational goal. 
Participant 6: Agreed with previous statements. Noted that as we consider other questions, that the 
stated goal acts as a cap. 1,600MW is too small. Incentives should be a matter of right for developers 
that deliver solar instead of facing caps.  
Participant 5: 1,600MW is the next interim objective, but not the goal. More development can benefit 
all ratepayers. 
Participant 6: MW goals and program caps create unintended dynamics. There is positive intent to spur 
development, but can lead to boom-bust cycles, and doesn’t allow for smooth continuation of market 
development. Seeing that with managed growth sector of SREC-II program. In other states, the solar 
carve-out is a percentage of retail load served. 
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3. Perspectives on current net metering approach 
Solar PV systems in Massachusetts typically benefit from net metering with various system sizes and 
configurations receiving different net metering benefits. Additionally, volumetric caps to net metering 
have been revised through legislation on multiple occasions over the past several years. Please provide 
your perspective on the current Massachusetts net metering approach.  
Participant 5: Before any discussion starts, we need better information.  A cost benefit analysis is the 
first step, then we can evaluate NEM and NEM vs. other policies. Also need to consider NEM in the 
context of the current rate design. If the rate design changes, is NEM still appropriate? 
Participant 4: Agreed with Participant 5. As it stands now that caps are created by statute and we have 
to return to legislature to raise cap. This creates uncertainty. Should be addressed by removing cap 
entirely or removing for smaller projects. Move from a 25 kW exemption to 1MW exemption. Virtual 
Net Energy Metering (VNEM) needs to be evaluated not just in terms of utility costs, but to insure that 
all ratepayers can access solar.  
Participant 7: Agrees with comments on VNEM. NEM and VNEM has been fundamental to development 
of solar in the state. This has to be taken into consideration in the cost-benefit analysis. VNEM allows 
concerns with NEM to be addressed by allocating credits to wider population. Have seen issues in 
Minnesota where cost-benefit analysis has made utilities reluctant to adopt. Need to look at benefits 
with MA in mind. Need policy not to stop and start as we have seen with PTC elsewhere.  
Participant 1: When H4185 was being debated some of the benefits that DG is providing to the grid, like 
capacity, were not focused on. Wants to make sure consulting group considers benefits, and the need 
for additional grid supply projects with traditional generators coming offline. This benefits ratepayer 
base as well.  
4. Perspectives on current Massachusetts solar incentive model approach 
Massachusetts solar installations typically benefit from a range of incentives, including SRECs, federal 
tax credits and net metering being major contributors to system economics. Please discuss your 
perspective on the current mix of incentives other than net metering (and virtual net metering) available 
to Massachusetts solar systems with a particular focus on the Massachusetts SREC incentive. 
Participant 4: SREC-II added the tiered SREC factor to favor projects over others, such as projects in low-
income communities and housing developments. This has created a major market where there 
previously was none. But, the SREC-II process can be too rigid. Under SREC-I, we completed a shared 
solar project, which sold power to assisted living, center, housing project and local business. SREC-II 
can’t look at this project with different actors and assign it appropriate value. Unintentionally excludes 
interesting projects- you don’t get as good of an incentive. Stifling innovation. Would be nice to address 
this inflexibility. 
Participant 9: SRECs have driven the Massachusetts market. The Commonwealth shouldn’t be wedded 
to this policy, but should not exclude it as an option. Should use this opportunity to test out other 
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models, but the status quo may not be the best option. Not being able to secure financing for future 
value of RECs is a problem.  
Participant 7: Need to make sure we have an efficient subsidy regime. Believes market mechanism is the 
most efficient way to achieve that.  Administratively-set incentives haven’t worked because they aren’t 
responsive to market forces. From the market-makers perspective, and in response to previous 
comment, there have been long-term hedges in the Massachusetts market. SRECs in Mass are 
supported by policy features- dynamic demand calculation, floor, and auction. This means the SRECs are 
less volatile, and thus long-term SREC hedges are provided. People have been able to get financing. 
SRECs and NEM are broad policies but have to look at Massachusetts context. SRECs has encouraged 
development efficiently here. Market will do well if stability and path forward is clear.  
Participant 10: Capital costs for Massachusetts are in the higher-range from a cash equity and tax equity 
perspective. This is partially because of the SREC market- thus would encourage other models. Capital 
costs are less in other places where incentive regime is simpler (i.e. California). In practice 
Massachusetts is 300-400 basis points higher because of the uncertainty of SREC transactions. Some 
companies can operate, but it’s a heavier lift. 
Participant 6: Likes SREC program. Long-term SREC pre-sales are significantly below spot prices. From 
our perspective- there are downside and upsides. Upsides: Does benefit local vendors and in-state/in-
market actors. Downsides: SREC program opacity, even the auction and market are downside to 
program. Value leakage from developers/ratepayers over to brokers, etc. (i.e. Attorneys who are now 
needed soft costs under SREC program).  
Participant 9:  Need to differentiate large-scale SREC process vs. residential projects. To individuals - 
SREC market swings wildly and homeowners have no market power. Need some more protection for 
residential scale SRECs holder to keep small-scale SREC market viable for homeowners.  
Participant 1:  In the consulting report for SREC-II, the way the incentive flows from buy-side to sell-side 
means that one-side of the market can be more incentivized than the other. But it’s a market-based 
mechanism so it can be responsive. Price is influenced by other factors not just solar supply in the 
market, but electricity costs, other incentives. If the value of the incentive is fundamentally too low, 
projects will slow down, and the SREC price will increase since there won’t be enough to meet demand. 
No legislative process to go through make changes. Understands that these price swings have happened 
in large drops- think there’s elements to adjust volatility to adjust the market. 
Going back to the 4185 process: If we used declining block incentives, solar would be in its own 
incentive program separate from other renewables. Market should be used to incentivize renewables 
just like the electricity market uses competition. Ultimately SREC-I and SREC-II will turn to Class-I RECs- 
its the same type of program as opposed to something radically different. 
5. Perspectives on other solar incentive models 
Other states have implemented a range of incentive program types in order to grow their solar markets. 
Several program types that you may be aware of include (but are not limited to):  
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• Standard offer incentive programs (aka. feed-in tariffs)  
• Declining block incentive programs  
• Competitive procurements (aka. auctions or solicitations)  
There are also many variations on these approaches, as well as co-policies. Are any of these incentive 
program types of particular interest to you? Please discuss your impressions of these or other incentive 
program types that you may be aware of, and whether we should focus on particular incentive types 
that are of interest to you. How do you think the effectiveness of these incentive program types vary for 
different solar installation types (e.g. residential vs. utility scale)? What options would you like to see the 
consulting team consider and analyze for Massachusetts? 
 
Participant 5: Feed in tariffs don’t do much to change the customer’s interactions with electricity. Seen 
as financial investment. Declining block- great for financing and helps reduce soft costs. Sets market 
expectation for value of solar will be lower and heading toward parity. Competitive procurement- 
should only be used for utility-scale solar, not appropriate for DG or customer-sited solar.  
 
Participant 4: Agrees with Participant 5’s thoughts on competitive procurement. Many ways to 
incentivize solar, but unless we see something better than SRECs, prefer current system. Would say stay 
away from buy-all and sell-all transfers hedge value from customer to ratepayer. Participant has sold net 
metering credits/electricity for low-cost electricity over the years.  Savings and hedge value in 
combination is appealing. If you remove the hedge, takes away incentive for low-income communities to 
go solar.  
 
Participant 6: If it’s a goal of the program to incent in-market vendors and program, the tariff would 
eliminate local market in favor of larger companies.  Under the procurement model a developer trying 
to contract would not want to have bids from unbuilt projects. Doesn’t think solar would grow under 
this model.  
 
Participant 1: Procurements are at specific point in time. If you don’t have everything in place at time of 
procurement, you have to wait. Competitive procurements have their own administrative cost burden.  
Notes per SREC fees for open markets is less than costs for competitive procurement. If the 
administrator of the program is an IOU or specific provider, they may manage market for long-time – 
this is not competitive. If there is something wrong with the administrator of the program, then not 
much you can do. In SREC states, brokers competes with other service providers to manage SRECs.  
 
Participant 7: Agrees previous comments. Competition is the name of the game. Administratively set 
rates are problematic. Declining block is great because acknowledges declining installed costs of solar 
over time, but many other factors to take into consideration as well. SREC-II mechanism has declining 
auction-price. Current system also assumes decreasing costs and has some of benefits of a declining 
block program. Competitive procurement is new can of worms. Stability is the crux to continue 
development. Utility-scale systems just figured out the new SREC market- revamping again, will have 
bad short to mid-term implications. In summary, markets are more efficient with competitive 
mechanisms. 
 
6. Perspectives on future use of net metering, as well as minimum bill provisions 
During the past year, efforts have been made to revise the framework for net metering in 
Massachusetts including the addition of a minimum bill for all electricity ratepayers. Please discuss 
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your perspective on the future use of net metering/virtual in Massachusetts and, to the extent you 
are able, what options or changes would you like to see and why? 
Participant 4: Grandfathering goes without saying. We can’t treat existing systems differently from how 
they’ve been treated; it disrupts financial stability and market security. 4185: Differentiated between 
NEM and VNEM, and somehow distinguished that VNEM electricity was worth less. This is too broad a 
distinction. A behind-the-meter triple-decker solar installation in Dorchester would be worth less under 
4185. No proof that VNEM systems provide less value to the grid. Many low-income communities live in 
shared-multi-family housing. Treating VNEM and NEM projects separately brings up questions access. 
Maybe look at size limitations? Not appropriate to assume all VNEM projects are being over-subsidized, 
but maybe some of the larger projects are. Large here meaning multi-MW. 4185 proposed a lower 
incentive value based on electricity prices with additional cash to ensure projects would be developed. A 
lot of the affordable housing developments are limited in the amount of cash they can receive. Third-
party providers would not be able to give cash for solar. Have to be careful about changes to the policy 
which might destroy certain market segment.  
Participant 4 submitted comments on minimum bill submitted at hearing. 
Participant 5: Need to discuss what the problem is right now or if there is one, then we can discuss 
solutions. Minimum bills are a solution to a problem, but we aren’t sure what problem we are 
addressing. Structure: Should only cover the fixed costs to serve that customer. Excludes electric 
distribution system costs.  
Participant: In 4185 discussions over the summer, benefits facilities provided were discounted. Many of 
these facilities cannot participate in capacity market. Agreed with Participant 5 on minimum bills. There 
may be other models out there, but unsure what they are. As retail electricity sales go down, utilities will 
hurt. How do we incentivize IOUs appropriately to maintain grid services going forward? Need to think 
about using EDC infrastructure as a platform to innovate onto.  
7. Perspectives on policy transitions 
H. At the 2nd Task Force meeting, it was suggested that analysis should account for uncertainty 
costs, (i.e., transition costs due to changing goals and programs.)  Please discuss qualitatively the 
nature of these costs as you see them, and whether and how you might suggest such costs could 
or should be quantified. 
I. Are there particular threshold milestones where it might make sense to consider policy 
transitions in order to minimize such costs? What other means are available to minimize such 
costs? 
 
Participant 5: Determine the risk and the value of uncertainty in the transition. Installed costs would 
increase based on uncertainty of a policy transition. This would vary based on the clarity of the 
transition plan. With perfect information, the transition should be painless. However, with an abrupt 
transition, uncertainty costs will be much higher. Other costs should include lost jobs.  
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Participant 10: During SREC I to SREC II transition, we saw capital providers leave the market. The 
ones remaining can charge a premium for their financial services. From the financing perspective, 
you could figure out the cost based on few equity providers in the market. We can put something 
together. If capital costs rise, then installed costs are impacted by X%. 
Participant 6: The assumption Participant 10 is making is that at some cost of capital, good projects 
can still get done. But, in our observations, if cost of capital goes up, projects don’t happen. Market 
disruption means you don’t get all the benefits of the program until certainty is restored. You 
probably won’t get much development. 
Participant 4:  From a non-profit developer perspective, increased project lead times, lead to more 
costs. Does not impact ratepayers directly, but reduces savings to end-users. If you spend 10% more 
on soft costs, then instead of selling cheaper electricity, you have to sell it at a higher price for the 
costs to pencil.  
Participant 7: Seems counter-intuitive: SREC criticisms are based on market volatility. Yet changing 
the program will cause more instability. Higher cost of capital are being exacerbated by talking 
about changing the policy. If there had to be a transition, the earlier comments make sense. Look at 
the transition from SREC-I and SREC-II. Price point was at the ACP is because development stopped 
because of the uncertainty.  
With regards to quantification: Quantify impacts with proxies such as jobs, or electric prices, gas 
price volatility. There are usually milestones to consider a transition. The time is not now. 1,600MW 
is an interim target. Let SREC-II play out- the rules recently changed. Suggests removing managed 
growth and net metering caps. Will hit the interim target before 2020, under these conditions. Give 
enough lead-time to market about what transition period will be.  
Participant 4: If we play out the legislative and regulatory process, realistically the rules would be 
changed by 2017, which only leaves 3 years. SREC-II is sunsetting at 1,600MW. Keep calendar in 
mind for the transition.  
Participant 1: If you cut-off SREC-II before the interim target, there will be consequences: Will push 
market into a sunset period sooner. Currently an increase in prices for 2015 and 2016 vintages of 
SREC-I. SREC-II will push price up faster market thinks it is ending  
8. Other topics 
Are there any major topics or perspectives related to the Task Force’s scope that we have not discussed 
today that you would like to comment on?  
Participant 5: Cost benefit analysis is extremely important. To the maximum extent possible we 
need to quantify benefits of solar. If help is needed, they have examples from other states. 
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Participant 4: Significant loss of generation assets is coming. We are either paying more for natural 
gas or for transmission lines. Solar is the only renewable resource in MA that has the potential to 
grow quickly and offset some of this need. The cost of not building solar is not zero.  
Participant 9: Focus on retaining as much of the positive economic impact within the 
Commonwealth.  
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Appendix A:
Task 3 - Analysis of Costs and Benefits: 
Key Assumptions
Massachusetts Net Metering Task Force
Sustainable Energy 
Advantage, LLC
(2)
Table of Contents:
• A. Overarching 
Assumptions
• B. Solar PV Modeling
• C. Production Dispatch 
Modeling Assumptions
• D. Avoided Retail Rates 
and Net Metering 
Revenues
• E. PV System Costs
• F. Solar Carveout
• G. Class I RPS
• H. Supply Curve
• I. Policy Paths A & B
• J. Cost & Benefit 
Components – supporting 
assumptions
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(3)
A. OVERARCHING ASSUMPTIONS & SIMPLIFYING 
ASSUMPTIONS
& SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS
(4)
Key Assumptions
• Analysis performed, and metrics, in Nominal $
• Tax Rates
• Massachusetts Tax Rates = 8%
• Federal Tax Rates = 35%
• Nominal Discount rate = 5%
• Federal Investment Tax Credits (ITC) were not assumed to be extended 
beyond their current statutory timeframe. 
• General inflation rate from EIA AEO 2014 GDP IDP
• Inflation rate for ACP from EIA AEO 2014 CPI All Urban Customers 
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(5)
MA DG Solar Avoids Electric Losses
Raw Data (Utility-specific average 
& peak loss factors)
For Solar Impact  Statewide 
Factors
Loss Level
Loss 
Factor
MA Avg. Peak T&D 8.62%
MA Avg.  Peak D 7.34%
MA Avg. Production-Wtd 
Energy T&D 5.58%
MA Avg. Production-Wtd 
Energy D 4.72%
Blue: provided by EDCs
Black: imputed based on similar relationships of peak to average data in 
blue
Red: used other EDC data as proxies 
Production weighting reflects higher-than-average 
loss reduction due to peak coincidence
(developed using inferred square-function matching average and peak losses)
(6)
Key Considerations for Understanding Results:
Implications of Simplifying Assumptions (1)
1. Retail Rate Structures Held Constant.  Assumed no change in retail rate structures from current, with respect to 
any shift from components billed on a per-kWh basis to fixed charges, customer charges, or the establishment 
of minimum bills.  Task Force determined that rate design is important but best addressed before the DPU.  
• A future shift in rate structure away from kWh charges would reduce the avoided cost or revenue realized for behind-
the-meter or net metered solar PV projects  Would diminish economics, lead to a slower build-out and a potential shift 
among installation types unless solar incentives were increased to match (as might be the case under Paths A and B).
• However, this analysis assumes that a subsector of the marketplace whose retail rate value is not hedged through fixed-
price PPA or discount arrangements would derate expectations of future rate revenue to some degree to account for 
exposure to change of rate structure risk (i.e., host owned <= 25 kW systems under SREC or Path B) 
2. Distribution System Saturation Ignored.  Did not explicitly examine limitations on development caused by 
saturation of distribution feeders or resulting elevated interconnection costs. Considering such factors would 
slow the pace of development.(forecast of installations does consider interconnection timelines/constraints). 
3. Technical Potential Saturation Largely Ignored. Did not explicitly constrain solar technical potential.  However, 
modeling does consider land area, population density, number of residential customers and number of non-
residential customers in regards to growth rates and relative potential among utilities.  Paths A&B have low 
growth rates and are not likely to be constrained by technical potential, but are constrained by the policy 
mechanism itself.  Path B is constrained economically.  Separately, we have done research that did not find 
significant near term constraints on brownfield, landfills, or VNM low-moderate income housing sub-sectors. 
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(7)
Key Considerations for Understanding Results:
Implications of Simplifying Assumptions (2)
4. Ignored Potential Differential Impacts of Installer Incentive Capture. Did not explicitly assume or analyze 
installed cost inflation under the more ‘generous’ policy options (compared to less generous policies), an 
installer ‘incentive capture’ phenomenon cited by some analysts, or assume lower installed costs for Policy 
futures with less generous combined solar and NM incentives.  
5. Ignored Impact of ITC Qualification Peril at 1/1/17.  Did not reflect the likelihood that projects are unwilling to 
commit to projects with risk exposure to loss of ITC due to interconnection delay or labor shortages in 2016, 
which may in practice lead to a risk-aversion-driven drop-off in development.  Simplified to assume a steadier 
rate of development influenced by economics and shifted some development back to earlier in the year as 
participants are well aware of the pending loss of ITC, the risk in being late and are starting development 
activity earlier. 
6. Assumed Municipal Light Plants Participate Like IOUs in Policy Paths A & B.  MLPs are assumed to participate in 
Policy Paths A&B the same way as do investor owned utilities (including allowing or not allowing virtual net 
metering in capped and uncapped scenarios).  We treated all MLPs as having a single prototypical rate 
structure based on Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant rates.  
7. Assumed Future LSE Participation in SREC Floor Price Auctions.  LSEs will fully participate in auction and thus 
hold marginal SRECs during the auction out years.  If LSEs continue to stay on sidelines, it causes extreme 
additional expenses for NPRs  seems imprudent to assume that this practice would continue indefinitely.
(8)
Key Considerations for Understanding Results:
Implications of Simplifying Assumptions (3) 
7. Ignored Nantucket as a location for solar development. Did not include Nantucket Electric in the primary 
analysis
8. Reclassified SREC-I Projects into SREC-II Sectors.  In order to provide SREC-I results in a comparable manner to 
other policy paths, we have made best guesses of project reclassification to SREC-II subsectors.  Assigning 
SREC-II subsectors provides a basis of computing and reporting build-out, revenue and cost and analysis.  
9. Treated All Towns as Served by Single Distribution Utility. In order to assess potential for different project types, 
utility square miles were computed.  Some Massachusetts towns are served by multiple utilities.  We assigned 
each town a unique utility in order to simplify the calculation.  
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B. SOLAR PV MODELING
FOR DISPATCH ANALYSIS ANDS COST & BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(10)
Solar PV Production Modeling
Technical Assumptions (1)
• Analysis requires understanding: 
• How many MWh produced per DC MW PV installed?
• # of SRECs (current policy) is less than this #
• When production occurs?
• Value of energy; Coincidence with applicable peaks
• 25-year economic Life of Solar PV Installations
• Key & Simplifying Assumptions:
• Ignore technological advance and change in mix of fixed vs. 
tracking
• Performance (profile and capacity factor) held constant for 
each installation type across analysis horizon and policy path
• Degradation: 0.5% energy production per yr.
• AC vs. DC
• PV rated @ Direct  Current (DC)
• Inverters convert to AC (Alternating Current)
• Energy on the grid is AC
• Solar Policy Goals are stated in DC
• DC to AC conversion efficiency varies by installation type
• Annual Production:
• Use “Proxy” profile representing simplified composite of different 
installation types
• Installation composition may vary over time
• PV Watts (NREL model estimating production @ specified 
location) used to estimate production volume and timing
• PV Watts requires assumptions on tile, azimuth (degrees from due 
south), AC to DC ratio determinates, shading, etc.
• MA CEC’s Production Tracking System (PTS) provides 
performance details on current MA PV fleet
• SEA studied PTS data on existing fleet, developed ‘standard’ 
installation characteristics for composite project type: Residential, 
C&I Rooftop, Ground Mount and Solar Canopy installations 
• SEA assumed fraction of each SREC-II subsector associated with 
each composite project type
• For PV Watts, assumed single location (Worcester)
• Results: Year 1 for any installation for current SREC-II fleet
• Capacity Factor (c.f.) (DC) = 14.3%
• Annual energy: 1627 kWh per AC kW installed
• Annual energy: 1253 kWh per DC kW installed
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• Each SREC-II subsector has:
• Composite proxy profile (constant c.f. 
and production profile over time)
• Economics of each subsector vary 
under each policy path  different 
quantity of PV installed for each 
subsector under each policy path
• Policy-path-specific blend of composite 
profiles and installation proportions 
aggregate annual PV production in 
each year  “Portfolio Annual 
Production”
• c.f. was held constant over time and 
between policy paths as a simplification
• Area for potential future study: 
• Allow performance over time to vary 
with evolving blend of system types
• More nuanced profile as weighted 
average of projects of varying 
technology, orientation, tilt, etc.
• Consider technology advance 
• Would allow looking at possible benefits 
of encouraging more peak-value 
orientation, etc.
Solar PV Technical Assumptions
Application to Modeling of Solar Policy & Net Metering Impacts (2)
Residential 
System
Commercial 
Rooftop
Ground 
Mount
Solar 
Canopy
16% 18% 63% 3%
(12)
• Applies to: market value, energy market price impacts, 
emission impacts
• Uses a single standard proxy profile of average day per 
month based on PV Watts profile, 0.77 AC/DC (Boston) (see 
graph and table: 14% annual c.f. (DC);  1593 kWh per AC kW
• Same as DOER 2013 Task 3B report
• MW targets in DC
• Modeling convention: Policy paths have similar solar PV 
build-out quantities
• Small differences will not alter per-MWh values materially
• Results of a single Aurora build-out analysis (graph)  scaled 
to projected portfolio annual production in each case using 
per-MWh Aurora result values
Solar PV Technical Assumptions
Application to Modeling - Production Modeling in Aurora (3)
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Solar Peak Impact 
Single site proxy 
(note the 
passing cloud)… 
in reality, many 
sites smooth the 
aggregate curve
(14)
• ISO-NE FCM value (purple):
• Doesn’t vary with PV MW
• Well below impact on reducing peaks 
until PV penetrations >> 2500 MW
• Actual PV impact on peaks declines 
with penetration
• PV has high peak coincidence
• But starting to shift time of peak
• Eventually: the CA ‘Duck Diagram’
• G&T peak reduction value (blue) 
somewhat higher than Distribution 
value due to different timing of peaks
• Difference between actual impact 
(e.g. lower ISO ICR) and value in FCM 
market is a benefit to all citizens of MA
• FCM value not monetized by 
generators also a benefit to all citizens 
of MA
Solar PV Impact on Avoiding G, T & D Capacity
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C. WHOLESALE MARKETS & PRODUCTION 
DISPATCH MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
DISPATCH MODELING & COST/BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS 
(16)
Wholesale Market Assumptions
• ISO-NE Transmission Tariff:
• 2014 RNS Tariff Rate = $89.80/kW-yr
• 2014 RNS MA Load Ratio Share = 43.59%
• Installed Capacity Reserve Margin
• Per ME VOS study, for the year 2017/18, the ISO New England 
reserve margin was 13.6% based on Net ICR
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Capacity Market Assumptions
• Capacity market prices = Historic actuals, projected values taken from CT 2014 IRP, 
adjusted to nominal using AEO 2014 GDP deflator, and converted to calendar year
(18)
Capacity Value of Intermittent Resources
• Intermittent Resources per : ISO-NE Commercialization and Audit/CCA 
Establish Procedures for FCM resource (ISO-NE, Apr. 17, 2014) 
• Intermittent reliability hours
• http://iso-ne.com/static-
assets/documents/committees/comm_wkgrps/othr/vrwg/mtrls/a4_commercializatio
n_and_audit.pdf
• Comparative benchmark for SCC: See slide 20 of this:
• http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2014/08/2014_final_solar_forecast.pdf
• 35% SCC used by ISO for estimate
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Internalized (Market) CO2 Price Assumptions
Used in Dispatch Modeling
Potential Future Carbon Pricing or 
Equivalent LMP Impact of GHG Regs Used as a PROXY
• Start with: Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) past and projected 
pricing (projections by ICF for RGGI)
• Transition after 2019 to Synapse Low as 
a proxy for some combination of future:
• Federal cap & trade
• Federal Clean Power Plan impact on 
energy costs
• MA Global Warming Solutions Act (and 
other regional state carbon regs) 
impact on energy prices
Note: Potential sensitivity of interest for further 
study: higher carbon price future
Used for this 
analysis (same 
as 2013 Task 3b 
Study for 
DOER)
(20)
Emission Pricing Assumptions for Dispatch Modeling
Remains $0 from 
2025 onward
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Gross Social Costs of Emissions
• Social costs of NOX and SO2 are taken from Table 4-7 of the 2014 EPA “Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution 
Guidelines for Existing Power Plants and Emission Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants” report
• Social costs of CO2 are taken from Table A-1 of the 2013 “Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis” 
prepared by U.S. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon under Executive Order 12866
(22)
Production Modeling of Impacts (1)
• Case 1a: no policy: remove SREC-I & SREC-II 
production (keep pre-carve-out PV), assume Class I 
RPS is met by adding a commensurate amount of 
wind or (if fall short) natural gas
• In past, before 1/1/2015 not modeled.  Instead:
• solar not replaced by other supply (onshore wind) but 
rather all the wind that could be built, was, so RPS supply 
came up shorter by the amount of SRECs projected, and 
replaced to the extent supply needed by natural gas  
• Fuel use and emissions changes not  modeled; rather, 
calculated at marginal values
• Was negligible congestion historically  assume same 
marginal units (modeled as hypothetical NG unit at 
composite marginal heat rate
• Assume no material change in LMPs
• In future: through 2017 assume no more wind could be 
built, so substituted by falling short of RPS, met be 
marginal natural gas; 2018 & thereafter, assume PV 
substituting with land-based wind
• Case 1b: Assume RPS shortfall made up by 
natural gas
• Case 2a: 1600 MW by 2020
• Buildout: Historic (from DOER) + projected (SEA MA-SMS 
in consultation w/ DOER)
• Case 2b: 1600 MW by 2020 continuing to 2500 MW by 
2025
• Buildout: Extrapolate normalized build per yr and round 
up to allow for a bit of growth
• Impacts calculated as differences: 
• SREC-I & SREC-II from difference between Case 1 & Case 2a
• SREC-I, SREC-II & (projected) SREC-III from difference between 
Case 1 & Case 2b
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• Geographic distribution 
assumed to be same as 
current cumulative build
• BOSTN = 11 North Shore + 
12 Boston
• CMA = 10 Central MA
• WMA = 8 Western MA + 9 
Springfield
• SEMA = 13 SEMA + 14 Lower 
SEMA
Production Cost Modeling (2)
• Note: the Aurora modeling was 
done using a slightly older SEA 
forecast (vintage Dec. 2014) of SREC 
Carve-out (current policy) than used 
for Policy Path A & B.  
• SEA’s March 2015 Solar Market Study 
model is better able to address the 
differential economics of alternative 
policy paths.   
• March 2015 model projects hitting 
1600 MW under current policy at a 
somewhat different pace.  
• Use of per-MWH Aurora results 
scaled to SMS MWH projections used 
to correct for this difference.
MODELING
ASSUMPTIONS
MA DOER Net Metering
Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC Presented to:
April 21, 2015
Presented by: La Capra Associates, Inc.
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Introduction: Modelling Overview
 The La Capra Associates NMM uses an hourly chronologic electric energy market simulation model based on the 
AURORAxmp® software platform (AURORA). The model provides a zonal representation of the electrical system of 
New England and the neighboring regions. For New England, the zones and corresponding transfer capabilities 
represented in the model conform to the information provided in ISO New England’s Regional System Plan. 
 AURORA is a well-established, industry-standard simulation model that uses and captures the effects of multi-area, 
transmission-constrained dispatch logic to simulate real market conditions. AURORA realistically approximates the 
formation of hourly energy market clearing prices on a zonal basis using all key market drivers, including fuel and 
emissions prices, loads, DSM, generation unit operating characteristics, unit additions and retirements, and 
transmission congestion and losses to capture the dynamics and economics of electricity markets. 
 The NMM utilizes a comprehensive database representing the entire Eastern Interconnect, including representations 
of power generation units, zonal electrical demand, and transmission configurations. EPIS, the developer of 
AURORA, provides a default database, which La Capra Associates supplements with updates to key inputs for the 
New England market.
26
Modeling Assumptions
 Case assumptions
 Environmental Policies
 Regional Demand and DSM
 Regional Generation
 Transmission
 Natural Gas
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Four cases run in Aurora 
Case 1: No SREC Carve-out (removes MA SREC I and II) and replaces solar with wind 
resources beginning in 2018
Case 1b: No SREC Carve-out (removes MA SREC I and II) 
Case 2a: 1600 MW of solar by 2020 (Current Policy)
Case 2b: 1600 MW of solar by 2020 and continuing to 2500 MW by 2025 with linear growth
28
Environmental Policies 
 There are two major policy issues affecting the regional market outlooks.
 The two programs particularly impact decisions on generation resource 
continued operation and new supply choices.
1. The continued strong support for Renewable Portfolio Standards 
2. The existing and developing GHG regulations
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Renewable Energy - Premium Markets RPS 
Premium Market RPS Requirements 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021-
2023 
CT Class 1 11.0% 12.5% 14% 15.5% 17% 19.5% 20.0% 20.0% 
MA Class 1 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16%+ 
NH Class 1 5.0% 6.0% 6.9% 7.8% 8.7% 9.6% 10.5% 11.4%+1 
NH Class 2 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
RI New 6.5% 6.5% 8.0% 9.5% 11.0% 12.5% 12.5%2 12.5% 
Load-Weighted 
Average 
9.0% 10.1% 11.2% 12.4% 13.6% 15.1% 15.9% 16.5%+ 
 
                                                          
1 Yearly increments are 0.9% until reaching 15% in 2025 and maintained thereafter. 
2 Maintained in 2020 and thereafter unless determined otherwise by regulators. 
30
Greenhouse Gas Regulations
RGGI
All New England states participate in RGGI, a cap-and-trade program aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from the power sector. Pricing 
carbon emissions through a cap-and-trade program affects New England electric energy prices by increasing the variable costs of 
fossil fuel-fired generators that are almost always on the margin.  RGGI allowance prices have been minimal since the program began 
in 2009 because actual CO2 emission levels have fallen well below the initial program caps.  On February 7, 2013 the RGGI states 
committed to an Updated Model Rule that would tighten the caps significantly in 2014.  A RGGI-commissioned study of the Updated 
Model Rule projects that emission allowance prices will rise from about $4 (2010$) per ton in 2014 to over $10 (2010$) per ton by 
2020.RGGI auction results to-date have benchmarked well to the Updated Model Rule forecast. After 2020, the reference case 
assumes that a national CO2 pricing program is implemented and that prices will reflect the “Low” case of Synapse Energy Economics, 
Inc.’s 2012 Carbon Dioxide Price Forecast.
Federal Policy
EPA released its Clean Power Plan proposal, which aims to cut carbon emissions from existing power plants and enable the US to 
reduce carbon emissions from the power sector by 30% below 2005 levels.  EPA has proposed each state or multi-state collaboration 
would develop a plan to meet an individual carbon intensity reduction target through any combination of plant efficiency improvements, 
shifting generation from higher to lower-emitting resources, maintaining and expanding nuclear and renewable generation, and energy 
efficiency.  New England has already implemented programs and policies that would likely generate more carbon dioxide reductions
than required under the EPA’s proposal, but the federal proposal would backstop these efforts. 
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Regional Electric Demand – Gross Outlook Pre - EE
ISO-NE Peak Demand Outlook
 2013 Normalized Demand Actual 27,941 MW
 2014 Forecasted Demand 28,290 MW
 2023 Forecasted Demand 31,878 MW
 10 Year CAGR 1.4 %
 10 Year Increase 3,937 MW 11% of 2023 Demand

ISO-NE Energy Requirements Outlook
 2013 Energy est. 135,000 GWh
 2014 Forecasted Energy 138,910 GWh
 2023 Forecasted Energy 152,347 GWh
 10 Year CAGR 0.7%
 10 Year Increase 3,006 GWh 10% of 2023 Energy
32
Energy Efficiency Resources
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Active Demand Response Resources
 There has been a major reduction in the 
amount of active DR available to ISO-NE by 
201-18  
 Total reductions are approximately 1,000 MW
 Proportionately largest reduction in 
Massachusetts
 This is primarily a result of the new rules 
requiring DR participation in energy markets
 Further operational requirements on DR 
could virtually eliminate DR as an FCA 
resource
34
Regional Electric Demand – Net Outlook after EE Effects
ISO-NE Peak Demand Outlook
 2013 Normalized Demand est 26,000 MW
 2014 Forecasted Demand 26,929 MW
 2023 Forecasted Demand 29,206 MW
 10 Year CAGR 0.7 %
 10 Year Increase 3,006 MW
ISO-NE Energy Requirements Outlook
 2013 Energy est. 134,000 GWh
 2014 Forecasted Energy 131,037 GWh
 2023 Forecasted Energy 134,786 GWh
 10 Year CAGR 0.1 %
 10 Year Increase 786 GWh
 364 
 
35
Generation Mix
 New England remains a natural gas fueled 
dependent region
 Renewables have not yet been 
established as a major component of 
generation mix
 Natural Gas share of energy increased 
every year until its highest in 2012, before 
regional constraints began to push 
natural gas prices upward
36
Generation Resource Retirements
 
Name Capacity 
(MW) 
Location Fuel 
Type 
Status Planned or Actual 
Shutdown 
Vermont Yankee 600 Vernon, VT Nuclear Shutdown 
Announced 
End of 2014 
Brayton Point (Units 
1-4) 
1,500 Somerset, MA Coal/Oil Shutdown 
Announced 
2017 
Salem Harbor (Units 
1-4) 
750 Salem, MA Coal/Oil Closed 2011-2014 
AES Thames 450 Montville, CT Coal Demolition 2011 
Mt. Tom 150 Holyoke, MA Coal Shutdown 
Announced 
2014 
Bridgeport Harbor 2 130 Bridgeport 
Harbor, CT 
Oil Shutdown 
Announced 
2017 
Norwalk Harbor 
(Units 1, 2, 10) 
350 Norwalk, CT Oil Deactivated 2013 
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Regional Capacity Outlook
ISO-NE FCA Results showing slight shortfall in 2017/18
38
Regional Transmission Developments
There are several other transmission projects currently planned or under construction 
in New England:
 Maine Power Reliability Program: six new substations, upgrades to numerous existing substations, and the 
installation or rebuilding of 440 miles of transmission line in the communities from Eliot to Orrington in Maine.  
Expected in service date is 2015. 
 New England East-West Solution: a group of related transmission projects addressing reliability needs in New 
England, including:
 The Greater Springfield Reliability Project: upgrades to 39 miles of transmission lines between Ludlow, MA 
and Bloomfield, CT.  Now fully in service.
 The Interstate Reliability Project: transmission upgrades spanning three states on a line from Millbury, MA 
to Card Street Substation in Lebanon, CT.  Expected in service date is December 2015. 
 Central Connecticut Reliability Project: a project currently in development to remedy reliability concerns in 
the central Connecticut area. 
 Rhode Island Reliability Project: includes several transmission upgrades in Rhode Island, including a new 
345 kV line from West Farnum to Kent County.  Now in service. 
 Boston Upgrades: transmission upgrades due to the retirement of Salem Harbor and advanced NEMA/Boston 
upgrades increasing Boston import capability in 2014. 
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Natural Gas Pricing Methodology
 Henry Hub: Prices are a blend of EIA’s December 2014 Short-Term Energy 
Outlook (2013-2015) and EIA’s 2014 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) (2015 
and after). In the early years, we rely on the Short-Term Energy Outlook. 
For years 2017 and 2021, we smooth our forecast by assuming that the 
price rises at a constant rate. In 2021 and beyond, our forecast follows the 
AEO2014 exactly.
 New England Basis Differential: We developed our near-term basis 
differential outlook using the average across a recent one year period 
(1/6/14 – 1/5/15) of daily closing quotes for February 2015 to January 2016 
Algonquin City-gates basis swaps. In 2018 and beyond, we revert to a basis 
that results in a delivered natural gas price equal to the AEO2014 Reference 
Case forecast for delivered prices to the New England electric industry. We 
make a straight-line interpolation for basis differential values between 2015 
and 2018. 
40
Natural gas price inputs in nominal dollars
Year HH Annual Forecast Algon Basis NE NG Forecast
2015 $3.83 $3.64 $7.47
2016 $4.41 $2.46 $6.87
2017 $4.76 $1.28 $6.04
2018 $4.91 $0.10 $5.01
2019 $5.06 $0.11 $5.17
2020 $5.21 $0.15 $5.37
2021 $5.37 $0.35 $5.72
2022 $5.64 $0.34 $5.98
2023 $5.90 $0.39 $6.30
2024 $6.20 $0.57 $6.77
2025 $6.45 $0.90 $7.34
2026 $6.72 $1.12 $7.84
2027 $7.00 $1.23 $8.23
2028 $7.26 $1.53 $8.79
2029 $7.63 $1.73 $9.37
2030 $8.12 $1.79 $9.92
2031 $8.47 $1.57 $10.04
2032 $8.91 $0.69 $9.60
2033 $9.41 $0.51 $9.92
2034 $9.83 $0.38 $10.21
2035 $10.31 $0.30 $10.61
2036 $10.93 $0.17 $11.10
2037 $11.23 $0.27 $11.50
2038 $11.53 $0.43 $11.96
2039 $12.04 $0.80 $12.84
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Additional Discussion or Questions ?
Contact Information:
End of Presentation
  
41
Mary Neal
Tel:  617-778-5515 x 120
mneal@lacapra.com
Doug A. Smith
Tel:  617-778-5515 x 123
das@lacapra.com
Laura Kier
Tel:  617-778-5515 x 105
lkier@lacapra.com
(42)
D. AVOIDED RETAIL RATES AND NET 
METERING REVENUES
AND RELATED ASSUMPTIONS
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Rate Trend Forecast:
Assume no fundamental change in rate structures over time
• Transition assumed to be 0% escalation after 2015, per 
EDCs
• Transmission assumed to be fixed (0% escalation), per 
EDCs
• Distribution assumed to increase by inflation in steps 
(corresponding to rate cases) every 5 years, per EDCs
• Generation assumed to escalate at index of 
wholesale blended energy (75%)/capacity (25%)* 
trend forecast
• Other Rate Components: Increase with Inflation, per 
EDCs
• Recent difference between wholesale energy prices 
and Basic Service generation rates applied to factor 
in impact of capacity, reserves, losses, etc.  
• Average of 2014 basic service rates (two procurements) 
used as the base for forecasting generation charge to 
avoid overstatement due to unusually high 2015 winter 
basic service rates
* Portion of spread to trend @ Energy vs. capacity escalator
(44)
Rate Trend Forecast: 
For Modeling Project Threshold Return Requirements
• Generators cannot take the uncertain projected retail 
revenue stream, dependent on long-term factors like 
carbon pricing, natural gas pricing and capacity 
market prices, which cannot be relied upon, to the 
bank
• For 3rd-party owned projects, this risk can and often is 
hedged (i.e., passed along to the host or NMC off-taker 
through a fixed-price transaction).  We assume going 
forward that this risk is hedged in such a manner for all 
3rd-party owned systems
• For host-owned small projects (<= 25 kW) under SREC 
and Policy Path B, we assume project owner is exposed 
to future retail price risk, and makes choices based on a 
more conservative outlook of future retail rates
• Modeled more conservative future by halving the year-
to-year growth in prior slide of generation and 
distribution rates after 2018
• Otherwise, under PBIs as studied in Paths A and B, the 
combined incentive structure serves to hedge this risk
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‘Generic” Municipal Light Plant Modeling
• Municipal light territories are modeled in aggregate
• Net metering credit assumed to be load-weighted average of a sample of 10 MLP NMC 
values (Taunton rates were used as proxy to differentiate G rate from other charges) 
• NMC escalated at wholesale/energy capacity forecast index
• Residential and commercial retail rates calculated as the ratio of EIA “loaded” $/MWh
(includes non-kWh charges) of IOUs to MLPs applied to the actual “unloaded” IOU retail 
rates
• 40% of MLP retail rate escalated by wholesale/energy capacity forecast index
• 60% of MLP retail rate escalated by CPI
• Assume 13% of installations in 2015 are in MLPs - based on historic installation trends
• For calculating rate component value, assume MLP rates are made up of basic service 
(40%), distribution (40%), and transmission(20%)
Errata Note: rates used were 20% higher than avg. MLP.  This was an error discovered too late in the analysis 
for revision.  Correction of this error would modify  results in the following manner:  overall growth in 
installations in the MLP sector would slow moderately, and the overall cost of solar incentives would be 
slightly higher. This does not alter the nature of overall conclusions in a material manner.
(46)
Applicable Rate Class & 
Net Metering Class Assumptions
Description Rate Class
% NM Beyond 
Billing 
Month/VNM
% BTM 
Production w/in 
Billing Month
Net Metering Class Assumed
3rd Party Host Owned Public Owned
Residential Roof Mount R-1 10% 90% Class 1
Small Commercial Roof Mount G-1 5% 95% Class 1
Solar Canopy G-1 5% 95% Class 2
Commercial Emergency Power G-1 5% 95% Class 1
Community Shared Solar G-1 100% 0% Class 2
On-Site LIH G-2 5% 95% Class 2
VNM LIH G-1 100% 0% Class 2
Building Mounted G-2 5% 95% Class 2
Small/Medium Ground Mount BTM G-2 5% 95% Class 2
Large Ground Mount BTM G-2 5% 95% Class 3 Class 2
Small/Medium Landfill G-1 100% 0% Class 2
Large Landfill G-1 100% 0% Class 3 Class 2
Small/Medium Brownfield G-1 100% 0% Class 2
Large Brownfield G-1 100% 0% Class 3 Class 2
Medium Ground Mount VNM G-1 100% 0% Class 2
Medium MG G-1 100% 0% Class 2
Large MG G-1 100% 0% Class 3 Class 2
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Net Metering Credit Rates
• Net meter credits are equal to the following components based on the project type net 
metering class:
• Small (<= 25 kW) projects always receive net metering (whether uncapped or capped 
scenario)
• In Policy Path A net metering credits are equal to the generation component only
Net 
Metering 
Class
Components
Class 1 Generation + Distribution + Transition + Transmission
Class 2 Generation + Distribution + Transition + Transmission
Class 3 Generation + Transition + Transmission
(52)
Historic Installed Costs
• Use DOER SREC-I and SREC-II SQA installed cost data to find the average annual 
residential installed costs and non-residential by size block for 2010 to 2014
2015 installed costs 
from other sources* 
* Discussed in detail PV System Costs section of Appendix
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Historic:
Other PV System Costs & Rates
• O&M, customer acquisition, and interconnection costs were backcasted by 
extrapolating the CPI to 2010 and applying the index to 2015 costs
• Fixed costs (lease payments & PILOT/property taxes) assumed to be fixed back to 2010
• Actual 2010 to 2014 rates for each utility were used to calculate net metering and retail 
value of production
(54)
Installed Cost Forecasts: Trends
• Survey of available public sources as of late 2014
considered
• Developed trajectory as an index, applied over analysis 
period to applicable recent historic installed cost data
• ‘Medium’     used as base case for this analysis
Note: No explicit 
adjustments made for 
impact of import duties; 
Overall impact on module 
price ~ 8¢/W (per SEAI), 
portion in effect during 
2014 already embedded 
in forecast
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Installed Costs 
Host Owned and Public Owned Third-Party Owned
• The following blocks were also modeled: Campus Lot Canopy, Commercial Emergency Power, Community 
Shared Solar, On-Site LIH, VNM LIH, Medium Building Mounted, Large Building Mounted, Medium Ground Mount 
BTM, Large Ground Mount BTM, Small Landfill, Medium  Landfill, Small Brownfield, Medium Brownfield, Large 
Brownfield, Medium Ground Mount VNM, Medium MG
• Blocks of high and low cost systems were also modeled (the above figures represent average cost systems)
(56)
• Based on historical data from public sources and supplemental 
research
• Assumed interconnections costs vary by project size and technical 
barrier to interconnect
• Year 1 Interconnection Costs:
• Escalated annually by CPI
• Assumed same interconnection costs across ownership models
Interconnection Cost Assumptions
Project Size Modeled Blocks Year 1 Cost
Small Residential Roof Mount, Small Commercial 
Roof Mount, Commercial Lot Canopy, 
Commercial Emergency Power, On-Site LIH, 
Small Building Mounted
$100/kW
Medium
(with Lower 
Technical Barrier)
Medium Building Mounted, Medium Ground 
Mount BTM
$125/kW
Medium and 
Large
Campus Lot Canopy, Community Shared Solar, 
VNM LIH, Large Building Mounted, Large 
Ground Mount BTM, Small Landfill, Medium 
Landfill, Large Landfill, Small Brownfield, 
Medium Brownfield, Large Brownfield, 
Medium Ground Mount VNM, Medium MG, 
Large MG
$150/kW
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• Based on NREL SunShot soft cost estimates
• Year 1 Customer Acquisition Costs:
• Escalated annually using Installed Cost 
Forecast
• Only applied to third-party owned projects
• Assumed no Customer Acquisition Costs for 
Canopy, VNM LIH, and Ground Mounted 
projects
Customer Acquisition Cost Assumptions
Project Type Year 1 Cost ($/kW)
Residential $480
Small Commercial $130
Large Commercial $30
(58)
• Based on historical data from public sources and 
supplemental research
• Assumed O&M costs “fixed” based on system size not
performance 
• Assumed O&M costs vary by project size  larger 
projects will have lower $/kW O&M costs
• Year 1 O&M Costs:
• Escalated annually by CPI
• Assumed same O&M costs across ownership models
O&M Cost Assumptions
Project Size Modeled Blocks Year 1 Cost
Large Community Shared Solar, VNM LIH, Large
Ground Mount BTM, Medium Landfill, Large 
Landfill, Medium Brownfield, Large Brownfield, 
Medium MG, Large MG
$16/kW
Small and 
Medium
Residential Roof Mount, Small Commercial Roof 
Mount, Commercial Lot Canopy, Campus Lot 
Canopy, Commercial Emergency Power, On-Site 
LIH, Small Building Mounted, Medium Building 
Mounted, Large Building Mounted Medium 
Ground Mount BTM, Small Landfill, Small 
Brownfield, Medium Ground Mount VNM
$21/kW
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Property Tax (PILOT) and Land Lease Cost Assumptions
• Assumptions developed through market analysis and benchmarking
• PILOT Costs
• Base Case assumed $10/kW per year, fixed over time
• Assumed constant across all ownership models
• Only applied to Ground Mount (incl. Landfill and Brownfield) projects 
• Land Lease Costs
• Base Case assumed $13/kW per year, fixed over time
• Assumed constant across all ownership models
• Not applied to Roof Mount projects
(60)
• For modeling, use simplified capital structure
• Debt:
• Host & 3rd-party owned systems: on commercial terms
• Publicly-owned projects: Based on long-term 
municipal bonds 
• Equity
• Initial developer/sponsor: cash + sweat equity
• Tax equity to fully monetize tax benefits as generated
• Where long-term contracts provide stable revenue, 
YieldCos emerge as another viable source of capital 
• Cost & availability of capital is assumed sensitive to: 
• Contract quantity and duration
• Type, duration & magnitude of incentive
• Greater revenue certainty  lower cost of capital
• Fixed PBI is likely to generate interest from more capital, 
at a lower cost, than a downward sloping soft price floor
• Modeling reflects:
• Increasing competition among equity providers, 
including availability and applicability of YieldCo
& similar investment vehicles
• Downward pressure on cost of capital over time
• Impact of transition from 30% to 10% ITC on 
capital structure and cost of capital
• Expiration of ITC for residential host-owned
• Impact of MA residential solar loan program for 
small portion of residential installations
• Implemented as slight interest rate reduction to all 
residential host-owned projects
• Considering the degree to which cost of capital 
advantage of fixed price PBI vs. SREC floor price 
shrinks as proportion of uncertain revenue shrinks
• At the limit, if discount to floor is sufficient to 
finance, cost of capital advantage vanishes 
Financing Assumptions:
Related to Risk under each Policy
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Financing Assumptions:
Derivation & Application of Key Inputs
Private, 3rd-Party Private, Host-Owned Public, Host-Owned
% Debt Based on maximum sustainable debt, 
subject to DSCR (average = 1.35);
> rev. certainty (PBI) means > leverage;
Debt % also ↑ as ITC % ↓
Estimate of corporate financing structure for 
major capital investments
Assumed to finance 100% of cost through 
municipal bonds
Debt Term Est. of commercial terms.
Shorter for SREC structure, longer for PBI
Est. of corporate financing, with guarantee. 
Term longer for PBI than SREC
20 year bond, all market structures
Int. Rate Term-specific risk free rate
plus market-based premium; assumes 
volume discount compared to one-off 
project
Term-specific risk free rate 
plus market-based premium; rates higher than 
Private, 3rd-Party due to one-off nature
20-year municipal bond market
Loan Fee An origination fee, paid to the lender. Set at a level which approximates the market-based premium above the base debt interest rate. For 
Private, Host-Owned the Loan Fee is assumed built into the term debt interest rate.
% Equity All remaining funds required after 
maximum sustainable debt; a blend of 
cash, tax and YieldCo equity; blend 
changes as ITC is reduced
Est. of corporate financing, with guarantee. Not applicable. Projects financed 100% 
with municipal bonds.
AT Wtd Cost of Equity A weighted average of cash, tax and 
YieldCo equity; subject to downward 
(competitive) pressure over time
Est. of corporate opportunity cost of other capital 
investments
Not applicable
WACC = (%e * Ke) + (%d*Kd*(1-Tax Rate))
The project-specific WACC is used to convert the PBI into an equivalent EPBI (rebate).
Not applicable
(62)
Financing Assumptions: SREC 
Private, 3rd-Party Ownership 
kW < 25 100 500 1,000 2,000+
‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25
% 
Debt
40% 50% 50% 40% 50% 50% 40% 50% 50% 40% 55% 55% 40% 55% 55%
Debt 
Term
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Int. 
Rate
5.50% 5.75% 6.00% 5.50% 5.75% 6.00% 5.50% 5.75% 6.00% 5.50% 5.75% 6.00% 5.50% 5.75% 6.00%
Loan
Fee
2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25%
% 
Equity
60% 50% 50% 60% 50% 50% 60% 50% 50% 60% 45% 45% 60% 45% 45%
AT Wtd
Cost of 
Equity
9.5% 8.4% 8.1% 9.5% 8.4% 8.1% 8.9% 8.4% 8.1% 8.9% 7.8% 7.6% 8.9% 7.8% 7.6%
WACC
7.0% 5.9% 5.8% 7.0% 5.9% 5.8% 6.9% 5.9% 5.8% 6.7% 5.4% 5.4% 6.7% 5.4% 5.4%
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Financing Assumptions: SREC 
Private Host Ownership 
kW < 25 100 500 1,000 2,000+
‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25
% 
Debt
50% 50% 50% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
Debt 
Term
15 15 15 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Int. 
Rate
6.50% 6.75% 7.00% 6.50% 6.75% 7.00% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50%
Loan
Fee
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
% 
Equity
50% 50% 50% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70%
AT Wtd
Cost of 
Equity
8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 12.0% 10.5% 9.0% 12.0% 10.5% 9.0% 12.0% 10.5% 9.0% 12.0% 10.5% 9.0%
WACC
5.9% 6.0% 6.1% 9.6% 8.6% 7.6% 9.5% 8.5% 7.5% 9.5% 8.5% 7.5% 9.5% 8.5% 7.5%
(64)
Financing Assumptions: SREC 
Public host Ownership
kW < 25 100 500 1,000 2,000+
‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25
% 
Debt
- - - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Debt 
Term
- - - 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Int. 
Rate
- - - 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00%
Loan
Fee
- - - 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
% 
Equity
- - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AT Wtd
Cost of 
Equity
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
WACC
- - - 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00%
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Financing Assumptions: PBI
Private, 3rd-Party Ownership 
kW < 25 100 500 1,000 2,000+
‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25
% 
Debt
50% 60% 60% 50% 60% 60% 50% 60% 60% 50% 65% 65% 50% 65% 65%
Debt 
Term
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Int. 
Rate
6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50%
Loan
Fee
2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25% 2.00% 2.00% 2.25%
% 
Equity
50% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 50% 35% 35% 50% 35% 35%
AT Wtd
Cost of 
Equity
7.6% 7.1% 7.2% 7.6% 7.1% 7.2% 7.1% 6.7% 6.9% 7.3% 6.8% 7.0% 7.3% 6.8% 7.0%
WACC
5.6% 5.1% 5.2% 5.6% 5.1% 5.2% 5.3% 4.9% 5.1% 5.5% 4.8% 5.0% 5.5% 4.8% 5.0%
(66)
Financing Assumptions: PBI 
Private Host Ownership 
kW < 25 100 500 1,000 2,000+
‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25
% 
Debt
50% 60% 60% 50% 60% 60% 50% 60% 60% 50% 65% 65% 50% 65% 65%
Debt 
Term
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Int. 
Rate
6.50% 6.75% 7.00% 6.50% 6.75% 7.00% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50% 6.00% 6.25% 6.50%
Loan
Fee
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
% 
Equity
50% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 50% 35% 35% 50% 35% 35%
AT Wtd
Cost of 
Equity
7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 10.0% 10.0% 9.0% 10.0% 10.0% 9.0% 10.0% 10.0% 9.0% 10.0% 10.0% 9.0%
WACC
5.4% 5.2% 5.3% 6.9% 6.4% 6.1% 6.8% 6.2% 5.9% 6.8% 5.9% 5.7% 6.8% 5.9% 5.7%
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Financing Assumptions: PBI 
Public host Ownership
kW < 25 100 500 1,000 2,000+
‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25 ‘15-’16 ‘17-’20 ‘21-’25
% 
Debt
- - - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Debt 
Term
- - - 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Int. 
Rate
- - - 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00%
Loan
Fee
- - - 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
% 
Equity
- - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
AT Wtd
Cost of 
Equity
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
WACC
- - - 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00% 3.5% 3.75% 4.00%
(68)
F. SREC POLICY ASSUMPTIONS
SREC-I, II AND III
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Modeling Extension of Current Policy: SREC-III
• Treated SREC-III from 1601 MW to 2500 MW dc as a separate tier, so as to not impact 
SREC-II expected prices and dynamics
• Extended the trend of SACP and floor price declines from those built into SREC-II policy
• Set and used annual MW targets with the objective of getting to 2500 MW by 2025, 
starting at the market size in last year of SREC-II with small escalator, in an analogous 
manner to SREC-II
• Modified SEA’s proprietary Massachusetts Solar Market Study model of SREC-II with the above 
changes, using projected system costs and rates, to produce forecasted market buildout and 
prices.
• Note: in modeling, SREC-III did not follow the targets, as sectors that were not ‘managed’ 
outstripped their targets and led to reaching 2500 MW well before 2025
(70)
G. CLASS I RPS
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ACP and Avoided Class I RPS Compliance Costs
(72)
MA RPS Load, RPS Exemptions and Class I Targets
• RPS Exemptions =  17.27% of annual load
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H. SUPPLY CURVE
APPROACH AND ASSUMPTIONS
(74)
SREC, Policy Paths A & B: 
Overarching Supply Curve Granularity
• The Foundation of the Path A & B Models is a Supply Curve comprised of 612 Production 
Blocks
• Each Production Block is a Unique Combination of:
• Project Type (i.e., Residential Roofmount, Medium Landfill, CSS) – 22 Types
• Utility District (i.e., Munis, NGRID, Nstar BeCO, etc.) – 6 Districts
• Ownership Type (i.e.. Third Party Owned, Host Owned, Public Owned) - 3 Types
• Cost Type (High, Medium, Low Cost) - 3 Types (only 6 projects type are further disaggregated 
by Cost Type)  
• MW Installs, MWh Production, Technical Potential, CoE, and Incentives are tracked on a 
quarterly basis for each of the 612 Production Blocks.   
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I. POLICY PATHS A & B
MODELING APPROACH AND ASSUMPTIONS
(76)
Path A & B: Aggregate Program Targets
• Overall Annual Program Targets were set to achieve 2500 MW (including SREC-I & SREC-II) by 
2500, with less than 2% increase in targets annually
• This was done to minimize installation volatility.
• For Capped Scenarios, Initial 2017 Program Aggregate Targets were set at 120 MW, increasing by 
2.5 MW, to a Target of 140 MW in 2025.
• For Uncapped Scenarios, Initial 2017 Program Aggregate Targets were set at 120 MW, increasing 
by 2.0 MW, to a Target of 136 MW in 2025.
• Increase was set lower than Capped because more MW were installed under SREC-II Uncapped than 
SREC-II Capped.
• Total Program Targets were set to exceed 2500 MW by 8.8 MW (Capped) and 13 MW (Uncapped) 
to Ensure 2500 MW target was Hit
• Overbuild in final quarter of installations was pro-rated to ensure that C/B analysis only modeled 
costs/benefits for 2500 MW of installations.  
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Path A & B: Sector Specific Program Targets
• For Path A and Path B Uncapped, the following 
Target % were set for each Sector:
• Sector A Small-Residential:  13.33%
• Sector A Small-Non-Residential: 1%
• Of the total % not devoted to Small Residential & 
Small Non-Residential:
• Sector A Large: 25% 
• Sector B: 25% 
• Sector C: 25% 
• Sector D (MG): 25% 
• For Path A and Path B Uncapped, the following 
Target % were set for each Sector:
• Sector A Small-Residential:  13.33%
• Sector A Small-Non-Residential: 1%
• Of the total % not devoted to Small Residential & 
Small Non-Residential:
• Sector A Large: 10%
• Sector B: 30%
• Sector C: 30%
• Sector MG: 30%
• Sector A Large, Path A & Path B is set at 10% under 
the Capped Scenario because, as CSS and VNM LIH 
cannot exist in a NM Capped Scenario, the Sector 
lacks Resource Potential to hit a 25% Target; the 15% 
that was not allocated to Sector A Large was evenly 
distributed between Sector B, C and MG. 
• Sector Specific Program Targets directly effect total 
installs by Path A Large Sectors, as  Quarterly Base 
Solicitation Targets are set equal to one-fourth of 
Annual Targets.
• Sector Specific Program Targets affect Path A & Path 
B DBI/PBI & EPBI as Initially Block sizes are set at ½ of 
the annual 2017 target.  
(78)
Path A & B: Starting Resource Potential –Utility Distribution
• Projected 2015-2016 Annual Installs were used 
as a Base Starting Resource Potential each 
Project Type (i.e., Residential Roofmount, CSS, 
Medium MG) 
• Base Starting Resource Potential was then 
divided between each utility for each project 
type based on whether the Project was 
Residential, Non-Residential, Land Use 
Constrained, or Landfill/Brownfield:
• Residential: Base Starting Potential was divided 
between each utility based on total % of 
Residential Customers (i.e. if Residential 
Roofmount project type has 10 MW of Base 
Starting Potential, and 10% of Residential 
customers are in Utility X, Utility X’s -Residential 
Roofmount has 1MW of Resource Potential)
• Non-Residential: Base Starting Potential was 
divided between each utility based on total % of 
Non-Residential Customers
• Land-Use Constrained: Base Starting Potential 
was divided between each utility based on a 
weighting of open space potential in the utility 
district (2x Weight), and % Non-Residential 
Customers in each utility (1x Weight).
• Open Space Potential is an analytically derived 
metric based on: 1.) Total Acreage in each Utility; 
and 2.) Population density in each utility. 
• Landfill/Brownfield: Base Starting Potential was 
divided between each utility based on a 
weighting  of open space potential in the utility 
district (1x Weight), and % Non-Residential 
Customers in each utility (2x Weight).
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Path A & B: Starting Resource Potential –Ownership/Cost Distribution
• After dividing Resource Potential between each utility, Resource Potential was then divided 
between project ownership types (Host Owned, Third Party Owned, Public Owned) based on 
2015-2016 SREC-II projections.
• E.G., Residential Roofmount had roughly a 51-49% relative split between Third Party Owned and Host 
Owned Projects, thus 51% of technical potential was distributed to 3PO, and 49% to HO projects.
• Finally, after dividing Resource Potential between utilities and ownership type, Resource potential 
was further divided based on whether the Project Type was segmented by High/Medium/Low 
Cost.
• 50% to Medium Cost
• 25% to Low Cost
• 25% to High Cost
• If a project type was not segmented by Cost, naturally no division occurred.
(80)
Path A & B: Ongoing Resource Potential & Growth Rates
• Production Block Resource Potential in each Sector grow at a fixed rate annually, which is equal 
to MW installed in the previous year multiplied by a Growth Factor.
• e.g., If a Production Block installs 20 MW in a year, and the Growth factor is 105%, the Production Block will 
have a technical potential of 21 MW in the subsequent year.
• Growth Rates set conservatively at 105%-116%  for all Sectors.
• Growth/Resource Potential forecasted on an annual basis; as the Model runs quarterly, annual 
Resource Potential was divided by four (4) to establish quarterly potential.
• Resurrection Rates: In the event a modeled Production Block installs no MW in a year, but Cost 
ofentry declines to such a degree that said Block could install in subsequent year, Resource 
Potential is set at ½ of Starting Potential (i.e., Resource Potential in 2017) for installs in the 
subsequent.  
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Path A Large: Competitive Solicitation, Modeling Assumptions
• Solicitations modeled to take place every Quarter.
• Base Quarterly Solicitation Targets equal to ¼ of Annual Sector Targets.
• “Price is Right” Type Solicitation Modeling: Each Quarter, Production Blocks are modeled to be 
successful until the cumulative MW including the next potential successful marginal Production 
Block’s Resource Capacity is greater than Solicitation Targets (i.e. closest without going over).
• This means that each solicitation, some % of the MW Target is not fulfilled (unless by chance, Cumulative 
MW installed for the Marginal Production Block exactly equals the Target);
• The % of MW target not hit is rolled to the next solicitation as a Remainder.
• Further, a 10% Failure Rate (i.e. 10% of selected projects fail to reach commercial operation) is assumed; all 
successful Production Blocks are prorated by 10%, and “Failed MW” are rolled into a solicitation exactly one 
year in the future.
• Quarterly Targets are equal to: Base Quarterly Target + Remainder & Failed MW carried to that solicitation.  
• The combination of Remainder MW and Failure Rates means that MW solicited in each quarterly solicitation 
increase at a higher rate than initially set Annual Target percentages, and, likewise, that less MW is installed in 
early years than targeted.   
• No Failure Rate assumed in 2025, so that the Model can hit Program Targets.
(82)
Path A Large: Competitive Solicitation, Incentive Assumptions
• Assumed that Production Blocks cannot bid below the value of Electric/NM Rates received from 
their utility.
• Production Block modeled to bid a Combined Incentive Bid (equal to their needed PBI Incentive 
+ Levelized 15-yr Value of Electric/NM Rates).
• It is assumed that Bidders will strategically bid in such a way as to converge their bids with the 
marginal bid; thus, in calculating incentives for C/B Analysis, the calculated Combined Incentive 
Bid for a successful bidder is equal to the average of the Marginal Bid and the bidders Cost of 
Entry Bid.  
• PBI Incentive are calculated for C/B analysis by netting out the 15-yr Levelized Value of 
Electric/NM Rates from the Combined Incentive Bid.
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Path A & B: DBI/PBI, Modeling Assumptions
• Modeled on a Quarterly basis;
• Initial DBI Block sizes set equal to ½ of 2017 Annual Targets;
• All Production Blocks across a Sector compete for the same DBI/PBI Block (however, DBI/PBI 
incentives vary by utility)
• Model only allows at most two (2) DBI Blocks to fill per quarter;
• Therefore, total MW that can be installed in a quarter is equal to: total MW remaining in a DBI Block that 
was partially filled in the previous quarter + the DBI Block Size.
• Model functions by looking at the PBI Incentive Level that each utility is offering, and allowing a 
Production Block to install in that quarter if PBI is greater than Cost of Entry.
(84)
Path A& B: DBI/PBI, Incentive Assumptions
• Initial DBI/PBI Incentives  are set for utility in each Sector, in reference to an Initial Benchmark “Combined 
Incentive.”
• Initial Combined Incentives are calculated by:
• Selecting a Benchmark Production Block (e.g., Commercial Solar Canopy-NGIRD-Third Party Owned);
• Determining the Levelized 15-yr Value of Electric/NM Rates for the Benchmark Production Block;
• Adding this Levelized 15-yr Rate Value to an Optimized DBI/PBI Starting $/MWh incentive (Optimization 
process discussed in subsequent slide);
• DBI/PBI incentives are then set for each utility by netting out the Levelized 15-yr Rate Value specific to the 
comparable Benchmark Production Block in that utility from the Combined Incentive.
• E.g., if the Benchmark Production Block is Commercial Solar Canopy-NGIRD-Third Party Owned, the Levelized 15-yr Rate 
Value for Commercial Solar Canopy-WMECO-Third Party Owned is netted from the Combined Incentive to determine 
the initial WMECO DBI/PBI .
• All Utility DBI/PBI incentives in a sector decline by the same specific fixed $/MWh rate:
• Fixed $/MWh decline used because a % based decline will never “zero-out”
• Further, analysis showed that program volatility can be better managed with $/MWh than % based DBI/PBI declines.       
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Path B: DBI/EPBI Modeling/Incentive Assumptions
• Path B DBI/EPBI was modeled using exactly the same process as DBI/PBI, with the exception that 
DBI/PBI and Initial Combined Incentives were calculated in $/kW rather than $/MWh; and
• The Levelized 15-yr Value of Electric/NM Rates was calculated by discounting the 15-year 
calculated PBI using the Production Block’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as a 
discount rate, rather than Target Equity IRR.   
(86)
Path A & B: DBI/PBI & EPBI Incentive Optimization Process
• Setting DBI/PBI Incentives involves a balancing of several factors: 2017 install Rates, and level of industry 
constriction versus 2016; level, constant growth versus volatile growth; setting minimum incentive levels to 
achieve 2025 targets at lowest cost.
• Because of this, Initial DBI/PBI/EPBI incentives (and decline rates) were set to meet the following policy 
objectives as closely as possible:
• 2017 annual installs in each sector being as close to 2017 targets as possible;
• Sectors hitting their targets (and the Program Hitting 2500 MW) as close to QT. 4, 2025 as possible;
• Minimize volatility in annual installs from 2017-2025;
• Incentive levels as low as possible, while still meeting the above objectives, to minimize costs;
• There is more than one solution set (i.e. Initial DBI/PBI or EPBI Incentive Levels and $/MWh or $/kW decline rate) 
that can meet the above parameters;
• However, more than 100 combinations were tested for each Sector (under each Policy Path and Scenario), and any 
parallel solution set would be, at best, only marginally better.
• As Path A, Large does not use an open-enrollment system, and incentives are set by bidding rather than 
centrally planned, no optimization process was necessary.
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J. CALCULATION OF OTHER COST & BENEFIT 
COMPONENTS
MISC. OTHER ASSUMPTIONS
(88)
‘Parametric Analysis’ Components
• Where data availability is limited or estimate would require extensive analysis infeasible within 
scope/timeline, we will make a parametric assumption
• Example: “x% of cost item retained in-state”
• Consulting team will make an ‘anchor’ estimate
• Based on brief literature, review, TF member input, or team judgment.
• When parametric assumption is applied to a model result (i.e. in $ or $/yr), a 10% sensitivity is 
possible.
• Example: if anchor parameter is 50%, result will also be calculated as 60%
• The sensitivity to changes of 10% from the key assumption is easily scaled to give magnitude of 
sensitivity over a broad range
• When parametric assumption is applied as an input to a complex model, analysis of 
sensitivities are beyond scope.
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Parameter
Selected 
Parameter
Selected 
Value
Base Sensitivity Description
System Installed Costs CB1.1 A Base 42% 42% 52.0%* % of System Installed Cost Expenditures Retained In-State
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 A Base 64% 64% 74.0%* % of Ongoing O&M & Insurance Cost Expenditures Retained In-State
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & 
Equity)
CB1.5 A Base 30% 30% 40.0%* % of Return to Debt & Equity Investors Retained In-State
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a A Base 15% 15% 25.0%* % of Federal ITC retained in-state (assume same as CB1.1-A)
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 A Base 28.8% 28.8% 38.8%* Fraction of solar PV monetizing its value in the FCM; [56 MW of DR PV 
with CSOs + 85 MW of PV with included on the load side for the FCA9 
ICR calculation] divided by 489 MW total forecast = 28.8% 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote 
Wind
CB6.1 A Base $ 27.50 $ 27.50 $ 35.00 $/MWh Incremental TX cost for Northern New England wind avoided by 
supplanting need for Class I wind with MA Solar PV
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote 
Wind
CB6.1 B Base 55% 55% 80% % of incremental TX cost for Northern New England Wind assumed 
allocated to load
Avoided Transmission Investment -
Local
CB6.2 A Base 30% 30.0% 40%* % of load on feeders with growth
Avoided Transmission Investment -
Local
CB6.2 B Base 80% 80.0% 90%* Scalar Adjustment Factor for technical issues (reduces gross value to 
account for a variety of technical issues preventing solar PV from 
avoiding investment deferral
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 A Base 30% 30.0% 40%* % of load on feeders with growth
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 B Base 50% 50.0% 60%* Scalar Adjustment Factor for technical issues (reduces gross value to 
account for a variety of technical issues preventing solar PV from 
avoiding investment deferral
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 C Base 50% 50.0% 60%* Scalar derating factor applied to distribution level energy losses avoided 
by solar PV, to reflect that the D investment is at varying locations often 
close to load, while aggregate D losses measured at D system injection; 
also reflects that some of literature review sources were already loss 
adjusted
Parametric Values Assumptions: 
Base Case Values used for All Presented Results; Sensitivity #s used for Sensitivity Analyses
(90)
System Installed Costs Retained in State (Inputs)
Residential
Small Commercial
(Roof-top)
Small Commercial
(Ground-mount)
Cost ($/kW)
% of Total 
Cost*
% Local 
Share
Cost ($/kW)
% of Total 
Cost*
% Local 
Share
Cost 
($/kW)
% of Total 
Cost*
% Local 
Share
System Installation Costs
Installation Costs
Materials & Equipment
Mounting (rails, clamps, fittings, etc.) $168.10 3.4% 50% $165.52 3.4% 40% $90.71 3.4% 25%
Modules $1,637.13 33.4% 0% $1,612.05 33.4% 0% $883.43 33.4% 0%
Electrical (wire, connectors, breakers, etc.) $108.16 2.2% 50% $106.51 2.2% 40% $58.37 2.2% 25%
Inverter $243.37 5.0% 50% $239.64 5.0% 40% $131.33 5.0% 25%
Labor
Installation $350.68 7.2% 95% $345.30 7.2% 90% $189.23 7.2% 70%
Other Costs
Permitting $651.64 13.3% 95% $641.66 13.3% 95% $351.64 13.3% 95%
Other Costs $293.02 6.0% 63% $288.53 6.0% 56% $158.12 6.0% 56%
Business Overhead $1,446.19 29.5% 63% $1,424.04 29.5% 56% $780.40 29.5% 56%
Sales Tax (Materials & Equipment Purchases) $0.00 0% 0% $0.00 0% 0% $0.00 0% 0%
Total $4,896.00 100.0% 47% $4,821.00 100.0% 43% $2,642.00 100.0% 40%
• % of Total Cost comes from NREL JEDI model default data for Massachusetts
• % Local Share developed from DOER 2013 Task 4 Consultant Report: “Comparative Regional Economic Impacts 
of Solar Ownership/Financing Alternatives” and supplemental research
• Used approx. weighted average of 42%.  Based on analysis of annual weighted avg. blend of res, commercial 
rooftop and ground mount over time.  #s were not highly sensitive to evolving blend, varying between 41% and 
43%.
System Installed Costs CB1.1
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(91)
System O&M Costs Retained in State (Inputs)
Residential
Small Commercial
(Roof-top)
Small Commercial
(Ground-mount)
Cost 
($/kW)
% of Total 
Cost*
% Local 
Share
Cost 
($/kW)
% of Total 
Cost*
% Local 
Share
Cost 
($/kW)
% of Total 
Cost*
% Local 
Share
Ongoing O&M Costs
Labor
Technicians $11.46 54.6% 100% $11.46 54.6% 90% $8.73 54.6% 90%
Materials and Services
Materials & Equipment $9.55 45.5% 50% $9.55 45.5% 40% $7.28 45.5% 25%
Services $0.00 0.0% 100% $0.00 0.0% 56% $0.00 0.0% 58%
Sales Tax (Materials & Equipment Purchases) $0.00 0% 0% $0.00 0% 0% $0.00 0% 0%
Total $21.00 100.0% 77% $21.00 100.0% 67% $16.00 100.0% 60%
• % of Total Cost comes from NREL JEDI model default data for Massachusetts
• % Local Share developed from DOER 2013 Task 4 Consultant Report: “Comparative 
Regional Economic Impacts of Solar Ownership/Financing Alternatives” and 
supplemental research
• Used 64%.  Based on analysis of annual weighted avg. blend of res, commercial 
rooftop and ground mount over time.  #s were not highly sensitive to evolving blend, 
varying between 63% and 68%
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2
(92)
Wholesale Market Price Impacts
• Wholesale energy market price effects are not in 
perpetuity
• Effect of installation in year X assumed to dissipate 
based on energy DRIPE 2014 dissipation schedule 
from AESC 2013
• Wholesale energy market price effects only 
impact purchases from spot market or short-term 
transactions influenced by spot market.  Energy 
transacted under multi-year energy hedges are 
not impacted
• Effect of installation in year X assumed to phase in 
according to 2014 energy DRIPE hedged energy 
schedule from AESC 2013
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1
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(93)
Estimating EDC Incremental Admin Costs for Policy Paths A & B
• Assumed all EDC labor costs were incremental (whether or not EDC would have sought additional rate recover for these types of costs as core vs. incremental staff in the past)
• Cost estimates by SEA based SEA interpretation of interviews with EDC procurement staff
• Results not reviewed or endorsed by EDCs
• Categories: 
• One-tome Setup Costs, New Policies (Staffing: EDC staff, legal); systems; tariff design, approvals, training)
• Small: 2 FTEs, split 75% in 2016, 25% in 2017
• Large: 2 FTEs, split 75% in 2016, 25% in 2017
• Same for Paths A & B
• Solicitation Costs (thru 2025) – Policy Path A (large) only
• Including core staff, assume 25% of $500K.  Assume this is per solicitation round based on LREC/ZREC 1 round/yr.  If move to 3 rounds per year, assume some scale economies ==> assume 2.5x the cost of 
one solicitation
• Escalate at 4%/yr
• Ongoing Admin. Costs from 2017 on (Ongoing admin costs (meter reading, hand holding, accounting, payments, recovery filings… (applying from startup to completion, thru 2050)
• Assume 1.25 FTEs initially for small and 2 for large
• Costs assumed to escalate annually by 20% of increase in target procurement volume to reflect some increase in labor costs with increased transcaction volume but strong scale economies
• Transaction Costs for reselling RECs on a $/MWh (Broker Fees Associated with the Sale of RECs if performed through a broker )
• Assume $1/MWh, applying to 50% of all distribution load (reflecting 1 – today’s basic service %)
• Note: Under SREC, Assume EDCs only purchase for own needs, don’t need to resell; SREC Policy 'transactional friction" modeled as part of SREC market mdoel as $2.50 per SREC purchased by LSEs 
outside of small quantity of direct hedge transactions entered into with generators up-front to support financing
• Note: corresponding market participant costs for SREC policies embedded in SREC market model, captured there
• Utility staff Average FTE cost used in model:  $162,500 fully-loaded, based on input from 2 EDCs
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4
(94)
Commercial PV Customer Acquisition Cost ($/kW) 
(from NREL studies)
Project Type Med/Small Med/Small Large
Project Size
Not 
Specified <250 kW >250kW
Note
2010 
Median
2012 
Median
2012 
Median
System Design $0.10 $0.04 $0.01 
Marketing/Adver
tising $0.01 - -
Other $0.08 $0.09 $0.02 
Total $0.19 $0.13 $0.03 
# of Projects
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Total
Acce
pted Ratio Total
Acce
pted Ratio Total
Acce
pted Ratio
Larg
e 
ZRE
C
CL&P 140 21 6.67 52 19 2.74 78 32 2.44
UI 22 6 3.67 12 4 3.00 8 8 1.00
Total 162 27 6.00 64 23 2.78 86 40 2.15
Med
ium 
ZRE
C
CL&P 113 47 2.40 157 70 2.24 113 95 1.19
UI 37 13 2.85 35 24 1.46 50 27 1.85
Total 150 60 2.50 192 94 2.04 163 122 1.34
Capacity (MW)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Total
Acce
pted Ratio Total
Acce
pted Ratio Total
Acce
pted Ratio
Larg
e 
ZRE
C
CL&P 94.3 12.2 7.73 34.2 12.2 2.80 65.3 27.6 2.37
UI 12.1 2.6 4.65 7.2 2.4 3.00 5.9 5.9 1.00
Total 106.4 14.8 7.19 41.4 14.6 2.84 71.2 33.5 2.13
Med
ium 
ZRE
C
CL&P 21.5 8.8 2.44 30.2 14.2 2.13 24.5 18.1 1.35
UI 7.1 2.5 2.84 6.4 4.4 1.45 9.7 5.1 1.90
Total 28.6 11.3 2.53 36.6 18.6 1.97 34.2 23.2 1.47
Policy Path A additional developer overhead due to the need to sell both winning and losing bids: 
Cust Aq. Cost * (sales/contract under solicitation – sale/contract under open program) 
Assume $0.05/W as approx. fleet 
wtd. Avg.
Assume 2.5 bids/winning bid
*
 $0.05/W*(2.5-1) = $0.075/W
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4
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(95)
Estimate of Taxable Discounts & Lease Revenue
Used for estimating income tax impact of these benefits on NOPs
% of Discount Payments Assumed 
Taxable
Scenario 2015 2020 2025
SREC Capped-1600 35% 80% 80%
SREC Uncapped-1600 35% 80% 80%
SREC Capped-2500 35% 80% 80%
Policy A Capped-1600 35% 80% 80%
Policy A Capped-2500 35% 80% 80%
Policy A Uncapped-1600 35% 80% 80%
Policy A Uncapped-2500 35% 35% 35%
Policy B Capped-1600 35% 80% 80%
Policy B Capped-2500 35% 80% 80%
Policy B Uncapped-1600 35% 80% 80%
Policy B Uncapped-2500 35% 35% 35%
% of Lease Payments Assumed 
Taxable
Assumptions made based on SEA side-analysis to estimate evolving mix of taxable and non-
taxable lease and PPA/NMC off-takers
Scenario 2015 2020 2025
SREC Capped-1600 75% 80% 80%
SREC Uncapped-1600 75% 80% 80%
SREC Capped-2500 75% 80% 80%
Policy A Capped-1600 75% 80% 80%
Policy A Capped-2500 75% 80% 80%
Policy A Uncapped-1600 75% 80% 80%
Policy A Uncapped-2500 75% 75% 75%
Policy B Capped-1600 75% 80% 80%
Policy B Capped-2500 75% 80% 80%
Policy B Uncapped-1600 75% 80% 80%
Policy B Uncapped-2500 75% 75% 75%
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b
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Appendix B:
Task 3 - Analysis of Costs and Benefits: 
Detailed Cost and Benefit Result Tables
Massachusetts Net Metering and Solar Task Force
Sustainable Energy 
Advantage, LLC
(2)
NOP Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped
Benefits 2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             228.2 $        3.3 $              209.0 $             4.8 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             152.6 $        2.2 $              148.1 $             3.4 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $             155.3 $        2.3 $              104.1 $             2.4 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $               25.4 $        0.4 $                17.5 $             0.4 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $               63.5 $        0.9 $                42.5 $             1.0 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                 9.6 $        0.1 $                  7.2 $             0.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               16.4 $        0.2 $                10.6 $             0.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $             476.0 $        6.9 $              476.0 $           10.9 
Total $          1,127.1 $      16.4 $           1,015.0 $           23.3 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV$/MWh 
Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $               59.2 $        0.9 $                52.3 $             1.2 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             258.8 $        3.8 $              228.7 $             5.2 
Total $             318.0 $        4.6 $              280.9 $             6.4 
Costs
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(3)
NOP Costs and Benefits – SREC Uncapped
Benefits 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
Lease Payments CB1.3 $              223.4 $             5.1 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $              160.7 $             3.7 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $                94.1 $             2.2 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $                15.7 $             0.4 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $                37.9 $             0.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                  6.6 $             0.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $                  9.1 $             0.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $              525.0 $           12.1 
Total $           1,072.5 $           24.6 
1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $                53.0 $             1.2 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $              231.9 $             5.3 
Total $              284.9 $             6.5 
Costs
(4)
NOP Costs and Benefits – Policy A Capped
Benefits 2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             304.3 $        4.3 $              222.7 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             204.3 $        2.9 $              156.8 $             3.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $             167.8 $        2.4 $              104.8 $             2.3 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $               24.9 $        0.4 $                17.3 $             0.4 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $               63.9 $        0.9 $                42.3 $             0.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               10.8 $        0.2 $                  7.3 $             0.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               10.2 $        0.1 $                  9.0 $             0.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $             453.1 $        6.4 $              453.1 $           10.1 
Total $          1,239.3 $      17.6 $           1,013.3 $           22.7 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $) NPV$/MWh Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Costs
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $               63.3 $        0.9 $                51.9 $             1.2 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             277.0 $        3.9 $              227.1 $             5.1 
Total $             340.4 $        4.8 $              279.0 $             6.2 
Costs
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(5)
NOP Costs and Benefits – Policy A Uncapped
Benefits 2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             203.8 $        2.9 $              198.1 $             4.4 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             146.8 $        2.1 $              142.9 $             3.2 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $             134.7 $        1.9 $                97.4 $             2.2 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $               19.8 $        0.3 $                16.2 $             0.4 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $               48.0 $        0.7 $                39.3 $             0.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                 9.1 $        0.1 $                  6.8 $             0.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               11.9 $        0.2 $                  9.3 $             0.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $             659.1 $        9.4 $              497.8 $           11.1 
Total $          1,233.2 $      17.5 $           1,008.0 $           22.6 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $) NPV$/MWh Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Costs
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $               36.6 $        0.5 $                49.0 $             1.1 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             160.2 $        2.3 $              214.2 $             4.8 
Total $             196.8 $        2.8 $              263.2 $             5.9 
Costs
(6)
NOP Costs and Benefits – Policy B Capped
Benefits 2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             299.1 $        4.2 $              222.4 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             204.3 $        2.9 $              157.5 $             3.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $             160.1 $        2.3 $              102.2 $             2.3 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $               25.9 $        0.4 $                17.0 $             0.4 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $               66.6 $        0.9 $                41.9 $             0.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               10.3 $        0.1 $                  7.1 $             0.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               11.8 $        0.2 $                  9.2 $             0.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $             453.1 $        6.4 $              453.1 $           10.1 
Total $          1,231.0 $      17.5 $           1,010.3 $           22.6 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $) NPV$/MWh Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Costs
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $               62.8 $        0.9 $                51.7 $             1.2 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             274.7 $        3.9 $              226.0 $             5.1 
Total $             337.5 $        4.8 $              277.7 $             6.2 
Costs
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(7)
NOP Costs and Benefits – Policy B Uncapped
Benefits 2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             299.1 $        4.3 $              222.0 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             213.2 $        3.0 $              159.5 $             3.6 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $             132.3 $        1.9 $                97.1 $             2.2 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $               21.6 $        0.3 $                16.1 $             0.4 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $               52.3 $        0.7 $                39.2 $             0.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                 8.8 $        0.1 $                  6.8 $             0.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               13.7 $        0.2 $                  9.6 $             0.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $             775.5 $      11.0 $              520.4 $           11.7 
Total $          1,516.6 $      21.6 $           1,070.8 $           24.0 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $) NPV$/MWh Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Costs
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $               45.7 $        0.7 $                53.0 $             1.2 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             199.9 $        2.8 $              232.0 $             5.2 
Total $             245.7 $        3.5 $              285.0 $             6.4 
Costs
(8)
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $             134.0 $        1.9 $                56.7 $             1.3 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $          1,304.8 $      18.9 $           1,258.7 $           28.9 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,373.7 $      63.5 $           3,565.2 $           81.8 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          2,263.9 $      32.9 $              940.0 $           21.6 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             376.3 $        5.5 $              163.9 $             3.8 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $          1,010.5 $      14.7 $              404.4 $             9.3 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $             129.6 $        1.9 $                62.7 $             1.4 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $             323.0 $        4.7 $              130.9 $             3.0 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          2,563.0 $      37.2 $           2,563.0 $           58.8 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $               69.0 $        1.0 $                48.4 $             1.1 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $             120.1 $        1.7 $                77.8 $             1.8 
Total $        12,668.0 $    183.9 $           9,271.7 $         212.8 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV$/MWh
Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          6,696.8 $      97.2 $           5,183.0 $         118.9 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $          1,382.7 $      20.1 $              980.3 $           22.5 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             228.2 $        3.3 $              209.0 $             4.8 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             152.6 $        2.2 $              148.1 $             3.4 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $               87.7 $        1.3 $                97.8 $             2.2 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             383.7 $        5.6 $              427.9 $             9.8 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Total $          8,931.6 $    129.7 $           7,046.2 $         161.7 
CG Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped
Benefits
Costs
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(9)
1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $                    - $              -
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $                42.4 $             1.0 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $           1,258.1 $           28.9 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $           3,526.7 $           81.0 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $              766.0 $           17.6 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $              130.9 $             3.0 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $              320.6 $             7.4 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                51.3 $             1.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $              103.1 $             2.4 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $           2,891.5 $           66.4 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                    - $              -
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $                77.9 $             1.8 
Total $           9,168.5 $         210.6 
1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $           5,136.5 $         118.0 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $              986.7 $           22.7 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $              223.4 $             5.1 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $              160.7 $             3.7 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $                23.0 $             0.5 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $              100.8 $             2.3 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                    - $              -
Total $           6,631.2 $         152.3 
CG Costs and Benefits – SREC Uncapped
Benefits
Costs
(10)
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               59.8 $        0.8 $                43.8 $             1.0 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $          1,335.4 $      19.0 $           1,251.3 $           28.0 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,342.9 $      61.7 $           3,592.3 $           80.4 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,462.9 $      20.8 $              836.4 $           18.7 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             213.3 $        3.0 $              138.6 $             3.1 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             551.3 $        7.8 $              343.0 $             7.7 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               90.3 $        1.3 $                55.9 $             1.3 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $             114.2 $        1.6 $                94.9 $             2.1 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          2,409.7 $      34.2 $           2,409.7 $           53.9 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $             841.1 $      11.9 $              226.7 $             5.1 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $             119.0 $        1.7 $                77.8 $             1.7 
Total $        11,540.0 $    163.8 $           9,070.2 $         202.9 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV$/MWh
Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          6,267.7 $      89.0 $           5,094.3 $         114.0 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $          1,270.7 $      18.0 $              949.5 $           21.2 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             304.3 $        4.3 $              222.7 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             204.3 $        2.9 $              156.8 $             3.5 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             222.2 $        3.2 $              123.1 $             2.8 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             972.0 $      13.8 $              538.5 $           12.0 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $               71.2 $        1.0 $                17.9 $             0.4 
Total $          9,312.3 $    132.2 $           7,102.7 $         158.9 
CG Costs and Benefits – Policy A Capped
Benefits
Costs
 399 
 
(11)
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               58.8 $        0.8 $                43.2 $             1.0 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $          1,337.1 $      19.0 $           1,256.4 $           28.1 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          3,830.3 $      54.5 $           3,446.4 $           77.2 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,258.6 $      17.9 $              786.3 $           17.6 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             182.1 $        2.6 $              131.8 $             3.0 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             452.2 $        6.4 $              321.1 $             7.2 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               81.2 $        1.2 $                53.2 $             1.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $             133.3 $        1.9 $                99.0 $             2.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          3,513.1 $      50.0 $           2,687.3 $           60.2 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $             119.2 $        1.7 $                77.8 $             1.7 
Total $        10,966.0 $    156.0 $           8,902.6 $         199.3 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV$/MWh
Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          6,236.8 $      88.7 $           5,085.4 $         113.9 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $             879.3 $      12.5 $              859.7 $           19.2 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             203.8 $        2.9 $              198.1 $             4.4 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             146.8 $        2.1 $              142.9 $             3.2 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             211.0 $        3.0 $                85.7 $             1.9 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             922.9 $      13.1 $              375.1 $             8.4 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $               69.9 $        1.0 $                16.4 $             0.4 
Total $          8,670.5 $    123.3 $           6,763.3 $         151.4 
CG Costs and Benefits – Policy A Uncapped
Benefits
Costs
(12)
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               60.0 $        0.9 $                43.8 $             1.0 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $          1,325.7 $      18.8 $           1,248.6 $           27.9 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,173.2 $      59.2 $           3,577.5 $           80.0 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,468.3 $      20.8 $              827.0 $           18.5 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             228.2 $        3.2 $              138.9 $             3.1 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             575.3 $        8.2 $              344.1 $             7.7 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               91.2 $        1.3 $                55.4 $             1.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $             131.0 $        1.9 $                99.5 $             2.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          2,409.7 $      34.2 $           2,409.7 $           53.9 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $             838.6 $      11.9 $              234.9 $             5.3 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $             119.2 $        1.7 $                77.8 $             1.7 
Total $        11,420.4 $    162.1 $           9,057.2 $         202.6 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV$/MWh
Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          6,224.5 $      88.4 $           5,086.3 $         113.8 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $          1,315.2 $      18.7 $              964.8 $           21.6 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             299.1 $        4.2 $              222.4 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             204.3 $        2.9 $              157.5 $             3.5 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             188.9 $        2.7 $              118.0 $             2.6 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             826.5 $      11.7 $              510.3 $           11.4 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Total $          9,058.4 $    128.6 $           7,059.2 $         157.9 
CG Costs and Benefits – Policy B Capped
Benefits
Costs
 400 
 
(13)
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               59.1 $        0.8 $                43.4 $             1.0 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $          1,334.5 $      19.0 $           1,255.7 $           28.1 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          3,418.6 $      48.6 $           3,496.4 $           78.3 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,277.5 $      18.2 $              788.0 $           17.6 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             203.9 $        2.9 $              132.3 $             3.0 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             492.0 $        7.0 $              323.5 $             7.2 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               81.3 $        1.2 $                53.2 $             1.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $             159.0 $        2.3 $              105.2 $             2.4 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          4,197.8 $      59.7 $           2,842.0 $           63.6 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $             119.3 $        1.7 $                77.8 $             1.7 
Total $        11,342.9 $    161.3 $           9,117.4 $         204.2 
2500 MW 1600 MW
C/B Component ↓ CB Code
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV$/MWh
Costs
NPV Costs 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Costs
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          6,274.2 $      89.2 $           5,095.9 $         114.1 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $          1,365.4 $      19.4 $              976.1 $           21.9 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             299.1 $        4.3 $              222.0 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             213.2 $        3.0 $              159.5 $             3.6 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             236.6 $        3.4 $                91.9 $             2.1 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $          1,035.3 $      14.7 $              402.0 $             9.0 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Total $          9,423.8 $    134.0 $           6,947.4 $         155.6 
CG Costs and Benefits – Policy B Uncapped
Benefits
Costs
(14)
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             146.9 $        2.1 $              150.1 $             3.4 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,471.6 $      21.4 $              921.8 $           21.2 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $             135.1 $        2.0 $                58.3 $             1.3 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                 3.9 $        0.1 $                  2.7 $             0.1 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.5 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,064.4 $      30.0 $           1,551.2 $           35.6 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             167.0 $        2.4 $              148.4 $             3.4 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.6 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             102.5 $        1.5 $                88.6 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             232.4 $        3.4 $              200.9 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.3 $              660.0 $           15.1 
Total $          5,270.6 $      76.5 $           3,958.8 $           90.9 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh
Costs 
NPV Costs
(Million $) NPV $/MWh Costs 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $             134.0 $        1.9 $                56.7 $             1.3 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,884.4 $      70.9 $           3,871.4 $           88.8 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs (e.g. SACP) CB2.2 $             200.0 $        2.9 $              175.7 $             4.0 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             401.7 $        5.8 $              181.4 $             4.2 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $          1,074.0 $      15.6 $              446.9 $           10.3 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $             125.1 $        1.8 $                63.1 $             1.4 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $             182.4 $        2.6 $                78.6 $             1.8 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          1,756.2 $      25.5 $           1,751.3 $           40.2 
Total $          8,757.8 $    127.1 $           6,625.1 $         152.0 
NPR Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped
Benefits
Costs
 401 
 
(15)
Benefits
Costs
NPR Costs and Benefits – SREC Uncapped
1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code NPV Benefits 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $                76.1 $             1.7 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $              893.5 $           20.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $                48.0 $             1.1 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                    - $              -
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $                64.4 $             1.5 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $           1,549.3 $           35.6 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $              148.2 $             3.4 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $              112.5 $             2.6 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $                88.5 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $              200.6 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $              660.0 $           15.2 
Total $           3,841.1 $           88.2 
1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Costs 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $                42.4 $             1.0 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $           3,812.7 $           87.6 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs (e.g. SACP) CB2.2 $              167.1 $             3.8 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                    - $              -
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $              146.6 $             3.4 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $              358.6 $             8.2 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                52.2 $             1.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $                60.3 $             1.4 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $           1,920.0 $           44.1 
Total $           6,559.9 $         150.7 
(16)
NPR Costs and Benefits – Policy A Capped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             285.5 $        4.1 $              175.0 $             3.9 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,552.6 $      22.0 $              961.4 $           21.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $               91.1 $        1.3 $                52.6 $             1.2 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $               47.0 $        0.7 $                12.7 $             0.3 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,103.3 $      29.9 $           1,552.6 $           34.7 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.6 $        2.4 $              148.4 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             107.3 $        1.5 $                90.7 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             243.2 $        3.5 $              205.6 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $          5,549.5 $      78.8 $           4,035.8 $           90.3 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh
Costs 
NPV Costs
(Million $) NPV $/MWh Costs 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               59.8 $        0.8 $                43.8 $             1.0 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,589.4 $      65.2 $           3,838.8 $           85.9 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs (e.g. SACP) CB2.2 $             191.1 $        2.7 $              191.1 $             4.3 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $             197.4 $        2.8 $                63.5 $             1.4 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             238.2 $        3.4 $              155.9 $             3.5 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             615.2 $        8.7 $              385.3 $             8.6 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               91.0 $        1.3 $                56.9 $             1.3 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               52.7 $        0.7 $                52.6 $             1.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          1,668.0 $      23.7 $           1,663.5 $           37.2 
Total $          7,702.9 $    109.4 $           6,451.3 $         144.3 
Benefits
Costs
 402 
 
(17)
NPR Costs and Benefits – Policy A Uncapped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             247.6 $        3.5 $              134.7 $             3.0 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,515.0 $      21.5 $              949.6 $           21.3 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $               77.8 $        1.1 $                49.4 $             1.1 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,101.6 $      29.9 $           1,551.2 $           34.7 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.3 $        2.5 $              148.2 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             106.9 $        1.5 $                90.5 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             242.3 $        3.4 $              205.1 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $          5,410.4 $      76.9 $           3,965.6 $           88.8 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh
Costs 
NPV Costs
(Million $) NPV $/MWh Costs 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               58.8 $        0.8 $                43.2 $             1.0 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,080.3 $      58.0 $           3,696.4 $           82.8 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs (e.g. SACP) CB2.2 $             191.7 $        2.7 $              191.7 $             4.3 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $             108.1 $        1.5 $                61.8 $             1.4 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             201.9 $        2.9 $              148.0 $             3.3 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             500.3 $        7.1 $              360.4 $             8.1 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               81.3 $        1.2 $                54.1 $             1.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               52.9 $        0.8 $                52.7 $             1.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          1,652.6 $      23.5 $           1,648.1 $           36.9 
Total $          6,927.9 $      98.5 $           6,256.5 $         140.1 
Benefits
Costs
(18)
NPR Costs and Benefits – Policy B Capped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             251.7 $        3.6 $              169.7 $             3.8 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,555.7 $      22.1 $              960.7 $           21.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $               90.9 $        1.3 $                51.9 $             1.2 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $               46.8 $        0.7 $                13.1 $             0.3 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,100.5 $      29.8 $           1,552.8 $           34.7 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.2 $        2.4 $              148.6 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             107.1 $        1.5 $                90.8 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             242.8 $        3.4 $              205.8 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $          5,514.8 $      78.3 $           4,030.4 $           90.2 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh
Costs 
NPV Costs
(Million $) NPV $/MWh Costs 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               60.0 $        0.9 $                43.8 $             1.0 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,419.7 $      62.7 $           3,824.0 $           85.5 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs (e.g. SACP) CB2.2 $             191.1 $        2.7 $              191.1 $             4.3 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $               85.3 $        1.2 $                30.3 $             0.7 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             254.0 $        3.6 $              156.0 $             3.5 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             641.9 $        9.1 $              386.0 $             8.6 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               91.6 $        1.3 $                56.2 $             1.3 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               76.9 $        1.1 $                58.8 $             1.3 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          1,668.0 $      23.7 $           1,663.5 $           37.2 
Total $          7,488.5 $    106.3 $           6,409.7 $         143.4 
Benefits
Costs
 403 
 
(19)
NPR Costs and Benefits – Policy B Uncapped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh
Benefits 
MA Income Taxes CB1.6.b $             282.3 $        4.0 $              144.9 $             3.2 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,520.2 $      21.6 $              950.2 $           21.3 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $               78.7 $        1.1 $                49.4 $             1.1 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,100.7 $      29.9 $           1,551.3 $           34.7 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.2 $        2.4 $              148.3 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             106.9 $        1.5 $                90.6 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             242.2 $        3.4 $              205.3 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $          5,450.2 $      77.5 $           3,977.0 $           89.1 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ CB Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh
Costs 
NPV Costs
(Million $) NPV $/MWh Costs 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6.a $               59.1 $        0.8 $                43.4 $             1.0 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          3,668.6 $      52.2 $           3,599.4 $           80.6 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs (e.g. SACP) CB2.2 $             191.7 $        2.7 $              191.7 $             4.3 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $               85.1 $        1.2 $                30.2 $             0.7 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 $             225.6 $        3.2 $              148.4 $             3.3 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 $             544.3 $        7.7 $              362.7 $             8.1 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               81.5 $        1.2 $                54.0 $             1.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               90.0 $        1.3 $                61.4 $             1.4 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          2,742.0 $      39.0 $           1,885.7 $           42.2 
Total $          7,687.9 $    109.3 $           6,376.9 $         142.8 
Benefits
Costs
(20)
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          2,812.6 $      40.8 $           2,176.9 $           50.0 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $             884.9 $      12.8 $              627.4 $           14.4 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             228.2 $        3.3 $              209.0 $             4.8 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             152.6 $        2.2 $              148.1 $             3.4 
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $          1,120.9 $      16.3 $              667.7 $           15.3 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $             195.7 $        2.8 $              188.8 $             4.3 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,471.6 $      21.4 $              921.8 $           21.2 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          2,554.3 $      37.1 $           1,102.4 $           25.3 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               14.2 $        0.2 $                  6.8 $             0.2 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $             157.0 $        2.3 $                62.9 $             1.4 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          1,282.7 $      18.6 $           1,287.7 $           29.6 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $               72.9 $        1.1 $                51.1 $             1.2 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.5 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,184.5 $      31.7 $           1,629.0 $           37.4 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             167.0 $        2.4 $              148.4 $             3.4 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.6 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             102.5 $        1.5 $                88.6 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             232.4 $        3.4 $              200.9 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.3 $              660.0 $           15.1 
Total $        14,581.0 $    211.7 $         10,354.3 $         237.6 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh 
Costs 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Costs 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $             642.5 $        9.3 $              656.5 $           15.1 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,884.4 $      70.9 $           3,871.4 $           88.8 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Total $          5,526.9 $      80.2 $           4,528.0 $         103.9 
C@L Costs and Benefits – SREC Capped
Benefits
Costs
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C@L Costs and Benefits – SREC Uncapped
1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $)
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $           2,157.3 $           49.6 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $              631.5 $           14.5 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $              223.4 $             5.1 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $              160.7 $             3.7 
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $              761.2 $           17.5 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $              188.7 $             4.3 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $              893.5 $           20.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $              908.1 $           20.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                  5.8 $             0.1 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $                51.9 $             1.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $           1,496.4 $           34.4 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                    - $              -
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $                64.4 $             1.5 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $           1,627.1 $           37.4 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $              148.2 $             3.4 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $              112.5 $             2.6 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $              660.0 $           15.2 
Total $         10,090.7 $         231.8 
1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Costs 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $              332.8 $             7.6 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $           3,812.7 $           87.6 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $                    - $              -
Total $           4,145.4 $           95.2 
Benefits
Costs
(22)
C@L Costs and Benefits – Policy A Capped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          2,632.4 $      37.4 $           2,139.6 $           47.9 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $             813.2 $      11.5 $              607.7 $           13.6 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             304.3 $        4.3 $              222.7 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             204.3 $        2.9 $              156.8 $             3.5 
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $             668.3 $        9.5 $              590.2 $           13.2 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $             200.3 $        2.8 $              187.7 $             4.2 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,552.6 $      22.0 $              961.4 $           21.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,721.8 $      24.4 $              993.7 $           22.2 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $               10.1 $        0.1 $                  6.3 $             0.1 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               71.6 $        1.0 $                51.3 $             1.1 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          1,194.8 $      17.0 $           1,199.3 $           26.8 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $             888.1 $      12.6 $              239.3 $             5.4 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,222.3 $      31.5 $           1,630.4 $           36.5 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.6 $        2.4 $              148.4 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             107.3 $        1.5 $                90.7 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             243.2 $        3.5 $              205.6 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $        13,954.3 $    198.1 $         10,268.0 $         229.7 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh 
Costs 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Costs 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $          1,249.0 $      17.7 $              765.6 $           17.1 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,589.4 $      65.2 $           3,838.8 $           85.9 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $             197.4 $        2.8 $                63.5 $             1.4 
Total $          6,035.8 $      85.7 $           4,667.9 $         104.4 
Benefits
Costs
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C@L Costs and Benefits – Policy A Uncapped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          2,619.5 $      37.3 $           2,135.9 $           47.8 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $             562.7 $        8.0 $              550.2 $           12.3 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             203.8 $        2.9 $              198.1 $             4.4 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             146.8 $        2.1 $              142.9 $             3.2 
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $             688.7 $        9.8 $              641.8 $           14.4 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $             200.6 $        2.9 $              188.5 $             4.2 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,515.0 $      21.5 $              949.6 $           21.3 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,471.1 $      20.9 $              933.1 $           20.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                 9.0 $        0.1 $                  6.0 $             0.1 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               92.3 $        1.3 $                55.6 $             1.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          2,519.7 $      35.8 $           1,537.1 $           34.4 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,220.7 $      31.6 $           1,629.0 $           36.5 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.3 $        2.5 $              148.2 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             106.9 $        1.5 $                90.5 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             242.3 $        3.4 $              205.1 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $        13,718.3 $    195.1 $         10,248.4 $         229.5 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh 
Costs 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Costs 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $          1,083.1 $      15.4 $              589.3 $           13.2 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,080.3 $      58.0 $           3,696.4 $           82.8 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $             108.1 $        1.5 $                61.8 $             1.4 
Total $          5,271.6 $      75.0 $           4,347.5 $           97.3 
Benefits
Costs
(24)
C@L Costs and Benefits – Policy B Capped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          2,614.3 $      37.1 $           2,136.2 $           47.8 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $             841.7 $      11.9 $              617.5 $           13.8 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             299.1 $        4.2 $              222.4 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             204.3 $        2.9 $              157.5 $             3.5 
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $             708.6 $      10.1 $              599.4 $           13.4 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $             198.9 $        2.8 $              187.3 $             4.2 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,555.7 $      22.1 $              960.7 $           21.5 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,719.3 $      24.4 $              981.1 $           21.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                 9.9 $        0.1 $                  6.3 $             0.1 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               65.9 $        0.9 $                49.9 $             1.1 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          1,194.8 $      17.0 $           1,199.3 $           26.8 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $             885.5 $      12.6 $              248.0 $             5.5 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,219.7 $      31.5 $           1,630.6 $           36.5 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.2 $        2.4 $              148.6 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             107.1 $        1.5 $                90.8 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             242.8 $        3.4 $              205.8 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $        13,986.6 $    198.6 $         10,278.3 $         229.9 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh 
Costs 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Costs 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $          1,101.2 $      15.6 $              736.4 $           16.5 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          4,419.7 $      62.7 $           3,824.0 $           85.5 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $               85.3 $        1.2 $                30.3 $             0.7 
Total $          5,606.2 $      79.6 $           4,590.7 $         102.7 
Benefits
Costs
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C@L Costs and Benefits – Policy B Uncapped
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
NPV Benefits 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh 
Benefits 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 $          2,635.2 $      37.5 $           2,140.3 $           47.9 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 $             873.8 $      12.4 $              624.7 $           14.0 
Lease Payments CB1.3 $             299.1 $        4.3 $              222.0 $             5.0 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 $             213.2 $        3.0 $              159.5 $             3.6 
ROI (Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity) CB1.5 $             575.7 $        8.2 $              651.0 $           14.6 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a $             200.2 $        2.8 $              188.4 $             4.2 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 $          1,520.2 $      21.6 $              950.2 $           21.3 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 $          1,488.6 $      21.2 $              934.5 $           20.9 
Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., EE, RE) CB3.4 $                 8.7 $        0.1 $                  6.0 $             0.1 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 $               82.6 $        1.2 $                53.4 $             1.2 
Virtual NM CB4.2 $          2,231.3 $      31.7 $           1,476.7 $           33.1 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 $                  - $         - $                    - $              -
Wholesale Market Price Impacts - Energy CB5.1 $               54.4 $        0.8 $                64.4 $             1.4 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 $          2,220.0 $      31.6 $           1,629.2 $           36.5 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 $             172.2 $        2.4 $              148.3 $             3.3 
Avoided Trans. Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 $             181.8 $        2.6 $              112.5 $             2.5 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Local CB6.2 $             106.9 $        1.5 $                90.6 $             2.0 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 $             242.2 $        3.4 $              205.3 $             4.6 
Avoided Environmental Impacts CB7.1 $             710.8 $      10.1 $              660.0 $           14.8 
Total $        13,816.7 $    196.5 $         10,317.0 $         231.0 
2500 MW 1600 MW 
C/B Component ↓ 
CB 
Code 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV$/MWh 
Costs 
NPV Costs 
(Million $) 
NPV $/MWh
Costs 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b $          1,235.2 $      17.6 $              634.0 $           14.2 
Direct Incentives (e.g., SRECs) CB2.1 $          3,668.6 $      52.2 $           3,599.4 $           80.6 
Solar Policy Incr. Admin. & Transaction Costs CB2.4 $               85.1 $        1.2 $                30.2 $             0.7 
Total $          4,989.0 $      71.0 $           4,263.7 $           95.5 
Benefits
Costs
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Appendix C:
Task 3 - Analysis of Costs and Benefits: 
Policy Paths A & B Modeled Incentives
Massachusetts Net Metering and Solar Task Force
Sustainable Energy 
Advantage, LLC
(2)
Policy Path A – Small Residential DBI/PBI
Capped Uncapped
Slightly different DBI clearing 
speed function of slightly 
different starting tech. potential 
(extremely marginal effect)
No PBI incentive needed Post-
2023-Q2
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(3)
Policy Path A – Small Non-Residential DBI/PBI
Capped Uncapped
Slightly different DBI clearing 
speed function of slightly 
different starting tech. potential 
(extremely marginal effect)
No PBI incentive needed Post-
2021
(4)
Policy Path A – Large  Competitive PBI – Sector A
Capped Uncapped
When lines cross, Sector A which is 
dominated by CSS and VNM LIH do not 
need PBI with VNM.  
Marginal bid moves to 
convergence with rates, all 
Sectors.
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(5)
Policy Path A – Large  Competitive PBI – Sector B
Capped Uncapped
Spikes reflect supply 
lumpiness and 
modeling method.
(6)
Policy Path A – Large  Competitive PBI – Sector C
Capped Uncapped
Higher Marginal Bid 
is function of 
modeling constraints, 
and not likely to be 
seen in practice.   See 
Note.
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(7)
Policy Path A – Large  Competitive PBI – Sector D
Capped Uncapped
Spikes are 
reflective of 
“Price is 
Right” 
Modeling 
Assumption
(8)
Policy Path B – Small Residential DBI/EPBI
Capped Uncapped
Same for Both NM/ 
no NM 
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(9)
Policy Path B – Small Non-Residential DBI/EPBI
Capped Uncapped
Same for Both NM/ 
no NM 
(10)
Policy Path B – Sector A DBI/PBI
Capped Uncapped
By 2019, CSS and 
VNM LIH are no 
longer dependent on 
PBI at current NM 
levels
Comparative PBI levels 
must be viewed in context 
of lowered target (25%-
10%)
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(11)
Policy Path B – Sector B DBI/PBI
Capped Uncapped
Comparative PBI levels 
must be viewed in context 
of raised target (25%-30%)
(12)
Policy Path B – Sector C DBI/PBI
Capped Uncapped
Without  NM retail rate is QF 
wholesale rate which is 
assumed equal across utility 
territories 
Most growth post-2020 
is NM rate driven; 
signals no need for PBI 
after 2021
Comparative PBI levels 
must be viewed in context 
of raised target (25%-30%)
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(13)
Policy Path B – Sector MG DBI/PBI
Capped Uncapped
Comparative PBI levels 
must be viewed in context 
of raised target (25%-30%)
Most growth post 
2021 is NM Rate 
Driven
Without  NM retail rate is QF 
wholesale rate which is 
assumed equal across utility 
territories 
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APPENDIX D: COMPONENTS OF COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
As noted in Section 1, this study is intended to explore the relative, in tandem with the overall, costs and benefits 
associated with net energy metering.  As noted in the final Task Force Framing Memorandum,  
The language in the legislation regarding “costs and benefits” is not intended for us to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
achieving this 1600 MW goal, but directs us to consider the relative costs and benefits of policy options to achieve the 
goal, as well as the overall cost and benefits of the existing net metering framework from the perspective of multiple 
customer groups. 
More specifically, this analysis illustrates how these costs and benefits compare, in both relative and overall terms, 
across different alternative policy futures, from the four cost-benefit perspectives (non-owner participant, customer-
generator, non-participating ratepayers, and citizens  of Massachusetts at large) described in Section 1.2. 
D.1 Overview of Cost Benefit Categories and Subcategories 
The cost and benefit framework addresses seven broad categories of costs and benefits.  These seven categories can be 
subdivided into two groups, as follows: 
D.1.1 Ratepayer & Participant Costs and Benefits 
Ratepayer and participant cost and benefit impacts experienced directly include those incurred and accruing to both 
participants and non-participants in solar and net energy metering policies.  They fall into four categories as follows: 
 Solar PV System Costs: The direct costs associated with PV systems; 
 Solar Policy: Massachusetts’ (and Federal) public policies and programs related to renewable energy and solar PV; 
 Behind-the-Meter (BTM) Solar Production within a Billing Month: The on-site and “behind the meter” solar PV production 
that reduces customer bills during the billing month; and 
 Net Metering Credits (NMC, from Net Metering Beyond the Billing Month & Virtual Net Metering (VNM): Net metering 
credits gained by customers as a result of solar PV production exceeding a customer’s usage during a given month from an 
on-site or remote VNM installation. 
These costs and benefits will differ significantly across the alternative policy futures explored in this study, particularly 
given that SREC, Policy Path A and Policy Path B have very different solar PV incentive structures and approaches dealing 
with net metering credits. In addition, each of these categories has multiple subcategories of costs and benefits, which 
have a diverse array of impacts on the four cost-benefit perspectives analyzed. 
D.1.2 Secondary Costs and Benefits 
In addition to the net ratepayer and participant values, solar PV can also cause three broad categories of costs and 
benefits to accrue broadly to each of the four perspectives on a secondary market and societal basis. Specifically, solar 
PV can result in secondary impacts to: 
 Electric Market(s); 
 Electric Investment Impacts; and  
 Externalities and Other Impacts. 
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These impacts are primarily a function of the amount of solar PV installed in Massachusetts, and therefore will be quite 
similar across the different scenarios to the extent that they each reach 2500 MW in a similar timeframe.  To the degree 
their values differ, this will be primarily driven by the variation in solar PV deployment between the futures studied.   
D.2 Cost and Benefit Components and Level of Analysis 
Within each of these categories, there are a number of individual cost and benefit components that comprise the 
individual impacts to be considered.  Table 43 below illustrates the subcategories associated with these three categories 
of secondary costs and benefits. A color coding of these broad categories by color code and hue is used throughout to 
aid the reader in following the various components of this complex analysis.   
Table 75: Cost and Benefit Categories and Components 
Category Subcategory Code Analysis 
PV System 
Costs 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 Quantitative 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 Quantitative 
Lease Payments CB1.3 Quantitative 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 Quantitative 
ROI (to lenders & investors) CB1.5 Quantitative 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6a Quantitative 
     MA Income Taxes CB1.6b Quantitative 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a Quantitative 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b Quantitative 
Solar Policy 
Direct Incentives  CB2.1 Quantitative 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs  CB2.2 Quantitative 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 Quantitative 
Solar Policy Incremental Admin. & Transaction Costs  CB2.4 Quantitative 
Behind-the-
Meter 
Production 
During the 
Billing Month 
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 Quantitative 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 Quantitative 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 Quantitative 
Other Retail Bill Components (Transition, EE, RE) 
CB3.4 Quantitative 
Net Metering 
Credits Beyond 
the Billing 
Month 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 Quantitative 
Virtual NM CB4.2 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 Quantitative 
Virtual NM Administrative Costs CB4.4 Qualitative 
Electric 
Markets 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Energy CB5.1 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Capacity CB5.2 Qualitative 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Line Losses CB5.4 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 Quantitative 
Electric 
Investment 
Impacts 
Avoided Transmission Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Investment – Local CB6.2 Quantitative 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline CB6.4 Qualitative 
Externalities 
and Other 
Avoided Environmental Costs CO2, NOx and SOx  CB7.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Fuel Uncertainty CB7.2 Qualitative 
Resiliency CB7.3 Qualitative 
Impact on Jobs  CB7.4 Qualitative 
Policy Transition Frictional Costs CB7.5 Qualitative 
Given the scope, tight timelines, limited budget, and other practical limitations, not all of costs and benefits of solar PV 
are quantified herein. This is the case, in part, because the data needed to undertake a study of this type requires a wide 
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variety of data sources that may or may not be easily or reliably quantified. As a result, this study includes a mix of three 
types of data: 
 Quantitative data derived from detailed analysis for the purposes of this study. 
 Parametric assumptions that represents an “educated guess” made in order to estimate the impact when quantitative data 
is difficult to verify or unavailable (later, we run sensitivity analyses on many of these parametric assumptions in order to 
assess the potential impact of uncertainty for the applicable components); and 
 Qualitative data and information that represents a generalized assessment of a particular category and/or sub-category of 
costs and benefits, but not included in the summation of cost of benefit.  
Certain major outputs included in more expansive economic analyses that are not fully quantified in this analysis 
include: 
 Indirect macroeconomic impacts, which (in this case) include the costs and benefits incurred broadly outside of the solar 
industry as a result of current policies and alternative policy futures;  
 Induced macroeconomic Impacts, or the changes in spending, economic behaviors or habits as a result of the 
direct and indirect costs and benefits. 
- Impacts identified as addressed qualitatively will be discussed in a generalized sense later in this report. Table 43 shows 
which cost and benefit components are quantified, and which are dealt with qualitatively. 
In order to clearly illustrate the “flows” or distribution of costs and benefits associated with each policy future, each 
component of costs and benefits discussed in this section has a table describing how that cost and benefit category 
manifests as either a cost or benefit (or both) from each of the four perspectives.  These tables also identify whether 
quantitative or qualitative analysis is performed for this study, and in some instances, whether a parametric assumption 
is used in estimating a quantified impact; the manner in which it is being used, and whether the result accrues as a 
benefit, cost, or is not considered to be either from each of the four cost-benefit perspectives. Table 44 below presents a 
key to understanding when each type of data is being used, and if that result is a cost or benefit to the perspective in 
question, within the sections that follow. 
Table 76: Key to Cost and Benefit Description Tables 
 
 
D.3 Category 1: PV System Costs 
The first major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the cost of grid-tied solar PV 
systems eligible for net metering. The nine subcategories of costs and benefits contained within PV system costs are as 
follows 
Subcategory Code Analysis 
System Installed Costs CB1.1 Quantitative 
Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs CB1.2 Quantitative 
Lease Payments CB1.3 Quantitative 
PILOTs / Property Taxes CB1.4 Quantitative 
Classification Benefit Cost N/A  
Type of Information  Quantitative (Bold) Parametric (Underlined) Qualitative (italics) 
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ROI (to lenders & investors) CB1.5 Quantitative 
MA Residential RE Tax Credit CB1.6a Quantitative 
     MA Income Taxes CB1.6b Quantitative 
Federal Incentives (ITC) CB1.7a Quantitative 
Federal Income Taxes CB1.7b Quantitative 
 
For ease of estimation, PV system installed and operating costs are assumed to be independent of the specific state 
policy futures, primarily driven by global module markets and local scale economies.106  These costs vary by installation 
type and in some cases ownership model, but are held constant across alternative policy futures. When calculated 
installed costs throughout the baseline policy and alternative policy futures, the total costs per year can be stated as: 
i
ij
ij kWkW /$*  
where  
i = type of installation; and j = the associated EDC territory.    
For operating & maintenance costs, insurance, lease payments, and property taxes, a similar formula s used: 
i
ij
ij kWyrkW /$*  
Table 45 below illustrates how these subcategories accrue as direct costs or benefits to the four perspectives analyzed. 
Table 77: PV System Cost Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspec
tive 
Subcategories Accruing as Benefits to 
Some or All With Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Costs to 
Some or All With Perspective 
Non-Owner 
Participants 
(NOP) 
- Lease Payments 
- PILOTs/Property 
Taxes 
- MA and Federal 
Income Taxes 
Customer-
Generators 
(CG) 
- ROI to 
Lenders/Investors 
- MA Residential RE Tax 
Credit 
- Federal Incentives 
(ITC) 
- System Installed Costs 
- Lease Payments 
- PILOTs/Property 
Taxes 
- MA and Federal 
Income Taxes 
Non-
Participating 
Ratepayers 
(NPR) 
- MA Income Taxes - Federal Income Taxes 
- Federal Incentives 
(ITC) 
- MA Residential RE Tax 
Credit 
Citizens of - System Installed Costs - Federal Income Taxes 
                                                          
106
 This analysis Ignored potential differential impacts on installed costs related to what might be referred to as “installer incentive 
capture”. It does not explicitly assume or analyze installed cost inflation under the more ‘generous’ policy options (compared to less 
generous policies), an installer ‘incentive capture’ phenomenon cited by some analysts, or assume lower installed costs for policy 
futures with less generous combined solar and NM incentives.   
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the 
Commonwe
alth at Large 
(C@L) 
- Lease Payments 
- PILOTs/Property 
Taxes 
- MA Income Taxes 
- ROI to 
Lenders/Investors 
-  
D.3.1 System Installed Costs 
System installed costs include the total upfront capital cost (and the replacement of the inverter) for solar PV systems 
installed in Massachusetts under the net energy metering program.  
To understand the variation in installed costs, the analysis utilizes an installed cost forecast, as derived for each 
subsector. The costs were then further differentiated by project size and the type of solar PV installation in question. 
The initial installed cost that served as the basis for each subsector forecast is based on historic data from both publicly-
available sources, as well as with data obtained through supplemental research. The costs of interconnection are 
assumed to increase at the rate of inflation, and (for ease of estimation) the inverter replacement is assumed to be 
covered by the initial 25-year warranty included in the upfront system cost.  
 The assumptions used in projecting PV system installed costs are detailed in Appendix A. 
Overall, the total cost associated with solar PV systems will be borne by the customer-generator as the owner and 
investor in the system, while the in-state share of that total cost comes as a benefit to the citizens of Massachusetts at 
large. The distribution of these costs does not vary across the differing policy futures. The table below outlines the costs 
and benefits accruing to the four perspectives.  
Table 78: PV System Installed Cost Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.3.2 Ongoing O&M and Insurance Costs 
Ongoing operations and maintenance (O&M) and insurance costs include the fixed O&M, as well as the cost of insuring a 
solar PV system (typically to ensure financing), for PV systems of all sizes.  
In a way similar to the installed cost estimates, the O&M cost estimates utilized in this analysis have been derived for 
each subsector through the use of publicly-available data, supplemented by additional research using private sources. 
All O&M costs are reported as a fixed $/kW-year, escalating annually at the rate of inflation. No variable O&M costs 
were modeled.  To calculate annual insurance expenses, the cost was estimated as a specified percentage of the total 
project cost.  The cost of project management was considered separately. 
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The costs of ongoing O&M and insurance are borne in all policy futures by the customer-generator, while benefits 
accrue in all scenarios to eligible non-owner participants and MA citizens at large. The table below illustrates the 
distribution of the costs and benefits across the four perspectives under consideration.  
Table 79: Ongoing O&M + Insurance Costs Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.3.3 Lease Payments 
The lease payments subcategory represents the total value of lease payments paid to land or other property owners for 
systems greater than 25 kW for the right to lease the land upon which a solar PV system is sited. 
The analysis assumes a range of lease payment costs ranging from $12-$14/kW per year for systems over 25 kW. This 
assumption was developed through market analysis, which allowed for the appropriate benchmarking of this range of 
costs. Calculation of the impacts of lease payments were limited to systems over 25 kW, given that systems under 25 kW 
(including residential & small commercial roof-mounted systems, or commercial emergency power installations) tend 
not to require the lease of land, or are roof-mounted on a customer generator or non-owner participant’s property. 
Lease payments are only considered in the analysis of costs and benefits insofar as the lease payments are additive to 
estimated PPA or VNM discounts to 3rd-party owned system hosts.  These costs were held constant across the baseline 
scenarios, as well as across all alternative policy futures examined. 
Overall, benefits associated with lease payments accrue to non-owner participants, as therefore also to citizens of 
Massachusetts at large. The costs are solely borne by customer-generators, and do not affect non-participating 
ratepayers. The distribution of these cost and benefit impacts do not change in either of the alternative policy scenarios. 
The table below illustrates the cost-benefit impacts of lease payments for systems over 25 kW by relevant cost-benefit 
perspective. 
Table 80: Land Lease Payments Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.3.4 Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs)/Property Taxes 
Property taxes and PILOTs are payments to local governments paid by the owner of property and/or land within their 
jurisdiction. These payments apply to solar PV systems, to the extent that systems are not exempt from paying them.  
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In general, the treatment of property taxes and PILOTs treatment varies widely across the Commonwealth. Thus, the 
assumptions for this analysis were developed through extensive market analysis and benchmarking. The results of this 
benchmarking exercise support a base case assumption of $10/kW-year.  As with lease payments, when the landowner 
or NMC offtaker is also the taxing authority, PILOTs and property taxes are only considered insofar as the lease 
payments are additive to the our estimates of NMC or PPA discounts. 
The costs associated with PILOTs and property taxes are borne by customer-generators, but the net local government 
revenue results generally in direct benefits for citizens at large, and do not affect non-participating ratepayers. The table 
below illustrates the distribution of related costs and benefits.  
Table 81: PILOTs / Property Taxes Impacts by Perspective 
  
D.3.5 Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity 
The aggregate returns to debt lenders and equity investors constitutes the difference between revenue and costs 
necessary to provide sufficient rents/profits to the customer-generator system owners and/or investors to induce 
investment.  As such, it is NOT SHOWN in the tallying of costs and benefits; rather, it is represented as the difference 
between calculated costs and benefits.  It was necessary however, to calculate the before tax returns to investors in 
order to estimate tax liabilities, and in addition, to estimate the proportion of these returns retained in state (a benefit 
from the perspective of citizens at large). 
For the purposes of this analysis, the returns to lenders and/or equity investors is the sum of 1) the debt interest, 2 the 
required returns for meeting the threshold rate of return for investment, and 3) the economic rents/profits made by the 
system’s owners. The analysis assumes that the returns are the net present value of total project revenue, less the net 
present value of the total costs, and will, in sum, vary across policy futures.  
These returns do not come at a direct cost to any perspective.  The portion retained in state is a benefit to customer-
generators and citizens at large through enhanced economic activity, without affecting non-owner participants or non-
participating ratepayers. The nature of these flows is consistent across policy futures, and is illustrated in the table 
below. 
Table 82: Aggregate Return to Debt & Equity Impacts by Perspective 
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D.3.6 Massachusetts Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit 
The Massachusetts residential renewable energy tax credit is a tax credit taken on the value of a solar PV system by 
customer-generators who host a system they own. Since the credit is only open to the owner or tenant of a residential 
property, it cannot be monetized by 3rd-party customer-generators.  
The state tax credit is equal to the lesser of 15% of the total system cost or $1,000. Any tax credits in excess of the value 
of an individual taxpayer’s total tax liability present in the first year may be carried forward to future tax returns for 
three years. Given that the total number of residential solar PV customers will vary considerably across policy futures, 
the total value of this tax credit will also vary accordingly.  
The state tax credit accrues as a benefit to residential host owners only, while coming as a cost to non-participating 
ratepayers in the form of the non-participant’s share of the cost of the tax credit. The assumption is that benefits and 
costs associated with the tax credit net to zero for the citizens of Massachusetts at large, which include both participants 
and non-participants alike. The table below shows the distribution of these costs and benefits. 
Table 83: MA Residential RE Tax Credit Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.3.7 Massachusetts Income Taxes 
The Massachusetts state income taxes used in this analysis comprise the net value of taxes paid to the state as a result 
of solar PV eligible for net energy metering. 
In order to calculate the direct costs and benefits of paying Massachusetts income taxes, the analysis assumes that a 
solar PV project’s taxable income increases as revenues increase, and decreases based on expenses and depreciation.  
Overall, the analysis contains several assumptions related to individual and corporate taxation. First, it is assumed that 
individuals and government entities cannot depreciate their assets for the purpose of taxation, nor are they subject to 
income tax related to project revenue or savings associated with savings from PPAs and net metering credits.  In terms 
of business taxpayers, it is assumed that all eligible taxpayers have the “tax appetite” (meaning a sufficient degree of 
taxable income) to take full advantage of the credit, as well as accelerated depreciation. The analysis also assumed that 
businesses would be subject to a range of tax rates, from 5.25% for small commercial host-owned systems to 8.25% for 
private third-party owned systems.  Finally, the analysis assumes that private non-residential non-owner participants 
also will incur increased tax liability, given that increase PPA and net metering credit revenue (as well as potential 
revenue from lease payments) results in an increase in taxable income as a result of lower operating expenses. 
Overall, Massachusetts taxes associated with solar PV systems come as a cost to participants, but accrue as a benefit to 
non-participating ratepayers. Benefits to the citizens of Massachusetts at large are assumed to net to zero. The table 
below illustrates the distribution of these costs and benefits across the four key perspectives, under various policy 
futures.  
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Table 84: MA Income Taxes Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.3.8 Federal Incentives (Investment Tax Credit) 
Federal incentives refer, in this analysis, to the federal investment tax credit (ITC), for which solar PV is currently an 
eligible technology.  The Federal ITC for solar PV systems is 30% of the total value of the system. Under current federal 
law, the credit for non-residential owners (including third-party owners) will drop to 10%, while the credit residential 
host-owned systems will drop to 0%. These credit values are maintained across all policy scenarios, given that the credit 
will be taken (or not taken) independent of Massachusetts’ policy choices. 
The value of the federal ITC is enjoyed strictly as a benefit in Massachusetts, specifically in terms of lower system costs 
for customer-generators, as well as the in-state share of the total share of the remaining direct economic value of solar 
PV systems retained in state to the benefit of the citizens of Massachusetts at large. The table below illustrates the 
distribution of these benefits. 
Table 85: Federal Incentives (ITC) Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.3.9 Federal Income Taxes 
The federal income taxes used in this analysis comprise the net value of taxes paid to the federal government as a result 
of solar PV systems eligible for net energy metering. All of the assumptions associated with calculating the impact of 
Massachusetts state taxes are exactly the same, save for the fact that the taxes in question are paid to the federal 
government, which also entails different tax rates. The marginal federal corporate and individual tax rate used in this 
analysis is 35%. 
The bulk of the net costs of federal income tax changes fall upon customer-generators and non-owner participants. The 
cost to customer-generators is the taxable share of their pre-tax net income (less depreciation), while the cost to non-
owner participants is represented by the taxable portion of the PPA and net metering credit savings accruing to 
corporate taxpayers. On net, the analysis thus assumes that federal income tax changes come at a net direct cost 
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(without accounting for any indirect or induced economic impacts) to the citizens of Massachusetts. The table below 
shows the manner in which these benefits are distributed across the four key perspectives, under various policy futures. 
Table 86: Federal Income Taxes Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.4 Category II: Solar Policy  
The second major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
complying with Massachusetts’ RPS pertaining to solar PV systems eligible for net metering. The four subcategories of 
costs and benefits part of solar policy costs include: 
Direct Incentives  CB2.1 Quantitative 
Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs  CB2.2 Quantitative 
Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs CB2.3 Quantitative 
Solar Policy Incremental Admin. & Transaction Costs  CB2.4 Quantitative 
In general, the value of these costs and benefits will vary dramatically across policy futures, given that the incentive 
components of each policy future vary the most across perspectives. The table below illustrates how these 
subcategories accrue as direct costs or benefits to the four perspectives analyzed. 
Table 87: Solar Policy Impact Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Costs to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- N/A - N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Direct Incentives - Solar Policy Incremental Admin. and Transaction 
Costs 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs - Direct Incentives 
- Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs 
- Solar Policy Incremental Admin. and Transaction 
Costs 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
(C@L) 
- Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs - Direct Incentives 
- Solar Policy Incremental Admin. and Transaction 
Costs 
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D.4.1 Direct Incentives 
Direct incentives include the total incentives directly paid to solar PV projects under all of the policy futures under 
consideration. Under the extended SREC policy scenario, these incentives take the form of SRECs as well as other 
incentive payments, including Commonwealth Solar and Solarize incentive payments. Under Policy Paths A and B, these 
costs will take the form of PBI or EPBI payments, or pass through of gross costs of those payments to ratepayers (netting 
the value from EDCs reselling energy procured into the market is addressed in other components below).  Given the 
variety of policy futures used in this study, the analysis incorporates a variety of different forms of direct incentives to 
eligible solar project (including those receiving net metering credits). These incentives are described in detail in Section 
2.4.1 and 2.5.1.  
To calculate the value of SREC payments, it is important to understand the structure of the existing SREC markets, as 
well as how a hypothetical program (SREC-III) that extends the basic structure of SREC-I and SREC-II to 2025.  Figure 76 is 
an illustration of the main structural flows and features of the Massachusetts SREC market, underscoring the hedging 
transactions that result in revenues to generators differing from costs to ratepayers. 
Figure 76: Schematic Diagram of Hedging Transactions within the SREC Carve-out Market 
 
To represent these effects, the analysis uses Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC’s proprietary Solar Market Study model 
to model SREC values based on a supply-responsive demand formula. To estimate policy costs under the alternative 
Policy Paths A & B discussed in Section 2.4 and 0, SEA developed custom models purpose-built for this analysis.  
Nevertheless, the use of supply curves is a common feature to both models. This analysis relies on modeling the 
economics of over 700 solar PV “supply blocks”, which represent the various types of solar PV systems that can be built 
in Massachusetts and are eligible for applicable incentives, as subdivided by: 
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 The local EDC territory the project is located in; 
 The size and characteristics of the project; 
 The ownership structure of the project; 
 The rate class of the end-user (or other off-taker); and 
 Other appropriate characteristics. 
To model the production of these systems, solar PV production data from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s 
PVWatts model, which uses Worcester, MA as the proxy location for all system output. 
The models used to estimate the total value of applicable incentives uses a proprietary modified version of the publically 
available Cost of Renewable Energy Spreadsheet Tool (CREST) model, a model designed by SEA for NREL. The model uses 
a variety of inputs, including fixed capital costs, all applicable project revenues (including uncontracted revenues), as 
well as financing assumptions, ownership, and the degree of hedged vs. unhedged risk exposure commodity, among 
many others. Finally, the analysis also assumes that investors value post-incentive Class I RPS RECs in their pro formas at 
$5/MWh.  The supply curve assumptions are discussed further in Appendix A. 
Table 88: Direct Incentives Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.4.2 Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs 
Solar policy compliance costs outside of direct incentives include the solar alternative compliance payment (SACP) 
revenues collected by DOER. Under Policy Paths A and B, these revenues would not be collected, as the SREC program 
would be replaced by the new incentive regimes described in Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 0.  
Both historic and projected SACPs were utilized in calculating the baseline SREC policy scenario. The total quantity of 
SACPs needed under SREC-I, SREC-II and SREC-III was calculated using SEA’s proprietary Massachusetts Solar Market 
Study Model.   Speciifc assumptions are included in Appendix A.  
Table 89: Other Solar Policy Compliance Costs Impacts by Perspective 
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D.4.3 Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs 
In any of the policy futures considered, the SREC or REC created obviates the need for, or serves to fulfill, a unit of 
Massachusetts Class I RPS compliance.   Solar PV production can displace RPS Class I compliance costs in two ways: 1) 
through eliminating the need to purchase non-solar Class I RECs (by meeting the Solar Carve-Out or minting a Class I 
solar REC), and 2) via behind-the-meter production (and instantaneous consumption) that reduces overall load. Thus, 
under the “SREC Policy” future, the analysis assumes that SRECs purchased avoid non-solar Class I purchases, as do the 
Class I RECs purchased via the upfront and performance-based incentives in place under Policy Path A and B. 
For each policy future, cases are considered in which either 1) the Solar Carve-Out displaces Class I wind RECs or 2) 
displaces payments of Class I ACPs under a shortfall in Class I RPS supply. 
Table 90: Displaced RPS Class I Compliance Costs Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.4.4 Solar Policy Incremental Administrative and Transaction Costs 
SEA modeled incremental solar policy administrative and transaction costs as discussed in Appendix A.  The costs in 
Appendix A represented the estimated one-time and ongoing costs for a single large EDC (National Grid or Eversource, 
and were scaled up to apply to the entire Massachusetts market.  Costs in this category for SREC policies are built into 
SEA’s proprietary MA Solar Market Study model.   In addition, under Policy Path A, developers seeking incentives must 
compete for PBIs, and (based on experience elsewhere) must incur costs to make more than one sale (to a host), on 
average, in order to secure incentives for winning bids.  This ‘dry hole’ cost represents additional overhead compared to 
an open incentive in which developers must make one sale per incentive contract.  The estimate of these costs is 
detailed in Appendix A. 
Table 91: Solar Policy Incremental Admin. & Transaction Costs Impacts by Perspective 
 
 
D.5 Category III: Behind-the-Meter Production within the Billing Month 
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The third major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the cost of grid-tied solar 
PV systems eligible for net metering. The four subcategories of costs and benefits contained within the category of 
behind-the-meter production include:  
Generation Value of On-site Generation CB3.1 Quantitative 
Transmission Value of On-site Generation CB3.2 Quantitative 
Distribution Value of On-site Generation CB3.3 Quantitative 
Other Retail Bill Components (Transition, EE, RE) CB3.4 Quantitative 
In general, the value of these costs and benefits will vary somewhat across policy futures, given that the treatment of 
behind-the-meter production in each policy future can vary due to changing installation mix and volumes.   
The table below illustrates how these subcategories accrue as direct costs or benefits to the four perspectives analyzed. 
Table 92: BTM Production within the Billing Month Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Net 
Costs to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- Generation Value of On-Site Generation 
- Transmission Value of On-Site Generation 
- “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-Site 
Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) 
- N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Generation Value of On-Site Generation 
- Transmission Value of On-Site Generation 
- “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-Site 
Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) [1] 
- N/A 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Generation Value of On-Site Generation - Transmission Value of On-Site Generation 
- “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-Site 
Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Generation Value of On-Site Generation 
- Other Retail Bill Components (Trans., RE, EE) 
- N/A 
[1] SREC Policy & Policy Path B Only 
 
D.5.1 Generation Value of On-Site Generation 
The generation value of on-site generation is the avoided cost value of generation service obviated by the reduction in 
total customer load (and thus retail purchases) caused by the on-site solar PV generation. The portion of on-site solar PV 
generation that is consumed simultaneously by the host customer reduces a customer’s load, thus avoiding retail 
kilowatt-hour purchases of energy at a 1-to-1 rate. Thus, a portion of the cost avoided is the cost of generation service 
that the customer would otherwise receive in the absence of a solar PV system. This value is represented by the 
generation or “G” component of a customer’s bill, remains consistent through all three policy futures, and offsets 
purchases in that month only. For ease of calculation, the study utilizes the Basic Service generation rate offered by each 
EDC.  
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Table 93: Generation Value of On-site Generation Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.5.2 Transmission Value of On-Site Generation 
The transmission value of on-site generation is the value of the transmission service obviated by the reduction in total 
customer load (and thus retail purchases) caused by the on-site solar PV generation.  Similar to generation service, the 
portion of on-site solar PV generation that is consumed simultaneously by the host customer reduces a customer’s load, 
thus avoiding retail kilowatt-hour purchases of energy at a 1-to-1 rate. Thus, a portion of the cost avoided is the cost of 
generation service that the customer would otherwise receive in the absence of a solar PV system. This value is avoided 
equally across all policy futures examined, is represented by the transmission or “T” component of a customer’s bill by 
applicable EDC, and offsets purchases in that month only. 
Table 94: Transmission Value of On-site Generation Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.5.3 “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-Site Generation 
The “adjusted” distribution value of on-site generation is the avoided cost value of the distribution service obviated by 
the reduction in total customer load (and thus retail purchases) caused by the on-site solar PV generation.  The rates 
used for this calculation are the adjusted values published by the EDCs which incorporate a range of charges and credits 
carried or passed through the distribution rates, other than the charges explicitly addressed in Section D.5.4. While the 
degree of distribution service avoided by net solar generation that exceeds a customer’s needs at a given time is a 
somewhat more complex question, the portion of on-site solar PV generation that is consumed simultaneously by the 
host customer reduces a customer’s load, thus avoiding retail kilowatt-hour distribution service of energy at a 1-to-1 
rate. Thus, a portion of the cost avoided is the cost of generation service that the customer would otherwise receive in 
the absence of a solar PV system. This value is avoided equally across all policy futures examined, and represented by 
the adjusted distribution or “D” component of a customer’s bill by applicable EDC, and offsets purchases in that month 
only. 
Table 95: “Adjusted” Distribution Value of On-site Generation Impacts by Perspective 
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D.5.4 Other Retail Bill Components 
The other retail bill components avoided by on-site generation are the avoided cost values of the other charges obviated 
by the reduction in total customer load (and thus retail purchases) caused by the on-site solar PV generation.  As with 
generation, transmission and distribution service components avoided by on-site generation, the other bill components, 
which include transition, energy efficiency, renewable energy and others charges, are also avoided on by on-site 
generation.  
Table 96: Other Retail Bill Components (Transition, EE, RE) Impacts by Perspective 
 
 
D.6 Category IV: Net Metering Credits beyond the Billing Month (Including Virtual Net 
Metering) 
The fourth major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
net metering credits beyond the billing month pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The four subcategories 
of costs and benefits associated with net metering credits beyond the billing month costs include: 
Offsetting On-site Usage CB4.1 Quantitative 
Virtual NM CB4.2 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Sales CB4.3 Quantitative 
Virtual NM Administrative Costs CB4.4 Qualitative 
It is important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount and types of solar PV installed and producing, and 
vary materially between different policy futures. However, these specific values are assumed to be the same per 
megawatt-hour (MWh) across all policy futures, given that total amount of PV production across all scenarios does not 
vary dramatically.  The table below illustrates the cost and benefit subcategories within this category accruing (on net) 
to each perspective. 
Table 97: Net Metering Credits beyond the Billing Month (Including Virtual Net Metering) Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits 
Subcategories Accruing as 
Costs 
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Non-Owner Participants (NOP) - Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month 
- Virtual NM 
- N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month 
- Virtual NM 
- Wholesale Market Sales 
- N/A 
Non-Participating Ratepayers (NPR) - N/A - Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month [1] 
- Virtual NM 
- VNM Admin Costs 
Citizens of the Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Offsetting On-Site Usage Beyond the Billing 
Month 
- Virtual NM 
- Wholesale Market Sales 
- VNM Admin Costs 
[1] SREC Policy and Path B Only 
 
D.6.1 Offsetting On-Site Usage beyond the Billing Month 
The on-site usage offset beyond the billing month is comprised of the net excess generation from the solar PV system, 
which is the share of generation from the system that exceeds the customer’s load during the billing month, and is 
carried over to a subsequent month.  For the purposes of this study, the rate treatment of net metering credits remains 
the same in Policy Path B as in the SREC policies baseline future, which is the sum of the per kilowatt-hour value of the 
generation, transmission, transition charge and the adjusted distribution component of customer bills. However, the net 
metering credit under Policy Path A is set at the wholesale value of electricity. These values have also been adjusted to 
account for line losses, as described in detail in Section 3.2. 
Table 98: Offsetting On-site Usage Beyond Current Billing Month Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.6.2 Virtual Net Metering 
Virtual net metering credits include the allowed retail credit value of bill credits accruing to a non-owner participating 
customer as a result of a remote solar PV system they have entered into a contract with. Under the SREC policy and 
Policy Path B the value of VNM credits is set by current statute (and varies depending on whether a project is a Class I, 
Class II or Class III net metering facility and whether or not it is a government customer), the value of this credit in Policy 
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Path A is reduced to the value of the wholesale value of electricity. The treatment of net metering credits for virtually 
net metered systems would be analogous to the treatment of customer-hosted systems. 
Table 99: Virtual Net Metering Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.6.3 Wholesale Market Sales 
Wholesale market sales include the value of the sales by distributed solar PV systems in excess of on-site load which is 
not eligible for net metering.  This production is sold into the wholesale electricity market.  In terms of the three policy 
futures in the current analysis, these costs and benefits will play a more significant role in scenarios where net metering 
caps are maintained.  While it is a largely negligible issue today, wholesale market sales by large distributed solar PV 
systems will become more relevant once statutory net metering program caps are reached, and more customer 
generators begin to focus on sales to the wholesale market. Thus, it is important to ensure that, depending on the point 
at which distributed PV deployment reaches both the private and public caps for all utilities (in policy futures and sub-
scenarios where caps are maintained), the wholesale generator rate applies to the portion of supply that might 
constitute a wholesale market sale, even for some oversized behind-the-meter projects.  
To ensure that this is done appropriately, the analysis utilizes projections of the production-weighted wholesale value of 
solar PV production on a cost per megawatt-hour ($/MWh basis. These projections were created using the AURORA 
model, which simulates economic dispatch of electricity, described in Appendix A. For ease of estimation, the same 
value per MWh is used across all policy futures, given that each policy future results in only moderately different solar 
PV capacity and energy production per year (relative to ISO New England scale).  
Table 100: Wholesale Market Sales Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.6.4 Virtual Net Metering Administrative Costs 
Virtual net metering (VNM) administrative costs are the costs incurred associated with billing, metering and other costs 
involved in administering a VNM program. EDC costs associated with these activities will continue to apply to varying 
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degrees in the different policy futures studied.  If a customer chooses to enter into a virtual net metering arrangement, 
that customer is required to designate beneficiary customer accounts, and do so using a Schedule Z form to do so. Given 
that these processes are not fully automated and are often done manually, the EDCs have noted that they must incur 
added costs to manually account for virtual net metering credits on the monthly bills of beneficiary accounts. To this 
end, some historical data was offered by Eversource Energy regarding their calculation of these costs during or prior to 
2013, when the volume of virtual net metering was well below the current level.    
After review of this data, the consulting team concluded that, while the cost component is certainly legitimate and 
potentially sufficient in magnitude to slightly impact the results of his analysis, that the data provided as difficult to 
extrapolate reasonably to future VNM scale, given that  (1) billing systems may evolve to more efficiently account for 
VNM customers and beneficiary accounts and (2) EDCs could potentially avoid a material portion of such costs by 
deciding to cut a check to the VNM facility rather than allocate VNM credits.  In any event, this category is acknowledged 
as a valid cost component that has not been quantified for this study.  
 
Table 101: VNM Admin Costs Impacts by Perspective 
 
 
D.7 Category V: Electric Market 
The fifth major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
avoided wholesale energy market costs pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The five subcategories of 
costs and benefits contained within avoided electric market costs include: 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Energy CB5.1 Quantitative 
Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Capacity CB5.2 Qualitative 
Avoided Generation Capacity Costs CB5.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Line Losses CB5.4 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges CB5.5 Quantitative 
It is important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount of solar PV installed and producing. However, 
these specific values are assumed to be the same per megawatt-hour (MWh) across all policy futures, with these values 
scaled to the actual solar PV production volumes projected in each instance.  The table below illustrates the cost and 
benefit subcategories within this category accruing (on net) to each perspective. 
Table 102: Electric Market Impacts Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Costs 
to All or Some With Perspective 
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Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- N/A - N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Avoided Generation Capacity Costs 
- Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges [1] 
- N/A 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Energy 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Capacity [1] 
- Avoided Generation Capacity Costs (and Avoided 
Capacity Reserves) 
- Avoided Line Losses 
- Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges [1] 
- N/A 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Energy 
- Wholesale Market Impacts – Capacity [1] 
- Avoided Generation Capacity Costs (and Avoided 
Capacity Reserves) 
- Avoided Line Losses 
- Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges [1] 
- N/A 
[1] Explored qualitatively 
 
D.7.1 Wholesale Market Impacts – Energy  
Energy-related wholesale market impacts represent the value of the difference in wholesale energy prices due to the 
impact of solar PV installations which create downward pressure on energy locational marginal prices in New England’s 
bid-based market.   These impacts vary between policy futures strictly as it relates to the amount and overall pace of 
solar PV deployment in each policy future.  While energy market price impacts can result in a transfer payment from the 
perspective of other wholesale generators (a perspective outside of the analysis scope) this price effect can result in 
short-term market price effects (known in the energy efficiency world by the colorful acronym DRIPE, for demand 
reduction induced price effect) connected to solar deployment. To measure these effects, the study uses the quantity of 
PV injected into system in order to determine the change in locational spot LMPs from addition of solar, which is 
assumed by the analysis to have zero variable costs.  
To quantify these effects, the study utilizes the annual results from AURORA dispatch modeling between the solar and 
no solar cases under both frameworks discussed in Section 1.3.  These values were adjusted downward using the 
approach and assumptions used in the Avoided Energy Supply Cost 2013 study (as discussed further in Appendix A) to 
reflect (i) the temporary nature of the price impact, and (ii) applied only to assumed fraction of energy consumed in 
Massachusetts not hedged through long-term contracts (and thus impacted by changes in spot prices). 
Table 103: Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Energy Impacts by Perspective 
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D.7.2 Wholesale Market Impacts – Capacity  
Capacity-related wholesale market impacts represent the impact of injecting solar PV into the system on the regional 
Forward Capacity Market (FCM) price.   As with energy-related wholesale market impacts vary between policy futures 
strictly as it relates to the amount and overall pace of solar PV deployment in each policy future.  
Quantitative measurement of the Forward Capacity Market (FCM) price impacts associated with the injection of an 
additional quantity of PV into the system is outside of the scope of the analysis. However, in a qualitative sense, while 
the change in the price of capacity is less likely to be material in scenarios comparing the Solar Carve-Out to a scenario in 
which wind is the marginal compliance resource (and thus relatively insignificant) ignored In the event PV was 
incremental, the avoided cost impact, while small, may be more noticeable when compared to natural gas.  
Table 104: Wholesale Market Price Impacts – Capacity Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.7.3 Avoided Generation Capacity Costs (Including Avoided Capacity Reserves) 
Avoided generation capacity and avoided capacity reserve costs are the costs foregone in the wholesale market 
associated with the reduced need for capacity as a result of solar PV.  
One value associated with distributed solar PV is the degree to which such resources reduce the need for new 
generation capacity, as well as installed capacity reserves (ICR). This subcategory of costs and benefits addresses (1) 
components of peak reduction impact, (2) the commensurate reduction in required ICR, and (3) the value of the share of 
overall solar capacity monetized in the FCM market. 
Under net metering tariffs, EDCs control rights to FCM from net metered systems, although to date they have thus far 
elected not to participate with this FCM in the Forward Capacity Auctions due to risk allocation and a lack of control. 
Whether they do or not, the claimed capability value of solar will reduce the ICR, thus will accrue to load, once PV is 
incorporated in ICR forecast as proposed for future FCAs. 
In addition, the analysis described in Section 3.1 revealed that solar PV’s electric load carrying capacity (ELCC), which 
decreases as PV penetration increases and shifts peak hours later into the evening, is substantially higher than the 
Seasonal Claimed Capacity for intermittent renewables in FCM – the value of which is independent of penetration. As 
Figure 19 in Section 3.1 shows, solar reduces peak, and thus the ICR, to the extent the peak reduction benefit is not fully 
captured in solar SCC calculations. The analysis in Section 3.1 also calculates the impact on peak reduction from solar PV 
as a function of penetration, which is used in these calculations. Thus, this analysis derives both the capacity impacts of 
distributed solar PV, and the installed capacity reserves (ICR), the net of which is the value of avoided capacity reserve 
requirements and on-peak line losses (also discussed in Section 3.2 and Section D.7.4). 
Table 105: Avoided Generation Capacity Costs (Including Avoided Generation Capacity Reserve Costs) Impacts by Perspective 
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D.7.4 Avoided Line Losses 
Line losses represent the generated energy that is lost due to electrical resistance in the process of delivering (i.e. 
transmitting and distributing) electricity from source to sink.  The derivation of loss factors in discussed in Section 3.2.  
The applicable loss factors are applied to individual cost and benefit components throughout this study, rather than 
being tallied explicitly as an individual line item.  The value of avoided marginal losses due to locating generation on the 
periphery of the distribution system near load is not captured by prices for generation, but accrues broadly to load, and 
thus to all ratepayers. Thus, the study adjusts many of the costs and benefit subcategories within this analysis using a 
solar production-weighted line loss formula based on statewide average line loss figures outlined in Table 42 in Section 
3.2.  
D.7.5 Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges 
Avoided transmission tariff charges represent the ISO New England Regional Network Service (RNS) cost reductions 
caused by coincident solar peak load reduction. While solar PV deployment does not reduce the ISO’s total transmission 
revenue requirement, through the reduction in billing units costs are shifted to other states (in concert with increased 
per-kW rates).  Through this mechanism, Massachusetts distributed solar PV installations can shift 1 minus the state’s 
load ration share.  In the absence of installing distributed generation in state, similar policies implemented in other 
states would have the effect of shifting load to Massachusetts, so this can be thought of as defensive in nature. 
Table 106: Avoided Transmission Tariff Charges Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.8 Category VI: Electric Investment Impacts 
The sixth major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
avoided electric infrastructure investment costs pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The four 
subcategories of costs and benefits contained within avoided electric investment costs include: 
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Avoided Transmission Investment - Remote Wind CB6.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Transmission Investment – Local CB6.2 Quantitative 
Avoided Distribution Investment CB6.3 Quantitative 
Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline CB6.4 Qualitative 
It is important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount of solar PV installed and producing. The table 
below illustrates the cost and benefit subcategories within this category accruing (on net) to each perspective. 
 
Table 107: Electric Investment Impacts Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits to Some or All With 
Perspective 
Subcategories Accruing as Costs 
to All or Some With Perspective 
Non-Owner Participants 
(NOP) 
- N/A - N/A 
Customer-Generators (CG) - N/A - N/A 
Non-Participating 
Ratepayers (NPR) 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Remote Wind 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Local 
- Avoided Distribution Investment 
- Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline Investment [1] 
- N/A 
Citizens of the 
Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Remote Wind 
- Avoided Transmission Investment – Local 
- Avoided Distribution Investment 
- Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline Investment [1] 
- N/A 
[1] Explored qualitatively 
 
D.8.1 Avoided Transmission Investment – Remote Wind 
Avoided transmission investment associated with remote wind installations represents the cost of transmission 
infrastructure connecting remote wind installations to load centers avoided by solar PV.  Given the assumption in this 
study that RPS compliance in the absence of the Solar Carve-Out would comprise Class I land-based wind RECs, 
installations of PV in Massachusetts under the Carve-Out can displace cost that would otherwise be incurred to build 
additional transmission to access wind sited out-of-state. The impact to Massachusetts ratepayers can be represented 
by the avoided proportion of the cost of transmission not borne by wind generators captured in Class I REC prices, but 
instead allocated to network load customers (through the ISO-NE RNS tariff).  This value can be stated as the net present 
value of: 
                  
                                                                          
                                    
Where:                                                                        
There is a great deal of uncertainty in the ultimate cost of this transmission in total and per-unit (depending on whether 
transmission is loaded lightly at wind capacity factors or more heavily with a wind/hydro blend), as well as the degree to 
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which such costs would be allocated to network transmission customers.  As a result, this value is estimated 
parametrically.  The base assumption was developed by SEA for other projects as a middle-of-the-range value, as 
described further in Appendix A in the discussion of parametric values assumptions.    
Table 108: Avoided Transmission Investment - Remote Wind Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.8.2 Avoided Transmission Investment – Local 
Avoided local transmission investment comprises the costs avoided by solar PV inasmuch as it allows an EDC to defer (or 
defer to the point of avoiding) investments intended to upgrade local transmission or sub-transmission systems. 
When solar PV is installed near load, some of it will contribute to changes in EDC planning, such that some local 
transmission upgrade investments will be deferred, potentially for many years (in some cases equivalent to avoiding the 
investment), that otherwise would have been needed to provide additional capacity to meet peak growth. This deferral 
value is, in fact, location-specific, but can be estimated on average over EDC service territory.    
The estimates of capital costs and deferral benefits associated with solar PV contained in this analysis are taken from 
literature review, and adjusted to be comparable by applying MA- and PV-specific factors discussed in Section 3.1. The 
active benefits derived from this literature review are site-specific, and all deferral benefits are a function of growth, and 
technical means may be required to achieve the deferral effect in local transmission planning.  Extrapolating net present 
value of the benefit from site-specific deferral values across a EDC territory can be stated as: 
                
                                                              
                             
In this case, “dependable capacity” includes the use of physical assurance, storage, smart inverters with ride-through, 
linked DR and/or other means of ensuring the capacity benefits of PV. These benefits have been adjusted upward to 
reflect the impact of avoided peak demand line losses, as described in Section 3.2, and are assumed to be the same 
across all policy futures.  The resulting values use the case-specific peak impact values calculated in Section 3.1 for each 
year.   
Table 109: Avoided Transmission Investment – Local Impacts by Perspective 
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D.8.3 Avoided Distribution Investment 
Avoided distribution investment is the total cost that solar PV allows an EDC to defer (or defer to the point of avoiding) 
investments intended to upgrade local primary and secondary distribution systems.  When solar PV installed near load, 
some of it will contribute to changes in EDC planning, such that some upgrade investments will be deferred, potentially 
for many years (in some cases equivalent to avoiding the investment), that otherwise would have been needed to 
provide additional capacity to meet peak growth. This deferral or effective avoidance can either be active or passive in 
nature.   
For Active Distribution Deferral, the Avoided Distribution Investment methodology for this study had five main steps: 
 First, estimates of deferral benefits were taken from a literature review.   Seven sources were selected to 
represent a reasonable range of conditions and methodologies, and an average value was calculated from these 
sources for the area-wide passive deferral benefit of solar PV, as described more fully in Appendix E.107  These 
sources included three case studies of active deferral in particular New England locations and four reports with 
estimates of passive or area-wide deferral impacts and with adequate detail on their methodologies.  Where 
necessary, the estimates from four of these sources were adjusted to be comparable by applying MA-specific 
and PV-specific factors. 
 Second, to confirm the reasonableness of the average distribution deferral value from the literature, that value 
was compared against a simplified analysis driven by assumptions about distribution feeder load growth, 
upgrade costs, solar penetration and coincidence of solar output with feeder load. 
 Third, the analysis assumes that the percentage of the state’s distribution system to which estimates of “active 
deferral” are applicable; this is the portion of the system that is growing and so will require new capacity or 
otherwise provides opportunities to defer distribution investments, estimated to be 30%.108  This was applied to 
estimates from the literature review to the simplified analysis in Step 2 to get statewide values.109  
 
Thus, the total active deferral benefits of a 100% peak coincident resource are the net present value of: 
                             
                                 
                                              
  
where 
                    
                                 
                                                   
  
However, if distributed solar PV is installed without integration into planning, the net deferral or avoidance 
benefits accrue in a rather different manner. While current utility planning assumes limited to no distribution 
                                                          
107 These sources are listed in Appendix E, along with their URLs.  Some of them were also referenced in “Review Of Solar PV Benefit 
& Cost Studies,” 2nd Edition, Rocky Mountain Institute, September 2013 (www.rmi.org/elab_emPower), pages 31-34. 
108 For portions of the distribution system on which there is literally no load growth, there is essentially no deferral opportunity for 
DER.  However, the deferral benefit is at its highest with load growth around ½ of 1 percent/year, other things being equal, since 
DER (at an assumed 10% penetration) can not only defer the upgrade but avoid it for an entire 30-year period. 
109 The average values used in this report will not be representative of any particular location. 
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deferral or avoidance benefit associated with PV in the short run, it can be assumed that over time, localized 
distribution planning (or the existence of distribution congestion pricing, if applicable) will take the solar into 
account in advance, leading to a “passive” deferral value that may be quantifiable in the future. While the 
passive value cannot currently be calculated on a locational basis without similar location-specific deferral 
values at many smaller, distribution-level nodes (often known as “buses”) the analysis calculates the total 
deferral value (including an estimate of passive deferral value) that can currently be averaged across each EDC 
service territory.   
 Thus, the fourth and penultimate step is to account for a number of factors that may be required in order for 
distribution planners to sufficiently rely upon solar DG to actually achieve a deferral of upgrade investments. To 
do this, the analysis results include a factor of 50% for the percentage of PV that can be counted upon for 
distribution deferral through the use of physical assurance, storage, smart inverters with ride-through, linked 
demand response and/or other means.   
 The final step is to account for the estimated PV contribution at times of local system peak (the Est % of 
Dependable PV Capacity from the formula below). 
Total Distribution Deferral Value: Thus, the formula for calculating the benefits of both active and passive deferral, as 
derived from a literature review of Massachusetts- and PV-specific values from is the net present value of: 
                           
  
 
                                                                   
                                                            
 
                           
 
where 
                                 
and 
                                   
Table 110: Avoided Distribution Investment Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.8.4 Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline 
Avoided natural gas pipeline costs include the costs associated with building natural gas pipeline infrastructure to serve 
natural gas-fired generation that may be avoided by solar PV resulting from the deferral or avoidance of a new gas-fired 
generating unit.  
When new natural gas-fired power plants are built or add to their capacity, added pipeline capacity to serve those plants 
may be needed (and under current pipeline-constrained conditions in New England, this can be assumed to be the case).  
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While solar has a lower capacity value during winter peak electricity (which coincides roughly with peak annual gas 
demand), increased PV capacity can potentially reduce total investment in gas pipeline capacity. These effects could be 
accentuated as technologies evolve to optimize PV’s dependable capacity. 
However, in part because capacity that leverages the Solar Carve-Out is generally assumed to replace wind, these 
benefits are outside the scope of the analysis, and are largely speculative at this juncture. While they are not quantified 
in this analysis, the associated avoided cost value related to PV would apply in the future if the cost of building future 
pipeline capacity is built into electricity prices and the amount of pipeline capacity needed reflected the (modest winter) 
contribution of solar to reducing winter energy demand. 
Table 111: Avoided Natural Gas Pipeline Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.9 Category VII: Externalities and Other 
The final major category of costs and benefits considered in this analysis are associated with the costs associated with 
avoided external costs and other costs to society pertaining to PV systems eligible for net metering. The five 
subcategories of costs and benefits contained within externalities and other costs include: 
Avoided Environmental Costs CO2, NOx and SOx  CB7.1 Quantitative 
Avoided Fuel Uncertainty CB7.2 Qualitative 
Resiliency CB7.3 Qualitative 
Impact on Jobs  CB7.4 Qualitative 
Policy Transition Frictional Costs CB7.5 Qualitative 
It is important to note that these values tend to vary with the amount of solar PV installed and producing. The table 
below illustrates the cost and benefit subcategories within this category accruing (on net) to each perspective. 
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Table 112: Externalities and Other Impacts Applicability to Analysis Perspectives 
Perspective Subcategories Accruing as 
Benefits 
Subcategories Accruing as 
Costs 
Non-Owner Participants (NOP) - N/A - Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
Customer-Generators (CG) - Avoided Fuel Uncertainty [1] - Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
Non-Participating Ratepayers (NPR) - Avoided Environmental Impacts - Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
Citizens of the Commonwealth at Large 
(CC@L) 
- Avoided Environmental Impacts 
- Avoided Fuel Uncertainty [1] [3] 
- Resiliency [1] [3] 
- Impact on Jobs [1] [3] 
- Policy Transition Frictional Costs [1] 
- Impact on Jobs [1] [2] 
- Resiliency [1] [2] 
[1] Explored qualitatively 
[2] (Qualitative) potential cost component 
[3] (Qualitative) potential benefit component 
D.9.1 Avoided Environmental Costs (CO2, SOx and NOx) 
Avoided environmental costs include the costs (both priced and not priced) of environmental damage associated with 
the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) electricity generation utilizing fossil 
fuels.  
To account for these avoided external environmental costs, the analysis, which includes analysis of scenarios assuming 
both full (and partial) compliance with Class I RECs assumes that each ton of CO2, NOx & SOx abated by solar PV 
production avoids the equivalent net social cost of emitting each ton of these pollutants. The net social cost per ton 
avoided is represented by the difference between the societal value of the environmental damage and the already 
internalized market price of the emissions avoided by PV production.  The quantities of avoided emissions were 
modeled through the AURORA dispatch analysis, which can account for added or avoided natural gas generation. The 
derivation of the societal value of avoided emissions uses standard methodologies used by US EPA, and are discussed 
further in Appendix A. 
Table 113: Avoided Environmental Costs CO2, NOx and SOx Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.9.2 Avoided Fuel Uncertainty 
Avoided fuel uncertainty accounts for the costs associated with the risk of a significant change in the price of fuels for 
electricity generation (specifically natural gas) and the associated costs of fuel hedging contracts and other instruments 
that can be avoided by solar PV deployment. In the case of solar PV, the value of avoided fuel cost uncertainty would 
capture the value of price-certain resource compared to a price-uncertain resource. While quantitative analysis of this 
value is beyond the scope of this study, the factor was recently included in Maine’s Value of Solar Study (Clean Power 
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Research, LLC; Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC; Perez Richard; Pace Law School Energy and Climate Center, 2015) 
released in March 2015. The Maine VOSS quantified this value to be $0.037/kWh (on a 25-year levelized basis) at  by 
estimating the cost associated with eliminating long term price uncertainty with procuring the quantity of natural gas 
displaced by solar PV. To do this, the authors of that analysis calculated the difference between the non-guaranteed and 
guaranteed price of natural gas to determine the net present value of hedging natural gas purchases. Thus, it appears 
that this methodology could be utilized in Massachusetts and could represent a significant value in Massachusetts.  We 
have not, however, included this value within this analysis. 
Table 114: Avoided Fuel Price Uncertainty Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.9.3 Resiliency 
Resiliency describes the broad category of benefits solar could provide, if accompanied by storage, as a beneficial 
ancillary service to the utility grid.  Sector A in the current SREC-II program Sector A includes “Emergency Power 
Generation Units”, but the benefits of these units (and their broader deployment during an emergency situation) is not 
yet readily quantifiable. The ability to provide emergency ancillary services benefits, however, could provide significant 
situational value, and is thus discussed qualitatively in greater depth in Section 9.2.  However, the net benefits will 
depend on the level of increased costs needed to create resiliency benefits.   
Table 115: Resiliancy Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.9.4 Impact on Jobs 
Job impacts associated with solar PV include the jobs gained and lost as a result of an increased (or decreased) rate of 
solar PV deployment.  The deployment of solar PV affects overall employment in Massachusetts in three distinct ways: 
1) through the in-state proportion of added jobs driven by solar installations and related supply chain (including, where 
applicable, manufacturing), 2) the potential loss of jobs in the wind sector associated with greater solar capacity (but 
which largely occurs out of state), and 3) the impact on employment from increased ratepayer costs resulting from any 
premium paid by those citizens, which is impacted by the share of revenue that would be spent in Massachusetts.  While 
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quantitative analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this study, the impact on jobs is likely to differ between policies, 
and is explored in Section 9.1. 
D.9.5 Cost-Benefit Impacts by Perspective 
Table 116: Impact on Jobs Impacts by Perspective 
 
D.9.6 Policy Transition Frictional Costs 
The “frictional” costs associated with a broad-scale policy transition refer to the potentially significant (but difficult to 
quantify) costs to solar market stakeholders and other participants associated with broad-scale solar policy change. The 
issue of the ex post costs to current market participants associated with policy friction was raised by stakeholders in 
interviews and at meetings of the Task Force.  Indeed, these conversations have revealed the fears of customer-
generators, investors, market-makers, and other market participants of the “substantial” costs cited as potential impact 
of transition to these parties from one policy regime to another. In fact, several stakeholders in Group F suggested this 
could be reflected as an increased cost of financing and departure of investors from markets, as well as layoffs if the 
market pauses as a result of policy uncertainty. Specifically, one investor in this group suggested that impact could be 
modeled as a 300-400 basis point increase in cost of capital (in some cases), while a lender indicated that investors tend 
to discount revenues that are more uncertain, thus increasing the cost of financing. 
One approach to mitigate this uncertainty suggested by certain members of the Task Force  could  be to design in longer 
lead times prior to change in the policy regime in order to allow time to adapt), particularly with respect to existing deals 
in the project and financing pipeline. 
It is foreseeable that an entirely separate set of ex post costs and benefits will accrue as a result of policy friction, and 
may ultimately be substantial. However, it is exceedingly difficult to account for the uncertain ex post nature of these 
impacts unique to the policy future selected (or variation thereof) in the absence of reliable comparisons on an ex ante 
basis. As such, while it is important for these costs to be considered further (and potentially quantified as part of any 
further analysis), quantitative analysis of the costs and benefits associated with friction is not a component of this 
analysis.  
Table 117: Policy Transition Frictional Costs Impacts by Perspective 
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APPENDIX E: BACKGROUND ON AVOIDED DISTRIBUTION INVESTMENT 
 
The Avoided Distribution Investment component was described as follows in Appendix D: 
 When solar PV is installed near load, some of it will contribute to changes in EDC planning, such 
that some upgrade investments will be deferred110 that otherwise would have been needed to 
provide additional capacity to meet peak growth; this is referred to as “active” deferral and 
applies to a subset of distribution area(s).   
 In contrast, when solar PV is installed without integration into planning, there may be no 
deferral benefit in the short run, but over time it can nevertheless be assumed that, with 
experience, planning will take the solar into account, explicitly or implicitly, and this will lead to 
a “passive” deferral.   
 Active and passive deferrals are estimated on the average and combined for the state.111 
The Avoided Distribution Investment component represented a benefit to two of the four perspectives 
in this analysis: Non-Participating Ratepayers and Citizens at Large, as summarized in the following table: 
 
The Avoided Distribution Investment methodology for this study had four main steps.   The approach 
and assumptions are summarized below for each step. 
Step 1: Literature Review 
First, estimates of deferral benefits were taken from a literature review.  
The following documents attempt to provide an overview of methodologies that have been and/or 
should be used to estimate the benefits and costs of solar PV for the T&D systems: 
 A Regulator’s Guidebook: Calculating the Benefits and Costs of Distributed Solar Generation, 
Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc., 2013, pages 26-30; 
 Review Of Solar PV Benefit & Cost Studies, 2nd Edition, Rocky Mountain Institute, September 
2013 (www.rmi.org/elab_emPower), pages 31-34. 
 Minnesota Value of Solar: Methodology, Minnesota Department of Commerce, Division of 
Energy Resources, by Clean Power Research, April 9, 2014, pages 31, 36, 41. 
These methodologies distinguish between T&D capacity benefits and “grid support” impacts.  For 
present purposes, while grid support benefits and costs may become increasingly important over time, 
                                                          
110
 The deferral may last for many years in some cases, particularly where load growth is slow and the DER penetration is 
substantial, such that in present value terms the “deferral” is equivalent to “avoiding” most of the investment. See note 3. 
111
 In addition to deferral of capacity investments, solar PV may have other grid support benefits, such as frequency and voltage 
regulation.  There may also be grid integration costs that are not internalized through the interconnection process.  These are 
complex subjects with changing technologies and rules, but for present purposes, these were not quantified and may be 
assumed to largely offset each other. 
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we do not attempt to quantify them here, since there is little information available with which reliable 
estimates could be made for Massachusetts.  We also assume that, to the extent solar interconnection 
and integration costs are incurred that are not internalized in the cash flows of solar owners, they are 
offset by grid support benefits.112   Therefore, T&D capacity benefits are the only T&D benefits that are 
quantified in this report. 
It is widely accepted that, under certain conditions, solar PV may contribute to economic savings by 
deferring the need to upgrade certain elements of the T&D system.  The primary basis for the estimates 
of deferral benefits used in the present report is a set of economic values reported for case studies and 
planning studies that are publicly available.  Specifically, the following seven sources provide a 
representative range of estimates.  
1. "DG and Distribution Planning: An Economic Analysis for the Massachusetts DG Collaborative,” 
Navigant Consulting, Attachment G to Report to DPU, Jan. 2006 
2. “2014 System Reliability Procurement Report,” The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a 
National Grid, R.I.P.U.C. Docket No. 4453 
3. Grid Solar Boothbay: Order Approving Stipulation, State of Maine Public Utilities Commission 
Docket No. 2011-138, April 30, 2012, Request for Approval of Non-Transmission Alternative 
(NTA) Pilot Projects for the Mid-Coast and Portland Areas 
4. "The Value of Distributed Photovoltaics to Austin Energy and the City of Austin,” Clean Power 
Research, L.L.C., March 17, 2006 
5.  “The Value of Distributed Solar Electric Generation to New Jersey and Pennsylvania,” for 
Mid‐Atlantic Solar Energy Industries Association & Pennsylvania Solar Energy Industries 
Association, by Perez, Norris & Hoff, Clean Power Research 
6. “The Benefits and Costs of Solar Distributed Generation for Arizona Public Service,” by Beach & 
McGuire, Crossborder Energy, May 8, 2013 
7. “Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of Net Energy Metering in CA,” prepared for The Vote Solar 
Initiative, Crossborder Energy, January 2013. 
The following table compares the most relevant estimates from these seven sources, and shows their 
average value: $.016/kWh. 
                                                          
112
 This report has not addressed any possible differences between the Policy Paths in the ability to optimize these unquantified 
costs and benefits, such as by targeting feeders or other locations with relatively low interconnection costs for solar projects or 
with relatively high grid support benefits. 
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One other study appeared too late to add into this average: “Value of Distributed Generation, Solar PV 
in Massachusetts,” Acadia Center, April 2015.  Its estimate of statewide deferral value for south-facing 
solar in Massachusetts -- $.018/kWh -- was only slightly above the average of the seven sources above, 
so it wouldn’t have significantly changed the result. 
Other sources provided relevant estimates of distribution investments or capital costs that are 
potentially deferrable (e.g., load or capacity upgrades), but stopped short of estimating deferral impacts. 
As can be seen from the table, the literature includes a wide range of estimates.  Also, different metrics 
are reported that are often not directly comparable.  Where necessary (see green values in table), 
values have been converted to comparable units of dollars per solar kW and cents per solar kWh, using 
assumptions for solar capacity factor (for column D) and ELCC (solar match, for column E) that are 
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consistent with the rest of the present project.   Values have also been adjusted to 2015 dollars, using a 
2.5% annual escalator. 
Step 2: Simplified Generic Worksheet of Distribution Deferral 
To confirm the reasonableness of the $.016/kWh average distribution deferral value from the literature, 
that value was compared against a simplified generic worksheet driven by a basic set of assumptions 
about distribution feeder load growth, upgrade cost, solar penetration and coincidence of solar output 
with feeder load.  This worksheet illustrates the range of potential deferral benefits as these 
assumptions are varied, and provides additional confidence in the deferral value from the literature in 
step 1.  The following table illustrates a scenario with a deferral from 2018 to 2037, which leads to a 56% 
savings in the present value of distribution investment required.  The assumptions that lead to this 
scenario are listed below. 
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The assumptions which lead to this deferral from 2018 to 2037 are listed below, including a distribution 
feeder load growth rate of 0.75%/year, an upgrade cost of $250/kW, penetration of 15% for solar (or a 
(1)																		 (2)															 (3)												 (4)														 (5)																			 (6)																		 (7)																		 (8)																		 (9)																					 (10)																
Existing with	DER Existing with	DER
Upgrade,				
No	DER
Upgrade,	
with	DER
Upgrades,	
No	DER
Upgrades	with	
DER
Annual	
Savings	
($000)
0 2015 98.0% 83.0% 250$														 100% 44% 56%
1 2016 98.7% 83.7% 0 0 256																 -																 -																 -$													 -$																 -$													
2 2017 99.5% 84.5% 0 0 263																 -																 -																 -$													 -$																 -$													
3 2018 100.2% 85.2% 2018 0 269																 269															 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
4 2019 101.0% 86.0% 0 0 276																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
5 2020 101.7% 86.7% 0 0 283																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
6 2021 102.5% 87.5% 0 0 290																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
7 2022 103.3% 88.3% 0 0 297																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
8 2023 104.0% 89.0% 0 0 305																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
9 2024 104.8% 89.8% 0 0 312																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
10 2025 105.6% 90.6% 0 0 320																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
11 2026 106.4% 91.4% 0 0 328																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
12 2027 107.2% 92.2% 0 0 336																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
13 2028 108.0% 93.0% 0 0 345																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
14 2029 108.8% 93.8% 0 0 353																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
15 2030 109.6% 94.6% 0 0 362																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
16 2031 110.4% 95.4% 0 0 371																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
17 2032 111.3% 96.3% 0 0 380																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
18 2033 112.1% 97.1% 0 0 390																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
19 2034 112.9% 97.9% 0 0 400																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
20 2035 113.8% 98.8% 0 0 410																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
21 2036 114.6% 99.6% 0 0 420																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
22 2037 115.5% 100.5% 0 2037 430																 -																 430															 31$															 14$																		 18$															
23 2038 116.4% 101.4% 0 0 441																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
24 2039 117.2% 102.2% 0 0 452																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
25 2040 118.1% 103.1% 0 0 463																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
26 2041 119.0% 104.0% 0 0 475																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
27 2042 119.9% 104.9% 0 0 487																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
28 2043 120.8% 105.8% 0 0 499																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
29 2043 121.7% 106.7% 0 0 512																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
30 2044 122.6% 107.6% 0 0 524																 -																 -																 31$															 14$																		 18$															
Sum 269															 430															 878															 388																		 490															
Net	Present	Value 235															 104															 356															 157																		 199															
Levelized	Values 27																	 10																				 15																	
Upgrade	and	Savings	Percentages 100% 44% 56%
Year	of	Need	for	
Upgrade
Load	as	%	of	Capacity
Upgrade	cost	incurred	in	year	when	needed
	Capital	Cost	&	Timing	of	
Upgrades	($000)
Amortized	Cost	of	Upgrades	($000),	
based	on	30-year	NPV		Cost	of	
Upgrade	
($000)
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combination of solar and other Distributed Energy Resources (DER), and coincidence of 33% between 
solar output and feeder load (equivalent to the ELCC, but at the distribution level; see Section 3.1  for a 
chart of this value over time).   The following table also summarizes the results of this deferral scenario 
in present value terms: 
 a 56% savings in the present value of distribution investment required, and 
 a distribution deferral value of $.055/kWh for PV on this feeder (for “active deferral”) from this 
simple model.113 
Two additional calculations appear at the bottom of this table, which are described in Steps 3 and 4 
below: 
 a statewide (or “passive”) distribution deferral value of $.016/kWh (which is nearly the same as 
the average from the literature in Step 1), after assuming (per Step 3 below) that 30% of the 
feeders statewide would have an opportunity for such an active deferral, and 
 a net statewide distribution deferral value of $.008/kWh after assuming that deferral would be 
feasible on 50% of the feeders despite technical challenges discussed in Step 4 below. 
 
 
 
Step 3: Opportunities to Defer Distribution Investments 
                                                          
113
 The amortized Annual Savings in column (10) are divided by the cumulative solar kW installed each year to defer the 
investment, and then the resulting $/kW annual savings are divided by solar output each year and levelized for this active 
deferral value of $.055/kWh. 
Illustrative	Model	of	Upgrade	Deferral	by	DER	(4/27/15)
Inputs: input	cell Results:
1 Feeder	Capacity	(MW) 1.0																
2 Current	Load	% 98%
Upgrade,				
No	DER
Upgrade,	
with	DER
Upgrade,				
No	DER
Upgrade,	with	
DER
3 Current	Load	(MW) 1.0 Present	Value	Analysis:
4 Peak	Load	Growth 0.750% Upgrade	Cost	($000) 220$													 97$															 333$												 147$															
5 New	DER	as	%	of	Feeder	Load 15.0% Savings	($000) 123$												 186$															
6 DER	Reduction	of	Load	(MW) 0.147 Savings	(%	reduction) 56% 56%
7 Upgrade	Cost/kW	* 250.00$							 Savings	$/kW	of	DER 834$												 1,262$												
8 Upgrade	Capacity 100% Savings	$/kW	of	Solar 275$												 1,043$												
9 Upgrade	Capacity	(MW) 1.0
10 Cost	($000,	$/kW-yr) $250 This	Run Weighted*
11 Escalation	of	Upgrade	Cost 2.5% Cumulative	Savings	$/kWh	of	Solar 0.0617$							 0.0548$							
12 Discount	Rate/WACC 7.0%
13 13.3%
Active Statewide
14 33% Distribution	Deferral	for	PV	across	territory	from	model	($/kWh) 0.0548$							 30% 0.0164$							
15 Solar	MW	(AC) 0.445												 Average	of	5	values	from	the	literature	($/kWh) 0.0542$							 30% 0.0163$							
16 Solar	MWh/yr 567															 Weighted/selected	results 0.0542$							 0.0163$							
17 Deferral	years 19 		Adjustment	for	technical	issues 50%
18 10,771										 Assumed	Distribution	Deferral	for	PV	($/kWh) 0.0081$							
Capital	Costs Annual	Costs
%	of	load	on	
feeders	with	
growth
Carrying	Chg/	Fixed	Chg	Rate	(see	
sheet)
	Solar	DCP	(Distrib	Contrib	as	%	of	
PV	kW)	
MWh	in	deferal	years	
		*	Weighted	by	load	
growth	and	DER	
penetration
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We make an assumption for the percentage of the state’s distribution system to which estimates of 
“active deferral” are applicable; this is the portion of the system that is growing and so will require new 
capacity or otherwise provides opportunities to defer distribution investments.114  We have used 30 
percent as a placeholder assumption for this factor.  This was applied to estimates from four of the 
literature sources and to the results from the worksheet in Step 2 to get a statewide distribution 
deferral value of $.016/kWh.115 
 
Step 4: Technical Factors to Achieve Deferral  
There are a number of factors that may be required in order for distribution planners to sufficiently rely 
upon solar DG to actually achieve a deferral of upgrade investments.  Some of these factors may affect 
the physical availability of PV to reduce load under challenging conditions, such as following power 
quality disturbances and grid outages; planning lead time is also a factor.  
These factors include: 
 IEEE 1547 standards requires DG to trip for low voltage and other disturbances, and low-voltage 
ride-through may be incompatible with anti-islanding protection; 
 Planners can’t count on PV to be on-line instantly as power is restored after outage; and, 
 Physical assurance may be needed to keep load off the distribution system if the solar goes 
down. 
 
These issues are important and should be addressed through further R&D, pilot testing and policy 
development.  This will lead to better information to estimate their impact on the benefits and costs of 
solar for the T&D system.  In the meantime, we simply apply a factor for the percentage of PV that can 
be counted upon for distribution deferral through the use of physical assurance, storage, smart inverters 
with ride-through, linked demand response and/or other means.  We have used 50 percent as a 
placeholder assumption for this factor, resulting in a net statewide distribution deferral value of 
$.008/kWh. 
Results 
The result for steps 1 through 3 for this illustration was $.016 average statewide value of Avoided 
Distribution Investment per kWh of solar PV.  After applying the 50% factor from Step 4, the net value = 
$.008/kWh.  The modeling for this study replaced the static assumption for peak coincidence described 
above with the with the solar penetration-dependent value for each year, calculated as discussed in 
Section 3.1. 
                                                          
114
 For portions of the distribution system on which there is literally no load growth, there is essentially no deferral opportunity 
for DER.  However, the deferral benefit is at its highest with load growth around ½ of 1 percent/year, other things being equal, 
since DER (at an assumed 10% penetration) can not only defer the upgrade but avoid it for an entire 30-year period. 
115
 The average values used in this report will not be representative of any particular location. 
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APPENDIX C: Task 4 PowerPoint Presentations 
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Consulting Team 
Presentation & Discussion of 
Preliminary Results and 
Candidate Policy Paths
Massachusetts Net Metering Task Force
Mtg #4 - February 12, 2015
Sustainable Energy 
Advantage, LLC
(2)
TASK 4
PROVIDE A RANGE OF OPTIONS TO REACH THE 
1600 MW GOAL… AND BEYOND
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(3)
Task 4: Objective
• Based on research, analysis, findings from Tasks 0, 1, 2 & 5, input from Task Force, other 
stakeholders & public…
• “Provide a range of options for appropriate structures for providing support to reach the 
1600 MW goal & provide opportunity for additional development.” 
• Select a subset to be analyzed, compared in cost/benefit analysis to Current Policy
• SREC Carve-out + Current Net Metering Regime, 1600 MW goals, Current NM caps
• To allow for more robust comparisons between options, DOER considering expanding 
modeling (for benchmarking purposes) of hypothetically extending current regime to 2500 by 
2025 under Net Metering regime TBD 
(4)
Outline
• Key assumptions
• Options to adjust/modify current net metering &/or solar incentives capable of reducing 
costs without reducing benefits
• Alternative structures for solar and/or net metering policy
• Categories
• Dimensions
• Options
• Criteria - for what might be deemed ‘appropriate’ or ‘desirable’
• Stakeholder goals
• Analysis
• Screen and group policy ‘elements’ into (up to 6) ‘Policy Paths’
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Key Assumptions
• Not constrained to 1600 MW by 2020
• 1600 not max
• Nothing magic about either MW amount or date by which a target is reached
• On the table:
• No change
• All new
• Modifications
• Hybrids
• Changes generally presume grandfathering past investments
(6)
Options to adjust/modify current net metering &/or solar incentives (1)
Capable of reducing costs without reducing benefits
• No Brainers
• Refunding (percentage of) ACP pmts. to ratepayers
• (model: recent CT PA 13-303)
• EDCs participation in auctions.
• Require/consider/analyze/justify why not/have DPU consider prudence of abstaining?
• Systematic abstention impacts cost of EDC purchases and spot market prices for all
• Shift incentives (greater SREC factors) to favor location “to support & enhance 
needs of distribution system” 
• as also suggested for LREC/ZREC program in recent CT draft IRP (p. 113)
• EDCs Monetize FCM benefits.  Options:
• Options: revenue flow-back to customers (while mitigating EDC exposure to performance 
risk); EDCs auction FCM rights to others; or let system owners keep rights
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Options to adjust/modify current net metering &/or solar incentives (2)
Capable of reducing costs without reducing benefits
• Other (more involved) options Include:
• Long-Term contracting within SREC program 
• NGRID competitive pilot proposal w/in SREC (2013)
• model: MA 83A or NJ EDC programs
• Note: may have modest distribution effects on benefits
• Firm the floor?  
• Source of $?
• Masking market price signals, impact on market, etc. (stimulating build when surplus?)
• Stretch SREC life to 15 yrs and lower cap & floor? 
• More directly comparable to CT ZREC, RI Renewable Energy Growth and DG Standard 
Contract prices
• Can prices converge to Class I more quickly?
Alternative Structures for Solar 
and/or Net Metering
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Treating Different Solar PV Categories Differently
• ‘Large’ vs. ‘Small’ Distributed Generation; Utility-scale (wholesale)
• Bifurcating treatment of large and small may be desirable
• Rationale – sophistication/expertise, transaction cost, efficiency
• Several studies have concluded different approaches preferable
• Of examples studies (T1) many take different approach to large vs. small, or DG 
vs. wholesale 
• CA, NY, RI, VT, CT, NJ, MA, DE; 
• VOST has only been used for small
• MA (historically and now)
(10)
Dimensions Considered
• Solar Incentive (Small vs. Large)
• Installation Diversity/Encouraging targeted types
• Net Metering Approach (Projects sized to load, oversized/VNM)
• Timing of Transitions
• Targets/Constraints
• Quantity target/timeline (set, or for analysis)
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OPTIONS: SOLAR INCENTIVES
Small Projects
(unsophisticated)
• SREC
• SREC-modified
• Financing within SREC (NJ/PSE&G)
• Standard Offers (SO):
• PBI/Solicitations (aggregated vs. individual)
• None
Large/Utility-Scale Projects
(conducive to competition)
• SREC
• SREC-modified
• PBI with long-term fixed price contract/tariff
• Solicitations:  e.g. CT ZREC, RI REG, DE, VT, NY, 
NJ EDC
• Adjustable Block Incentive (ABI) (CA ReMAT)
• PBI/DBI (CA)
• EPBI/SO/Rebate
• (NY: hybrid DBI w/3-yr PBI)
• Solar avoided cost /LT EDC purchase obligation
• None
Structure 
Price Formation 
PBI/SO* Upfront Cost Reduction 
(rebate)/SO
Administratively-set price RI REG (small) CT (res-HOPBI)
Competitive benchmark CT ZREC (small)
DBI pricing mechanism CA (small C) NY (small), CA (Small R)
Key:
• Already considered
• Unlikely to be politically 
acceptable
• Identified of interest by TF
• Other options to consider
11
(12)
Installation Distribution: Diversity/Encouraging Targeted Types
• Un-stratified
• head to head, low price (or premium) wins
• Limits to larger projects, or not?
• Stratified by size (sub-tiers of specified size)
• Stratified by type (like SREC-II)
• MW distributed by EDC pro-rata to load
• like CT ZREC, CSI
• What Favored (disfavored)?
• Brownfields/LFG
• Municipal
• Aggregate (common ownership, municipalities)
• Community-Shared Solar (CSS)
• Low-income
• Support/enhance distribution system
• Host-owned vs. 3rd-party-owned
• How favored?
• SREC Factors
• Co-incentives (e.g. SBC pmts)
• Segmentation of incentive, or competitive 
points
• Design choice can have the effect of…
• favoring national/large players, or maintaining a 
role for local firms too?
• Impacting degree to which policy supports 
adding permanent local jobs
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OPTIONS: NET METERING APPROACH
(CREDIT FOR ON-SITE PRODUCTION)
Net Metering Credits
(projects sized to load)
• As-is - With or without caps?
• NM netted from solar incentive
• Value of Solar Tariff (VOST)
• (Small only?)
• alone or with other incentives?
• Separate rate class Modified w/rate changes, 1 
or more of:
• Min. Bill
• Shift D rates to more demand-based revenue
• Demand charges on outgoing flow 
• None
Virtual Net Metering Credits
(Oversized)
• As-is - Capped at what level?
• NM netted from solar incentive
• Limited to Aggregate 
• municipal & other common ownership
• Targeted to CSS
• Modified w/rate changes, 1 or more of:
• Min. Bill
• Shift D rates to more demand-based revenue
• Demand charges on outgoing flow 
• Remove D charge from credit for Class II and III VNM 
public sector and CSS projects
• None
Key:
• Already considered
• Unlikely to be politically 
acceptable
• Identified of interest by TF
• Other options to consider
13
(14)
Options: Timing of Transitions
1. Set date* 
a) End of ITC (new program @ 1/1/2017)
b) Other
2. Set MW*
a) Post-1600 MW
b) Other
3. End of SREC-II as currently defined* 
4. End of NM caps
a) Current
b) Expanded
• Practical barrier: EDCs will hit NM caps at different times
* Capping NM could be synchronized with this 
option
Key:
• Already considered
• Unlikely to be politically 
acceptable
• Identified of interest by TF
• Other options to consider
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Options: Targets/Constraints
• MW Goal with Timeline
• Firm timeline (e.g., RI, VT)
• Soft timeline (e.g., MA, CA ReMAT (hybrid?))
• MW Goal without Timeline (e.g., DBI in NY, CA)
• Budget-defined & limited (quantity moves inversely with price) (e.g., CT ZREC)
• Unconstrained
• (e.g., avoided cost, VOST, SO/FIT without caps, NM/VNM-only w/o caps, with TVRs)
(16)
Quantity Target/Timeline (set, or for analysis)
• If applicable
• MW Goal or Target, e.g.:
• 2500 MW
• Other
• Timeline, e.g.:
• 2020
• 2025
• other
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Policy Paths
• Comprised by selecting a choice from each menu
• Thousands of possible combinations
• Aim to have a limited, but diverse and distinct set of alternatives for consideration
• To highlight major differences
• Doesn’t preclude fine-tuning later
• Goal (from scope/budget):
• Team to ID 6 paths
• TF to select from those a subset for benefit and cost analysis
• Analysis of 2 scenarios in Consultant scope/budget
• Additional analysis requires more budget and time 
(18)
Proposed ‘Policy Paths’
Path #/Name: Description
1. SREC Program Modifications incl. 
LT Contracting Pilot
Keep the current incentive model but make adjustments that reduce 
costs while maintaining benefits
2. Minimize Ratepayer Impacts Incentives set based on results of regular competitive solicitation to 
ensure only the most cost effective installations are built, minimizing 
ratepayer impacts
3. Orderly Market Evolution Offer declining block incentive (DBI) to create market certainty and 
lower cost of financing while transitioning away from state incentives
4. Sustained Growth Adapting to 
Market Changes
Incentives rates automatically adjust (up or down) to market conditions 
through volume-based price setting
5. Maximize federal incentives w/ 
Managed Growth Boost  + 
Sustainable Growth
Incentives rates automatically adjust (up or down) to market conditions 
through volume-based price setting
Add tailored incentive for “managed growth” sector to capture max 
federal incentives before 2017
6. Reliability First Target PV to support & enhance needs of the distribution system
Max system owners contributions the distribution system
7. Maximize Installed MW within 
Defined Ratepayer Impact
Apply measures to drive down cost premium, while limiting outlays to 
preset budget
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1. SREC Program Modifications incl. LT Contracting Pilot
Description
Keep the current incentive model but make adjustments that reduce costs while 
maintaining benefits
Analog • Mass. SREC-II Program, N.J. PSE&G loan program, proposed National Grid SREC pilot (2013)
Solar Small
• Current SREC-II Model; plus Implement utility SREC performance-based (PBI) incentive 
standard offer program with REC resales for a portion of the market
Solar Large
• Current SREC-II Model; plus Implement utility SREC long-term contracting program through 
PBI solicitations with REC resales for a portion of the market
Distribution • Increase SREC factor for locations that enhance grid reliability
Net Metering • As-is, uncapped
Virtual Net Metering • As-is
NM Caps & Timing of 
Transitions
• Net metering cap as-is
• Transition target: 1/1/16 (or ASAP
Targets, Constraints • MW goal with soft timeline
Quantity Target, Timeline • 1600 MW by 2020
Other Features
• Refund Alternative Compliance Payments (ACP) to ratepayers
• Promote utility participation in SREC auction
• Require monetization of forward capacity market (FCM) revenues
Other Potential Options
• Firm the SREC price floor
• Extend SREC life to 15 years
(20)
2. Minimize Ratepayer Impacts
Description
Incentives set based on results of regular competitive solicitation to ensure only the 
most cost effective installations are built, minimizing ratepayer impacts
Analog • Rhode Island Renewable Energy Growth, Connecticut ZREC
Solar Small
• Performance-based incentive (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• Incentive rates indexed to large-scale competitive solicitation rates
• First-come, first-served access (i.e., standard offer)
• Rates based on bundled electricity value and RECs
Solar Large
• Performance-base incentive  (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• Set through competitive solicitations 3X per year
• Rates based on bundled electricity value and RECs
Distribution • Limited differentiation between installation types; maximize economies of scale
Net Metering • Reduce incentives by net metering credit compensation,  + minimum bill
Virtual Net Metering • Reduce incentives by net metering credit compensation,  + minimum bill
NM Caps & Timing of 
Transitions
• Remove net metering caps before transition
• Transition target: 1/1/17 (end of federal incentives)
Targets, Constraints • MW goal with timeline (annual targets)
Quantity Target, Timeline • 2,500 MW by 2025
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3. Orderly Market Evolution
Description
Offer declining block incentive (DBI) to create market certainty and lower cost of financing 
while transitioning away from state incentives
Analog • California Solar Incentive (CSI), New York Megawatt Block Program
Solar Small
• Rebates (i.e., upfront payments)
• First-come, first-served (i.e., standard offer)
• Rates set via declining block incentive (DBI)
Solar Large
• Performance-based incentive (i.e., $/kWh produced) or hybrid rebate/performance-
based incentive
• First-come, first-served (i.e., standard offer)
• Rates set via declining block incentive (DBI)
Distribution
• Separate incentive pools for each utility 
• Incentive adders for different system types/locations
Net Metering
• Keep current net metering rates but add minimum bill or transition to Value of Solar Tariff 
(VOST)
Virtual Net Metering
• Limit to aggregate net metering and community shared solar
• Keep current net metering rates but add minimum bill or transition to Value of Solar Tariff 
(VOST)
NM Caps & Timing of 
Transitions
• Remove net metering caps before transition
• Transition target: end of SREC-II or 1/1/17 (end of federal incentives)
Targets, Constraints • MW goal with fixed-quantity blocks, no firm timeline
Quantity Target, Timeline • 2,500 MW at program close
(22)
4. Sustained Growth Adapting to Market Changes
Description
Incentives rates automatically adjust (up or down) to market conditions through volume-
based price setting
Analog • California Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (ReMAT)
Solar Small
• Rebates (i.e., upfront payments)
• First-come, first-served (i.e., standard offer)
• Adjustable Block Incentive with incentive pricing adjusting (up or down) to program 
participation levels
Solar Large
• Performance-base incentive  (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• First-come, first-served (i.e., standard offer)
• Adjustable Block Incentive with incentive pricing adjusting (up or down) to program 
participation levels
Distribution
• Separate incentive pools for each utility 
• Incentive adders for different system types/locations
Net Metering
• Keep current net metering rates but add minimum bill or transition to Value of Solar Tariff 
(VOST)
Virtual Net Metering
• Limit to aggregate net metering and community shared solar
• Keep current net metering rates but add minimum bill or transition to Value of Solar Tariff 
(VOST)
NM Caps & Timing of 
Transitions
• Remove net metering caps before transition
• Transition target: end of SREC-II or 1/1/17 (end of federal incentives)
Targets, Constraints • MW goal with fixed-quantity blocks, soft timeline
Quantity Target, Timeline • 2,500 MW at program close
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5. Maximize federal incentives w/ Managed Growth Boost  
+ Sustainable Growth
Description
Incentives rates automatically adjust (up or down) to market conditions through volume-based price 
setting
Add tailored incentive for “managed growth” sector to capture max federal incentives before 2017
Analog • California  Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (ReMAT)
Solar Small
• Rebates (i.e., upfront payments)
• First-come, first-served (i.e., standard offer)
• Adjustable Block Incentive with incentive pricing adjusting (up or down) to program participation levels
Solar Large
• Before 1/1/2017: Administratively set performance-based incentive below SREC price floor for “managed 
growth” sector (i.e., large, greenfield solar)
• After 1/1/2017: Performance-base incentive  (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• After 1/1/2017: First-come, first-served (i.e., standard offer)
• After 1/1/2017: Adjustable Block Incentive with incentive pricing adjusting (up or down) to program 
participation levels
Distribution
• Separate incentive pools for each utility 
• Incentive adders for different system types/locations
• Before 1/1/2017: Tailored incentive for “managed growth” sector
Net Metering • Keep current net metering rates but add minimum bill. or transition to Value of Solar Tariff
Virtual Net Metering
• Limit to aggregate net metering and community shared solar
• Keep current net metering rates but add minimum bill or transition to Value of Solar Tariff
NM Caps & Timing of 
Transitions
• Remove net metering caps before transition
• Transition target: end of SREC-II or 1/1/17 (end of federal incentives)
• Provide managed growth incentive ASAP
Targets, Constraints • MW goal with fixed-quantity blocks, soft timeline
Quantity Target, Timeline • 2,500 MW at program close
(24)
6. Reliability First
Description
Target PV to support & enhance needs of the distribution system
Max system owners contributions the distribution system
Analog • Connecticut ZREC; Mass. H4185
Solar Small
• Performance-based incentive (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• Incentive rates indexed to large-scale competitive solicitation rates
• First-come, first-served access (i.e., standard offer)
• Rates based on bundled electricity value and RECs
• Incentive adder for systems in designated reliability support grid zones
Solar Large
• Performance-base incentive  (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• Set through competitive solicitations 3X per year
• Rates based on bundled electricity value and RECs
• Incentive adder for systems in designated reliability support grid zones
Distribution
• Limited restrictions of system size
• Geographic targeting for enhances distribution system support
• Separate incentive pools for each utility 
Net Metering • Add minimum bill or shift transmission and distribution charges to demand-based charges
Virtual Net Metering
• Sunset virtual net metering
• Implement buy-all, sell-all compensation
NM Caps & Timing of 
Transitions
• Remove net metering caps before transition
• Transition target: 1/1/17 (end of federal incentives)
Targets, Constraints
• Total MW limited by pre-defined program budget
• 2/3 of budget targeted to specific grid reliability regions
Quantity Target, Timeline • Whatever budget supports by program 2025
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7. Maximize Installed MW within Defined Ratepayer 
ImpactDescription Apply measures to drive down cost premium, while limiting outlays to preset budget
Analog • Connecticut ZREC; Rhode Island DG Growth Program 
Solar Small
• Performance-based incentive (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• Incentive rates indexed to large-scale competitive solicitation rates
• First-come, first-served access (i.e., standard offer)
• Rates based on SRECs only
Solar Large
• Performance-base incentive  (i.e., $/kWh produced)
• Set through competitive solicitations 3X per year
• Rates based SRECs only for net metered systems; SRECs and energy for virtual net metered 
systems
Distribution • Incentives stratified by size
Net Metering • As-is or add minimum bill
Virtual Net Metering
• Sunset virtual net metering
• Implement buy-all, sell-all compensation
NM Caps & Timing of 
Transitions
• Remove net metering caps before transition
• Transition target: 1/1/17 (end of federal incentives)
Targets, Constraints • Total MW limited by pre-defined program budget
Quantity Target, Timeline • Whatever budget supports by program 2025
(26)
Note on Finalizing Policy Paths
• Installation Diversity Options
• Design features to support diversity of installation types, sizes, 
participants, installers while encouraging optimal location… Can be 
superimposed upon most other paths
• The following can be altered under most of the paths, a set of 
choices that still must be specified for any C/B modeling
• Timing of Transitions
• Targets/Constraints
• Quantity Target/Timeline
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Summary of Survey Results on
Candidate Policy Paths
Massachusetts Net Metering Task Force
Mtg #5 - March15 2015
Sustainable 
Energy 
Advantage, LLC
Response Overview
Responses Received from:
Member
Angie O'Connor, DPU Chair; Task Force Co-Chair
Benjamin B. Downing, Senator
Eric J. Krathwohl, Rich May, P.C.
Liam Holland
Paul Brennan, Attorney General’s Office
David Colton, Easton Town Administrator
Robert Rio, Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Charles Harak, National Consumer Law Center
William Stillinger, SEBANE
Fred Zalcman, SunEdison and Solar Energy Industries 
Association
Janet Besser, New England Clean Energy Council
Larry Aller, Next Step Living
Lisa Podgurski, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers Local 103
Camilo Serna, Eversource
DPU Included the Following 
Disclaimer in ALL responses
(omitted from summary for readability)
• The Department seeks to promote solar 
growth while protecting the interests of 
ratepayers. The Department’s choices for 
modeling preferences in this survey do 
not reflect the Department’s preferences 
for any particular option as a final 
recommendation to the legislature.  
Rather, the options chosen have been 
selected in order to compare diverse 
policy elements that differ from the base 
case model.   Furthermore, the selection 
of "Top Choice" and "Second Choice" 
does not indicate the Department's 
preference of one option over the other. 
Rather, these are the options among 
those presented that the Department 
suggests be considered in modeling to 
compare diverse policy elements. 
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Question 2: Preferred Complete 
Policy Path
Defined Path Responses
1. SREC Program Modifications incl. LT 
Contracting Pilot
0
2. Competitive Solicitations 1 (Brennan)
3. Orderly Market Evolution
2 
(O’Connor, 
Harak)
4. Sustained Growth Adapting to Market 
Changes
1 (Colton)
5. Maximize federal incentives w/ Managed 
Growth Boost  + Sustainable Growth
1 
(Krathwohl)
6. Prioritize Distribution System 0
7. Maximize Installed MW within Defined 
Budget
0
No Opinion 1 (Fisher)
Combination Paths Responses
2. Competitive Solicitations +
4. Sustained Market Growth
1 (Holland)
3. Orderly Market Evolution +
4. Sustained Growth Adapting to 
Market Changes
5 (Aller, 
Stillinger, 
Podgurski,
Besser, 
Zalcam)
2. Completive Solicitations +
3. Orderly Market Evolution
1 
(Rabinowitz
)
2. Competitive Solicitation +
6. Prioritize Distribution System
1 (Rio)
Other: Competitive process with 
defined budget
1 (Serna)
3
Primarily the "sustained growth adapting to market
changes" model for rooftop/smaller systems
associated with onsite load. The "competitive
solicitations" model for "large" projects, especially
those unaffiliated with load at or near the facility.
Modifying both to some degree in order to capture
benefits of federal tax incentives. Modifying both
market segments in order to incentive solar
development where they support and enhance
needs of distribution system. (Holland)
A combination of 'sustained growth adapting to
market changes' and 'orderly market evolution' with
the following characteristics: a MW block program
with medium to long-term visibility on future
incentive levels that generally decline overtime but
are able to react (up or down) to market signals
based on known and transparent formulas.
(Podgurski)
National Grid fully supports competitive solicitations for
large-scale solar installations within a defined budget in
order to contain costs for electricity customers. Such an
approach will automatically allow the price paid for
solar output to adjust to the market conditions and tax
incentives available. This could be paired with either a
Declining Block Incentive or cost-based standard PBI
(with variations as appropriate by size and location) for
smaller solar installations, as consistent with the models
in Rhode Island and New York. Other aspects of a
preferred policy path would be to enable and
appropriately incent solar owners to provide grid
support services (such as voltage support or load relief),
when possible, and a rapid, orderly transition to the
new model. (Rabinowitz)
Similar to #4, with the following modifications: A
combination of 'sustained growth adapting to
market changes' and 'orderly market evolution' with
the following characteristics: a MW block program
with medium to long-term visibility on future
incentive levels that are able to react (up or down) to
market signals based on known and transparent
formulas, with the goal of eventually declining to
establish a self-sustaining market, with no
incentives.-Different definitions for small vs. large
solar segments, with no distinction based on behind
the meter or not, just a delineation based on size:
*<1MW AC: Small, Over 1MW AC: Large *Virtual net
metering is not changed from existing policy
*Minimum bill is sent to DPU for consideration as a
rate case, with limitation of maximum value being no
more than $10 at any point in the future *Any "value
of solar" analysis drives a "value of solar credit",
rather than a "value of solar tariff" - perhaps a minor
point, but may be important for tax purposes. (Aller)
A combination of 'sustained growth adapting to
market changes' and 'orderly market evolution' with
the following characteristics: a MW block program
with medium to long-term visibility on future
incentive levels that generally decline overtime but
are able to react (up or down) to market signals
based on known and transparent formulas. (Besser)
A combination of 'sustained growth adapting to
market changes' and 'orderly market evolution' with
the following characteristics: a MW block program
with medium to long-term visibility on future
incentive levels that generally decline overtime but
are able to react (up or down) to market signals
based on known and transparent formulas.
(Rever/Zalcam)
Eversource continues to emphasize that any selected
policy path needs to accomplish the following goals:*
Ensure existing net metering and virtual net metering
rules are replaced with a new rate design that properly
recognizes today’s environment and ensures the
principle of rate equity among customers.* Ensure solar
incentives are set through competitive and transparent
processes.* Ensure Massachusetts is not paying above
market costs for solar, especially compared to other
states in the region.* Set budgets to provide
transparency regarding the investment in solar
development in Massachusetts. (Serna)
Orderly Market Evolution - declining block, modified
as indicated by the responses to the remaining
questions in this survey. (O’Connor)
A combination of 'orderly market evolution' (3) and
'sustained growth adapting to market changes' (4)
with the following characteristics: a MW block
program with medium to long-term visibility on
future incentive levels that generally decline
overtime but are able to react (up or down) to
market signals based on known and transparent
formulas. In addition I ask that the consultants
consider the merits of the proposal submitted by a
number of solar advocates to the task force on
February 20, 2015 titled "Fair Solar Policy
Framework". (Stillinger)
If I had to chose of the paths it would be 2 - Competitive Solicitations and 6 - Prioritize Distribution. However a
far more preferred approach is to return to a market where solar is valued exactly what it is worth. For instance,
ideally, solar customers would only get credit for the kWh they are avoiding at the time they are avoiding, while
still paying for T&D. There would be variable rates throughout the day based on how much power the
competition would be - which is the marginal cost of power. This could be done with smart meters or based on
some averages until smart meters become common. It is odd that the DPU is moving to TVR when a basic
service customer purchases power, but when it comes to selling power back to the grid, the person gets basic
service rates no matter the time of day. Eliminating the T&D from the net metering would avoid minimum bills
since the person would be paying for T&D and would still have an incentive to use less. There could still be
some variation with regards to locational pricing. In absence of that however, 2 and 6. The proponents keep
saying the costs have come down but the subsidies still remain high. (Rio)
Question 2 Responses
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Question 3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Tradable SRECs PBI Up-front 
Payments
No Opinion
3. Type of Incentive (Small Solar Market)
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
Not of Interest
5
Question 3 Comments
• (Stillinger) Under Policy Alternative #3, Orderly Market Evolution, please examine an incentive for residential and 
small commercial solar projects that is structured as an up-front payment to the system owner that would be based 
on the estimated generation of the system over its initial years of operation (e.g. ten years).
• (Rabinowitz) National Grid favors PBI implemented through a tariff, and not through a long term contract. In 
addition, an incentive such as up-front payments should be borne by taxpayers, and ideally implemented through 
tax policy, rather than adding costs to electricity customers’ bills.
• Under Policy Alternative #3, Orderly Market Evolution, please examine an incentive for residential and small 
commercial solar projects that is structured as an up-front payment to the system owner that would be based on 
the estimated generation of the system over its initial years of operation (e.g. ten years).
• (Besser, Rever, Aller, ) Please examine an incentive for residential and small commercial solar projects that is 
structured as an up-front payment to the system owner that would be based on the estimated generation of the 
system over its initial years of operation (e.g. ten years).
• (Rio) This is complicated - technically I am preferring a performance based system. However, it is more of a hybrid. I 
believe small solar should be paid at power rates, not including T&D. This would eliminate the need for any real 
program changes and eliminate the need for minimum bills. However, to the extent there may be short term need 
for additional money, the ACP money can be used as kind of a floater, to give money when needed on short term 
(upfront), but be removed as needed.
• (Krathwohl) as applicable to this and following questions, i like a policy path yielding increased certainty in the PV 
market to allow participants to be able to plan and implement which in turn will faciltat achievement of the MW 
target and provide the benefits associated with increased solar development including more jobs. Ultimately this 
must be done at a cost that is not unreasonable, but more work must be done to see how the numbers fall out
• (Holland) Strongly consider a continued up-front rebate for small residential systems like the commonwealth solar 
program in addition to the PBI. 
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Question 4
0
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Cost-based 
price 
Competitive 
Benchmark 
DBI ABI Competitive 
Solicitation
No Opinion
4. Means of Setting Price (Small Solar Market)
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
Not of Interest
7
Question 4 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) These options are all variations on a theme, & elements of one could be supported in another. In addition, any of 
the options above can and should be adjusted based on the amount of market response received, thus ABI does not seem like a 
separate price option. However, the goal should be to choose a means of lowering prices over time to limit the added costs to
electricity customers’ bills. Even the small solar market could become a competitive one, & a competitive market solicitation
could inform the price that will be set by the government agency.
• (Brennan) Unclear about what the "distinct competitive event" would be -- would need additional information.
• (O’Connor) When modeling the declining block, please consider modeling the ability to respond to market conditions and the 
option of including market adders. 
• (Rever) Also not of interest: competitive benchmark and competitive solicitation
• (Rio) same answer as Q3 - The price should not be "set" at all - the risk of solar should be on the owner - someone this program
has turned into a risk-free proposition. The backstop could be the ACP, however, there is not legitimate reason why being a solar 
owner should be equivalent to printing money - the risk is on all the other ratepayers and the solar owner is not paying his or 
her share. the owner of the solar should receive power rates that are variable based on the need at the time - This could be done 
using a smart meter when they are available or could be done using some averages. it is completely unfair for a homeowner on 
basic service to be required to pay TVR (as some have proposed) while solar people get basic service rates at all times - using 
TVR for solar would force people to install the panels in a way they are maximizing benefit to the system not maximizing benefit
to their pocket.
• (Krathwohl) Although i support some administrative process to determine a reasonable price there should be some constraints 
on that process - probably set in the legislation to ensure that the process no matter how well-intended -- is not susceptible to 
getting bogged down and as a result hinders the development of the solar market
• (Colton) Competitive bidding should be discouraged, particularly if the EDCs are going to be involved in the solicitation and
selection process. The states uncoupling of distribution and generation shouldn't be compromised.
• (Aller) For small solar, competitive solicitation is not cost effective or feasible, and linking the incentive level to the values 
determined by competitive solicitation for large-scale solar has several risks:  -There are several major cost drivers for small
projects, especially residential, where costs would evolve differently than large projects: customer acquisition, permitting,
inspection, and interconnect, and materials required by local electric code that drive large additions to the cost stack.   -Even if 
an incentive multiplier is set accurately at the start, which is by no means easy, costs for residential/small and large projects do 
not evolve in a linked manner over time.  -If the multiplier is set up to be adjusted regularly, that creates a policy and advocacy 
burden for participants in the small solar segment, which is of significant cost and risk as they are generally not set up to do this.    
For these reasons, please focus on using another incentive type for small solar, such as the adjusting block incentive discussed in 
other options (or SRECs), rather than linking the small solar incentive to competitive solicitation results for large solar.
8
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Question 5
0
2
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8
10
12
14
Tradable SRECs Hybrid, with Long-Term 
PBI for Part of Targets 
w/in SREC Market
PBI No Opinion
5. Type of Incentive (Large Solar Market)
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
Not of Interest
9
Question 5 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) Tradable SRECs and a Hybrid approach are "Not of 
Interest." National Grid favors PBI, as long as it involves tariff-based 
payments, and not long-term contracts. Up-front Payments should 
be an option for this market as well. In addition, an incentive like up-
front payments should be borne by taxpayers and implemented 
through tax policy, and not add costs to electricity customers’ bills.
• (Brennan) Would want more information on the "hybrid" option.
• (Besser) Please examine an incentive for large projects that is 
structured as or includes an up-front payment to the system owner 
that would be based on the estimated generation of the system (PBI) 
over its initial years of operation (e.g. ten years).
• (Krathwohl) market certainty and financeability again are key 
components -- of course along with reaonable price.
10
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Question 6
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6. Means of Setting Price (Large Solar Market)
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
Not of Interest
11
Question 6 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) Any of the options above could be adjusted 
based on the amount of market response received, thus ABI 
does not seem like a separate price option.
• (Brennan) Would want additional information on the 
"adjustable block incentive" option.
• (O’Connor) When modeling the declining block, please 
consider modeling the ability to respond to market conditions 
and the option of including market adders. 
• (Holland) Definition of large versus small projects an 
unresolved issue although SREC-II market sectors provide a 
good guideline.  Competitive solicitation best suited for large 
projects with no onsite load (SREC-II market sector C)
12
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Question 7
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targets) for each 
utility
Higher incentive for 
projects supporting 
distribution system
7. Geographic Distribution
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(weighted)
Don't Consider
13
Question 7 Comments
• (Holland) Re: Higher incentive for projects supporting distribution system: Unresolved discussion topic: How do 
consumers ultimately share in any savings that may be realized if targeted solar projects successfully defer T&D 
investments?  Assuming cost recovery of solar incentive payments remains similar to the existing model, ratepayers 
pay immediately for cost of solar incentive payments, but will only realizing savings from deferred T&D 
investments once the distribution company has a mandatory rate case.  Should ratepayers share in any savings 
from deferred investments?    Re: Separate pools for each utility - if this option is meant to address the disparate 
rate of solar development in different utility service territories, perhaps the issue is better addressed by 
standardizing the utility cost-recovery mechanism statewide and by inter-distribution company payments to 
address recovery under and over collections.
• (Rabinowitz) National Grid does not support a uniform statewide incentive unless it is to include a price cap and 
ensure a uniform selection process.  Projects do not need further incentives, so a new incentive would require a 
different analysis of value – not a new layer.  Essentially, National Grid supports fair compensation for distributed 
generation.
• (Serna) For any higher incentive for projects supporting the distribution system, it is important that those 
incentives can be quantified, tracked and proven to benefit the distribution system. 
• (Brennan) The incentives need to be based on quantifiable benefits with some level of oversight. 
• (Rio) This is the best thing to do. No objection to higher incentives when it can be proven that such installation 
helps the grid - However, this incentives should be for a short time as the benefits are likely to dissipate over time. 
• (Aller) Differences in electric rates should be taken into account when setting incentives - less incentive is needed 
where electric rates and associated production credits are higher, for example.  However, it is also important that 
separate pools be structured in a way that does not create complexity for developers, and that enables solar to be 
developed in a balanced way across the state, rather than being much more feasible in one area than another. 
• (Krathwohl) though i recognize there are differences between utilities and operating realities must be considered, 
the simplicity of a uniform approach across the Commonwealth should be more beneficial and workable ultimately 
14
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Question 8
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8. Differentiation of Incentives by Market Sector
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
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15
Question 8 Comments
• (Rever, Besser, Aller, Podgurski, Stillinger) Top Choice builds on the SREC-II Market Sector framework, and further 
segments the market based on (a) whether the owner benefits from depreciation tax deductions, and (b) the scale 
of the facility (e.g., stratification by size) and ensures low income category. This approach incorporates both social 
objectives and economic differences.
• (Rabinowitz) Because a large, stand-alone project costs less to develop, on a $ per watt basis, it needs less of an 
incentive than a “behind-the-meter” net metering project. Such “behind-the-meter” net metering projects, when 
sized correctly and when actually offsetting load, should be encouraged.
• (Brennan) Policies should reflect support for favored developments (i.e., brownfields, low-income, distribution 
system upgrade offsets)
• (Rio) I think the small solar leads more to TVR than the large solar, therefore the incentives should be different. The 
larger systems also will likely have more of an impact on the geographic issues. However, the costs of these 
programs need to be known. While this may be sold as a boon to low-income people, the laws of economics tell 
me that the other low-income people are paying the cost 
• (Holland) Community Shared Solar/Low Income Solar within SREC-II market sector A may need to be closely 
examined to ensure sustainable solar growth 
• (Serna) Any differentiation shouldn't be arbitrary. It should be structured to lead to a minimization of costs and 
maximization of benefits to customers. 
• (Krathwohl) As recognized in the public comment, further support for low income and community shared solar is 
desirable (within reasonable cost parameters) and the differential support built into SREC-II (which presumably can 
be adjusted as market conditions suggest from time to time) is desirable 
16
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Question 9
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Shift to Value of Solar 
Tariff
9. Sized-to-Load Net Metering
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
Not of Interest
17
Question 9 Comments
• (Holland) Consider a net metering tariff that expires after a certain long-term period after solar installation followed by value 
of solar tariff after long-term period.    Consider immediately shifting to value of solar tariff for very large industrial electric 
users (such as WMECo T-5 rate class) and prohibiting net metering or receipt of net metering credits by such users, limiting 
their facilities to value of solar tariff + additional incentive, but also exempting such customers from paying for any cost-
recovery surcharge for net metering lost revenue recovery applicable to the other customer classes (except for 
grandfathered net metering cost recovery) 
• (Rabinowitz) All of these options are "Not of Interest."  We need a new framework, similar to energy efficiency incentives, 
that acknowledges that solar is an important policy goal and identifies the subsidy to the cost of solar that is needed to 
encourage the installation of solar.  We hope for an evolution from net metering to a “value-of-services” two-way rate 
structure, as described in our earlier written comments to the consultants. 
• (Rever) We have concerns over implementation details with regards to a Value of Solar Tariff. 
• (Besser) Shift to VOS could be considered for the long term as more experience and information becomes available. 
• (Serna) Choice of reduction of net metering credits as the first choice, assumes that the net metering credits will be set at the 
wholesale price of energy.    Any value of solar tariff will need to be set in a regulatory proceeding and focus on quantifiable
electric system benefits. 
• (Brennan) This assumes that there is an alternate, transparent support framework in place as necessary. 
• (Aller) Please consider any "value of solar" approach as calculation of the appropriate bill credit, rather than a tariff.  While a
value of solar credit approach has strengths, operationally it must be set up to limit the risk of policy-making market 
inefficiencies, such as utilities' ability to be reimbursed by ratepayers for their legal advocacy costs, and the associated 
imbalance in ability to fund balanced advocacy by other parties.  There is also the  necessity of clear data about the 
functioning and cost of the distribution grid to inform accurate analysis of the costs and benefits to the grid. 
• (Krathwohl) Certainly pricing on the basis of economic benefits is sound, but i am concerned about what it would take to 
determine the value of solar.  Net metering and virtual net metering especially from the public comments seem critical to 
continuing the solar market much less achieving the established goals and establishing a supportive framework thereafter. 
• (Stillinger) Careful study needed for the second choice (VOST); not likely to be done in the task force's term. The 
implementation details are crucial here. 
• (O’Connor) The reduction of net metering credit values can be size based and/or location based. 
18
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10. Virtual Net Metering Credit Structure
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
Not of Interest
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Question 10 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) All of these options are "Not of Interest." Virtual net metering projects should not be provided with 
net metering credits that are almost equal to retail rates because they increase customer costs and do not ensure 
that solar generation is co-located with an appropriate amount of load. Such projects should be provided only 
credits equal to the cost of supply. With the shift to a “value-of-services” model (see response to # 9, above), large 
virtual net metering units will appear as what they are, which is stand-alone generators, and would need to 
compete in general solicitations with like-sized units to garner any subsidy support, if available under a new 
program.
• (Brennan) This assumes that there is an alternate, transparent support framework in place as necessary. There may 
need to be additional consideration for unique, low-income customers who utilize virtual net metering.
• (O’Connor) For the reduction of credit values, the Department would be interested in modeling the current 
framework for low income customers and community shared solar and decrease credit values for all other 
customers. 
• (Serna) Choice of reduction of net metering credits as the first choice, assumes that the net metering credits will be 
set at the wholesale price of energy. Any value of solar tariff will need to be set in a regulatory proceeding and 
focus on quantifiable electric system benefits. For virtual net metering, Eversource also strongly recommends 
ensuring any credit assignment be handled by another party and not the distribution company.
• (Rever) We have concerns over implementation details with regards to a Value of Solar Tariff.
• (Rio) VNM is where all the costs are as I understand it. Therefore, this is an area that needs to be tackled. A lot of 
these issues can be dealt with by doing a fair and honest accounting of what it actually costs to install these 
systems and who is making the money. it is extremely difficult to answer these questions without knowing the 
exact economics of these systems.However, based on what I know the these systems are being overused and 
overcompensated
• (Aller) Same points as question 9 about value of solar - while in an economic-theory view, a value of solar credit 
has many strengths, the ability to implement such an approach faces many real world challenges.  As such, the 
current approach is a better and more cost effective way to move forward.  For one, it avoids loading rate payers 
with the advocacy costs related to value of solar. 
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11. Virtual Net Metering Project Type Limitations
Strongly Consider or Consider 
(weighted)
Don't Consider
Observation: “Don’t 
Consider” options for 
narrowed eligibility were 
split between those not 
wanting to maintain any 
virtual net metering, and 
those wanting to 
maintain the current 
approach and not 
narrow eligibility.
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Question 11 Comments
• (Holland) Maintain VNM in current framework for residential properties where host customer account and customer account 
receiving credits share a common meter bank (or something along those lines) to ensure that condos, triple-deckers and other 
types of similar properties are not disadvantaged only because their property contains multiple electric meters/accounts.    
Consider maintaining VNM for excess credits associated with residential or small commercial on-site projects sized larger than load 
to maximize solar energy production on a particular rooftop, provided that most load (perhaps at least 67% over a year) is used 
on-site.    Consider maintaining eligibility for common ownership/community shared solar projects, but modifications to credit 
structure may be appropriate.  In order to send correct price signals and encourage the benefits associated with development on-
site, a customer considering building a project off-site should receive a lower credit value to reflect some of the cost of delivering 
his energy across the network.    Concerns for low-income customers may be legitimate, but may be better addressed and less 
discriminatory by broader reforms to rate structure that benefit all low-income or moderate income ratepayers.
• (Rabinowitz) Notwithstanding our selection above, NGrid supports providing low income customer with greater access to solar 
opportunities developed consistent with the framework that we envision. In addition, a “campus” approach to virtual net metering
may be appropriate.
• (Serna) For virtual net metering, Eversource also strongly recommends ensuring any credit assignment be handled by another party 
and not the EDC. 
• (Stillinger) VNM is especially important for low/moderate income, community shared solar, and small "common owner" situations 
(e.g. farms, churches, campuses, etc.). Consultants should analyze the impact of narrowing eligibility on solar development, benefits 
and costs to customers, and broad economic development, energy and environmental benefits to Commonwealth as a whole.
• (Besser) Consultants should analyze impact of narrowing eligibility on solar development, benefits and costs to customers, and 
broad economic development, energy and environmental benefits to Commonwealth as a whole.
• (Rever) Any review of narrowed eligibility should be justified and the impacts on the market sector of that narrowing be reviewed.
• (Rio) The problem with allowing VNM for some installation and not others is that we end up with one group of people (even within 
the same class) subsidizing others for absolutely no benefit to the system. At some point the best sites for VNM are going to be
taken and the system will be left with a group of have- and have-nots. low income people who come off the system are not 
helping the low-income population as others are picking up the tab for all T&D and social programs. the basic model is 
unsustainable. therefore, solar installations should not be granted to anyone as a right - it should be done methodically as a 
benefit tot the system - and that means as a means of diversity as well as a means for reliability. VNM should be subject to a higher 
standard - it is expensive and if we can get a better bang for the buck somewhere else it should not be first come first serve or a 
matter of right. That is why I support brownfields - these are areas where the money spent on solar can be put to good use - that si
a double benefit and those areas should be encouraged. .
• (Krathwohl) public comments strongly support the need for virtual net metering - especially for community shared solar and for 
low income customers. Any policy path followed must consider cost impacts on customers but also the benefits -- short and long 
term -- from support of solar installations.
• (Colton) Virtual Net Metering is beneficial to municipalities and low income communities. It should be expanded to capture rental 
housing, private non-profit institutions such as hospitals and universities. 22
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12. Virtual Net Metering Size Limitations
Strongly Consider or 
Consider (weighted)
Don't Consider
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Question 12 Comments
• (Podgurski) Consider capping at 2 MW or differentiated caps, but only for studying
• (Brennan) This would depend on the level of payment, and whether virtual net metering is restricted to certain 
types of projects.
• (O’Connor) Possible size limitations for virtual net metering was not previously discussed in the Consultant 
presentations. Absent a discussion of the various options presented here and their possible impact on modeling, 
the Department is not able to indicate any preference
• (Besser) Consultants should analyze impact of 2 MW size cap and differentiated caps on solar development, 
benefits and costs to customers, and broad economic development, energy and environmental benefits to 
Commonwealth as a whole.
• (Serna) Project size limitations should consider ISO-NE wholesale market rules and aggregate thresholds for 
settlement only generating units.
• (Rio) I see no reason to limit projects to some arbitrary size PROVIDED they meet criteria of benefitting the system 
and the cost has been rationalized. I don't really understand the reason for the caps in the first place, other than 
perhaps to limit costs. Get the costs and process under control and we can eliminate caps.
• differentiated caps ala SREC 2 might be a good approach
• (Harak) Different (more generous than for other sectors) caps for community shared solar, projects serving 
low/mod income, muni sector. 
• (Krathwohl) differentiated caps ala SREC 2 might be a good approach 
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13. Net Metering Caps
1st or 2nd (weighted 0.5)
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25
Question 13 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) Except for "Keep Existing" net metering caps, the other choices are "Not of Interest." Notwithstanding 
our response above, any further increases to the net metering caps should be accompanied by changes to credit 
values for virtual net metering projects. Please see the responses to # 10, #11, and #12, above
• (Brennan) With adequate rate design (via DPU rate case) and adjustment for the net metering payment in place, 
the cap could be removed entirely.
• (Fisher) en. Downing asks that I answer no opinion to all with the exception that he would like to make sure that 
aligning the cap to meet the 1600MW goal remains in the discussion.
• (Besser) If not removing caps entirely, should look at increasing to accommodate more than 1600 MW to ensure 
smooth transition (i.e., don't create a cliff or "gold rush").
• (Serna) Eversource will continue to recommend to keep the existing caps as long as the net and virtual metering 
model leads to rate inequity and above market costs.
• (Rio) Same answer as above - the caps are arbitrary - we keep fighting over them because of cost issues. Clearly 
they are too rich. If the cost and net metering is done right, the market can decide the right trajectory - currently 
the system is being manipulated and therefore we need to maintain caps
• (Krathwohl) removing caps is certainly an idea that found significant support in the public hearings. If the 
consultant ran some models on this path and the economic burden was not excessive, this might be a way to go.
• (Holland) If caps needed, consider a cap based on non-participating customer rate impact instead of existing even-
more arbitrary cap structure. 
• (Aller) Keeping existing caps would reduce the amount of federal money coming to MA, by reducing the speed of 
solar development before the end of 2016. 
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14. Timing of Transition
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Not of Interest
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Question 14 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) Except for "As early as possible (01/01/2016)," the other choices are "Not 
of Interest." Immediate action is necessary in order to contain the costs of the SREC 
and net metering programs for electricity customers.
• (Brennan) Transition should consider existing commitments/projects - but this 
requires additional discussion and flexibly on how that is achieved.
• (O’Connor) The Department would prefer not to tie the transition to any potential 
incentive changes at the federal level. 
• (Krathwohl) a more sustainable, supportive yet balanced structure should be 
implemented as soon as possible in order to take advantage of the Federal ITC
• (Aller) A transition before 2017 would have massive costs to the state in both jobs and 
dollars - solar businesses would cut back due to uncertainty, and business looking to 
use solar to gain predictability into their energy costs, as we heard at the task force 
meeting 2/25, would lose that ability.  Furthermore, this would reduce the federal 
money coming to MA by delaying solar development before the federal ITC expires 
for residential and steps down 66% for commercial. 
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Question 15 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) Except for "Budget constrained" and "MW Target with Firm Timeline," the 
other choices are "Not of Interest." The policy framework should require the solar 
development community to work within a defined budget and increase the cost 
efficiencies. Experience has shown that the incentives are much higher than necessary 
to encourage solar development, and especially large solar projects.
• (Brennan) Targets and timelines need to be focused on getting to a point where you 
are supporting the market to self-stabilization.
• (Rio) If the program is aligned right, I believe we can get more and better sytsems
installed.
• (Holland) Applicable to incentive payment, not net metering. 
• (Aller) An adjustable block incentive where each block is a known dollar amount, and 
what varies based on market signals is the per-unit incentive should be considered. 
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Question 16 Comments
• (Rabinowitz) National Grid would support a minimum bill for distributed generation customers only if it were designed correctly. 
National Grid seeks an opportunity to explore and elaborate on what the correct design would involve.
• (Stillinger) It comes as no surprise to anyone that this is a politically explosive issue. Any min. bill must be capped for residential 
and other small-scale users. This is one way to ensure that all customers pay fairly and equitably for their use of the "grid".
• (Brennan) This is an important issue, but the question as framed is difficult to answer. The parameters of the min. bill "credit" need 
to fleshed out in a DPU process. The concept of a minimum bill applying across the board could be considered, but then different 
classes/customers who use the grid differently should have minimum bills that reflect the costs associated with their classes. Any 
minimum bill discussion must include an evaluation of impacts on low income & low usage customers before implementation.
• (O’Connor) The Department understands that consideration of a minimum bill is part of the mandate of this task force. However, 
the Department views a minimum bill and the policy paths as separate issues and therefore recommends that any policy option 
modeled consider two scenarios: one in which a minimum bill is applied, and one in which it is not
• (Besser) If DPU finds that a minimum bill is necessary, it should be nondiscriminatory across all customers (adjusted by rate class or 
size with provisions to protect low income customers taken as second step if needed).
• (Serna) Eversource supports a greater amount of cost recovery through fixed charges as it more properly assigns costs to 
customers thereby reducing both intra- and inter-class subsidization of costs. The transmission and distribution system is largely a 
fixed cost in which volumetric usage does not have a direct bearing on the costs incurred by any particular customer. Greater fixed 
cost recovery should be considered as part of an overall rate design approach to replace net metering. Rate design should be 
addressed in a fully adjudicated rate proceeding before the DPU. Such investigation should explore the proper rate design needed
to ensure that the Department’s rate-making goals continue to be met in light of the rapid growth of distributed generation.
• (Rever) also not of interest: for certain customers only
• (Rio) If the program is aligned right, with customers only receiving power rebates, minimum bill goes away since the customer is 
still contributing T&D and social programs. if the system stays as is then minimum bills based on a true analysis of the cost must be 
implemented for DG customers. the key is to do a true analysis to see what it is.
• (Krathwohl) This seems to be quick a tricky issue. Certainly the general ratemaking goal of rates reflecting costs imposed on the 
system is good and if applied correctly that is what a minimum bill would do. One concern is, as noted above, the process of 
setting the minimum bill getting in the way of the solar market development, which is a condition to be avoided. Another concern
made clear through the public comments concerns seasonal customers and small farms and other businesses for whom a 
minimum bill could distort their economics. Those concerns need to be considered though it might require a more refined costing 
analysis than has often occurred in utility ratemaking over the years.
• (Colton) If one applies the min. bill concept to the extreme, i.e., ratepayers who reduce use to zero would pay a min. bill...in my view 
this makes the min. bill a tax, rather than a fee or user charge. Taxes should not be levied by anyone other than the Legislature. 
ANY min. bill is regressive & would adversely affect low income users & municipalities. It is not a door that I would willingly open.
• (Holland) For solar customers or those receiving virtual net metering credits.  Grandfather existing net metering customers. For 
residential customers, consider limiting to existing customer charge and furthermore delaying any minimum bill until an agreed-
upon non-participant net metering rate impact. 32
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(1)
Policy Paths Chosen for Modeling
Name A: EDC-centric: Competitive Solicitations B-1: ‘Open’ Notes
3. Solar Small: Type PBI EPBI [1]
4. Solar Small: Setting DBI w/ Safety Valve DBI w/ Safety Valve [2]
5. Solar Large: Type PBI PBI
6. Solar Large: Setting Competitive Solicitation DBI w/ Safety Valve
7. Geog. Distribution
solar (not NM) incentives vary by EDC but MW are a statewide block with ex-post $ reconciliation btw 
EDCs to equalize cost impact
[3][4] 
8. Differentiation by Market 
Sector
Based on SREC-II [5]
9. Sized-to-Load Net
Metering rate applicable to 
billing period roll-forward
G Rate Current components of retail rate
10. VNM Credit Structure 
(applicable to net excess 
after roll-forward)
W/S rate Current framework &rates
11. VNM Proj. Type 
Limitations
n/a
12. VNM size limitations Keep current
13. NM Caps (i) No Caps; (ii) Current Caps
(i) No Caps; (ii) Align to match reaching 1,600 MW 
target, not on a % of peak load basis
14. Timing of Solar Policy 
Transition
1/1/17 Once 1600 MW reached [6]
15. Targets and Timeline
Set targets ramping up to 2500 by 2025 (proxy 
for possible ‘budget-limited’ approach)
2500 MW with no hard timeline; calibrate modeled 
incentives to match 2500 by 2025 as best possible
16. Min Bill  n/a [7]
Disposition of RECs  For all: assume RECs minted as Class I and resold into market (consistent with RI, CT approach)
(2)
Notes for Prior Slide
1. EPBI is an upfront incentive (rebate) that is based on expected production over a time period (with claw-back if underperforms), 
similar to used in NY and as requested by several TF members.
2. Modeling of DBI and ABI are similar if assumed costs drop over time.  ABI model in practice is more complex to model. Define as 
“DBI with safety valve” that has option for administrative change, and start after 1/1/17 post-ITC (also after energy prices 
expected to start to abate), allowing a modeling as declining incentive; allows simplification of analysis.
3. “Higher incentive for supporting projects supporting Distribution system” had near unanimous support; but also EDCs point out
that there is not currently system-wide information on which to base modeling.  Apparent consensus among TF, where all 
understand this could improve cost/benefit, and is therefore a potential TF recommendation; we propose not to model.
4. Choice among separate pools by utility or uniform statewide incentive need to be meaningfully linked to Net Metering modeling 
choice.  One argument for separate pools would be driven substantially by rate differences, which would disappear if NM 
discontinued.
5. May be very difficult to model many of variation that have been requested or suggested  need choice to be simple enough 
to model; does not preclude TF deciding to recommend more nuanced changes.
6. Modeled transitions must be chosen to simplify modeling while revealing maximum learning; ASAP is, realistically, within months of 
1/1/17.  Modeling choice does not preclude recommendation for earlier transition.  
7. All seem to agree that min. bill design and applicability is best left for DPU, and effort to design and analyze is extensive.  
Furthermore, impact depends heavily on the details.  If designed so that incentive is increased to offset min. bill, then impact is 
distributional, and in aggregate is none.  If incentive is not increased, then all agree that economics would be negatively 
impacted, reducing adoption, all else equal.  Can we separate this issue from all models in Task 3, and illustrate on a more 
limited basis under Task 5?  
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Appendix D: Utility Data Request and Responses 
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Appendix E: Other Documents 
DRAFT 
 
525 
 
Additional documents related to the efforts of the Task Force can be found on the following webpage: 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-utilities-clean-tech/nms-taskforce/previous-meetings.html  
These documents include the following: 
 Public Comments 
 Task Force Ground Rules 
 Task Force Framing Document 
 Consultant Scope of Work 
 Meeting Agendas 
 Meeting Minutes 
 Consultant PowerPoint Presentations 
 
 
